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Glossary of Terms and Acronyms 
 
 
TERM DEFINITION 
APCOMM The Association of Police Communicators 
ACPO Association of Chief Police Officers 
AUDIOBOOM Website and app which allows users to share record, share and 
listen to sound files online.  
COP College of Policing 
FACEBOOK An online social networking site launched in 2004 which 
encourages users to generate and share updates, photos, ideas and 
interests with each other.  
FLICKR Image and video hosting website.  
FOI Common abbreviation for an information request made under the 
Freedom of Information Act (2000)  
HASHTAG (#) A function on Twitter which allows people to group ideas, 
conversation topics or objects together so that they can be easily 
tracked and joined in with. Hashtags can also be used to brand a 
tweet; e.g. #bobbyonthetweet 
HMIC Heƌ MajestǇ͛s IŶspeĐtoƌate of CoŶstaďulaƌǇ 
INSTAGRAM An online mobile photo and video sharing social media service 
which allows users to cross post digital content across a number of 
social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr and Flickr.  
LINKEDIN An online professional networking site designed to facilitate contact 
between professionals across the world.  
MPS. Common abbreviation for the Metropolitan Police Service 
NPIA National Policing Improvement Agency 
NYPD New York Police Department 
ONS Office for National Statistics 
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PINTEREST Photo sharing website 
PR Common abbreviation or acronym for public relations.  
SOCIAL MEDIA An online, computer mediated tool which allows users to generate 
and share content, ideas, conversations, pictures and interests 
instantaneously through the internet.  
Kaplan and Haelein (2010, p61) define social media as "a group of 
Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and 
technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation 
and exchange of user-generated content. 
TUMBLR Microblogging social network website where users can post short 
multimedia blogs for other users to follow, read and comment 
upon.  
TWITTER An online micro blogging social networking site which allows users 
to broadcast information and respond to other users in 140 
character posts called tweets. 
Created by Jack Dorsey, Evan Williams, Biz Stone and Noah Glass in 
2006, Twitter has over 645 million registered users across the world 
(Twitter, 2015).  
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Abstract 
 
This research examines the concept of public relations in the English police; what it is, how it 
has changed and the problems police forces now face with regard to communications. The last 
two decades has seen a transformation within police public relations as it has become 
increasingly standardised, corporatized, professionalised and more open, playing a key part in 
the police transparency agenda. Police officers have been replaced by civilian experts as the 
departments have grown in size which has led to changes in the structure, strategy and 
ideology as these departments have adapted to the new challenges posed by social media, 
severely restricted budgets, apparent loss of public confidence and public cynicism. Since 2009 
EŶglaŶd͛s poliĐe foƌĐes haǀe ďeĐoŵe iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ aĐtiǀe oŶliŶe. Theƌe is ǀeƌǇ little ƌeseaƌĐh, 
however, into how and why social media is being used by the police, how it fits into the 
broader communication strategies, and how this is changing traditional police public relations. 
 
During this study a national comparison of police forces was undertaken to investigate these 
issues. What emerged was a picture of dynamic tension between change and continuity within 
police communications around identity, ideology, form and function. Once an understaffed, 
ancillary function, affiliated to ďut Ŷot paƌt of ͚ƌeal poliĐe ǁoƌk͛, most police public relations 
depaƌtŵeŶts aƌe Ŷoǁ ĐoŶsideƌed aŶ ͞opeƌatioŶallǇ esseŶtial͟ paƌt of ŵodeƌŶ poliĐiŶg iŶ theiƌ 
force. Social media has enabled police forces to communicate directly to and with large 
segments of the populous for the first time. This research has also identified strong evidence 
of the emergence of a new model, that of ͚diƌeĐt aŶd digital͛ within police communications. 
This new approach appears to be moving police communications from primarily a reactive 
service to a proactive dialogical one that is increasingly looking to engage with audiences 
directly online rather than through conventional methods.  
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Introduction 
 
͞CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs iŶ policing informs, deters, engages, affects change and supports delivery 
of… strategiĐ oďjeĐtiǀes aŶd operatioŶal priorities… [it] is aďout haǀiŶg the right ĐoŶǀersatioŶ 
at the right tiŵe ǁith the right people͟. 
(Bedfordshire Police Communications Strategy, 2015 p.2) 
 
It has loŶg ďeeŶ thought that theƌe is a ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ͚effeĐtiǀe poliĐiŶg͛ aŶd puďliĐ 
relations. According to Terris (1967 p.ϲϭͿ, ͞the poliĐe siŵplǇ ĐaŶŶot opeƌate effeĐtiǀelǇ as loŶg 
as they are viewed with scepticism or hostility by much of the populatioŶ… suĐh attitudes 
mean that crimes are often not reported, that witnesses often refuse to identify themselves or 
to testify in court, and that suspects resist arrest with the tacit or even physical support of 
ďǇstaŶdeƌs͟.  This ďelief has ďeen a recurrent theme and a popular concern in academic 
discourse since the 1950s (McManus, 1955; Hough, Jackson and Bradford, 2011; Sindall, 
“tuƌgis aŶd JeŶŶiŶgs, ϮϬϭϮ; WeŶtz aŶd “ĐhliŵgeŶ, ϮϬϭϮ; O͛Neill, ϮϬϭϯďͿ aŶd foƌ those iŶǀolǀed 
in policing (HMIC, 2001; 2014).   
 
The origin of this concern arguably lies in the notion of there being a historic relationship 
between the public and their police. This relationship confers upon the police a quasi-moral 
authority and legitimacy by intertwining the police and general public into one inseparable 
entity (Beetham, 1991) and has, somewhat ironically, succeeded in embedding a sometimes 
fiercely contested institution in a philosophical model of consent (Reith, 1956; Keane and Bell, 
2013).  
 
At its heart, this concept is founded on the premise of popularity and image (Ignatieff, 2006; 
Philips and Storch, 2007). How the police are perceived and understood by their public is 
considered the bedrock of both their continued legitimacy and effectiveness (HMIC, 2011a). 
Loader (1997, p.14) observes that there is an almost unique relationship between the police 
aŶd puďliĐ iŶ EŶglaŶd ǁhiĐh has plaĐed the ͞loǁlǇ ǀillage ďoďďǇ͟ at the ĐeŶtƌe of ͞ŶatioŶal 
iĐoŶogƌaphǇ͟. It is a suďjeĐt ǁhiĐh eǀokes polaƌisiŶg opiŶioŶs fƌoŵ laƌge seĐtions of society 
and often dominates political debates and yet the difficulty is that only a select minority of the 
population ever come into direct contact with the police (Leishman and Mason, 2003). As a 
consequence, what people know about the police principally comes from two sources: what is 
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said aďout the poliĐe ;͚CultiǀatioŶ TheoƌǇ͛, Diƌikǆ aŶd VaŶ DeŶ BulĐk, ϮϬϭϰͿ aŶd ǁhat the 
police say about themselves (Greenwood, Chaiken and Petersilla, 2005; Huey and Broll, 2012).  
 
How the police communicate with the public then plays an integral part in both the production 
and reaffirmation of the police image and is therefore of central concern to police forces; 
particularly in an era of social media and synopticon-like scrutiny of public organisations 
(Zavattro and Sementelli, 2014). With sites like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube enabling news 
to tƌaǀel ǀast distaŶĐes iŶstaŶtaŶeouslǇ, the pƌoduĐtioŶ of ͚Ŷeǁs͛ is Ŷo loŶgeƌ the sole pƌoǀiŶĐe 
of journalists but of anyone with internet access (Greer and McLaughlin 2010).  Harnessing, or 
at least managing, this hyper-mediated environment has become essential for the success of 
any public organisation (Lovell, 2002; Brainard and Edlins, 2015), but particularly so for police 
forces who are now not only expected to have an active presence on these sites but  
increasingly to provide core services online as well (NPIA, 2010). 
 
Police public relations departments have changed significantly over the last century as have 
their names and functions within policing. The first official police press office was established 
in 1919 in order to manage enquiries from the press. Since then this department has become 
increasingly centralised, standardised and corporatised as it has evolved into what is now 
commonly called Corporate Communications. It was during the 1990s that a trend towards 
professionalisation in police forces was first observed (Morgan and Newburn, 1997; Mawby, 
2002). Professionalisation can be understood as the development of specialist roles within 
general policing and the placing of professional experts into these roles that had previously 
been performed by non-professionally trained police officers. From the late 1980s onwards 
police forces both in England and America started adopting not only the specialised managerial 
language of the private sector (Wright, 2002), but also gradually replacing police officers in 
backroom functions (such as communications) with civilian experts (Surette, 2001; Mawby, 
2002; Reiner, 2010).   
 
Professionalisation, however, is only part of the story. Along with the civilianisation of these 
departments, the late 1990s also saw the beginnings of a cultural change towards 
communicating with external audiences and in how the department was viewed and used 
within the wider policing context. Instead of avoiding the media as in the past (Benson, 1981; 
Kingshott, 2011), police forces are now using the press as one channel of many in order to 
communicate regularly with their audiences (Brainard and Edlins, 2015).   
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The concept of police public relations no longer consists of grudgingly given press conferences 
aŶd a ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ͛s ƌelatioŶship ǁith the loĐal ͚ďoďďǇ oŶ the ďeat͛ ;JoŶes, ϭϵϵϲͿ. OŶĐe a 
forgotten, understaffed and underfinanced facility, affiliated to but not part of the police, this 
department has now seemingly become a central aspect of the police-public relationship and 
an essential part of modern policing (Wright, 2002).   
 
The advent of social media has been a fundamental driving force in this transition, as police 
forces have had to adapt quickly to new challenges and a very different communications 
landscape from that which characterised police communications for most of the 20th Century. 
IŶ aŶ eƌa of ͞iŶfoƌŵatioŶ politiĐs͟ aŶd Ϯϰ houƌ ŵedia, ͞the optioŶ of sileŶĐe has ;soĐiologiĐallǇ 
speakiŶgͿ ďeeŶ Đlosed off͟ ;Loadeƌ aŶd MulĐahǇ ϮϬϬϭa p.ϮϱϰͿ. The poliĐe ĐaŶ Ŷo loŶgeƌ affoƌd 
to hide iŶ the shadoǁs oƌ ƌetƌeat ďehiŶd a pƌoteĐtiǀe, oďfusĐatiŶg ǁall of ͚Ŷo ĐoŵŵeŶt͛ ;Gƌeeƌ 
and McLaughlin, 2010).   Nor can police forces hope to maintain control of how the media and 
the general public frame events or knowledge in the unprecedented environment created by 
soĐial ŵedia ;WaƌƌeŶ, “ulaiŵaŶ aŶd Nooƌ, ϮϬϭϰͿ. The poliĐe ŵaǇ haǀe a ͞Đoƌpoƌate ideŶtitǇ͟ 
aŶd a ͞Đoƌpoƌate iŵage͟ to go ǁith it, as MaǁďǇ ;ϮϬϬ2, p. 1) suggests, but these images and 
how the police are maintaining them is changing, as are the threats and opportunities now 
facing police forces. 
 
For the first time police forces are able to communicate directly to and with members of the 
public on a mass scale – engaging the public in discussions about policing and mobilising 
information networks to help solve crimes and action police agendas (see section 1.3). The first 
official police Twitter account in England was launched in December 2008 by West Midlands 
PoliĐe. “iŶĐe theŶ EŶglaŶd͛s poliĐe foƌĐes haǀe ďeĐoŵe iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ aĐtiǀe oŶliŶe.  EǀeƌǇ poliĐe 
force now has at least one registered Twitter account and Facebook page; with many forces 
maintaining a routine presence on other sites as well (3.1.6). As Crump (2011) points out, 
social media and the rapidly advancing technologies available present police forces with 
unprecedented opportunities for communication, engagement and publicity. Such a change is 
not without problems however, especially in the current economic climate which is requiring 
police forces to make substantial savings and continually demonstrate the effectiveness of 
departmental activities on a national platform.   
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This question of effectiveness, what it looks like and how to measure it, has become a central 
concern to police forces and the search for it is a dominant theme running through the 
literature. So far, however, there has been little research into the area of police public 
relations in the age of social media. What studies there are that look at this subject either 
predate the introduction of social media (Mawby, 2002), focus on public confidence (Bradford, 
2012), are based in a foreign country (Surette, 2001; Lee and McGovern, 2014), or only look at 
police social media output, separating it from the other activities and roles of police 
communications (Crump, 2011; Conner, 2015).  
 
Research looking at how, why and what police forces are communicating is not only topical at 
the moment with the increasing activity police forces have on social media but also because 
there has been an apparent reversal in the trend towards corporatisation identified by Morgan 
and Newburn (1997). Over the last decade police forces have increasingly distanced 
themselves from public relations terminology, the most visible example of which is the 
removal of the term from their department name (Mawby, 2007; section 1.2).  Such a move 
poses the question of whether public relations can still be considered relevant in policing. 
Given the central importance communication has now gained, understanding how and why 
police forces are communicating is essential especially in light of the limitations and gaps in 
our knowledge of this area.   
 
This thesis set out with three interconnected aims to explore the phenomenon of public 
relations in the English police:  
1)  To provide a picture of the current state of public relations in the English police; 
2)  To explore how police public relations has changed and continues to change in the 
age of social media; and 
3)  To investigate whether the concept of public relations is still relevant for the police 
today.  
Over the course of this study representatives from 27 English police communications teams 
were interviewed. This thesis is divided into four parts; literature review, methodology, results 
and discussion. The following chapter (Chapter 1) explains the history of public relations in the 
police, the literature which informed the direction the project has taken and the context in 
which this research has taken place. This is then followed in the second chapter by a break 
down and analysis of the methods used, the rationale behind the decisions made and the 
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methodological difficulties faced during the research itself. Chapter 3 details the results of the 
research; the findings and key themes from which are then discussed in Chapter 4 before the 
conclusions are summarised in Chapter 5.   
 
The central theme that emerged from this research was one of change and continuity. The 
field work carried out in this project confirms that there have been significant changes within 
police public relations over the last two decades with regard to strategy, structure, operational 
position and staffing. It is a function continually in a state of transition and challenging 
circumstances that has had to adapt quickly in a rapidly evolving area and environment that is 
often hostile, unpredictable and is driven by ever increasing expectations.  
 
MaǁďǇ ;ϮϬϬϮ, p.ϳͿ pƌoposed fouƌ peƌiods of puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs iŶ the EŶglish poliĐe: ͞IŶfoƌŵal 
Image Woƌk͟, ͞EŵeƌgeŶt PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs͟, ͞EŵďeddiŶg PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs͟ aŶd ͞The 
PƌofessioŶalizatioŶ of PoliĐe Iŵage Woƌk͟. IŶ additioŶ to these fouƌ eƌas, hoǁeǀeƌ, the data 
suggests that there is now compelling evidence of a fifth periodisation – that of ͚DiƌeĐt and 
Digital͛. “oĐial ŵedia aŶd the iŶteƌŶet has ƌadiĐallǇ ƌedefiŶed the ǁhat, ǁheƌe, ǁheŶ aŶd hoǁ 
of communication, the traditional communication channels and the relationship between 
individuals and public institutions.  
 
In conjunction with these changes there appears to be a corresponding ideological shift that is 
eŵeƌgiŶg iŶ poliĐe puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs. This ͚Ŷeǁ͛ ideologǇ is seeiŶg a gƌoǁiŶg Ŷuŵďeƌ of foƌĐes 
moving away from reactive, defensive communication to a proactive, inclusive model that 
actively seeks to build networks and relationships with outside communities. And yet, for all 
the evidence of change there is also strong evidence of continuity – that the more things 
ĐhaŶge, the ŵoƌe theǇ staǇ the saŵe. These depaƌtŵeŶts ŵaǇ haǀe eleĐted to dƌop ͚public 
ƌelatioŶs͛ fƌoŵ theiƌ Ŷaŵes ďut as this studǇ fouŶd the ĐoŶĐept of puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs ƌeŵaiŶs aŶ 
essential part of modern police communications. How police forces communicate maybe 
changing to take advantage of new technologies but many of the core messages and problems 
faĐed ďǇ these depaƌtŵeŶts, suĐh as ĐoŶtƌol of the ͚poliĐe ǀoiĐe͛ ƌeŵaiŶ ƌelatiǀelǇ uŶĐhaŶged 
from their first appearance nearly a century ago.  
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Chapter 1:           Literature Review 
 
Part One: What is Public Relations? 
 
1.1 What is Public Relations: The Great Definition Debate 
 
Silverman (2013) suggests that the starting point for any research topic is to define the 
research problem. Without such a definition it is a challenge to isolate the research 
parameters or to know what it is you are looking at or indeed for. The starting point for this 
research was in finding a suitable definition for public relations. On the face of it this might 
appear a fairly simple matter as it is a well-known term with a prevalent, almost ubiquitous 
presence in modern society and an intuitive understanding associated with it (Corneliessen, 
2011). One only has to dig a little deeper, as this chapter will discuss, to discover that there is 
nothing simple or straightforward about trying to explain this particular concept (Bolger, 
1983), particularly when it relates to the police.  
 
DefiŶitioŶs seƌǀe at least tǁo puƌposes: ͞To help us uŶdeƌstaŶd the ǁoƌld aƌouŶd us aŶd to 
aƌgue foƌ a paƌtiĐulaƌ ǁoƌld ǀieǁ of hoǁ oŶe ĐoŶĐept ƌelates to otheƌ ĐoŶĐepts͟ ;Bƌooŵ and 
Sha, 2013, p.29). Consequently, the way in which a phenomenon like public relations is defined 
does not just tell us what public relations is, or does, but how it relates to the industry it is 
attached to and to the wider social environment in which it operates. Crucially it also reveals 
hoǁ the defiŶeƌ peƌĐeiǀes ͚puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs͛.  
 
The definition of public relations used in this study is that given by Grunig and Hunt (1984, p4) 
ŶaŵelǇ ͞puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs is the ŵaŶageŵeŶt of ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs ďetǁeeŶ aŶ organisation and 
its puďliĐs͟.  
 
This is not, however, the only accepted definition of public relations. The difficulty begins with 
the faĐt that theƌe is Ŷot ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ a defiŶitiǀe defiŶitioŶ of ǁhat ͚puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs͛ aĐtuallǇ is. 
Harlow (1976) reported that during the 1970s there were 472 different, and frequently 
contrary, definitions of public relations - a number that only seems to have grown over the 
intervening decades as the practice of public relations has evolved and expanded (Morris and 
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Goldsworthy, 2012). The root of this problem is that public relations is not a new practice 
although the Ŷaŵe ͚puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs͛ is a ƌelatiǀelǇ Ŷeǁ teƌŵ; appeaƌiŶg iŶ populaƌ usage 
around the beginning of the twentieth century (Tench and Yeomans 2006). Indeed, Smith 
;ϮϬϬϰͿ aƌgues that ͞ǁhat ǁe Ŷoǁ Đall puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs is aŶ esseŶtial aŶd Ŷatuƌal aspeĐt of 
huŵaŶ soĐietǇ… ǁheŶeǀeƌ ǁe look at soĐial iŶteƌaĐtioŶs ǁe fiŶd eleŵeŶts of todaǇ͛s puďliĐ 
ƌelatioŶs: iŶfoƌŵatioŶ, peƌsuasioŶ, ƌeĐoŶĐiliatioŶ, ĐoopeƌatioŶ͟. As such it has become difficult 
to distinguish and separate from our social history (Bernays, 1928). Indeed, according to Bates 
;ϮϬϬϲ p.ϱ, ͞ŵuĐh of histoƌǇ ĐaŶ ďe iŶteƌpƌeted as the pƌaĐtiĐe of puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs͟. The 
methods might have changed as technology has evolved but informing, persuading and 
integrating, the three core elements that underpin all social interaction, have remained the 
same. 
 
Connected to this is a second, and arguably greater, issue that of how public relations is 
perceived and the often notorious reputation it has gained. According to Fisher (2012), public 
ƌelatioŶs ͞has a P‘ pƌoďleŵ͟. Milleƌ aŶd DiŶaŶ ;ϮϬϬϴ, p.ϮͿ aƌgue that iŶ the aďseŶĐe of aŶ 
agƌeed defiŶitioŶ ͞spiŶ has ďeĐoŵe the uďiƋuitous teƌŵ foƌ puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs͟. The pƌoďleŵ is 
that in a democratic society that prides itself on freedom of information and where the public 
believe it is their right to be involved in the governance of their society, perceived control of 
information can be deeply unpopular and backfire spectacularly (Stauber and Rampton, 1995; 
Motion, 2000).   
 
With such prevalent examples as the BP oil spill in the Mexican Gulf (Warner, 2010), the 
infamous actions of the tobacco industry during the 1950s and 1960s (Proctor, 2008) and the 
current public relations battle over climate change (Oreskes and Conway, 2008, 2010) it is 
perhaps not surprising that public relations has gained a reputation for obfuscation and 
corruption nor that it is commonly conflated with spin and propaganda (Eisenberg, 1990; 
Carson, 2006). The confusion around PR, propaganda and spin has engendered a distrustful 
view of public relations practice and practitioners in wider society and has led to words like 
rhetoric, sophistry and propaganda being labelled taboo encouraging professional 
communicators to avoid any implied association with these terms (Morris and Goldsworthy, 
ϮϬϭϮͿ. The ďiŶaƌǇ assoĐiatioŶ of ǁoƌds as ƌelatiŶg to eitheƌ ͚good͛ oƌ ͚ďad͛ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs 
practices, however, has obfuscated the central point that all communication is about 
negotiating reality and how we understand and experience it.  
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Paget ;ϭϵϵϬ, p.ϮͿ poiŶts outs that the ͞ŵodeƌŶ ŵaŶ ǁoƌships ͚faĐts͛ – that is, he aĐĐepts ͚faĐts͛ 
as the ultiŵate ƌealitǇ͟. ͚“piŶ͛, aŶd ďǇ assoĐiatioŶ puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs, is disliked ďeĐause it is seen 
as ͚Ŷot tƌuth͛; a deliďeƌate atteŵpt to ŵislead, ŵisiŶfoƌŵ aŶd ĐoŶĐeal the tƌuth iŶ oƌdeƌ to 
achieve organisational objectives (Welch, 2013).  
 
Gelders and Ihlen (2009) suggest that in conjunction with this during the twentieth century 
there was a distinctive tendency to view all forms of power with overt suspicion - which 
combined has acted to reinforce suspicion and dislike of public relations. The prospect of an 
͞iŶǀisiďle goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͟ that ͚ŵoulds ouƌ ŵiŶds, foƌŵs ouƌ tastes aŶd suggests ouƌ ideas͛ 
;BeƌŶaǇs ϭϵϮϴ Đited iŶ O͛“hea ϮϬϬϴͿ seeŵs to ďe the aŶtithesis of the deŵoĐƌatiĐ ideal aŶd 
poses a serious threat to the quixotic fantasies and ideologies that underpin democratic 
national identity (Tench and Yeomans 2006).  
 
While there is a compelling aƌguŵeŶt that iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ is, iŶ esseŶĐe, ͚spiŶ͛ as it is the 
alteƌiŶg of the ͚tƌuth͛ aŶd aŶǇ ƌepƌoduĐtioŶ of ͚faĐt͛ oƌ ͚tƌuth͛ ǁill ŶeĐessaƌilǇ plaĐe a uŶiƋue 
twist on how it is delivered and received (Berger and Luckman, 1966
1
) such an approach does 
little to reconcile the negative associations around the concept. Associations which, as 
Daymon and Holloway (2011) point out, often make it a difficult subject to research or to 
define. 
 
Over the course of this research nearly a hundred different definitions were considered (see 
Appendix 1.1). According to Broom and Sha (2013) most definitions of public relations tend to 
fall into one of two categories:  
1) Outcome based. Public relations is defined by what it does – the observable effects, 
operations and outputs. For example, reputation management and media relations 
(Table 1, Appendix 1.1).  
2) Ideological definition. Public relations is defined by aspiration, purpose or intention. 
This is the type of definition used by Bernays (1928) and Lee (1906 cited in 
Goldman, 1948). These definitions often focus on behaviour change, strategy, 
targeted information sharing or relationship management (Table 2, Appendix 1.1).   
 
                                           
1
 See also Foucault (1997), McHoul and Grace (1993), Baudrillard (1994), Grattan (1998) and 
O͛MalleǇ ;ϮϬϬϭͿ.  
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As Broom and Sha (2013) point out however, neither type of definition is without problems or 
significant limitations. Most definitions (see Appendix 1.1) focus on the outcomes and are 
phrased in terms of these outcomes. Such definitions are usually narrow in scope and imbued 
with the emotionally charged language which has fostered a negative perception of public 
ƌelatioŶs ;Milleƌ aŶd DiŶaŶ, ϮϬϬϴͿ. This appƌoaĐh, ǁhile it shoǁs ǁhat puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs ͚does͛, 
does not allow the researcher to look at the purpose behind the outcomes or provide a 
framework for analysing public relations activities in a public facing organisation like the Police.  
 
The difficulty with defining public relations by outcome or activity was highlighted during an 
international consultation held by the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) in 2012. The 
aim of this consultation was to create a universal, easy to understand, modern definition of 
public relations that could be used to start tackling widely held misconceptions about the 
practice. During the consultation period for this research, the PRSA (2012) asked members to 
explain the functions and responsibilities they thought their jobs entailed. This survey found 
that there were seventeen commonly cited elements or aspects of public relations (Fig. 1.1).  
 
Fig: 1.1    Functions of Public Relations 
Advertising 
Community Relations 
Counselling 
Crisis Management 
Government Affairs 
Industry Relations 
Internal Communications 
(Employee/Employer relations) 
Issues Management 
Marketing 
Media Relations 
Minority Relations/Multi-cultural Affairs 
Public Affairs 
Public Participation/Engagement 
Publicity Management 
Research 
Special Events 
 
The problem, as the PRSA (2012) discovered, is how do you condense an area as broad, as 
flexible and as multi-dimensional as public relations into a pithy and easily intelligible concept 
without necessarily losing key aspects or limiting the definition to an error inducing extent by 
focusing on single elements?  Outcome based definitions all demonstrate the same limitation 
that the PRSA (2012) found during their research; that this approach tends to focus on specific 
aspects – often in isolation.  
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Part of the attraction of this sort of definition is that it is easily understood and summarised. In 
the absence of a clear understanding of what public relations is the tendency has been to try 
to explain it usiŶg taŶgiďle eǆaŵples of its pƌaĐtiĐe. Theƌe is the diffiĐultǇ, hoǁeǀeƌ, that ͞ŵost 
effective public relations efforts are not visible outside the organization and therefore are not 
iŶĐoƌpoƌated iŶto populaƌ peƌĐeptioŶ of puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs͟ ;“haǁ aŶd White, 2004 p.494). 
Historically, public relations might have concentrated principally on publicity, reputation and 
marketing (Bates, 2006), but as times have changed so too has the practice of PR; as Table 1.1 
shows these aspects are no longer all that public relations involves (PRSA, 2012). In 
emphasising a few of the more popularly recognisable operations elements, like reputation 
management, you necessarily ignore other less visible features, such as internal 
communications. Outcome based definitions also tend to avoid any discussion over the raison 
d'être behind the public relations activity thus rendering them rather one dimensional and 
incomplete (Morris and Goldsworthy, 2012). This can, and has, led to a rather distorted and 
inaccurate understanding of the profession that, Miller and Dinan (2008) believe, has 
compounded the poor image public relations has in modern society.  
 
The reverse is also true of strategy/ideology based definitions. In this case, where the former 
definitions were too specific and limiting the latter are often too vague and confusing. A good 
eǆaŵple of this is the P‘“A͛s ;ϮϬϭϮͿ Ŷeǁ defiŶitioŶ: ͞PuďliĐ ƌelatioŶs is a stƌategiĐ 
communication process that builds mutually beneficial relationships between organisations 
aŶd theiƌ puďliĐs͟. David C. Rickey (2012), secretary for the PRSA, found that despite months of 
careful research that had gone into crafting this definition people who saw it were still 
ĐoŶfused aďout ǁhat P‘ is aŶd does. ‘efeƌeŶĐiŶg ͞ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ pƌoĐesses͟ aŶd ͞ďeŶefiĐial 
ƌelatioŶships͟ souŶds defiŶitiǀe aŶd self-explanatory but it actually describes very little; what 
aƌe ͚ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ pƌoĐesses͛? What ĐoŶstitutes ďeŶefiĐial ƌelatioŶships? AŶd peƌhaps ŵoƌe 
importantly, beneficial for whom?  
 
George Orwell (1945) remarked that there was a concerning trend developing in the twentieth 
century to obscure difficult issues through a mixture of vagueness and long, complicated, 
official sounding words that made the writer sound clever and well informed but which 
concealed a worrying level of meaninglessness. A similar problem has been noticed by other 
writers when it comes to definitions (see Klockars, 1985); particularly in contentious subjects 
where it is not always in the interests of the parties involved to have an unambiguous answer 
(Eisenberg, 1990).  This point was picked up by Morris and Goldsworthy (2012) who propose 
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that underpinning the majority of definitions is a curious reluctance to draw attention to the 
mechanics involved in public relations which leads to longwinded and unclear explanations.  
 
AĐĐoƌdiŶg to “haǁ aŶd White ;ϮϬϬϰ, p.ϱϬϭͿ, paƌt of the pƌoďleŵ is that ͞the eŶtiƌe eǆisteŶĐe of 
the public relations profession rests on the assumption that positive attitudes contribute 
toǁaƌds faǀouƌaďle ďehaǀiouƌ͟.  The ŵajority of ideological definitions, however, tend to avoid 
any suggestion, implied or otherwise, of behaviour modification which has long been 
associated with propaganda (Gelders and Ihlen, 2009). Morris and Goldsworthy (2012) argue, 
that this has led to words like rhetoric and sophistry acquiring negative connotations and 
falling into disuse as public relations professionals seek to distance themselves further from 
the contentious history of their profession.  
 
Eisenberg (1990) proposes that far from being a problem, ambiguity is often an essential part 
of public relations as a means of avoiding conflict by concealing confusion, increasing 
adaptability and allowing multiple interpretations and understandings to co-exist uncontested. 
Ambiguity, however, is not particularly helpful when attempting to research the topic in 
ƋuestioŶ. IdeologǇ ďased defiŶitioŶs pƌoǀide a ͚staƌtiŶg poiŶt͛ to uŶdeƌstaŶd ǁhat puďliĐ 
relations aims to achieve, but in trying to cover everything they are often too vague and non-
specific to be of much practical use.    
 
One of the recurring themes with regard to definitions is the emotionally charged nature of 
public relations and the negative reputation the practice has gained over the last century. The 
problem identified by Morris and Goldsworthy (2012) has led to many practitioners distancing 
themselves from any implied association with the negative elements of their reputation. This 
has led to a positive biasing in the way some definitions have been constructed. Terms like 
͚ďeŶefiĐial ƌelatioŶships͛ aŶd ͚puďliĐ iŶteƌest͛ haǀe aŶ iŵpliĐit ďias ǁhiĐh ƌeduĐes the 
possibility that public relations activities can be anything other than positive or good (see 
Appendix 1.1).  Such emphasis is understandable but ultimately unhelpful from a research 
perspective as it seeks to colour how one interprets the evidence; which renders these 
definitions unviable.  
 
Maloney (2000 cited in Tench and Yeomans 2006) argues that public relations is too 
multifaceted and has too many subtle nuances to be adequately conveyed in one explanation 
and that it is a mistake to even attempt to. As the above discussion shows, there is some 
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ĐƌedeŶĐe to MaloŶeǇ͛s ;ibid) argument; definitions are usually either too narrow (Outcome 
based) or too vague (Aspirational/Ideology based) to be considered complete or accurate. A 
few scholars and practitioners, like Harlow (1976), have tried to address these problems and 
create definitions which include both operations and ideological elements these definitions 
tend to be long winded, complex and too confusing to be useful (Daymon and Holloway, 2011; 
Table 3, Appendix 1.1).  
 
Grunig (1989) suggests that part of the difficulty with creating one definition is that public 
relations is better understood as an umbrella term covering a wide variety of activities, 
ideologies and ideas than as a singular concept. For Grunig (1989) public relations can be 
broken down into four basic models which account for the visible differences in practice and 
operations: 
1) Press agency / publicity: this is one waǇ, top doǁŶ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ aiŵed at ͚pushiŶg͛ 
positive images of a company/organisation/individual. This is the model most 
commonly confused with propaganda as it is primarily about control of an image, or 
reputation, through control of the story.  
 
2) Public information: Sometimes known as the journalism model, this approach 
promotes truthful, accurate information but does not volunteer negative information 
about the company. While it is also one directional, this model differs from the Press 
Agency model by emphasising truth over half-truths and targeted communication in 
order to yield results rather than a blanket approach. 
 
3) Two way asymmetrical: This model is all about persuasion to trigger a transaction. 
While ͚tǁo ǁaǇ asǇŵŵetƌiĐal͛ iŶǀolǀes a dialogue ďetween the organisation and its 
public, the goal is anything but balanced. In this model the organisation uses strategic 
engagement to manage their presence in the public sphere; it is a model designed to 
͚ŵaŶage͛ situatioŶs aŶd to pƌoteĐt the oƌgaŶisatioŶ through a dialogue.    
 
4) Two way symmetrical: This model involves two way communication between the 
organisation and its public. Public relations, in this model, plays both mediator and 
persuader in order to negotiate the continued relationship between all the parties 
involved.  This model encourages information flow between a company and its public; 
promoting bargaining and negotiating in order to facilitate open communication and 
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fosteƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg. This is the ŵost ďalaŶĐed of GƌuŶig͛s ;ϭϵϴϵͿ ŵodels aŶd the one 
to which both Lee and Bernays aspired (Smith, 2004).  
 
For Grunig (ibid), rather than one model dominating, modern public relations ebbs and flows 
between these models as necessity, circumstance and environment requires. Attempting to 
encapsulate all of the facets into one definition is, therefore, inherently problematic; 
particularly given the rise of social media and instantaneous global communication.  
 
If the challenge during the twentieth century was to harness the power of the mass media in 
order to ensure the success of organisations and politicians alike (Glickman, 1960; Robinson 
1996); then the challenge in the twenty-first century is how to communicate directly with and 
motivate the individual (Paek, Hove, Jung and Cole, 2013). The advent of freely available mobile 
internet and social media sites has significantly shifted the nexus of communicative power from 
organisations and corporations to the individual (Gurmilang, 2012).  
 
Given the sensitivities and confusion around the concept of public relations what is required 
for this research is a value neutral definition with a broad, but manageable, scope which 
simultaneously covers both outcomes and purpose. During the preliminary information 
gathering stage of this project over one hundred different definitions of public relations were 
considered. While many of the definitions matched one or more of the above criteria the only 
definition which fit all four was the one created by Grunig and Hunt (1984) who defined public 
ƌelatioŶs as ͞the ŵaŶageŵeŶt of ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ aŶ oƌgaŶisatioŶ aŶd its puďliĐs͟. 
This definition was chosen for four reasons: 
1) Flexibility of scope. Most definitions were either too vague to be of use or so specific 
that they were too restrictive to allow a truly holistic and comprehensive examination 
of police communications departments. To complicate matters further, many 
definitions also simplified public relations to an unhelpful extent by focusing on only 
one or two aspects, such as reputation management. It became apparent early on in 
this project that flexibility was going to be essential in any workable definition given 
the variety of practices and differences between police departments.  
 
2) Value neutral language. Quite a few of the definitions, while technically correct, used 
emotionally charged terminology which encouraged the negative associations 
commonly linked to the concept of public relations. Silverman (2013) and other 
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methodology experts (see Cho and Trent, 2006; Klockars, 1985) all warn about the 
hidden dangers of prejudice and bias in research. Some prejudice and bias is 
unavoidable (Chapter 2.8); however, starting off with a value laden definition is 
neither helpful nor likely to encourage unbiased results.    
 
3) Simple to understand. A common issue raised by the PRSA (2012) during their 
consultation was that there was a tendency to over-complicate the definition; 
including everything in order to try and convey the esoteric concept of public relations 
to non-practitioners. This often resulted in longwinded and confusing definitions that 
did little to enlighten the uninitiated as to what public relations actually is.  
 
4) Avoids tautology. The fiŶal, ďut ďǇ Ŷo ŵeaŶs least, ƌeasoŶ foƌ usiŶg GƌuŶig aŶd HuŶt͛s 
(1984) definition is that it is not prone to the same tautological difficulties of many 
other definitions.  By not defining the subject purely by the output it produces the 
definition also avoids the narrow scope of many other definitions which are often 
limited only to the visible elements of public relations. 
 
The lack of accurate definition within the wider industry itself posed a considerable difficulty at 
the start of this research; particularly as there seems to be similar confusion over what public 
relations entails within the police forces as well. As will be discussed in the next section, the 
fiŶdiŶgs fƌoŵ the HMIC ͚OpeŶ All Houƌs͛ ƌepoƌt ;ϮϬϬϭͿ aŶd MaǁďǇ aŶd WoƌthiŶgtoŶ͛s studǇ 
(2002) reveal an almost systemic confusion around public relations within police forces. These 
reports were also predictive of some of the findings and issues that became apparent during 
the interviews (Chapter 3); in particular the confusion around defining or explaining public 
relations, the consequent corporate distancing from public relations terminology and the 
rebranding of these depaƌtŵeŶts as ͚CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͛, oƌ soŵe ǀaƌiaŶt theƌeof. 
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1.2  Public Relations in the Police 
 
IŶ ϮϬϬϭ Heƌ MajestǇ͛s IŶspeĐtoƌate of CoŶstaďulaƌǇ ;HMIC ϮϬϬϭͿ puďlished the ƌepoƌt ͚OpeŶ 
All Hours: a thematic inspection on the role of police visibility and accessibility in public 
ƌeassuƌaŶĐe͛. The puƌpose of this iŶspeĐtioŶ ǁas to assess the leǀels of puďliĐ ƌeassuƌaŶĐe, 
visibility and accessibility against performance indicators, identify problem areas and suggest 
best practice in how to improve these levels. The inspection identified public relations 
activities as a key aspect of improving the police-public relationship and essential for police 
legitimacy in an increasingly hyper-mediated world. The report concluded, however, that 
police understanding and practise of public relations was patchy, inconsistent and that there 
was evidence of widespread confusion over the difference between public relations and 
marketing.  
 
Similar results were found by Mawby and Worthington (2002) who reported that of the 58 
police forces surveyed across England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and the Isle of Man 
only 15 forces had a specific definition for marketing and PR while 14 forces did not define 
marketing at all, 9 said that marketing was the same as public relations, three replied that 
marketing was badly defined in their force and three forces were currently in the process of 
redefining these terms. In the last section it was argued that one of the reasons public relations 
is so difficult to understand and define is because we now recognise that public relations 
consists of activities and practices which are natural aspects of social life (Smith, 2004). The 
same is true of public relations in the police.  
 
It has been previously thought that police public relations is a new phenomenon; one born of 
modernity and need in an increasingly hostile, consumer driven, mass mediated environment 
(Cooke and Sturgis 2009).  Yet there is considerable evidence that the practice of public 
relations has been at the centre of poliĐiŶg iŶ EŶglaŶd siŶĐe the iŶĐeptioŶ of Peel͛s Neǁ PoliĐe 
(Flanders, 2011; Churchill, 2014); an idea which was confirmed in this research (see Chapter 4).  
 
WheŶ ‘oďeƌt Peel iŶtƌoduĐed his ͞ďlue loĐusts͟, the Neǁ PoliĐe ǁeƌe ďoƌŶ iŶto a soĐietǇ that 
was deeply distrustful and fiercely resentful of the change (Tobias, 1972, p.8; Silver, 2005). 
Reforming the old watch based police system had been dismissed in 1785, 1818 and 1822 due 
to unpopularity and wide spread concerns over the implications to liberty (Emsley, 1987). 
Despite support from the broadsheets, for many years after their introduction the new 
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Metropolitan Police force (hereafter the MPS) was intensely unpopular with many people 
(White, 1983; Wood, 2013) who feared the rise of a continental style police regime and 
increased government regulation (Emsley, 1991; Worsley, 2013).  
 
From the start the New Police were, arguably, dependent upon public relations strategies 
(Mawby, 2002). Every detail, from their uniform to their manner when dealing with the public, 
was carefully crafted to create and maintain the image Peel wanted for his new police force to 
aid with their integration and acceptance with the London populous (Emsley, 1987; Reiner, 
2010).  
 
Most importantly,  Rawlings (2002) argues, the success of these strategies demonstrate the 
importance of public relations in not just ensuring the gradual societal acceptance of the police 
ďut iŶ hoǁ the EŶglish ͚ďoďďǇ͛ has ďeeŶ eleǀated to a ďeloǀed ŶatioŶal sǇŵďol that has Đoŵe 
to ƌepƌeseŶt the Đoƌe of ͚EŶglishŶess͛; aŶ ideal foƌ fƌeedoŵ aŶd justiĐe ;Loadeƌ ϭϵϵϳͿ. This is a 
somewhat ironic outcome when one considers that the riots at their introduction were 
spawned from fear of a repressive, French-like, state poliĐe that ǁould ƌoď theŵ of ͞that 
perfect freedoŵ of aĐtioŶ that is the gƌeat pƌiǀilege aŶd ďlessiŶg of soĐietǇ iŶ this ĐouŶtƌǇ͟ 
(Select Committee 1822 cited in Tobias 1972 p.204). Young (1966, p.195), however, argues that 
it is esseŶtial to distiŶguish ďetǁeeŶ ǁhat he Đalled ͞uŶĐooƌdiŶated͟ aŶd ͞plaŶŶed͟ poliĐe 
public relations activities. For Young (1966) and others (see Gregory, 1970; Hodges, 1987; 
Mawby, 2002; Motschall and Cao, 2002) there is an important difference that needs to be 
ƌeĐogŶised ďetǁeeŶ the ͚ǁhat ǁoƌks͛, uŶstƌuĐtuƌed appƌoaĐh used by everyday police officers 
and the structured, intentional activities of professional departments.   
 
Mawby (2002, p.7), suggested that it is useful when looking at this subject to think of public 
relations in the English police as divided into four conceptual periods, or phases: 
1) ͞IŶfoƌŵal iŵage ǁoƌk͟ ;ϭϴϮϵ – 1919);  
2) ͞EŵeƌgeŶt puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs͟ ;ϭϵϭϵ – 1972); 
3) ͞EŵďeddiŶg puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs͟ ;ϭϵϳϮ – 1987); 
4) ͞The pƌofessioŶalisatioŶ of poliĐe iŵage ǁoƌk͟ ;ϭϵϴϳ – present day).   
 
The first period was unstructured, informal and aimed at legitimising and normalising an 
uŶǁaŶted aŶd uŶpopulaƌ Ŷeǁ ƌegulatoƌǇ ďodǇ. As MaǁďǇ ;ϮϬϬϮ, p.ϳͿ eǆplaiŶs;  the ͞ŵodeƌŶ 
language of image management was not in existence and activities now recognisable within the 
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spheres of corporate identity, marketing and public relations were not distinct activities with 
theiƌ oǁŶ oďjeĐtiǀes͟ ďut iŶsepaƌaďle fƌoŵ the ŵeasuƌes used to ŵake the Neǁ PoliĐe 
acceptable to a distrustful public. 
 
This phase theŶ, falls ǁithiŶ YouŶg͛s ;ϭϵϲϲͿ ͞uŶĐooƌdiŶated͟ stƌategies.  YouŶg ;ϭϵϲϲͿ 
pƌoposes that the staƌt of ͞plaŶŶed͟ puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs ďegaŶ ǁith the ĐƌeatioŶ of the Neǁ 
Scotland Yard Press Bureau in 1919 by Commissioner Macready.  The introduction of the Press 
Office heralded a change in image management and public relations to a more formal 
communications enterprise run from the a central point. This change led to the second period 
of ͞EŵeƌgeŶt PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs͟ ;MaǁďǇ, ϮϬϬϮ, p.ϳͿ. Foƌ MaǁďǇ ;ϮϬϬϮͿ this eƌa is ĐhaƌaĐteƌised 
by a formalisation of police-press relations and the start of official image and information 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt. MaĐƌeadǇ͛s iŶteŶtioŶ ǁas ͞to set aside oŶe ƌooŵ iŶ “ĐotlaŶd Yaƌd ǁheƌe, at aŶǇ 
hour of the day, Press Representatives will be interviewed by a responsible official, be given 
information on matters on which they seek it, and be supplied with such police information as 
it ŵaǇ ďe of adǀaŶtage to ŵake puďliĐ͟ ;ϭϵϭϵ Đited iŶ ‘oĐk, ϮϬϭϰ, p.ϮϵͿ.  
 
The Press Bureau originally comprised of one civil servant who issued on average two press 
releases a day (Mawby, 1998). The remit of this office was to liaise with the media, respond to 
media queries and to confirm stories that journalists had already sourced (Young, 1966). It was 
fundamentally a reactive service designed, Gregory (1970) suggests, as more of a fact checker 
than a tool for communication. It was also, according to Wood (2013) sporadic, unstructured 
and mostly informal and created, at least partly, because of the rising number of complaints 
and scandals that dogged the MPS during the interwar years. The Press Bureau, however, was 
not considered to be the same as public relations by the MPS as a letter from Metropolitan 
Police Secretary Howgrave-Graham to Commissioner Philip Game made clear: 
͞The ǁoƌk of a PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs OffiĐeƌ is puďlicity – i.e. publicity by means of 
liaison with the Press, Films, Advertisement, and so on. We have, as you know, our 
press organisation here and the assistance of the Home Office Press Officer is also 
aǀailaďle to us. We doŶ͛t Ŷeed adǀeƌtiseŵeŶt iŶ the saŵe ǁaǇ as a ďig ͞ďusiŶess͟ 
like the Post OffiĐe.͟ ;ϭϵϯϳ Đited iŶ ‘oĐk, ϮϬϭϰ, p.ϰϱͿ. 
 
As Rock (2014) points out, Howgrave-Graham, and later Commissioner Game both stated that 
the MPS was not in need of public relations as that was some
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corporate world, not the police. By the 1962 Royal Commission, however, that view had 
changed (Clarke, 1965).  
 
The ϭϵϲϬs saǁ the eŶd of the so Đalled ͚GoldeŶ Age of PoliĐiŶg͛ of the ϭϵϰϬs aŶd ϭϵϱϬs aŶd iŶ 
its place was an increasingly critical, anti-establishment movement which challenged the 
estaďlished ͚DiǆoŶ of DoĐk GƌeeŶ͛ iŵage of the poliĐe that had ďeeŶ Đultiǀated duƌiŶg this 
period (Reiner, 2005; Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke and Roberts, 1978). The first head of 
public relations at the MPS, G.D. Gregory (1970, p.282), suggested that  public relations in the 
poliĐe gƌeǁ out of a Ŷeed to Đoŵpete ǁith all the otheƌ ͞puďliĐ ǀoiĐes ĐlaŵouƌiŶg foƌ 
ƌeĐogŶitioŶ iŶ the pƌess… ƌadio aŶd teleǀisioŶ… to iŶfoƌŵ ouƌ puďliĐ aďout ǁhat ǁe aƌe doiŶg, 
how we aƌe doiŶg it aŶd hoǁ ǁell͟. GƌegoƌǇ ;ϭϵϳϬͿ ďelieǀed that the ĐƌeatioŶ of these 
departments was a reaction to the realisation that the police were no longer the principal 
voice in an increasingly literate and news-aware society and that there were now 
conversations taking place from which the police were excluded. Over the coming decades 
relations between police and certain sections of the public would deteriorate, culminating in 
the Brixton Riots and the Scarman report (Hodges, 1987; Reiner, 2010), and leading to 
successive political moral panics over public trust and confidence in the police (Wood, 2011).  
In the 1960s, however, the cracks were only just beginning to show (Jones, 1996).  
 
The ϭϵϲϮ ‘oǇal CoŵŵissioŶ eŵphasised the Ŷeed foƌ ͞ĐultiǀatiŶg good relations between the 
poliĐe aŶd puďliĐ͟, aŶd suggested that Đhief ĐoŶstaďles should ͞ŵake ǁhateǀeƌ loĐal pƌoǀisioŶ 
is appƌopƌiate to the Ŷeeds of a paƌtiĐulaƌ aƌea͟ iŶ oƌdeƌ to aĐĐoŵplish this ;Đited iŶ YouŶg, 
1966, p.197). While the Commission made no definite recommendation on this subject it did 
lead to renewed police interest which culminated in a report by Chief Constable George Scott
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and Commissioner Sir Joseph Simpson which was presented to the Association of Chief Police 
Officers in December 1964 ;YouŶg, ϭϵϲϲͿ. The ƌepoƌt ƌeĐoŵŵeŶded that ͞iŶ ŵost, if Ŷot all, 
forces one or more officers should be allocated to public relations duties and should have 
pƌopeƌ tƌaiŶiŶg foƌ the puƌpose͟ ;iďid, pϭϵϳͿ. FolloǁiŶg a pilot Đouƌse iŶ FeďƌuaƌǇ ϭϵϲϱ the fiƌst 
official Public Relations department was established in West Riding Constabulary in May of the 
same year to be run by a Chief Inspector.  
 
The Ŷeǁ depaƌtŵeŶt ďased iŶ Wakefield ǁas foƌŵed to ͞ĐooƌdiŶate the puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs ǁoƌk 
already being done by various departments to provide a speedy source of accurate information 
                                           
2
 Chief Constable of West Riding Constabulary 
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to the press, and generally to make deliberate, planned and sustained efforts to establish and 
ŵaiŶtaiŶ ŵutual uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg ďetǁeeŶ the West ‘idiŶg CoŶstaďulaƌǇ aŶd the puďliĐ͟ ;YouŶg, 
1996, p.198). Other work included publicity material, crime prevention literature, and 
recruitment adverts.   
 
The iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ of the fiƌst offiĐial ͚PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs͛ depaƌtŵeŶt heƌalded the ǁateƌshed of 
professional public relations in the English police and marked a significant change in how police 
forces communicated with the public. According to Kingshott (2011) and Wood (2014), the 
ϭϵϲϮ ‘oǇal CoŵŵissioŶ aĐhieǀed the Hoŵe OffiĐe͛s loŶg held aŵďitioŶ of ĐeŶtƌalisiŶg the 
English police; transferring powers and control from constabularies to the Government.  A 
similar centralisation was also occurring in police communications. Up until the introduction of 
the Scotland Yard Press Bureau, image management and keeping the public informed was 
primarily carried out by individual officers interacting with the public (Mawby, 2002).  The 
arrival of the press office saw the start of centralisation in police communications; as first the 
press office and then the public relations department became the official voice of the police 
and individual officers were discouraged from talking to the press (Kingshott, 2011).  
 
Following the successful introduction of a public relations department in West Riding 
Constabulary other police forces soon established their own (Gregory, 1970), which lead to the 
staƌt of MaǁďǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϮͿ thiƌd phase. ͚EŵďeddiŶg PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs͛ ďegaŶ ǁith the appoiŶtŵeŶt 
of Sir Robert Mark in 1972. Mark, the first Commissioner of the MPS to have risen through all 
the ranks to attain the position of Commissioner, was responsible for radically changing the 
ƌelatioŶship ďetǁeeŶ the MP“ aŶd the pƌess. UŶdeƌ Maƌk͛s goǀeƌŶaŶĐe, the MP“ appaƌeŶtlǇ 
ŵoǀed fƌoŵ ͞the pƌiŶĐiple ͚tell theŵ oŶlǇ ǁhat Ǉou ŵust͛… to ͚ǁithhold oŶlǇ ǁhat Ǉou ŵust͛͟ 
(Mark 1977 cited in Mawby 2002, p.21).  The police however, balanced their new openness 
with strict control of information (Chibnall, 1979).  
 
As MaǁďǇ ;ϮϬϬϮ, p.ϮϮͿ eǆplaiŶs; ͞iŶfoƌŵatioŶ faĐilities ǁeƌe oŶlǇ opeŶ to Đaƌd holdeƌs aŶd the 
cards were issued at the discretion of the MPS, thus ensuring that they controlled the flow of 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ͟. IŶ takiŶg aŶ aĐtiǀe ƌatheƌ thaŶ passiǀe ƌole iŶ the disseŵiŶatioŶ of iŶfoƌŵatioŶ 
the MPS were able to assume a more powerful position in the police-press relationship and 
thus have more of a say in the message; thus further skewing what some academics consider 
was an already asymmetrical relationship more in their favour (Chibnall, 1975b; Shpayer-
Makov, 2010).  
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During this period, public relations departments across constabularies continued to grow and 
embed themselves within the everyday operational life of policing (Lee and McGovern, 2014). 
The ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ stƌategǇ ǁas ĐhaƌaĐteƌised ďǇ ǁhat is soŵetiŵes Đalled a ͚pƌess 
ageŶĐǇ/puďliĐitǇ ŵodel͛ ;GƌuŶig, ϭϵϴϵͿ oƌ a ͚push͛ ŵeŶtalitǇ ;Meƌgel, ϮϬϭϰͿ; communication 
was one-directional with the aim to present the police story without engaging in dialogue or 
discussion and has in the past been closely associated with propaganda (Grunig, Grunig and 
Dozier, 1992).   
 
The next significant change with police public relations came with the appointment of Sir Peter 
Imbert as Commissioner of the MPS in 1987 and the report he subsequently commissioned 
fƌoŵ Đoƌpoƌate iŵage ĐoŶsultaŶts, Wolff OliŶs ;MaǁďǇ, ϭϵϵϴͿ. “iƌ Peteƌ Iŵďeƌt͛s appoiŶtŵeŶt 
marked the start of the fouƌth aŶd ĐuƌƌeŶt peƌiod, ͚PƌofessioŶal PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs͛ ;MaǁďǇ, 
2002); it is this period that is of particular interest with regard to my research.   
 
The Wolff Olins report (1987) was arguably the catalyst for the professionalisation of police 
public relations. Previously, these departments had been staffed by internally trained police 
officers. From 1987 onwards, however, police forces increasingly looked to employ external 
specialists to these posts (Hodges, 1987; Mawby, 2008).  Now police public relations 
departments are almost exclusively staffed by non-warranted police staff with professional 
qualifications in public relations, marketing or journalism. This change in police 
communications and the professionalisation of police public relations was not restricted to the 
English police. Similar transitions were observed in America (Surette, 1995, 2001; Pearlmutter, 
2000; Brainard and McNutt, 2010), Canada (Ericson, 1989, 1994; Ericson and Haggarty, 1997; 
Brodeur and Dupont, 2006), Australia (Lee and McGovern, 2010; 2014), Israel (Lahav, 2014) and 
France (de Maillard and Savage, 2012) during the 1980-90s.  
 
OŶe of the ŵost iŶtƌiguiŶg aspeĐts of MaǁďǇ͛s fouƌth peƌiod, hoǁeǀeƌ, is Ŷot the 
professionalisation of police public relations but the gradual distancing of these departments 
from public relations terminology. The 1980s and 1990s had demonstrated a growing degree of 
corporatism in police forces generally and in the MPS in particular (Morgan and Newburn, 
1997). This cultural shift was reflected in the corporate terminology that became common 
place in policing vernacular – oŶe eǆaŵple of ǁhiĐh ǁas the iŶĐoƌpoƌatioŶ of ͚PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs͛ 
iŶto the Ŷaŵe of the ͚Pƌess OffiĐe͛.   
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Mawby (2007) commented in his survey of police public relations departments in 1996/7 that 
the ŵost ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ used Ŷaŵes ǁeƌe joiŶtlǇ ͚Pƌess OffiĐe͛ aŶd ͚Pƌess aŶd PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs͛. 
Fouƌ Ǉeaƌs lateƌ this had shifted slightlǇ to ͚Pƌess aŶd PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs͛ aŶd ͚Media “eƌǀiĐes͛. 
MaǁďǇ͛s ϮϬϬϲ/ϳ suƌǀeǇ, hoǁeǀeƌ, shoǁed a distiŶĐt Ŷational move with most departments 
dƌoppiŶg the puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs eleŵeŶt. MaǁďǇ ;ϮϬϬϴ, p.ϭϰͿ ĐoŶĐluded that ͞the ĐhaŶge iŶ 
name indicates the aspirations of these departments and the direction of professionalism in 
which police communications has been moving oǀeƌ the last deĐade͟: ͚Pƌess͛, ͚Media͛ aŶd 
͚PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs͛ had giǀeŶ ǁaǇ to ͚Coƌpoƌate CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͛ depaƌtŵeŶts.   
 
In the 2006 survey, Mawby (2007) recorded that 17 of the 37 English police forces which 
aŶsǁeƌed his suƌǀeǇ ǁeƌe usiŶg ͚Coƌpoƌate CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͛; as of MaǇ ϮϬϭϱ this had 
increased to 25 of the 39 police forces in England with the remaining 14 forces using a variety 
of diffeƌeŶt Ŷaŵes. It is iŶteƌestiŶg Ŷote that ǁhile ͚PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs͛ is Ŷo loŶgeƌ pƌeseŶt iŶ aŶǇ 
department title (see 3.2.3) it is still used in some job titles (Appendix 3.2).   There has been a 
clear transition in the official strategic practices of these departments over the last few 
decades (Ericson and Haggarty, 1997; Ericson, 2006). As will be discussed further in part 3, the 
poliĐe seeŵ to haǀe ŵoǀed aǁaǇ fƌoŵ the ͚Pƌess AgeŶĐǇ͛ appƌoaĐh appaƌeŶt duƌiŶg MaǁďǇ͛s 
;ϮϬϬϮͿ seĐoŶd aŶd thiƌd phases aŶd toǁaƌds GƌuŶig͛s ;ϭϵϴϵͿ ͚PuďliĐ IŶfoƌŵatioŶ͛ aŶd ͚Tǁo-
ǁaǇ AsǇŵŵetƌiĐal͛ ŵodels.  
 
Researching a phenomenon that started with one name and then distanced itself through 
rebranding can be something of a minefield of unexpected difficulties and did pose a challenge 
at times during this study. It was suggested during the research process by several of the 
interviewees that the title of this study should drop the public relations element as outdated 
(PI.17 and PI.27) and focusses on the wrong aspects of their work (PI.2 and PI.26). There was 
also some concern raised that by using the term public relations the aim of this research was 
to foĐus oŶ ͚poliĐe spiŶ͛ aŶd poƌtƌaǇ theŵ iŶ a Ŷegatiǀe light ;PI.ϯ aŶd PI.ϳͿ.  
 
It is important to note that this concern is not one restricted solely to communications 
professionals in police forces but reflective of what is arguably an industry wide anxiety 
(Morris and Goldsworthy, 2012; Wright, 2015). It is also not without foundation given the 
ƌeaĐtioŶ ďǇ soŵe of the pƌess; ǁith Ŷeǁs titles suĐh as ͚PoliĐe “peŶdiŶg £ϭϬϬ,ϬϬϬ a daǇ oŶ 
Pƌess OffiĐeƌs͛ ;Whitehead, ϮϬϭϭͿ, ͚PoliĐe “peŶd £ϯϮ MillioŶ oŶ Media ͚“piŶ DoĐtoƌs͛ as 
23 
 
Boďďies aƌe Cut͛ ;Daǀis, ϮϬϭϱͿ aŶd ͚Despite Cuts, Iŵage CoŶsĐious PoliĐe FoƌĐes “till “peŶdiŶg 
£ϯϮ MillioŶ oŶ ͚“piŶ DoĐtoƌs͛ ;LaŶe, ϮϬϭϱͿ.  
 
There were three main reasons for keeping the public relations focus in the title in the face of 
these concerns. Firstly, there is the historical element which bears consideration. Departments 
have only recently moved away from identifying themselves as public relations departments. 
While the name might have changed, the core responsibilities and activities of these 
departments have remained constant, although tactics, such as communications techniques, 
have evolved. Thus, public relations remains the most accurate and practical umbrella term to 
describe the various activities of departments in the absence of new terminology particularly 
as the foĐus is oŶ the ͚puďliĐ͛ aspeĐt of theiƌ aĐtiǀities. “eĐoŶdlǇ, plaĐiŶg the foĐus ǁithiŶ puďliĐ 
relations provides a useful and necessary framework from which to investigate and analyse 
police communications aĐtiǀities aŶd pƌoĐesses. FiŶallǇ, ǁhile ͚ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͛ aŶd puďliĐ 
ƌelatioŶs͛ aƌe Ŷoǁ ĐoŶsideƌed ǀiƌtuallǇ sǇŶoŶǇŵous iŶ ĐoŵŵoŶ ǀeƌŶaĐulaƌ, ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs is 
a much broader term within policing and one which has multiple uses. As well as being used in 
relatioŶ to the ͚Coƌpoƌate CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs DepaƌtŵeŶt͛ it is also ofteŶ used ǁheŶ talkiŶg 
about the CCR (Communications Control Room) which handles the 999 and 101 calls as well as 
the phone infrastructure. As such, and the public relations element was kept in the title to 
clearly identify the area of investigation.   
 
In order to avoid any subsequent confusion in the following chapters, however, as many of the 
official documents and interviewees (see Chapter 3) refer to their departments as 
͚ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͛ aŶd ͚Đoŵŵs͛, the depaƌtŵeŶts ǁill ďe ƌefeƌƌed to as ͚Đoƌpoƌate 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͛, ͚poliĐe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͛ oƌ puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs depaƌtŵeŶt.  
 
The question remains, however, what is public relations in the context of the police?  The 
HMIC (2001, p.117) proposed a defiŶitioŶ of puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs iŶ oƌdeƌ to ͞aid ĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ͟ iŶ 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg ďetǁeeŶ poliĐe foƌĐes. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to the HMIC ;iďidͿ puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs ͞iŶǀolǀes 
providing information to the public, producing documentation in the form of leaflets and 
posters, and running campaigns for specific initiatives. Unlike press and media work, it is not 
necessarily topical and can be planned weeks or months in advance. Although generally 
outǁaƌd faĐiŶg, P‘ does also eŶĐoŵpass soŵe iŶteƌŶal ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ.͟ 
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As discussed in the previous section Outcome based definitions, like the one put forward by 
the HMIC (2001), have several rather significant limitations; particularly in light of the 
technological and ideological changes examined above. By enumerating the activities involved 
in public relations activities the definition necessarily excludes certain aspects which limits the 
field of research. Reputation management has been, and arguably still is, vitally important to 
the police; presenting the right image was an essential paƌt of the gƌadual aĐĐeptaŶĐe of Peel͛s 
New Police during the 19
th
 century (Shpayer-Makov, 2010). However, it is by no means the 
only, or primary, concern of modern police public relations – as the majority of those 
interviewed in this study were keen to make clear.   
 
Most pƌaĐtitioŶeƌs aŶd defiŶitioŶs agƌee that at its heaƌt, puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs is aďout ͞ŵeaŶiŶg 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt͟ ;BeƌŶaǇs, ϭϵϮϴ, pϯͿ. Hoǁeǀeƌ oŶe Đhoses to defiŶe puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs, it iŶǀolǀes 
managing communications with various, often competing, audiences in order to negotiate the 
health and survival of the organisation, company or brand (Broom and Sha, 2013). Social 
media, as Part 2 of this chapter explores, has radically altered the communications landscape 
for police forces.  
 
Internet sites and social media have not just created the opportunity for, but also encouraged, 
governments and organisations to communicate directly with individuals and opened the 
potential to engage with their audiences in a real-time dialogue (Zerfass and Schramm, 2013). 
Every police force in England now has at least one Facebook page and Twitter account with 
many forces maintaining local accounts as well as their corporate pages (see 1.4.1). Social 
media has changed our relationship with information and each other in a profound manner 
(Hamsley and Mason, 2013). It has also had an equally significant impact on public relations 
(Zerfass and Schramm, 2013), changing the classic communications model from a B2B
3
, where 
the primary audience is the media (who then disseminate information to the public), to one 
where public relations departments must cater to both the B2B model as well as to the B2C 
model
4
; where corporate bodies communicate directly with their audiences (Ford and Mason, 
ϮϬϭϯͿ. GƌuŶig aŶd HuŶt͛s ;ϭϵϴϰͿ definition provides a flexible and robust framework for 
investigating this area and exploring the impact the advent of social media has had upon police 
public relations. 
 
                                           
3
 Business to Business model 
4
 Business to Customer Model 
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Part Two:  Understanding the Literature Landscape 
 
The purpose of this section is to examine the existing research into police public relations in 
order to set the context within which this project was conducted and highlight some of the 
problems which this study sought to address. Police public relations is not a straightforward 
subject but one which is entangled with a number of other contentious and complex areas that 
come with a mountain of associated literature. Fig 1.2 shows one interpretation of how this 
subject sits within the wider literature landscape. While it is an artificial and speculative 
conceptualisation it does provide a useful illustration of how the different tangential areas 
overlap and coexist and the close inter-relationship.  
                                                                                      
Research into police public relations has predominantly looked at this subject either from a 
desire to improve public confidence in the police or to understand the police-media 
relationship. The few studies which have directly examined police public relations are now 
several years old (Mawby 2002;2007) or research from other countries (Ericson and Haggarty, 
1997; Surette, 2001; Lee and McGovern, 2013b).  There is also now the question of social 
media. According to Mergel (2010), social media has revolutionised the way people and 
organisations communicate and has fundamentally changed expectations of service provision 
and delivery and how users relate to the world around them. Such a profound move in 
Fig  1.2 
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communication has by necessity had an impact on public relations professionals and practice 
(Zavattro and Sementelli, 2014); the degree to which this has affected police public relations 
needs to be addressed (Connor, 2015). Prior research into this has tended to view social media 
as part of police communications and subsequently positioned it as a subsidiary of the public 
relations area. What the interview data from this study suggested, however, is that social 
media can more comfortably be placed in the centre of Fig 1.2. Social media is often 
considered now as an essential part of the public confidence question and has had a significant 
impact on the police-media relationship.   
 
During the course of this project over five hundred research sources were consulted, covering 
more than 50 journals. Due to the amount of space available, however, the following review 
concentrates only on the literature directly relevant to this area and the central process based 
interest that guided this research project. The review is divided into three sections; the first 
looks at public confidence and media related research, two areas which have tended to 
dominate academic attention and which also set the context and initial impetus for the start of 
this project. The second section looks at the primary studies that have been conducted into 
police public relations; while the third discusses the impact social media has had on how police 
forces are now communicating.    
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1.3 Public Confidence and the Media 
 
Academics have long been interested in the peculiar relationship between the police and 
puďliĐ iŶ EŶglaŶd ;Toďias, ϭϵϳϮ; MaŶŶiŶg, ϭϵϴϬ, ϮϬϬϱͿ ǁhiĐh has seeŶ the ͞Đultuƌal 
ŵetaŵoƌphosis͟ of the oŶĐe fieƌĐelǇ ƌeseŶted EŶglish ͚ďoďďǇ͛ eleǀated to a ďeloǀed ŶatioŶal 
sǇŵďol that has Đoŵe to ƌepƌeseŶt the Đoƌe of ͚EŶglishŶess͛ ;MĐLaughliŶ, ϮϬϬϳ p.ϯ). The lowly 
British bobby has become an icon for freedom and justice rather than repression (Ignatieff, 
2006; Bayley, 2005). However disliked the police were when first introduced (Silver, 2005; 
Philips and Storch, 2007) the post war period (1945 - 1955) is ofteŶ ĐoŶsideƌed the ͚goldeŶ 
age͛ of poliĐiŶg iŶ EŶglaŶd; a halĐǇoŶ eƌa duƌiŶg ǁhiĐh poliĐe aŶd puďliĐ supposedlǇ ǁoƌked 
together with mutual respect and deference towards authority and the law (Reiner, 2005). The 
pinnacle of this was represented by the eŶduƌiŶg suĐĐess of ͚DiǆoŶ of DoĐk GƌeeŶ͛, oŶe of the 
first police shows and the second most popular television programme at the time regularly 
drawing fourteen million viewers (Leishman and Mason, 2003).  
 
Policing occupies a fundamental, almost unique, paleo-symbolic position in England. The 
EŶglish poliĐe haǀe oǀeƌ the last tǁo ĐeŶtuƌies ͞iŶseƌted theŵselǀes iŶto ouƌ soĐial 
suďĐoŶsĐious as faĐts of life͟ ;IgŶatieff, ϮϬϬϲ, p.ϮϱͿ. Not oŶlǇ aƌe the poliĐe a souƌĐe of ĐoŶtƌol 
and regulation but they now also play a prevalent part in everyday entertainment (Sacco, 
1998; Greer, 2004; Lee, 2007; Callanan and Rosenberger, 2011). From fictional shows, such as 
͚Life oŶ Maƌs͛ aŶd ͚DCI BaŶks͛, to doĐuŵeŶtaƌies like ͚TƌaffiĐ Cops͛ aŶd ͚Ϯϰ Houƌs iŶ PoliĐe 
CustodǇ͛; the police are, in one way or another, seldom out of the media spotlight or far from 
public attention.  
 
Loadeƌ ;ϭϵϵϳ, p.ϮͿ aƌgues that oŶe ƌeasoŶ foƌ the EŶglish poliĐe͛s eŶduƌiŶg populaƌitǇ, iŶ 
fiĐtioŶ if Ŷot alǁaǇs iŶ faĐt, is that ͞theǇ ƌeŵaiŶ oŶe of the principle means by which English 
soĐietǇ tells stoƌies aďout itself͟. The tiŵe has goŶe, hoǁeǀeƌ, ǁheŶ the poliĐe, like the ‘oǇal 
Family, were above and beyond criticism or reproach (Reiner and Shapland, 1987). The last 
half of the twentieth century marked a move towards what Loader and Mulcahy (2001b p.262) 
Đall ͞detƌaditioŶalisatioŶ͟; ͞the deĐliŶe of the saĐƌed aŶd the eŵeƌgeŶĐe of ŵultiple ;seĐulaƌͿ 
authorities, the withering of deference and the emergence of citizenship rights and 
eŶtitleŵeŶts͟ ǁhiĐh have all contributed to the erosion of the unquestionable legitimacy that 
such institutions enjoyed previously (ibid).  
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This change has marked a deeper and more widespread shift in both policing practice and in 
the puďliĐ͛s ƌelatioŶship ǁith its poliĐe seƌvice.  Following the scandals of the 1960s and the 
social unrest of the 1970s public confidence is often thought to have plummeted to the extent 
that it Đƌeated a ͞Đƌisis of ĐoŶfideŶĐe͟ iŶ the poliĐe ;MoƌgaŶ aŶd NeǁďuƌŶ, ϭϵϵϳ p.ϭ; ‘eiŶeƌ, 
2010); particularly with the regard to the most famous of the English police forces – the MPS 
(Wilson and Ashton, 2006).  
 
Successive findings in the British Crime Survey from the 1980s and 1990s seem to support the 
assertion that there has been a general decrease in public trust and confidence towards the 
police (Skogan, 1996; Jackson and Bradford, 2010; Bradford, 2011, 2012; Sindall et al, 2012; 
Jackson et al, 2013; Sindall and Sturgis, 2013;) although longitudinal research by YouGov (2013; 
Humphreys, 2014) found the opposite. The apparent decline of public confidence in the police 
has become a key issue both politically and academically and has led to numerous research 
studies (for example - Bennett, 1991; Goudrian, Witterbrood and Nieuweerta, 2009; Holh, 
Bradford and StaŶko, ϮϬϭϬ; TaŶkeďe, ϮϬϭϬͿ aŶd politiĐal iŶitiatiǀes suĐh as Laďouƌ͛s OŶe 
National Target.  
 
The ͚OŶe NatioŶal Taƌget͛ ǁas iŶtƌoduĐed iŶ ϮϬϬϵ ďǇ the Laďouƌ GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt iŶ ƌeaĐtioŶ to aŶ 
alleged decrease in public confidence levels. The aim of the target was to replace all preceding 
targets with the overreaching aim of improving local public confidence levels in each of the 
police forces (Flemming and McLaughlin, 2012b). Although this target was later removed in 
2010 by the incoming Coalition Government, it is a useful example of the level of concern that 
the issue of public confidence can, and has, generated in recent years.  
 
One of the concerns underpinning this issue is the possible impact public confidence has on 
the continued legitimacy and effectiveness of the police. This concern has led to the 
pƌolifeƌatioŶ of a gƌeat ďodǇ of ƌeseaƌĐh iŶto the ͚PƌoĐeduƌal JustiĐe Model͛ of poliĐe - public 
confidence (Tyler, 2001; De Vries and Van Der Hooftvan Der Zigil, 2003; Hough et al, 2010; 
Myhill and Quinton, 2011; Myhill and Bradford, 2012; Tyler and Jackson, 2014). The origin of 
this liŶk to legitiŵaĐǇ Đoŵes fƌoŵ ǁhat is ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ ƌefeƌƌed to as ͚Peel͛s NiŶe PƌiŶĐiples of 
PoliĐiŶg͛5 which were set out in the General Instructions given to every police officer in the 
newly formed Metropolitan Police (Kingshott, 2011 p.245). Police officers were instructed to:-  
                                           
5
 A Đoŵplete ĐopǇ of Peel͛s NiŶe PƌiŶĐiples is aǀailaďle iŶ AppeŶdiǆ ϭ.Ϯ 
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1. ͞To ƌeĐogŶise alǁaǇs that the poǁeƌ of the poliĐe to fulfil theiƌ fuŶĐtioŶs aŶd duties is 
dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour, and on their 
aďilitǇ to seĐuƌe aŶd ŵaiŶtaiŶ puďliĐ ƌespeĐt͟.  
 
2. ͞To ŵaiŶtaiŶ at all tiŵes a ƌelatioŶship ǁith the puďliĐ that giǀes ƌealitǇ to the histoƌiĐ 
tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police, the police 
being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties 
which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and 
eǆisteŶĐe͟. 
 
The argument is that a decrease in public confidence will lead to a corresponding decrease in 
the cooperation police officers receive from members of the public and in the number of 
crimes reported by the public as they will not have the confidence in the police that their 
problem will either be addressed or resolved (Tsfati, 2002). This will make the police less 
effective not only in their roles as guardians of the law but also their public order and 
reassurance work (Tyler and Jackson, 2014). Harkin (2015 p.608), however, argues that ͞the 
model of legitimacy offered by Beetham and procedural justice often fails to account fully for 
the uŶpƌediĐtaďle aŶd peĐuliaƌ ƌeaĐtioŶs to poliĐe ŵalfeasaŶĐe͟.  
 
What Harkin (2015) is referring to is the phenomenon recorded by YouGov (2013) and other 
polls (see Duckford 2011, 2012; Friedman, 1998; Job, 2005) that demonstrates how the public 
often fail to react in a consistent manner when confronted with police scandals and evidence 
of malpractice; when a scandal involving policing occurs the expectation is that there will be a 
corresponding downward shift in public confidence levels over that period. YouGov (2013), 
however, report the opposite - that iŶ spite of sĐaŶdals suĐh as ͚PleďGate͛ puďliĐ ĐoŶfideŶĐe 
has remained steady over the last decade; a result counter to that reported in the British 
Crime Survey and the predictive model of Procedural Justice (Bradford, 2012). Why, or 
whether, there has been this loss of public confidence remains subject to debate.  
 
Chandek and Porter (1998), for example, proposed that one reason confidence in police forces 
might have decreased is due to disappointed expectations. Chandek and Porter (1998) found 
in their study that crime victim expectation was an accurate predictor for victim satisfaction 
and confidence in the police.  
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Everyone has set expectations of the police whether they stem from childhood, direct or 
vicarious experiences, political beliefs or fiction (Surette, 1998; Rosenbaum, Schuck, Costello, 
Hawkins and Ring, 2005Ϳ. BǇ the eŶd of the Fiƌst Woƌld Waƌ the poliĐe had aĐhieǀed aŶ ͞alŵost 
heƌoiĐ ƌeputatioŶ͟ iŶ Ŷewsprint and fiction (Shpayer-Makov, 2010 p.672).  With the 
proliferation of instant access media in the latter half of the twentieth century the police are 
rarely absent for long. If people have expectations of the police which are not met – either 
through direct experience or learnt about through other means (e.g. newspapers or social 
media) Expectancy Disconfirmation may occur resulting in loss of confidence (Chandek and 
Porter, 1998).  
 
Alternatively, advocates of the Media Effects model propose that one reason for the 
downward trend in recorded public confidence levels is due to the hyper-mediatisation over 
the last century which has challenged the authority and credibility of the police voice. Policing 
ŵaǇ haǀe eŵeƌged iŶ the ϭϵϲϬs as the ͞iŶteƌpƌeteƌs of the Đƌisis͟ ǁho ͞possessed a poǁeƌful 
eŵotiǀe appeal foƌ laƌge Ŷuŵďeƌs of ďesieged aŶd aŶǆious ;͚ƌespeĐtaďle͛Ϳ ĐitizeŶs͟ ;Loadeƌ aŶd 
Mulcahy, 2001b p.261). But they are not now the only voice, nor, necessarily, the most popular 
or the most credible (Gregory, 1970; Greer and McLaughlin, 2010).  
 
Some academics have suggested that society has become increasingly conscious of risk over 
the last sixty years to the point where people have left public space (Ericson, 2005; McCahill, 
2003; Campbell, 2004; Brodeur, 2005; Ericson and Leslie, 2008) and society is now in a state of 
͞ŶatioŶal agoƌaphoďia͟ ;Boǆ, ϮϬϬϰ p.ϮϳϮͿ. This aďseŶĐe ĐoŵďiŶed ǁith the deĐliŶe of soĐial 
interdependence has led to people becoming isolated in their secure fortress-like homes (Lee, 
2007). In this new environment the media has become the principle source of social news, 
conveyer of culture and essential for establishing a sense of communal solidarity through 
shaƌed kŶoǁledge aŶd ͞ǀiƌtual ĐolleĐtiǀeŶess͟ ;Gƌeeƌ, ϮϬϬϰ pϭϬϵ; Daǀis, ϮϬϬϱ; Peelo 2005). 
 
This has faĐilitated the ĐƌeatioŶ of ͞a hǇpeƌ ƌealitǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh ŵedia doŵiŶatioŶ suffuses to suĐh 
aŶ eǆteŶt that the distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ iŵage aŶd ƌealitǇ Ŷo loŶgeƌ eǆists͟ ;Baudƌillaƌd, ϭϵϴϭ 
cited in Jewkes 2004 p.26). The media, because of this, has ďeĐoŵe the ĐustodiaŶ of ͚tƌuth͛ 
aŶd ͚faĐts͛; theǇ ĐoŶtƌol to a sigŶifiĐaŶt degƌee ǁhat the puďliĐ kŶoǁs aŶd thus the peƌĐeptioŶs 
aŶd opiŶioŶs of the puďliĐ ;Poǁdeƌŵakeƌ, ϮϬϬϮͿ. The ŵdia͛s iŶflueŶĐe oǀeƌ puďliĐ opiŶioŶ is 
thought to be even more profound than it otherwise might be because proportionally few 
people actually come into contact with the police (Skogan, 2006) and therefore the principle 
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source of information for society on the police is through the media, whether in the news or in 
fictional programmes (Mawby, 2003).  
 
The ŵedia has loŶg ďeeŶ thought to haǀe a ͞defiŶite aŶd poǁeƌful iŶflueŶĐe oǀeƌ the thoughts 
aŶd aĐtioŶs of people, eitheƌ iŶdiǀiduallǇ oƌ iŶ gƌoups͟ ;“tƌiŶati ϮϬϬϬ, p.ϭϳϵͿ. The Media 
Effects, or Hypodermic model, is premised upon the assumption that audiences are passive, 
uncritically receptive sponges who absorb the views, opinions and information expressed in 
the media, films and television (Lang and Long, 1986; Mutz, 1989; Dirikx and Van Den Bulck, 
2014). The extent to which this knowledge is absorbed and then assimilated depends upon the 
age, race and gender of the watcher, their interest in the programme, the level of 
trust/believability they accord the source of information (Sacco, 1998; Baumeister, Bratslavaky 
and Finkenaur, 2001; Callanan and Rosenberger, 2011) and whether they have experienced 
directly, or indirectly, anything which corroborates or discounts what they are being told 
(Becker, 1967; Chiricos, Eschholz and Gertz, 1997). The Media Effect model proposes that as 
people are inundated with an increasing number of negative images of the police 
concentrating on police corruption and failures so the traditional image of the police has been 
challenged and eroded, resulting in people feeling less confident and satisfied with policing in 
general (Swindler, Rapp and Scysal, 1986; Dowler, 2002; Chiricos, Eschholz and Gertz, 1998; 
Greer, 2004; Dowler and Zawilski, 2007).   
 
Although the Media Effects model is subject to a number of criticisms and inherent limitations, 
which are beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss in detail, it does highlight several 
important points; one of which is that there is a difference between what the police do, what 
they think they do and what the public think they do (Bittner, 2005.). If asked what the police 
do ŵost people ǁould Đite the uďiƋuitous ŵedia poƌtƌaǇal of the poliĐe as ͞fiƌst aŶd foƌeŵost 
Đƌiŵe fighteƌs͟ ;EƌiĐsoŶ aŶd HaggaƌtǇ, ϭϵϵϳ p.ϮϬͿ. That the poliĐe do Ŷot speŶd the ŵajoƌitǇ of 
their time and resources on the detection and prevention of crime is, according to Bayley 
;ϭϵϵϰ, p.ϯͿ, ͞oŶe of the ďest kept seĐƌets of ŵodeƌŶ life… eǆpeƌts kŶoǁ it, the poliĐe kŶoǁ it, 
ďut the puďliĐ does Ŷot kŶoǁ it͟. All the tiŵe ͚the poliĐe͛ ǁeƌe the doŵiŶaŶt ǀoiĐe iŶ ĐƌiŵiŶal 
justice matters they could maintain this illusion and promote a comforting myth that like the 
MouŶties theǇ ͚alǁaǇs got theiƌ ŵaŶ͛ ;“alŵi et al, ϮϬϬϱͿ.  IŶ the hǇpeƌƌealitǇ of ŵodeƌŶ 
soĐietǇ, hoǁeǀeƌ, theƌe is Ŷo ͚siŶgle͛ ǀoiĐe. IŶstead, people aƌe ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ aŶd ĐoŶsisteŶtly 
bombarded by a bewildering montage of issues, whether fact or fictitious, conflicting 
information and competing views (Baudrillard, 1994).  
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Reiner (2000 p.87) argues that this process of demystification has undermined the traditional 
image of the poliĐe as iŶfalliďle ͚good guǇs͛ ǁho ƌepƌeseŶt justiĐe aŶd alǁaǇs get theiƌ ŵaŶ. 
IŶstead the puďliĐ Ŷoǁ sees the iŶstitutioŶ ǁith ͞ǁaƌts aŶd all͟. MaŶǇ aĐadeŵiĐs haǀe 
commented over the years that policing in Britain has always been as much a matter of image 
as of substance (Manning, 1997; Mawby and Reiner, 1998; Mawby, 2010b; Klockars, 2005; 
O͛MalleǇ, ϮϬϬϱͿ. The central issue, Sillince and Brown (2009, p.1832) suggest, is that 
oƌgaŶisatioŶs like the poliĐe ͞aƌe soĐiallǇ aŶd sǇŵďoliĐallǇ ĐoŶstƌuĐted usiŶg ƌhetoric to 
achieve identity transformation and management. Organisational identities are, thus, 
phenomenological, socially constructed, rhetorical constructs, concerned with what 
oƌgaŶisatioŶs staŶd foƌ aŶd ǁhat seŶioƌ ŵaŶageƌs ǁaŶt theŵ to ďeĐoŵe͟.  
 
As such, positive reputation and image management are essential components for their 
continued success in society (Mawby, 2002). According to McLaughlin (2007) the image of the 
humble British bobby has been nurtured with great care since the late 19
th
 century; starting 
with Charles Dickens (Shpayer-Makov, 2010) and carrying on through early attempts during 
the 1920s to actively foster public support (Wood, 2013), to the culmination of cinematic 
success with the Blue Lamp (Leishman and Mason, 2003). Bittner (1970 cited in Klockars, 2005) 
points out that a certain degree of circumlocution is necessary with regard to policing in order 
to reconcile people to an institution that is fundamentally at odds with them. This 
circumlocution enfolds the police in signs, symbols and myths that act to mystify and 
legitimate the organisation and protect it from critical scrutiny (Klockars, 2005; Reiner, 2010).   
 
The ͞sǇŵďoliĐ diŵeŶsioŶ͟ of the poliĐe, hoǁeǀeƌ, ͞has ďeeŶ eƌoded ďǇ disillusioŶŵeŶt͟ aŶd 
thus the public no longer trust that the police will save them from the horrors of society, 
theƌeďǇ iŶĐƌeasiŶg theiƌ ͚feaƌ of Đƌiŵe͛ ;MaǁďǇ ϮϬϬϮ, p.ϭϲ; Lee, ϮϬϬϳͿ. BottoŵleǇ ;ϭϵϴϵ, p.ϴϳͿ 
astutely remarked that happiness and trust in societal institutions can only be maintained in 
the absence of knowledge – that the ͞ŵoƌe ǁe kŶoǁ oƌ iŶfeƌ… the ŵoƌe iŶjustiĐe ǁill appeaƌ 
ǁheƌe oŶĐe it ǁas assuŵed justiĐe ǁas ďeiŶg doŶe͟. IŶ a siŵilaƌ ǀeiŶ, “oƌokiŶ ;ϭϵϯϳ Đited iŶ 
“ĐhŶeideƌ, ϭϵϲϮ p.ϰϵϮͿ suggested that kŶoǁledge ĐaŶ ͞pƌoǀe eǆĐeediŶglǇ iŶjuƌious to many 
illusioŶs ǁhiĐh aƌe ŶeĐessaƌǇ foƌ the eǆisteŶĐe of ǀalues iŶ a gƌoup͟. KŶoǁledge, foƌ “oƌokiŶ 
(ibid), is the antithesis of faith and faith is the foundation of confidence - you can have one but 
not both, and the more you know about something the less confidence you will have in it.  
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The difficulty, as Proctor (2008) and McGoey (2007) point out, is that ignorance can now be 
more easily challenged. The advent of instant internet access has fundamentally changed how 
individuals and organisations communicate and redefined the traditional role of information 
gate-keeping (Hemsley and Mason, 2013). Information that could previously be contained is 
now freely available and it is now much more difficult to either keep secrets from the public 
domain (Zavattro and Sementelli, 2014), or to manage the consequences of their discovery 
(Greer and McLaughlin, 2010).   
 
Social media, in particular, has revolutionised the communications industry and has had a 
profound impact upon public sector organisations like the police (Paek, et al, 2013); allowing 
poliĐe foƌĐes ͞to ďǇpass the tƌaditioŶal ŵedia aŶd deliǀeƌ… ŵessages diƌeĐtlǇ to the puďliĐ, 
ǁithout the filteƌ oƌ editiŶg applied ďǇ jouƌŶalists.͟ ;Neǁ “outh Wales Coƌpoƌate 
Communications Unit, 2013; Lee and McGovern, 2015). Prior to the advent of social media 
sites, the news media was the primary means of mass communication for the police (Warren, 
Sulaiman and Noor, 2014). Social media has significantly altered the dynamics of this 
relationship; skewing what some academics consider to be an already asymmetrical power 
dǇŶaŵiĐ fuƌtheƌ iŶ the poliĐe͛s faǀouƌ ;“hpaǇeƌ-Makov, 2010; Schneider, 2014) by encouraging 
the police to cut out the middle man and talk directly to their audiences at a time and in a 
context which they control (Heverin and Zach, 2010). The advent of free, immensely popular 
and easily accessibly technology has changed the way news is produced and disseminated. In 
esseŶĐe ǁith the ƌise of the ͚ĐitizeŶ jouƌŶalist͛, soĐial ŵedia has ĐhalleŶged the ŵoŶopolǇ of 
the print press; news producers are no longer necessarily affiliated with a news outlet but 
potentially anyone with a smart phone (Greer and McLaughlin, 2010). In this environment 
police public relations gains a new online importance.  
 
The question remains, however, what role does public relations play in modern policing? As 
the previous chapter discussed, effective communication is a skill that lies at the very heart of 
forming relationships; in motivating, educating and reaching an audience, and is crucial to the 
survival of all public organisations in a hyper-mediated, globally connected world (Gurmilang, 
2012).  From the introduction of the first official police Press Office in 1919, professionalised 
public relations departments have become an essential, if often overlooked, aspect of modern 
policing. Public relations in policing is no longer a simple matter of broadcasting the 
information and official story they wish known (Loader and Mulcahy, 2001a; Mawby, 2002); 
poliĐe foƌĐes Ŷoǁ haǀe aŶ ͞oďligatioŶ… to eŶgage ǁith the puďliĐ͟ ;ACPO, ϮϬϭϮ pϰͿ.  
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IŶdeed, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to the HMIC ;ϮϬϭϭa, p.ϮϴͿ it ǁas ͞as a ƌesult of this aŶd of the Ŷeed to 
enhance public confidence in the Service through reassurance and engagement with 
increasingly diverse communities, the police communications function has evolved. Force 
press offices have become corporate communications departments which manage the internal 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs aŶd Đoƌpoƌate ŵaƌketiŶg aŶd ideŶtitǇ, as ǁell as ŵedia Ƌueƌies͟. 
 
Engagement, confidence and transparency are now key objectives for police forces and central 
to the success of this is the public relations department (HMIC, 2011a). Yet, as sections 1.4 and 
1.5 will discuss, there has been comparatively little research into these departments and even 
less into how they are managing the public relations issues and challenges facing their police 
forces in the digital age.  
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1.4 Police Public Relations Research 
 
What then is known about public relations in the English police? The answer is not a great 
deal. Other than the detailed history of public relations in the MPS pieced together by Mawby 
(2002) (see 1.2Ϳ aŶd MaǁďǇ͛s ethŶogƌaphiĐ studǇ of the puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs depaƌtŵeŶt iŶ the 
South Yorkshire police, research on this topic is sparse, patchy and now mostly out of date. 
The ƌeseaƌĐh iŶ this aƌea ĐaŶ ďe sepaƌated iŶto thƌee ďasiĐ tǇpes; ͚pƌiŵaƌǇ͛ studies of poliĐe 
puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs, ͚eǀaluatiǀe͛ studies lookiŶg at oŶe speĐifiĐ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ sĐheŵe ;e.g. 
Ŷeǁsletteƌ dƌopsͿ aŶd ͚disĐussioŶ͛ aƌtiĐles.  
 
Mawby (2002) argues that public relations is essential to the legitimacy and continued 
legitimisation of the police. The previous section briefly discussed the idea that there is a crisis 
of confidence in policing in England. Indeed, Loader (1997) suggested that by the late 1990s 
the situation had reached the point where the police were permanently in crisis; nearly 20 
years on and this fear is still a recurrent theme in political speeches and news articles (BBC, 
2014a; BBC, 2014b).  
  
According to Kingshott (2011Ϳ poliĐe foƌĐes͛ haǀe tƌaditioŶallǇ ƌelied upoŶ a sileŶt, Ŷo-
comment approach when dealing with difficult situations. As Wilson et al (2011) point out, 
however, in a hyper-mediated world where there are a multitude of independent voices the 
police can no longer afford to remain aloof from the conversations going on around, or about, 
them.  
 
Considering, then, the central importance public relations has played in the success of the 
British police since their inception in 1829 (Rawlings, 2002), it is interesting to note that it has 
received only sporadic academic interest. Raymond Clift (1949), a captain in the Cincinnati 
Traffic police division, was one of the earliest commentators on police public relations and 
published an article aimed at educating officers as to the importance of these activities in 
1949.  
 
Foƌ Clift ;ϭϵϰϵ, p.ϲϲϳͿ, ͞of the ŵaŶǇ aĐtiǀities iŶ poliĐe depaƌtŵeŶts todaǇ feǁ aƌe ŵoƌe 
important that those which aim to better the press and public relations for the police service. 
These activities are the very root of police efficiency. They engender the kind of public co-
opeƌatioŶ ǁithout ǁhiĐh the poliĐe seƌǀiĐe Đould Ŷot fuŶĐtioŶ.͟ Clift Ŷoted that ǁhile the 
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͞fuŶdaŵeŶtal͟ iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs iŶ poliĐiŶg had Ŷot ďeeŶ ƌeĐogŶised iŶ the past, 
there was growing understanding and attention being paid to the practice now (ibid).   
  
Clift͛s ;ϭϵϰϵͿ aƌtiĐle ǁas the fiƌst of seǀeƌal ͚disĐussioŶ͛ aƌtiĐles duƌiŶg the ϭϵϱϬs – 1970s from 
both American (Gourley, 1954; McManus, 1955; Terris, 1967) and British authors (Pulling, 
1962; Young, 1966; Gregory, 1970; Tobias, 1972; Hilton, 1973; Hunt, 1973); and marked the 
staƌt of ͚aĐadeŵiĐ͛ iŶteƌest iŶ this topiĐ. The iŶteƌestiŶg thiŶg aďout these aƌtiĐles is that theǇ 
were all written by serving police officers or police staff who either had an interest in raising 
the profile of public relations or were working in the department and wished to promote the 
necessity for police communications.   
 
In terms of academic interest in police public relations, this began during the 1980s. Surette 
(2001) remarked that when he started researching this area there were only two prior studies 
which looked directly at public relations in American police forces rather than obliquely 
mentioning them in connection with something else; Surette and Richard (1993) and Chermak 
and Weiss (1997). In England a similar situation had also developed. There has long been 
interest in the unusual, sometimes unhealthy, co-dependent relationship between the police 
and news media (Lovell, 2002; Powdermaker, 2000) and, as such, there has been considerable 
attention paid to it over the years – particularly in the work of Steve Chibnall (1973, 1975a, 
1979) who has been considered the authority on the police – press relationship for much of 
the last forty years (Mawby, 20010a, 2010b). Other seminal studies in this area include the 
work of Hall et al (1978), Schlesigner and Tumber (1993), Innes (1999; 2006), Mawby (2003; 
2012), Reiner (2010) and Wilson, et al (2011) in England; Hollins and Bacon (2010), McGovern 
and Lee (2010), Baker and Hyde (2011) and Lee and McGovern (2014) in Australia; and Skolnick 
and McCoy (1984), Chermak, 1995, Cottle (2003) and Chermak and Weiss (2005) in America.   
 
This thesis is primarily concerned with police public relations from the police perspective, as 
such the following section concentrates only on those studies which have examined police 
public relations departments.  
 
1.4.1 Primary Research 
In terms of studies examining the operational and strategic aspects of police public relations, 
hoǁeǀeƌ, theƌe has ďeeŶ ĐoŶsideƌaďlǇ less aĐadeŵiĐ iŶteƌest. With the eǆĐeptioŶ of MaǁďǇ͛s 
work (1998; 2002; 2007; 2014), which will be discussed later, there have been few other 
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studies of police public relations; for example, Cooke and Sturgis (2009) in England, Ferret and 
Spenlehauer (2009) in America, Lee and McGovern (2014, 2015) in Australia and Ericson and 
Haggarty (1997) and Brodeur and Dupont (2006) in Canada.  
 
Cooke aŶd “tuƌgis͛ ;ϮϬϬϵͿ studǇ looked at ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs iŶ DeƌďǇshire and Leicestershire 
police and how it has changed with the introduction of the Freedom of Information Act (2000). 
While Ferret and Spenlehaur (2009) and Brodeur and Dupont (2006) concentrated on testing 
EƌiĐsoŶ aŶd HaggeƌtǇ͛s ;ϭϵϵϳͿ theoƌǇ that the police have become contemporary knowledge 
workers; collecting, collating and distributing knowledge about crime, risk and victimisation to 
people and partner organisations.  
 
AĐĐoƌdiŶg to EƌiĐsoŶ ;ϭϵϵϰ, p.ϭϰϵͿ, the poliĐe haǀe ďeĐoŵe ͞kŶoǁledge ďƌokeƌs; eǆpeƌt 
adǀisoƌs aŶd seĐuƌitǇ ŵaŶageƌs to otheƌ iŶstitutioŶs͟. EƌiĐsoŶ aŶd HaggaƌtǇ͛s theoƌǇ suggests 
that risk is now the dominant framework and language by which companies and individuals are 
governed (Ericson and Leslie, 2008). For Power (2004 cited in Ericson and Leslie, 2008), 
organisations like the police are not only processing uncertainty but also causing it, which 
creates a mutually reinforcing cycle. The result is the amplification of risk management in 
order to raise more awareness of these risks and to promote preventative behaviour. Lee 
(2007) commented that a paradox has arisen in modern society where the more officials try to 
control crime and reduce the fear associated with it the more fearful people seem to become.  
 
Ericson and Haggarty (1997) argue that understanding and controlling risk provides the 
foundation for the public to accept the police as the credible voice of expert knowledge on risk 
and crime. As such, in the risk society communication becomes vital to the continued success 
and survival of policing. Police public relations promotes not only the police voice but is the 
primary means by which police forces sell themselves, their services and retain credibility in 
order to continually legitimise their position in the hierarchy of control (Lee and McGovern, 
2013a). 
 
Bƌodeuƌ aŶd DupoŶt ;ϮϬϬϲͿ, hoǁeǀeƌ, poiŶt out that ǁhile EƌiĐsoŶ aŶd HaggaƌtǇ͛s ;ϭϵϵϳͿ 
theory has become accepted as an orthodox reality there is little evidence to support it. In 
their study of American and Canadian police forces, Brodeur and Dupont (2006) found that the 
police were not yet the central hub of knowledge collection, production and dissemination 
that Ericson and Haggarty (1997) hypothesise. Nor did Brodeur and Dupont (2006) find 
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evidence to support the idea that the police were considered the dominant authority on 
criminal matters. Similar findings were reported by Ferret and Spenlehaur (2009) in their meta-
analysis of policing across seven countries. Ferret and Spenlehaur (2009) concluded that 
Ericson and Haggarty͛s theoƌǇ ǁas too all eŶĐoŵpassiŶg to ďe sustaiŶaďle iŶ pƌaĐtiĐe: 
principally because while the police might try to raise awareness of risk and promote 
preventative advice many people are either unaware of these campaigns or chose to ignore 
them (Elder et al, 2004).  
 
Lee and McGovern (2015, p.1), counter to Brodeur and Dupont (2006) and Ferret and 
“peŶlehauƌ ;ϮϬϬϵͿ, aƌgue that ͞ƌisk as aŶ oƌgaŶisiŶg logiĐ has stƌoŶglǇ iŶflueŶĐed the Ŷatuƌe of 
ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ poliĐe/ŵedia/puďliĐ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͟. Foƌ Lee aŶd MĐGovern (2015), how the 
poliĐe iŶ Austƌalia aƌe usiŶg soĐial ŵedia is pƌoof positiǀe of EƌiĐsoŶ aŶd HaggaƌtǇ͛s ;ϭϵϵϳͿ ƌisk 
based communications with the majority of police messages on these channels being about 
public safety and communicating information either about risk or how to avoid it. The 
language of risk has become more subtle but, according to Lee and McGovern (2015), it is also 
undeniably present in how, what and why police forces are communicating and is one of the 
central reasons why public relations has become so important to police forces in recent years.  
 
IŶ AŵeƌiĐa, “uƌette͛s ƌeseaƌĐh ;ϭϵϵϱ; ϮϬϬϭͿ ƌeŵaiŶs oŶe of the ŵost detailed aŶd iŵpoƌtaŶt 
studies into police public relations. Surette (ibid) in his articles noted an increasing 
professionalisation of the police public relations departments during the late 1980s. Surette 
believed that this was due to cost cutting measures which encouraged police forces to replace 
warranted officers with civilian staff in backroom functions, like communications. The most 
interesting point that, according to Surette (2001, p.108), came out of this study was evidence 
of ͞the eǆisteŶĐe of a stƌuĐtuƌal diǀisioŶ͟ ďetǁeeŶ ĐiǀiliaŶ staff aŶd ǁaƌƌaŶted offiĐeƌs ǁithiŶ 
these departments; both in terms of gender, age, education level and the degree of proactivity 
in the department.  
 
“uƌette͛s ;ϮϬϬϭͿ suƌǀeǇs shoǁed that ǁaƌƌaŶted offiĐeƌs teŶded to ďe oldeƌ, ŵale, ǁith 
educational backgrounds in criminal justice and with little media related/communications 
experience prior to joining the public relations department. Civilian staff, however, tended to 
be female, in their thirties with a university education in communications, public relations or 
marketing and with significant experience of working with the media.  
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Surette (2001) also observed that the departments run and staffed by civilians were more 
proactive and progressive than those managed by warranted officers. Given this, Surette 
(2001) contended that the professionalisation of these departments first observed by Chermak 
and Weiss (1997) was most likely to have been driven by the increasing number of civilian 
employees. A similar trend was noted by Mawby (2007), Mawby and Worthington (2003) and 
Kingshott (2011) in the English police. 
 
Gundhus (2013) suggests that the professionalisation of these departments developed in 
tandem with the police desire to control knowledge production. From the late 1980s onwards 
police public relations gained a new degree of professionalism (HMIC, 2001; Mawby, 2002). 
The 1980s saw the intƌoduĐtioŶ of Đoƌpoƌate teƌŵiŶologǇ, suĐh as ͚Đoƌpoƌate ideŶtitǇ͛, 
͚ƌeputatioŶ ŵaŶageŵeŶt͛ aŶd ͚Đoƌpoƌate iŵage͛, iŶto the laŶguage of the Bƌitish poliĐe 
;MaǁďǇ, ϮϬϬϮͿ. IŶdeed, it ǁas ƌeŵaƌked upoŶ ďǇ the HMIC ƌepoƌt ͚OpeŶ All Houƌs͛ ;ϮϬϬϭͿ that 
backroom policing functions were becoming increasingly professionalised and corporate – 
both in appearance and function. The police occupy a privileged position in terms of being in 
demand by the media and other agencies to provide news and information on crime, risk and 
insecurity (Ericson, 1990). As the demand has grown so police public relations departments 
have had to evolve to cater to it (Wilson et al, 2011).  
 
MaǁďǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϳͿ ƌeseaƌĐh iŶto poliĐe puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs is uŶusual iŶ the seŶse that Ŷot oŶlǇ is it 
the only longitudinal study on the subject, starting during the mid-1990s and continuing 
through to 2007, but it also includes an in-depth ethnographic case study of public relations in 
the South Yorkshire police. Over the course of his research, Mawby (ibid) has noted a general 
increase in both the size of these departments and in the ratio of civilian to warranted officers 
employed in them. According to Mawby (2002), prior to the Wolf-Olins report in 1987 most 
public relations departments were staffed by warranted officers. During the early 1990s, 
however, police forces increasingly started replacing warranted officers with civilian staff to 
the point where by 2001 82% of forces were recruiting civilian staff, 87% of department staff 
across the country were civilian experts recruited from journalism, marketing and public 
relations backgrounds and 85% of department heads were now civilians. In 32 of the 50 forces 
canvassed (64%) by his survey, Mawby (2002) found that all public relations staff were now 
civilians; compared to the 52% reported in the 1996/7 survey.  
 
40 
 
While Mawby (2002; 2007) did not go into quite the same level of comparative detail between 
civilian and warranted staff as Surette (2001), he did note that police public relations 
departments were developing at different rates and in different ways across the police service 
iŶ EŶglaŶd. “uĐh aŶ oďseƌǀatioŶ is paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ iŶteƌestiŶg iŶ light of “uƌette͛s ;ϮϬϬϭͿ theoƌǇ 
that departments staffed and run by warranted officers would show discernible differences in 
how proactive and innovative they were when it came to communication and public 
engagement.   
 
From his research, Mawby (2002, p.177) concluded that there were three emergent, or 
͞plausiďle possiďilities͟ ƌegaƌdiŶg the ĐuƌƌeŶt aŶd futuƌe sigŶifiĐaŶĐe of puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs ;͚iŵage 
ǁoƌk͛Ϳ iŶ poliĐiŶg.  
1. Marginal: Public relations as a marginal or insignificant part of police work; there to 
provide the police with a buffer against potential public back-lash from unpopular police 
work but still distinct froŵ ͚ƌeal poliĐe ǁoƌk͛. PuďliĐ ƌelatioŶs aĐtiǀities aƌe ƌestƌiĐted to 
department staff and the departments themselves occupy a low position in the 
organisational hierarchy.  
 
2. Supportive: Public relations as supportive image work. Image work is considered more 
significant by the organisation and has a higher position within the hierarchy. It is 
͞foƌŵallǇ ƌeĐogŶised aŶd haƌŶessed ďǇ the poliĐe seƌǀiĐe to assist foƌĐes iŶ ĐopiŶg ǁith 
theiƌ eǆteƌŶal eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt ǁhiĐh the ŵass ŵedia peƌǀade͟ aŶd as a ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe is 
allotted more resources (ibid, p.179). However, image work is still considered separate 
and distinct from police work with the heads of these departments occupying an 
͚adǀisoƌǇ͛ ƌole ǁithiŶ the seŶioƌ ŵaŶageŵeŶt of the poliĐe foƌĐe ďut ǁith Ŷo ƌeal poǁer 
or influence.  
 
3. Core: ͞PoliĐe ǁoƌk ďeĐoŵes iŵage ǁoƌk͟. This sĐeŶaƌio is the ŵost ĐoŵpƌeheŶsiǀe aŶd 
far reaching: public relations departments become embedded within the organisation 
hierarchy while communications work becomes an integrated facet of the police force. In 
this sĐeŶaƌio staff aŶd offiĐeƌs ǁill ǁoƌk togetheƌ, ͞ĐollapsiŶg the deŵaƌĐatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ 
opeƌatioŶal poliĐiŶg aŶd ͚ďolt-oŶ͛ iŵage ǁoƌk, suĐh that all are image workers, who 
shape what policing is in the mass-ŵediated eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt͟ ;iďid p.ϭ81). 
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Mawby (2002, p.181) argued that while there were traces of all three, police public relations is 
predominantly a mixture of the first and second scenarios; albeit weighted more towards the 
second. He concluded that there was, at the time of his reseaƌĐh, ͞toe-holds of the ͚Đoƌe͛ 
sĐeŶaƌio͟, ďut thought that fuƌtheƌ deǀelopŵeŶt of this sĐeŶaƌio ǁas ͞oƌgaŶisatioŶallǇ 
uŶfeasiďle at pƌeseŶt͟.  
 
Mawby (2002, p.184) proposed that the evidence of all three scenarios in modern policing 
͞highlights the Đoŵpleǆ nature of image work and the scope for convergence and divergence 
in the practice of forty-thƌee oƌgaŶisatioŶ͟. He fuƌtheƌ hǇpothesised that giǀeŶ the gƌoǁiŶg 
iŵpoƌtaŶĐe aƌouŶd the ͞ŵaŶageŵeŶt of ǀisiďilitǇ͟ it ǁas possiďle poliĐe foƌĐes ǁould ŵoǀe 
increasiŶglǇ toǁaƌds the thiƌd sĐeŶaƌio aŶd puƌsue aŶ appƌoaĐh ǁhiĐh ǁould ͞iŶǀolǀe the 
deǀelopŵeŶt of pƌess aŶd puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs offiĐes Ŷot as optioŶal ͚ďolt-oŶ͛ auǆiliaƌǇ 
depaƌtŵeŶts ǁhiĐh ͚ŵaŶage͛ the ŵedia aŶd uŶdeƌtake puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs tasks͟ ǁheŶ Ŷeeded 
but to use ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ iŶ aŶ ͞iŶtegƌated ŵaŶŶeƌ aĐƌoss poliĐiŶg fuŶĐtioŶs to… alloǁ foƌ 
ĐoŶsultatioŶ aŶd dialogue͟ ;MaǁďǇ, ϮϬϬϮ p.ϭϵϴͿ.  
 
It is interesting to note that over a decade later a similar disparity was found in a survey 
commissioned by APComm (ACPO, 2014). This survey was intended to find how the 684 
ŵeŵďeƌs ͞ǀieǁed theiƌ ƌole iŶ poliĐe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs ďoth ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ aŶd goiŶg foƌǁaƌd͟ ;ibid, 
p5). The survey found that the value placed on communications and the operational position 
of these departments varied significantly across different police forces. While 87% of 
ƌespoŶdeŶts felt that theiƌ foƌĐe ǀalued theiƌ ǁoƌk ͞to soŵe eǆteŶt͟ a fifth said that ͞theǇ 
didŶ͛t ďelieǀe speĐialist ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ ǁas appƌeĐiated ďǇ theiƌ oƌgaŶisatioŶ͟ ;Iďid, p.ϯͿ and 
nearly half (48%) felt that they were unable to influence changes or had no impact. A common 
complaint across most respondent groups was the lack of support from police officers and the 
ǀieǁ that poliĐe offiĐeƌs ͞kŶoǁ ďest͟ ;Ibid, 2014 p.14). It is also interesting that despite a move 
aǁaǇ fƌoŵ puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs teƌŵiŶologǇ, ϱϵ% of ƌespoŶdeŶts said that ͚P‘͛ ǁas still oŶe of theiƌ 
regular areas of responsibility (ACPO, 2014 p.7).  
 
1.4.2 Research Limitations 
One of the reasons why there is such limited understanding of what public relations is in a 
policing context is due to the skeletal history we have of its evolution in the English police – 
particularly with respect to constabularies other than the MPS Mawby (2002) observes that of 
all the police forces in England the MPS is the best known, the most researched and the best 
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documented; this has led to it being used as the model, or dominant story, through which 
academics look at the history of the police. In comparison, the experience and development of 
public relations in the other, smaller constabularies, has tended to be overlooked or forgotten 
(Wood, 2013).  
 
Part of the reason for this has been the frequent reorganisations and changes the county forces 
have undergone over the last one hundred and fifty years. In 1900 there were 243 separate 
forces across England, Wales and Scotland. Following the Police Act of 1946, and then later the 
Police Act of 1964, this number reduced to 47 forces in England and Wales as many of the 
smaller town forces merged with county constabularies in the pursuit of greater efficiency
6
. 
There are currently 39 constabularies in England, although several of the interviewees during 
the course of this research expressed the view that it is possible that more forces may follow 
West MeƌĐia ĐoŶstaďulaƌǇ͛s lead aŶd ŵeƌge ǁith theiƌ Ŷeighďouƌs iŶ the futuƌe giǀeŶ the 
economic problems they are facing (PI.17, PI.22 and PI.23). In the process of merging and 
restructuring aspects of these forces, historical information has been lost or confused. The 
absence of this information can make accurately tracing the development of something like 
public relations rather difficult. An example of this, is that many of the police forces can only 
estimate when they first established these departments; several only identifying the decade 
(Appendix 3.2).  
 
The diffiĐultǇ, Cooke aŶd “tuƌgis ;ϮϬϬϵͿ poiŶt out, is that ǁhile the ͚poliĐe͛ iŶ EŶglaŶd aƌe ofteŶ 
spoken of as a homogenous, unified agency, in truth the forces are individual units akin to 
separate cogs in a much greater machine. The incomplete history we have of public relations in 
county forces has contributed to the MPS becoming the dominant storyteller; however, the 
MPS is also a force like no other (Reiner, 2010) which raises questions over how applicable the 
experiences and practices of this force are to other constabularies. For Miller (2005), the 
history of policing is naturally contentious and difficult to study and should be recognised as 
such. Each force has its own unique history based on an individual socio-historical context and 
development responding to local problems and tensions. As such, Miller (2005) argues, it is 
unwise to assume that what applies to one force necessarily applies to all the others; how and 
why public relations developed in the MPS may not be the case elsewhere and as Mouzelis 
(2008) warns,  not all data can be generalised . Lack of research in this area and the information 
                                           
6
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that has been lost through mergers and poor record keeping, however, have resulted in just 
this generalisation occurring.  
 
This dearth of research has also led to another issue which should be acknowledged. Due to the 
patchy knowledge base we have of police public relations in England, literature from other 
countries was consulted in order to act as an alternative. While it is interesting to note that 
public relations in the police seems to be a global phenomenon, rather than uniquely British, 
there is a question over how applicable foreign research and ideas are when applied to a 
different police foƌĐe, like the EŶglish poliĐe. “uƌette͛s ;ϮϬϬϭͿ oďseƌǀatioŶ that theƌe ǁas a 
difference between civilian and police led public relations departments is a good example of 
this. “iŵilaƌlǇ, theƌe ŵust also ďe a ƋuestioŶ oǀeƌ hoǁ appliĐaďle Lee aŶd MĐGoǀeƌŶ͛s ;2014) 
aŶalǇsis of AustƌaliaŶ poliĐe foƌĐes͛ ƌelatioŶship ǁith the Ŷeǁs ŵedia is to the situatioŶ ǁith 
English police forces.   
 
The lack of research has only further exacerbated the methodological limitations of the 
research that has been carried out. Most studies, with the exception of Mawby (2007), have 
concentrated on a limited number of forces. Cooke and Sturgis (2009), for example, compared 
the public relations departments of Derbyshire and Leicestershire police forces; while Mawby 
(2002) in his ethnographic case study of police public relations concentrated primarily on South 
Yorkshire police. Equally, the evaluative studies of Steenhuis (1980), De Vries et al (2003), 
Weitzer and Tuck (2004), Bradford et al (2009), Wunsch and Holh (2009), Holh et al (2010), 
Hough et al (2010), Mazerolle, Bennet, Manning, Gerguson and Sargeant (2010), Huq, Tyler and 
Schulhofer (2011), Holh, Stanko and Newburn (2012) and Murphy, Mazerolle and Bennett 
(2014) all concentrate on small, isolated geographical areas from which general hypotheses are 
then drawn.  
 
The reasons for this are both practical and sensible as it would be unfeasible to devote the level 
of time and attention to every force in England as one can in a limited study looking at only a 
small number of police forces or a specific geographical area. The corollary of this is that, just 
as with the history of public relations, we are left extrapolating generalisations from a small 
sample group which are then applied to all the forces in England. There is always the problem 
with research of the stone left unturned. Research by its very nature must be self-limiting, 
otherwise it would never be finished (Silverman, 2011). The difficulty here is the number of 
stones not yet looked under – thirty-four (87%), in fact, if you discount Devon and Cornwall 
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police (Kingshott, 2011), Derbyshire and Leicestershire (Cooke and Sturgis, 2009), South 
Yorkshire (Mawby, 2002) and the MPS (Mawby, 2002; Holh, Bradford and Stanko, 2010; Hough 
et al, 2010); which is a significant number.  
 
The most significant difficulty with the existing research in this area, however, is that most 
studies aƌe Ŷoǁ seǀeƌal Ǉeaƌs old ǁith soŵe, iŶ the Đase of MaǁďǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϮͿ seŵiŶal Đase studǇ 
of “outh Yoƌkshiƌe poliĐe aŶd “uƌette͛s ;ϮϬϬϭͿ suƌǀeǇ of puďliĐ ƌelations officers in America, 
conducted over a decade ago. The problem is that communications is a fast changing area. Lee 
and McGovern (2014, p.213) point out in their research into public relations in Australia police 
foƌĐes that ͞the ǁoƌld of poliĐe ŵedia and public relations is ever changing, expanding and 
highlǇ ǀolatile͟ ǁhiĐh ǁithiŶ a feǁ Ǉeaƌs ǁill pƌoďaďlǇ Ŷot ƌeseŵďle the situatioŶ disĐussed iŶ 
any research now.  
 
There is a need for updated information on how and what police forces are doing with regard 
to ͚iŵage ǁoƌk͛ aŶd puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs – particularly given the recent inclusion of social media in 
the police communications arsenal; a development which is discussed further in the next 
section.  
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1.5 Social Media 
 
͞EffeĐtiǀe eŶgageŵeŶt is at the heart of policing. The revolution in digital technology 
means that people are engaging with services at their convenience and in the 
manner, medium and at a time which suits them. The police service is starting to 
engage and be engaged in ways that are unpreĐedeŶted iŶ the history of UK poliĐiŶg͟  
(Nick Kean cited in Engage, (NPIA, 2010, p.4). 
 
One of the most significant developments in the communications industry over the last decade 
has been the advent of social media. A recent study by the Parliament Street Research Team 
;ϮϬϭϰͿ ĐoŶĐluded that ͞FaĐeďook aŶd Tǁitteƌ aƌe the defiŶiŶg pƌoduĐts of ouƌ age, tools that 
haǀe ĐhaŶged the ǁaǇ ǁe iŶteƌaĐt, ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate aŶd liǀe͟. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to HeŵsleǇ aŶd MasoŶ 
(2013), social media has drastically altered the way information travels, how knowledge is 
managed and the way relationships are formed and maintained. The consequence of this has 
ďeeŶ a Ŷeǁ diŵeŶsioŶ to the poǁeƌ of ͚ǀoǆ populi͛ aŶd a gƌoǁiŶg deŵaŶd foƌ deŵoŶstƌaďlǇ 
open and accountable governance (Brainard and McNutt, 2010; Goldsmith, 2010).  This has led 
to companies, organisations and people with public personas or offices facing increasing 
pressure to embrace this new technology and build digital support and information networks 
(Ayres, 2011; Warren et al, 2014).  
 
The teƌŵ ͚soĐial ŵedia͛ ƌefeƌs to a set of oŶliŶe platfoƌŵs desigŶed to eŶĐouƌage soĐial 
interaction between different and diverse audiences who might never meet or engage in the 
real world (Fisher, 2009; Information Age, 2011)
7
. The last five years has witnessed a significant 
uptake in the use of digital and social media technologies. Data collected by the Office for 
National Statistics suggests that approximately 78% of adults in England are now accessing the 
internet and just over half are using social media on a regular basis (ONS, 2014). It was 
estimated by Twitter in 2012 that there were approximately 140 million Twitter users 
worldwide with 10 million living in the UK (Arthur, 2012). By 2014 the number of accounts 
registered in the UK had increased to 15 million (Twitter, 2015). Similarly, Facebook reported 
that they had 31 million active accounts in the UK (McGrory, 2014). As of 2015, research 
suggests that Facebook is the favourite platform globally and in the UK is thought to have 43% 
of the populatioŶ usiŶg the site Đoŵpaƌed to Tǁitteƌ͛s ŵoƌe ŵodest ϭϵ% ;MĐGƌoƌǇ, ϮϬϭϲͿ.   
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Four years before Mark Zuckerberg first launched Facebook and six before the first tweet was 
seŶt, West ;ϮϬϬϬ, p.ϮͿ pƌediĐted ǁhat he Đalled the ƌise of ͞E-goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͟. Foƌ West (2000), 
the growing use and usefulness of the internet was not just as a repository of knowledge but a 
potential vehicle through which governments could increasingly provide low cost services and 
information online to a far greater audience than they could usually reach. Nearly a decade 
afteƌ West͛s ƌeseaƌĐh the fiƌst poliĐe foƌĐe iŶ EŶglaŶd Đƌeated a Đoƌpoƌate Tǁitteƌ aĐĐouŶt.  
 
Recognising the growing importance and practical uses social media has, the NPIA
8
 released 
the first official national police guide in 2010. The aim of this document was to help police 
forces, and individual officers, use social media as a means of communication. Engage (NPIA, 
ϮϬϭϬ, p.ϮϬͿ Đalled foƌ a ĐhaŶge iŶ stƌategǇ fƌoŵ ͞siŵplǇ puďlishiŶg iŶfoƌŵatioŶ iŶto soĐial 
media spaĐes, to fullǇ eŶgagiŶg ǁith ouƌ oŶliŶe ĐoŵŵuŶities͟ thƌough the use of soĐial ŵedia. 
As Fisheƌ ;ϮϬϬϵͿ eǆplaiŶed ͞soĐial ŵedia seeŵs to pƌoǀide aŶ esseŶtial ĐoŶduit ďetǁeeŶ the 
police and the public. As a reflection of the world around them, police need to communicate 
with the public with greater frequency, speed, and informality. People want to hear from, and 
talk to the poliĐe ǁheŶeǀeƌ theǇ aƌe, iŶ a ǁaǇ ǁhiĐh suits theŵ͟.  
 
1.5.1 A Brief History of the English Police and Social Media 
By December 2008 seven forces had a Facebook page while one (West Midlands) police force 
had a registered corporate Twitter account. By July 2011 all police forces in England had a 
corporate Twitter account while 33 had a Facebook page (Fig 1.3).  
 
Jeremy Crump (2011), however, in his study of police use of Twitter noted that while there 
were a few notable exceptions police adoption of social media was slow, and in some forces 
obviously reluctant.  According to Proctor, Crump, Karstedt, Voss and Cantijock (2013) the 
main catalyst for police digital activity was the London Riots in August 2011. In their research, 
Proctor et al (2013) reported that prior to the riots the MPS had around 3000 followers on 
Twitter. Between August 6th and 21st this number increased to over 30,000 with similar 
results being recorded in other forces.  
 
The riots in 2011 highlighted the importance of an active police presence online – not just from 
a surveillance and operational policing perspective (Wall and Williams, 2013) but in order to 
                                           
8
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manage the flow of information, correct misinformation and rumours, reassure the public, 
improve police visibility, and keep the public informed about trouble areas, road closures and 
what they were doing. During this period the police became the go-to source for information; 
replacing the media as the primary provider of breaking news (Reicher and Stott, 2011). 
Proctor et al (2013) also point out, however, that how the police used social media during this 
period was not always effective or consistent in order to combat misinformation and reassure 
the public.  
   
 
Fig 1.3 
 
A similar point was raised by the HMIC in their report on the riots. The report suggested that 
oŶe of the ĐoŶtƌiďutiŶg faĐtoƌs iŶ the outďƌeak of the ƌiots ǁas that the MP“ had ͞stalled iŶ its 
communications both with the local community and with the national press in the immediate 
aftermath of the shooting of Mark Duggan on Tuesday 4th August and did not recover until 
disoƌdeƌ had ďeĐoŵe estaďlished͟ ;HMIC ϮϬϭϭď, p.ϲϵͿ. The HMIC ;ϮϬϭϭͿ iŶǀestigatioŶ found 
that rumours of a police execution had been circulating from the morning of the 5th of August 
but that this was not challenged until the IPCC made a statement late on the 7th. Hough et al 
(2011) in their analysis of the London Riots found much the same: lack of communication, poor 
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community engagement and a difficult relationship with the police helped escalate the 
tensions which led to the riots 
 
͞The poliĐe͟, HMIC ;ϮϬϭϭď p.ϯϬͿ ĐoŶĐluded, ͞haǀe ŵuĐh to leaƌŶ aďout soĐial ŵedia, aŶd the 
quickly shifting modern communications of today. With some notable exceptions, the power 
of this kind of media (both sending out and receiving information) is not well understood and 
less ǁell ŵaŶaged͟. OŶe suĐh eǆĐeptioŶ ideŶtified ǁas West MidlaŶds poliĐe ǁho Đƌeated a 
dediĐated aƌea oŶ theiƌ foƌĐe ǁeďsite ͞to pƌoǀide a oŶe stop shop foƌ disoƌdeƌ ƌelated 
ŵessagiŶg͟ ǁhiĐh aĐĐoƌdiŶg to HMIC figuƌes ͞OŶ its fiƌst daǇ it ƌeĐeiǀed ϯϬϬ,ϬϬϬ ǀisits – about 
the same as their combined web and mobile sites normally receive in a month (HMIC 2011b, 
p.31). In the main, however, police forces across the country, and particularly in the affected 
areas, were slow to respond and adapt to using social media effectively. Proctor et al (2013) 
found in their analysis of police online activity during the riots that there was a general lack of 
dialogue and engagement from the police and that many officers and forces failed to use the 
hash tag function
9
 which excluded them from many of the conversations taking place online 
and limited the audience who received, and paid attention, to police messages. 
 
Meijer and Thaens (2013, p.1) argue that social media is the way forward for police forces 
faĐiŶg iŶĐƌeasiŶg ďudget ĐoŶstƌaiŶts. ͞“oĐial ŵedia͟, theǇ suggests, holds ͞the pƌoŵise of 
increasing the effectiveness and legitimacy of the public sector by facilitating communication 
aŶd ĐooƌdiŶatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ a ǀaƌietǇ of iŶteƌŶal aŶd eǆteƌŶal stakeholdeƌs͟. “iŵilaƌ thoughts 
have been expressed by Connor (2015) and Brainard and Edlin (2015).  
 
The previous section (1.4) discussed the extent and limitations of research into police public 
relations. Social media is of particular interest in the study of public relations as it is the first 
technology which not just offers but encourages users and organisations to move away from 
traditional one-way broadcasting communication models and towards a dialogue (Heverin and 
Zach, 2010) or what Grunig (1989) called two-way models of public relations. For Mathauer 
;ϮϬϭϬ, p.ϴϬͿ, ͞the soĐial ŵedia Ŷeǁsƌooŵ is a dǇŶaŵiĐ iŶfoƌŵation and communication 
platform on which the company combines classic public relations content with the contents of 
various web 2.0 services aggregated to build a comprehensive and sustained dialogue with its 
taƌget gƌoups͟. “oĐial ŵedia has ƌeǀolutioŶised the communications industry and yet, as with 
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police public relations in general, there has been so far little interest directed at understanding 
how the police in England are adapting to the challenges of using this new technology; or, if it 
is working (Connor, 2015).  
 
Given that social media is an emerging area of academic interest; it is, perhaps, not surprising 
that there are only a few studies looking at it. In terms of research looking at the English police 
there is the work of Crump (2011) and Proctor et al (2013) which examined police use of 
Twitter during the London riots in August 2011; Goldsmith (2010; 2013) who looked at the 
dangers of social media in a policing environment, police misuse and abuse of social media and 
the implications social media has for police visibility; Greer and McLaughlin (2010) who 
discussed the rise of citizen journalism and how this has affected the police – media 
relationship; and Wall and Williams (2013) who studied the feasibility of using social media to 
monitor tensions within specific neighbourhoods to predict future civil unrest.   
 
1.5.2 Police and the News Media 
Lee aŶd MĐGoǀeƌŶ ;ϮϬϭϯa, p.ϭϲϲͿ ďelieǀe that ͞poliĐe oƌgaŶizatioŶs haǀe ďeĐoŵe iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ 
adept in managing and controlling their media image, heralding a new era of police-media 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs, oŶe that is pƌoaĐtiǀe iŶ Ŷatuƌe͟.  
 
One of the most interesting consequences of social media is the change it has wrought on the 
relationship between police forces and the news media. Before, the news media was the 
primary means of mass communication for the police (Peelo, 2005). Chibnall (1979), in his 
seminal studies of police – press relations, argued that while the power dynamic in the police – 
press relationship was skewed firmly in the favour of the police as the legitimate providers of 
crime news, there were two redeeming aspects which helped to re-balance the relationship: 
firstly, the investigative abilities of the crime reporters to locate and publish information the 
police did not want them to have and secondly, the fact that the police needed the press in 
order to communicate with the public (Skolnick and McCoy, 1984).  
 
This is no longer the situation. Social media allows the police to talk directly to their audience 
at a time and in a context which they control (Brainard and McNutt, 2010). As the New South 
Wales Coƌpoƌate CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs UŶit ;ϮϬϭϯͿ eǆplaiŶed; soĐial ŵedia ͞alloǁs us to ďǇpass the 
traditional media and deliver our messages directly to the public, without the filter or editing 
applied by jouƌŶalists.͟ IŶ adoptiŶg this appƌoaĐh, Neǁ “outh Wales poliĐe haǀe esseŶtiallǇ Đut 
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out the middle man and thus significantly altered the dynamic of the relationship between 
police and press. Lee and McGovern (2013) found in their content analysis of crime reporting 
in Australia that in one month 67% of all crime related stories came from the police public 
relations office and were reported almost verbatim.  
 
A similar change in crime reporting has been noted by Chermak and Weiss (2005), by Mawby 
(2014) and Boyle (1999). This change has been partly explained by the increasing financial 
constraints on journalists which restrict their activities and has led to a decline in the number 
of dedicated crime reporters. In such a climate it is significantly easier and quicker to print the 
official police story (Lee and McGovern, 2014).  
 
According to Greer and McLaughlin (2010), however, social media should not be viewed as an 
unqualified positive for the police - as the events surrounding the death of Ian Tomlinson 
during the 2009 G20 Summit demonstrated. The rise of citizen journalism has been, and 
continues to be, one of the most significant threats to the hegemony of news production. The 
advent of mobile phones, digital cameras and a culture of social networking and posting online 
means that there are now millions of potential journalists already present at every event 
ǁheƌe oŶĐe theƌe ǁeƌe ĐleaƌlǇ deŵaƌked ͚pƌess͛ ǁho Đould ďe ŵaŶaged aŶd kept out of the 
way (Greer and McLaughlin, 2010; Wilson et al, 2011).  
 
Lee aŶd MĐGoǀeƌŶ ;ϮϬϭϯ, p.ϭϬϱͿ poiŶt out the iƌoŶǇ that ͞as poliĐiŶg has deǀeloped 
increasingly sophisticated models of shrivelling the public, it has simultaneously come under 
increasing scrutiny from interested audiences – open through the very same new surveillance 
teĐhŶologies͟. “oĐial ŵedia ŵight giǀe the appeaƌaŶĐe of alloǁiŶg poliĐe to doŵiŶate Ŷeǁs 
production but it also focuses the spot light on police forces in a new and unprecedented way; 
enabling what Mathiesen (1997) referred to as a synopticon society - where the many watch 
the few (Trottier, 2015).  
 
One area that would benefit from further research is in looking at how police forces are 
adapting to this change; both in terms of visibility and in the altered dynamic with their long 
staŶdiŶg ͚fƌeŶeŵǇ͛, the Ŷeǁs ŵedia. IŶ the aďseŶĐe of ƌeseaƌĐh the iŵpliĐatioŶ is that this 
change is one that will have benefited police forces – this might not, however, be the case.   
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1.5.3 Policing and Social Media 
Traditionally, police communications has been one-way broadcasting aimed at pushing 
information into the public sphere (see 1.1; 1.3). This raises the question - how are the police 
in England using social media and has this changed since Crump (2011) and Proctor et al (2013) 
completed their studies? The difficulty in attempting to answer this question is the lack of 
recent research looking at communication in the English police. There have been several 
recent studies looking at social media in police forces across America, Canada and Australia 
which have yielded interesting results.  Given the dearth of information in this country, the 
following discussion primarily looks at these studies in order to provide a comparison and 
highlight some of the research gaps.  
 
According to Meijer and Thaens (2013, p.343) social media is now being used by the police in 
AŵeƌiĐa to ͞eŶhaŶĐe ĐitizeŶs iŶput iŶ poliĐe iŶǀestigatioŶs, to stƌeŶgtheŶ the puďliĐ iŵage of 
police departments, to control crowds, to tackle crisis situations, to obtain better input in 
police-making processes aŶd to attƌaĐt Ŷeǁ poliĐe offiĐeƌs.͟ IŶ CaŶada, “ĐhŶeideƌ ;ϮϬϭϰ, p.ϭϰͿ 
argues, social media has become the means by which police officers and forces are reinventing 
theŵselǀes foƌ the ŵodeƌŶ age iŶ oƌdeƌ to ͞eŶĐouƌage sǇŵďoliĐ suppoƌt͟ fƌoŵ aŶ iŶĐƌeasingly 
disenfranchised community. And in Australia, Lee and McGovern (2013) found evidence of 
significant engagement between police and public with police officers regularly posting 
updates on crime risks, recent arrests and crime prevention tips. The aim, Lee and McGovern 
;ϮϬϭϯ, p.ϭϭϱͿ suggested, ǁas to Đƌeate ͞a ǀiƌtual pƌeseŶĐe to let the ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ kŶoǁ that the 
loĐal poliĐe aƌe suĐĐessfullǇ peƌfoƌŵiŶg theiƌ poliĐiŶg͟.  
 
Following an in-depth analysis of government e-communications in America, Mergel (2012) 
pƌoposed fouƌ stƌategies foƌ soĐial ŵedia use ďased oŶ GƌuŶig͛s ;ϭϵϴϵͿ puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs ŵodel: 
1) Push: one-way, non-interactional communication which positions citizens as the 
audience. In this model, social media is simply a broadcasting channel for official 
discourse. Focused on reputation management and brand message it is closely 
associated with Grunig (1989) Press Agency model.  
 
2) Pull: this model seeks to improve the organisations image and build good relations 
with citizens in order to create and maintain an audience. With Pull communication 
audiences are encouraged to start interacting with the organisation by answering 
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questions and giving it information; such as customer feedback surveys and complaint 
forms.  
 
3) Network: highly interactive, this model encourages engagement in a group/network 
discussion. On Twitter this is often facilitated by use of hashtags which allows users to 
quickly find, categorise and join conversations on a particular topic.  This approach 
allows organisations to listen passively, or become involved, in audience 
conversations. It is a useful source for fact-checking, monitoring opinion and building 
trusted relationships in an online community.  
 
4) Transaction: this model builds upon the previous three to position the audience as the 
business partners of the organisation. Social media in this model becomes an 
environment for actual transactions between the organisation and the individual.   
 
Meijer and Thaens (2013) in their study of social media in American police departments 
concluded ǁhile theƌe ǁas Ŷo eǀideŶĐe of Meƌgel͛s ;ϮϬϭϮͿ ͚TƌaŶsaĐtioŶ ŵodel͛ ŵost poliĐe 
depaƌtŵeŶts shoǁed a ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ of ͚Push͛, ͚Pull͛ aŶd ͚Netǁoƌk͛ stƌategies iŶ theiƌ oŶliŶe 
interactions and behaviour.  The authors also found, however, that the evidence of Push, Pull 
and Networking communications was more often the result of individuals reacting to different 
circumstances and audiences than as a consequence of formal strategic plans.  
 
Brainard and McNutt (2010) and Brainard and Edlins (2015) found similar results in their 
studies into how police were using social media. According to Brainard and McNutt (ibid) there 
was very little evidence of engagement or collaborative problem solving between police and 
public in Yahoo! groups and that the NYPD
10
 was mostlǇ usiŶg theŵ as a ĐhaŶŶel foƌ ͚pushiŶg͛ 
information into the public domain. Five years later and Brainard and Edlins (2015) reported 
fiŶdiŶgs ĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith BƌaiŶaƌd͛s oƌigiŶal studǇ ;BƌaiŶaƌd aŶd MĐNutt, ϮϬϭϬͿ. BƌaiŶaƌd aŶd 
Edlins (2015, p.728) concluded that ͞ǁhile PDs haǀe aŶd use soĐial ŵedia aŶd ǁhile ĐitizeŶs 
are responsive, there is much less interaction in part due to the non-responsiveness of PDs 
theŵselǀes͟. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to BƌaiŶaƌd aŶd EdliŶs ;ϮϬϭϱͿ, FaĐeďook shoǁed soŵe positiǀe sigŶs of 
sustained interaction and network building the majority of police departments remained set in 
͚push͛.  
                                           
10
 New York Police department 
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These observations were further supported by a survey conducted by Market Research 
company LexisNexis (2012) into social media in American law enforcement. The report by 
LeǆisNeǆis ;ϮϬϭϮͿ fouŶd a stƌoŶg eŵphasis oŶ ͚push͛ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs, ŵiǆed eǀideŶĐe of 
engagement and a sometimes uncomfortable relationship between social media and serving 
police officers; with police officers reluctant to use the new technology. Across the border in 
Canada, an IACP (2011) survey into how Canadian police forces were using social media found 
that just under half of the forces surveyed (42.9%) were using social media for public relations 
purposes while 49.9% were using it as a means of notifying the public about incidents, crime 
updates and road closures.  
 
One interesting difference highlighted by both the IACP (2011) and LexisNexis (2012) surveys 
ǁheŶ Đoŵpaƌed to JeƌeŵǇ Cƌuŵp͛s ;ϮϬϭϭͿ ƌeseaƌĐh ǁas ƌegaƌdiŶg poliĐe foƌĐes͛ faǀouƌed 
social media sites.  There was a clear preference for Facebook that was shown by both 
Canadian and American police forces in 2011; with 75% of Canadian forces using Facebook 
compared to 33.6% using Twitter (IACP, 2011).  Crump (2011), however, found the reverse was 
the case with English forces who used Twitter more often.  
 
Leiberman, Koetzel and Sakiyama (2013) suggest that this difference might be partly due to 
how police forces are using social media. IACP (2011) reported that 71.1% of respondents were 
using social media as part of criminal investigations; similarly, LexisNexis (2012) found that 
69% of respondents were using social media for criminal investigations with only 26% using 
social media sites for community outreach, public relations activities or community 
engagement. In England, however, police use of social media began as a means of community 
engagement, taking off during the 2011 London Riots as a means of crisis communication and 
public order management (Proctor et al, 2013); it was only later adopted as a tool for 
investigation (Williams et al, 2013).  
 
From an investigative point of view Twitter can be much more difficult to monitor, due to the 
volume of tweets, and the disjointed way conversations appear on the screen. During the 2011 
London riots Proctor et al (2013) noted that one of the problems facing the police was in trying 
to sift through and keep up with the extraordinary amount of information and conversations 
taking place on social media. Facebook, in comparison, is more static and similar to a 
conventional message board in the sense that posts and responses stay grouped together, 
which makes it an invaluable tool for investigations (Leiberman et al, 2013).    
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Social media is a very fast moving environment  and due to the volume of information 
available for researchers, research tends to focus on one or a small selection of police forces 
(Brainard and McNutt, 2010; Crump, 2011; Meijer and Thaens, 2013). As Proctor et al (2013, 
p.ϰϭϯͿ eǆplaiŶ ͞ǁheƌe oŶĐe the ŵaiŶ pƌoďleŵ faĐiŶg soĐial researchers was scarcity of data, 
theǇ ŵust Ŷoǁ Đope ǁith its aďuŶdaŶĐe͟; aŶd the age of Big Data, ǁith its eŶoƌŵous data sets 
has its own problems (Parks, 2014). The most problematic of which is an often unmanageable 
amount of information that then hides the data actually required and distracts researchers 
from the fact that these data sets are still representative samples, albeit very big ones, and 
prone to the same questions about generalisability that smaller sets are. As Gallison (2008) 
points out, aŶ aďuŶdaŶĐe of data ĐaŶ ŵake it as diffiĐult to ͚kŶoǁ ǁhat Ǉou kŶoǁ͛ as a laĐk of 
data ĐaŶ. The daŶgeƌ heƌe is ǁhat is soŵetiŵes ƌefeƌƌed to as ͚paƌalǇsis ďǇ aŶalǇsis͛ 
(Kolakowski, 2015); or, to use a popular idiom, not seeing the wood for the trees. With so 
much readily accessible data it is not always easy to know the right questions to ask or who to 
address them to (Silverman, 2011); which could partly explain why there are currently so few 
studies looking at this aspect of social media.      
  
1.5.4 Problem Areas  
Social media has come to be considered by some as something of a communications panacea 
for the police with multiple operational uses and benefits (Stevens, 2010; NPIA, 2010; Williams 
et al 2013). Platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook, are increasingly viewed as an attractive 
means of strengthening public relations as they are cheap to run, fast and easy to use with 
potentially a large ready-made audience (Meijer and Thaens, 2013). Others, however, have 
pointed out that social media can often be a double edged sword, particularly with regard to 
policing (Goldsmith, 2010; Ayres, 2011; Leiberman et al, 2013). 
 
The first potential problem with social media, which was touched on earlier, is the level of 
scrutiny and visibility it has placed the police under. According to Schneider, 2014 p.15) 
͞Tǁitteƌ, aŶd soĐial ŵedia iŶ geŶeƌal, ƌepƌeseŶt the ŵost ƌeĐeŶt ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ teĐhŶologǇ 
that tuƌŶs all poliĐe ŵatteƌs, iŶĐludiŶg those pƌiǀate aŶd off dutǇ ŵatteƌs iŶto ͚oƌgaŶisatioŶal 
pƌoduĐts͛͟; espeĐiallǇ as social media is increasingly available to all officers as a means of 
public communication rather than remaining under the sole purview of the public relations 
depaƌtŵeŶt ;Goldsŵith, ϮϬϭϯͿ. As the HMIC ;ϮϬϭϭa, p.ϭϭͿ ƌepoƌt ŵakes Đleaƌ, hoǁeǀeƌ; ͞the 
natuƌe of poliĐiŶg ŵakes iŶfoƌŵatioŶ disĐlosuƌe ǀeƌǇ high ƌisk͟. The ǀisiďilitǇ, speed aŶd 
intrusive nature of social media challenges past approaches to knowledge management.  
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Hemsley and Mason (2013) point out that traditionally, knowledge belonged to the 
organisation that produced it and that there were systems in place to manage its flow and who 
could access it. According to Ford and Mason (2013), social media has created an 
unprecedented knowledge ecosystem which requires redefining the capabilities of traditional 
gatekeepers when it comes to ownership and control of information (Ford and Mason, 2013). 
Information is now totally uncontrollable once the genie is out of the bottle (or in this case 
oŶliŶeͿ as ͞oŶĐe Đaptuƌed, the iŶteƌŶet offeƌs a ͚geŶeƌatiǀe͛ system that takes away a 
fundamental means of controlling the flow of information and images from those traditionally 
iŶ Đhaƌge of ďƌoadĐastiŶg͟ ;Li, ϮϬϬϵ Đited iŶ Goldsŵith, ϮϬϭϬ, p.ϵϭϵͿ.  
 
This is a particular problem with regard to indiscretions made online by police officers. 
Goldsmith (2013) noted in his study of police use of social media that there was an increasing 
number of scandals associated with police indiscretions either becoming known online or 
through mistakes made when posting. There have been numerous news articles over the past 
few years detailing the politically incorrect behaviour off duty police officers have been 
involved in (Goldsmith, 2013; Miller, 2013), inappropriate social media messages and wrongful 
disclosure of information/data protection breaches to journalists through social media sites 
(HMIC 2011a). One of the dangers with social media, as Goldsmith (2013) observed, is that it 
encourages, and rewards, familiarity and for users to pursue popularity through the cultivation 
of aŶ oŶliŶe peƌsoŶa as a ͚ŵiĐƌo-ĐeleďƌitǇ͛. WheŶ used ĐoƌƌeĐtlǇ, soĐial ŵedia ĐaŶ ďe aŶ 
effective means of communication, the corollary of this is that when things go wrong there is a 
large audience to witness it and this can have consequences for police reputation and their 
relationship with the public.   
 
This increased visibility is also problematic in another way for the police. Tester (1994 cited in 
Goldsŵith, ϮϬϭϬ p.ϵϭϴͿ aƌgues that the ƌoot of poliĐe poǁeƌ aŶd ͞soǀeƌeigŶtǇ͟ is ďased iŶ theiƌ 
relative anonymity and distance from society. The wide scale use of social media across all 
levels of police forces renders both individual officers and their organisation more knowable to 
the outside public. Schneider (2014, p.12) suggests that social media use by the police creates 
a ͞legitiŵaĐǇ ĐoŶuŶdƌuŵ͟ as, oŶ the oŶe haŶd, poliĐe legitiŵaĐǇ ƌeƋuiƌes ŵiĐƌo leǀel 
acceptance – which social media facilitates – while on the other, at the core of police 
legitimacy is the premise of impersonal authority and therefore kŶoǁiŶg the ͚ŵeŶ͛ ďehiŶd the 
uŶifoƌŵ ŵight aĐt to deĐoŶstƌuĐt that iŵage. This ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ĐloselǇ aligŶs ǁith ‘eiŶeƌ͛s ;ϮϬϭϬͿ 
point about the demystification of the police over the last fifty years that the more visible and 
56 
 
known something is, the less mythical and more fallible that thing becomes (see also 
Bottomley, 1989). Such a concern is not without merit considering the level of attention and 
apprehension surrounding the question of police legitimacy at present (Hawden, 2008).  
 
Secondly, there is a long staŶdiŶg ďelief that ͞theƌe is a ĐoŵfoƌtiŶg eŵotioŶal seĐuƌitǇ iŶ 
seeiŶg that the poliĐe aƌe eǀeƌ pƌeseŶt͟ ;DuĐkfoot, ϮϬϭϮ, p.ϵͿ. But as Lee aŶd MĐGoǀeƌŶ 
(2013b) point out, so far little is known about how virtual encounters impact on public 
perception. There is an increasing body of evidence (see Decker, 1981; Brandl, Frank, Warden 
and Bynum, 1994; Bridenball and Jesilow, 2008; Bradford, 2011) which suggests that citizens 
with the highest satisfaction/confidence levels with the police are those who have no direct 
contact with them. In light of the above, increased virtual visibility of the police might in fact 
increase fear of crime, generate feelings of insecurity and decrease levels of public confidence 
rather than provide reassurance, by making people more aware of problems and crimes than 
they were before (Leiberman et al 2013); particularly if the experience is unpleasant or does 
not meet expectations (Chandek and Porter, 1998; Skogan, 1996, 2006, 2012). 
 
There is also the question of  how to measure the success or efficacy of organisational use of 
social media (Paek et al, 2013). Police use of social media for awareness campaigns such as 
Gƌeateƌ MaŶĐhesteƌ PoliĐe͛s ϮϬϭϰ ƌape aǁaƌeŶess dƌiǀe ;#ŶoĐoŶseŶtŶoseǆͿ aƌe iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ 
popular but, as Gregory (1970) observed, there is not a great deal of point in devoting 
resources to campaigns if you cannot measure or assess the outcome.  
 
Mergel (2014) in her analysis of how Government organisations were using social media in 
America suggested that one of the problems people often found with analysing social media 
was that it is very easy to get distracted away from meaning by the large amounts of 
measurement data there is available on audiences.  For Mergel (2014), the number of 
followers, the number of reposts or likes, engagement or the reach of a post is considerably 
less important than ascertaining whether the original message has achieved the desired 
outcome – which is normally some form of behaviour change from the target audience. 
Measuring behaviour change, however, can be rather challenging (Paek et al, 2013); 
particularly when it comes to crime and policing (Elder et al, 2004), as will be discussed further 
in Chapter 4.  
 
57 
 
MaŶŶiŶg aƌgues that ͞the ǁaǇs iŶ ǁhiĐh the poliĐe oďtaiŶ, pƌoĐess, eŶĐode, deĐode and use 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ aƌe ĐƌitiĐal to uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg theiƌ ŵaŶdate aŶd fuŶĐtioŶ͟ ;ϭϵϵϮ Đited iŶ 
Goldsmith, 2013 p.1). Social media has made organisations, and their staff, more knowable 
and far more visible on a much larger stage (Stevens, 2010; Schneider, 2014). Sites like 
Facebook and Twitter also make it easier to communicate with some difficult to reach 
audiences (Haverin and Zach, 2010), reduce communication costs (Leiberman et al, 2013) and 
help to Đƌeate the poteŶtial foƌ a ͞dialogiĐal͟ appƌoaĐh to puďlic relations (Mawby, 2002 
p.196), 
 
Along with these potential benefits, however, social media also brings new risks, particularly 
for police forces (HMIC, 2011b) and are not necessarily a magic bullet answer to 
communication problems (Donovan, 2016).  Information about the police may be a commodity 
in constant demand (Goldsmith, 2013) but Brainard and McNutt (2010) and Proctor et al 
(2013) found very little evidence of engagement or conversation in their studies of police use 
of social media. Crump (2011) found much the same in the English forces and concluded that 
police use of social media in England was inconsistent and that police forces had not yet 
attained the aspirations set out by the NPIA (2010) in Engage.   
 
Given that the use and study of social media is still in its infancy it is not surprising that there 
are methodological teething problems or concern over how and what to use these new tools 
for. What is apparent, however, is that it is increasingly important to understand how the 
police are using social media, whether this is working, and how the adoption of social media 
has changed police public relations.  
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1.6 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter set out to address two questions: what is public relations and, what role does it 
play in modern policing?  The first part of this chapter discussed some of the underlying 
difficulties and contentions surrounding the study of public relations; beginning with the 
recurrent problem of definition (Harlow, 1976) and ending with the patchy history we have of 
what public relations has meant to the police in the past (Mawby, 2002). The purpose of the 
second part was to explore through the existing literature what is currently known about 
public relations in the police and to set the context in which this research is set.  
 
The introduction of the first official Press Office in the Metropolitan Police Service in 1919 
heralded the start of a general trend towards the centralisation of communication within 
police forces (Young, 1966; Boyle, 1999). Centralisation, however, has not always been a 
smooth, accepted or transparent process. Kingshott (2011, p.251), who served with the Devon 
and Cornwall police as a Media Advisor for several decades, remembers that for a long time 
͞the goldeŶ ƌule ǁas ͚Ŷeǀeƌ eǀeƌ͛ speak to a ƌepoƌteƌ͟. JuŶioƌ offiĐeƌs ǁeƌe disĐouƌaged fƌoŵ 
engaging with journalists as there was a pervading sense that police spokesmen were often 
seeŶ as ͞ďuŵďliŶg aŶd iŶaƌtiĐulate͟ ǁhiĐh oŶlǇ seƌǀed to ĐoŶfiƌŵ puďliĐ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs of poliĐe 
incompetence and reinforced the sense of isolation and distance between police and public. 
Information was not a resource to be made publically available and communication was a 
necessary evil to be endured but not welcomed. This culture, Kingshott (2011) believes, only 
started to change with the introduction of community policing during the late 1990s which 
allowed for a review of the police-ŵedia ƌelatioŶship. FolloǁiŶg this ƌeǀieǁ ͞all offiĐeƌs ǁeƌe 
alloǁed to talk ǁith the ͚pƌess͛͟ so loŶg as the iŶfoƌŵatioŶ ǁas ͞faĐtuallǇ ǁithiŶ their 
kŶoǁledge͟ aŶd that theǇ ͞did Ŷot eǆpƌess aŶǇ opiŶioŶ oƌ Đoŵpƌoŵise aŶǇ oŶ-going 
iŶǀestigatioŶ͟ ;ibid, p.247).  
 
It was noted in part one that over the course of the twentieth century there was a trend 
towards centralisation in policing both locally and nationally (Wood, 2013). Since the 
introduction of community policing, however, there has been a consistent and interesting 
reversal in certain aspects of this with the devolution of communications away from the 
professionals and back to the frontline. Police officers, regardless of rank, are now actively 
encouraged to connect and communicate with members of the public directly through social 
media sites and to maintain a visible online presence (NPIA, 2010). Alongside the official 
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corporate sites, individual officers and Safer Neighbourhood Teams now often have their own 
local social media pages which they are responsible for. There are also a growing number of 
blogs by police officers about their professional lives which have started to attract wide 
readerships and popular acclaim; such as Mental Health Cop who has won multiple awards for 
his blog on mental health and policing
11
. It is important to note, however, the presence of 
police officers online is not always received positively and there have been a number of 
scandals involving police personal and professional use of social media which has reinforced 
cynicism around police culture (Goldsmith, 2010).  
 
Despite the growing recognition of the importance of effective police communication there 
has been comparatively little research into police communications or public relations in the 
age of social media. There has been a great deal of research into the history, practices and 
problems facing the police over the last century. With respect to the area of police public 
relations, however, research since it was first discussed nearly sixty years ago has been quite 
limited. Interest in this subject has waxed and waned since the mid twentieth century when 
the first flurry of scholarly articles and research was published. The first commentators on this 
͚Ŷeǁ͛ pheŶoŵeŶoŶ ǁeƌe pƌiŶĐipallǇ seƌǀiŶg poliĐe offiĐeƌs ǁho ǁeƌe eageƌ to eǆplaiŶ, aŶd 
justify, the growing importance of effective communication with the public and media 
management in order to safeguard the police image from increasing scrutiny (see Clift, 1949; 
Gourley, 1954; McManus, 1955; Young, 1966; Gregory, 1970; Hilton, 1973; Hunt, 1973;).   
 
While there is a smattering of research that looks directly at public relations in the police from 
the police perspective, the majority of research which has been conducted in this area has 
been output rather than process based; looking at either -  
1. The public confidence aspect; principally concentrating on understanding what 
motivates public opinion towards the police and how to improve it. Research in this 
group is usually centred around evaluating the effectiveness of one scheme or 
intervention in a specific area and over a set period (see for example, Bradford, 2012; 
Wentz and Schlimgen, 2012) or looking at the influence of various types of media on 
public opinion (see Media Effects model).  
 
2. The relationship between the media and the police. This area came to the fore during 
the 1970s and has traditionally been based in a critical sociological perspective; 
                                           
11
 https://mentalhealthcop.wordpress.com/ 
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primarily looking at the police-media relationship in terms of power dynamic, 
hegemony and control and usually places the police as the dominant party in the 
partnership (Chermak, 1995; Chibnall, 1981; Sacco, 1998). There are, however, 
different interpretations (Brown, 2008; Lee, Lewis and Powers, 2014) and there is 
certainly some question over whether the police see themselves as the ones in control 
(Surette, 1998; Huey and Broll, 2012Ϳ. The situatioŶ has ĐhaŶged siŶĐe ChiďŶall͛s 
pioneering work. The rise of 24 hour news, the widespread use of social media, the 
introduction of the Freedom of Information Act (2000) to improve the transparency of 
public organisations and the new rules guiding police-media relations after the 
Leveson Inquiry (Mawby, 2014) have significantly altered the police-media landscape.  
 
With the iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ of  soĐial ŵedia as paƌt of poliĐe foƌĐes͛ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs stƌategǇ a Ŷeǁ 
avenue for enquiry has become available for research and there are a growing number of 
studies examining police use of these platforms for communication purposes both in England 
(Goldsmith, 2010; Greer and McLaughlin, 2010; Crump; 2011; Goldsmith, 2013; Proctor et al, 
2013) and America (Brainard and McNutt, 2010; Heverin and Zach, 2010; Meijer and Thaens, 
2013; Leiberman et al, 2013; Schneider, 2014). Social media has profoundly altered how 
people, businesses, organisations and governments communicate with each other.  
 
In 2008, seven police forces had a Facebook page and only one had a registered Twitter 
account. Today each police force in England has an active web presence with constabulary run 
websites and multiple social media pages. Now, all 39 police forces in England have at least 
one Twitter account and a corporate Facebook page, 30 have their own YouTube channel and 
just under half of the constabularies are using at least one other online medium such as 
Audioboo or Flickr (3.1.6). Police adoption of these new technologies, however, has not been 
straightforward, consistent or incident free; and there have been significant concerns raised 
over the possible implications of social media with regard to controlling the flow of 
information, protecting the reputation of the police and whether using social media diminishes 
the authoritarian perception of the police (Lexis Nexis, 2011; Schneider, 2014; Connor, 2015).  
There is also wide spread debate about how to measure the success, failure and effectiveness 
of social, and digital, media use (Mergel, 2014).  
 
The area of police public relations is important because how police forces communicate with 
theiƌ puďliĐs shoǁs Ŷot just ͚ǁhat͛ theǇ aƌe saǇiŶg ďut also ǁhat ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶs theǇ ǁaŶt to ďe 
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a part of, the image they wish to project, who they perceive to be their audiences and, in many 
respects, shape our understanding of who the police are and what they do (Manning, 1997). 
Yet studies explicitly and comprehensively looking at police communications from the police 
perspective, that combine both department functionality, relationship with the media and use 
of social media, are few and far between. 
 
The purpose of this section has been to give a critical overview of the research and studies in 
the area of police communications. In examining the existing knowledge base questions arose, 
highlighting important gaps in understanding and information which needed to be answered. 
For example: 
1) Do police communications departments agree with the popular and academic 
assessŵeŶt that theƌe is a ͚Đƌisis͛ of ĐoŶfideŶĐe iŶ poliĐiŶg? 
2) How has the adoption of social media changed police communications and public 
relations? 
3) How do the police think their relationship with the media has changed with the rise of 
citizen journalism and social media? 
4) Mawby (2002) concluded in his research that there was so far evidence of four eras in 
police public relations. With the advent of social media is there now evidence of a 
fifth? 
ϱͿ Lee aŶd MĐGoǀeƌŶ ;ϮϬϭϱ, p.ϭͿ ideŶtified ͞ƌisk as aŶ oƌgaŶisiŶg logiĐ͟ ǁhiĐh has dƌiǀeŶ 
the development of police public relations in Australian police forces. Is there 
evidence that this is the situation in English police forces? 
6) Is there a discernible difference between police staff and police officer led 
departments as suggested by Surette (2001)? 
7) Do public relations strategies differ between policing environment or is 
communication the same irrespective of police force? 
8) How does the public relations / communications department fit into the operational 
side of policing in modern police forces? 
9) How has police public relations evolved over the last decade? Has it reached the point 
ǁheƌe ͞poliĐe ǁoƌk is iŵage ǁoƌk͟ as MaǁďǇ ;ϮϬϬϮ, p.ϭϴϰͿ hǇpothesised? 
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10) Is it possible to measure what, or whether, police communication strategies are 
having an impact? 
11) What is the purpose of the police public relations / communications department in a 
modern police force and has this role changed over the last decade? 
 
The principal objective of this research project is to look at police communications in the 
modern police force from the police perspective. The points identified above formed the basis 
of this study; informing the research questions, the initial focus and the methods used during 
the research. The next chapter examines the methodology utilised and discusses the evolution 
this project has undergone from the knowledge gaps raised during the literature review to this 
doctoral thesis. 
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Chapter 2:       Methodology 
 
Accurate and credible data is of vital importance in research. Data does not speak for itself and 
no research method is infallible or perfect (Coleman and Moynihan 2000). In addition, there is 
the potential for significant methodological problems when researching anything as 
complicated and emotive as the police (Reiner, 2010) or as new and fast paced as 
communications in the digital age (Zavattro and Sementelli, 2014).  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the theoretical, analytical and conceptual processes 
that have informed and directed this research, the challenges experienced and the rationale 
behind the decisions made.  This chapter is divided into three parts. The first (2.1 – 2.3) covers 
the research questions underpinning this project and the methodology used for exploring 
them. The second part (section 2.4 – 2.8) discusses the scope and limitations of this research 
and the methodological considerations that must be addressed when undertaking any form of 
qualitative research. The final part (sections 2.9) examines the story of this project; mapping 
the evolution it has undergone from a simple research question asking why police forces have 
͚Coƌpoƌate CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs depaƌtŵeŶts͛ to a doĐtoƌal thesis.  
 
 
PART ONE:   Methodology 
 
2.1 Methodology 
 
Most research into police communications in the last decade has focused almost exclusively on 
the public confidence element (1.3). In doing so, most studies have taken a narrow and 
contextually isolated view of these questions in order to address a specific issue; such as 
evaluating the effectiveness of a specific scheme for improving public confidence levels. Such 
studies have a marked tendency to ignore wider aspects of police communication or overlook 
that the phenomenon they are testing is not isolated but part of an inter-connected and 
interdependent whole.  
 
64 
 
In order to answer the research questions (2.2) in an integrated way this study utilised a 
combination of semi-structured interviews with the heads of police Communications 
departments (or their nominated representatives), Freedom of Information requests 
(hereafter FOI) and an in-depth literature review. In total 21 heads of department, one deputy-
head, six managers, two Chief Constables and a PCC were interviewed as part of this research 
with interviews ranging from 40 minutes to over 120 minutes. The interview data was then 
analysed using the framework analysis approach suggested by Ritchie and Spencer (1994)
12
. 
The findings from the interviews were then compared against a comprehensive literature 
review covering English, American, Australian, Canadian and European studies on policing, 
communication and public opinion, FOI requests made to each of the 39 police forces and 
official government documents pertaining to police communication.   
 
It has long been held that using multiple methods can help to protect and reduce threats to 
the validity of the research (Cho and Trent, 2006). This research used a combination of 
methods to discern the difference between intended (official) organisational outcomes and 
unofficial (departmental/personal) outcomes in order to add vital contextual data about the 
work and position of police communications departments and to mitigate some of the 
concerns raised by the sample (2.4). Such an approach, however, is not without problems of its 
own. These methodological issues and how they are dealt with are examined in depth in the 
second part of this chapter (2.4 – 2.8).  
 
  
                                           
12
 See Appendix 2.7 
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2.2 Research Questions 
 
Weber (1949 cited in Turner, 2013 p.ϭϲϭͿ aƌgued that people Ŷeed to ͞ask ƋuestioŶs aďout 
those things which convention makes self-eǀideŶt͟. This is the appƌoaĐh adopted iŶ this 
research. The research questions are divided into two groups: primary and secondary. The 
primary group are what Ritchie and Spencer (1994, p.ϭϴϮͿ teƌŵ ͚ĐoŶteǆtual ƋuestioŶs͛ that 
seek to estaďlish the ͞foƌŵ aŶd Ŷatuƌe of ǁhat eǆists͟; iŶ this Đase the ƌole aŶd puƌpose of 
police communications. The secondary group is a ŵiǆtuƌe of ͚diagŶostiĐ͛, oƌ ͚ǁhǇ͛ tǇpe 
ƋuestioŶs that eǆaŵiŶe the ƌeasoŶs aŶd Đauses foƌ ǁhat eǆists aŶd ͚eǀaluatiǀe͛ ƋuestioŶs 
which compare communication across different policing environments, measurements of 
effectiveness and how police communications have changed with the introduction of social 
media (ibid).  
 
Primary Questions 
1.1   What is the purpose of police communications? 
1.2   What are police forces trying to communicate? 
1.3  How are the police communicating? 
1.4  With whom are the police trying to communicate? 
1.5   What are the threats and challenges currently facing policing communications? 
 
Secondary Questions 
2.1   Is the concept of public relations still relevant in the modern police force? 
2.2   To what extent do public relations strategies differ between policing environments? 
2.3   What position does communications hold within the operational side of policing? 
2.4   Is it possible to measure what, or whether, police communication strategies are having an 
impact? 
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2.3 Originality and Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This thesis has been inspired and shaped by the research that has come before it and began 
with three basic questions: 
1)  What are the police trying to communicate; 
2)  How are they trying to communicate it; and 
3) What is the purpose of police communications.  
 
There has been remarkably little research, or interest, in gaining an integrated contemporary 
view of what research has shown to be a complex and often contradictory area. The work of 
Mawby (2002; 2007), Crump (2011), Wilson et al (2011) and Proctor et al (2013) have made 
the most significant inroads into the area of police communication but each of these studies 
also has considerable limitations in regard to the extent of the research; either because they 
have been geographically restricted to one or only a handful of forces (Meijer and Thaens, 
2013), are dated now at several years old (Surette, 2001, Mawby, 2002, 2007), or in terms of 
the subject matter under investigation (Cooke and Sturgis, 2009; Crump, 2011; Proctor et al, 
2013).  
 
The contribution this research makes to this area is three fold: 
1) Breadth: During the course of this research interviews were conducted with 
representatives from 27 police forces. This data was then compared and evaluated 
against a comprehensive analysis of the output from their Corporate Communications 
departments. Similar research has been conducted looking at Australian police 
Corporate Communications by Lee and McGovern (2014) but nothing on this scale has 
as yet been attempted in England using a similar methodology.  
 
This breadth proved to be an essential aspect of this research as it has demonstrated 
that ǁhile ͚the poliĐe͛ aƌe usuallǇ disĐussed as a hoŵogeŶeous eŶtitǇ ;alďeit ĐouŶtƌǇ 
speĐifiĐͿ, ͚the poliĐe͛ iŶ EŶglaŶd ĐoŶsists of ϯϵ sepaƌate police forces that are 
historically, culturally and geographically different. Each police force in England is 
distinct from the others with, at times, little commonality or consistency in approach, 
strategy or practice when it comes to communications. These differences, therefore, 
need to be both considered in conjunction and independently from one another in 
order to create an accurate picture of police communications.  
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2) Traditional and Digital Communications: As mentioned above, one of the limitations 
in existing research literature is that it has tended to focus either on the traditional 
(e.g. Press, TV) or on digital technology (e.g. social media sites). No research into the 
English police currently published has examined both of these facets together as part 
of a cohesive investigation into police public relations and communications. This 
research incorporates both aspects in order to understand how and why 
communications has changed over the last few years and how these two different, and 
at times competing, platforms coexist within police communications strategies.  
 
3)  Updated Knowledge: One of the first things that became apparent during the 
iŶteƌǀieǁs ǁas hoǁ ŵuĐh poliĐe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs had ĐhaŶged siŶĐe MaǁďǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϮͿ 
study of South Yorkshire Police. Within the first five minutes of one of the early 
interviews, the Head of Communications (PI.3) returned the participant information 
sheet (Appendix 3.4a) with the recommendation that it be rewritten as almost 
eǀeƌǇthiŶg ǁas ǁƌoŶg: ͞Oǀeƌt ŵaŶipulatioŶ aŶd iŵage ŵakiŶg aƌeŶ͛t ǁhat ǁe͛ƌe 
aďout aŶǇŵoƌe͟, he said ͞ǁe͛ƌe Ŷot heƌe to Đoǀeƌ up poliĐe ŵistakes ďut to ďƌidge the 
gap ďetǁeeŶ poliĐe aŶd puďliĐ so theǇ ĐaŶ eŶgage iŶ dialogue͟. This repositioning of 
the communications department was a recurrent theme frequently brought up during 
the interviews. It is particularly interesting in light of the recent Hillsborough inquiry 
aŶd the allegatioŶs that haǀe ĐoŶtiŶued to peƌsist aƌouŶd poliĐe foƌĐes that ͚spiŶ͛ 
(Conn, 2016).  
 
This research particularly builds on the work of Mawby (2002, 2007, 2009) in order to 
update our knowledge of police public relations. Mawby (2002) suggested that in his 
research that there was evidence of four eras (or periodisations) within police public 
relations (1.2). This study asks whether with the introduction of social media there is 
now evidence of a fifth periodisation in police public relations. This is discussed further 
in Chapter 4.  
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PART TWO:      Credibility, Limitations and Methodological   
Considerations 
 
Interviews and observation based studies are particularly problematic when researching an 
essentially esoteric and closed institution like the police. Research is a constant balancing act 
between what is desirable for validity and thoroughness and what is possible in terms of cost, 
tiŵe, politiĐs aŶd aĐĐess. This ͞ƌeseaƌĐh ďaƌgaiŶ͟ ĐaŶ pose sigŶifiĐaŶt pƌoďleŵs foƌ the sĐope, 
validity, reliability and generalisability of the research findings (Hughes, 2006 p.241). The 
following sections critically examine the issues and dilemmas that inevitably arise during 
practical research and how they were dealt with; starting with the challenges associated with 
gaining access to institutions like the police before discussing the perennial topics of 
transcription, scope and validity.  
 
 
2.4 Participants and Access 
 
2.4.1 Participants and Sampling 
PaƌtiĐipaŶts foƌ this ƌeseaƌĐh ǁeƌe seleĐted usiŶg ͚puƌposiǀe saŵpliŶg͛ ;“ilǀeƌŵaŶ, ϮϬϭϭͿ. 
Interviewees were chosen based upon their position within the department. As participation 
was on a voluntary basis of a small, non-probability sample there is a concern over the impact 
of self-selecting bias on the results. Collier and Mahoney (1996) argue that self-selecting bias 
can result in the sample not being representative of the population being studied due to the 
inherent bias and agenda of the participants (2.7 and 2.8). Randomised and proportionate 
sampling of police communications departments were considered to mitigate this issue but 
dismissed as inappropriate in the context of this research as it was expert knowledge that was 
required rather than quantity.  
 
The heads of the Communications department were identified as the individuals best placed to 
be able to give in-depth, accurate overviews of police communications and to answer the 
research questions. In some cases the heads of these departments nominated a representative 
to be interviewed rather than taking part themselves. These representatives were all senior 
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members of the communications team and were confirmed by their head of department as 
having sufficient expert knowledge to take their place in the research.   
 
Heads of department were approached via a letter to their Chief Constable in January 2014 
(Appendix 2.1). Invitations for police forces to take part in this research were restricted to the 
39 territorial public police forces in England (2.5 and 2.7). Of these police forces there were, in 
2014, 37 Communications departments. Suffolk and Norfolk police forces had merged their 
communications departments in 2010 while West Mercia police and Warwickshire police had 
merged their respective communications departments in 2012. The letter was addressed to 
the Chief Constable of each of these forces with a participant information sheet included for 
additional information. This letter clearly stated the aims and methods to be employed in the 
research and requested an interview with the head of the Communications department. The 
letter also offered a copy of the research findings to all police forces who participated.  
 
From the first invitation letter sent in January 2014 15 forces replied that they were interested 
in this research and would like to participate. Five forces sent holding replies acknowledging 
receipt of the letter stating that an official response would shortly follow. Of these forces only 
three later agreed to take part. 17 forces did not respond to the letter at all, one force sent a 
holding letter with no follow up and only one force sent a letter of refusal.  
 
A second round of letters was sent out in April 2014 to the 17 forces who had not responded 
to the first letter. As a result of this letter an additional 10 forces agreed to participate while a 
further seven again did not respond or acknowledge the letter. The reason given by most of 
the forces who replied to the second letter was that they had not received the first.  
 
In July 2014 a third letter was sent to all police forces who had either not responded to either 
of the two previous letters or who had sent holding letters with no further contact. After this 
letter a further four forces agreed to an interview bringing the total up to 29 participants out 
of a possible 37. Unfortunately, due to unforeseen difficulties with restructuring two police 
forces later withdrew from the research prior to their interviews and a further two heads also 
left their jobs before their interviews could take places; in both cases the new heads preferred 
not to take part as they felt they lacked sufficient experience. In total then, representatives 
from 25 communication teams (out of a possible 37), including two joint teams, were 
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interviewed achieving a 68% sample with two forces undecided, four who withdrew, five who 
did Ŷot ƌespoŶd aŶd oŶe ͚No͛.  
 
2.4.2 Access 
One of the most difficult challenges in fieldwork is gaining access to the subject matter you 
want to study. There is a considerable amount written about the thorny issue of access 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007; Silverman, 2013). What is less often discussed is maintaining 
this access. As Wolcott (1995) points out, negotiating access does not stop once an interview is 
agreed, it continues for the length of your association with that person. Indeed Hughes (2006) 
argues that access to the police is an ongoing and constantly evolving process and one which is 
precarious because it can be stopped at any time by the police. Awareness of these issues can 
affect how researchers proceed in their research, the questions asked and the decisions made.  
 
Academia is by nature a public affair where the end result is to publish your findings. The 
police, it could be said, are the opposite; the police have in the past been characterised as an 
iŶstitutioŶallǇ Đlosed oƌgaŶisatioŶ ;Hughes ϮϬϬϬͿ, ǁho ƌaƌelǇ ͞ǁelĐoŵe the spotlight͟ 
(Fleming, 2010 p.144) and who have tended to guard their secrets and resent any intrusion 
(Jupp, 1989). From the 1990s onwards there has been a general trend towards increasing 
openness, transparency and accountability in police forces (Mawby, 2002; Kingshott, 2011), 
with the introduction of the Freedom of Information Act (2000), the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s puďliĐation 
scheme and the popularity of police documentaries. However, tensions remain as academics 
aƌe ofteŶ seeŶ as ͚pƌofessioŶal stƌaŶgeƌs͛ ;Agaƌ, ϭϵϵϲ p.ϭͿ ͞ǁho speĐialise iŶ askiŶg aǁkǁaƌd 
questions and criticise because that is what ƌeseaƌĐheƌs aƌe tƌaiŶed to do͟ ;FleŵiŶg, ϮϬϭϬ 
p.144).  
 
Perhaps the crux of the matter is that research by outsiders will be perceived as a betrayal no 
ŵatteƌ hoǁ ǁell iŶteŶtioŶed oƌ sǇŵpathetiĐ the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ, as ͞oŶe ŵakes puďliĐ the pƌiǀate 
and leaves the loĐals to the ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes͟ ;Miles aŶd HuďeƌŵaŶ ϭϵϴϰ Đited iŶ WolĐott ϭϵϵϱ 
p.147; Breen, 2007).  Such concerns can act as gatekeepers to block or minimise the level of 
access potential researchers are granted to the organisation. Access may start with the 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt͛s foƌŵal aĐĐeptaŶĐe of the ƌeseaƌĐh pƌoposal ďut just ďeĐause the Chief 
Constable has authorised your presence does not mean that other police employees will 
accept your presence or participate fully in the research (Marks, 2004). Such behaviour often 
leads to informal gatekeeping and lacklustre or deliberately obstructive cooperation (Reiner, 
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2010).  In addition to this, the threat of losing access is omnipresent in police research (Yin, 
2011); this knowledge creates a power imbalance between the research subject and the 
researcher which can lead to research bargaining and strained relationships (Hughes 2000).  
 
How to engage the various police forces in order to obtain access is then a fundamentally 
important question. Without their desire to participate the information gleaned would be of 
questionable practical value and significantly less textured and detailed. According to Wolcott 
(1995, p.ϭϮϰͿ, ǁheŶ ŶegotiatiŶg aĐĐess theƌe is ofteŶ a ͞teŵptatioŶ to ŵake too ŵaŶǇ 
promises while selling the idea of a ƌeseaƌĐh pƌojeĐt͟; this ĐaŶ lead to uŶƌealistiĐ aŶd 
ultimately disappointed expectations regarding the nature of the research. The difficulty with 
promising the moon and then throwing in the sun and sky for good measure is that there is 
often a wide gulf between the ideal research plan and the reality of what can actually be 
accomplished. Incompatible or disappointed expectation is one of the greatest causes of 
problems between police and academics (Kelty and Julian, 2012).  
 
Becker (1982, p.103Ϳ pƌoposed that ͞patƌoŶs paǇ aŶd theǇ diĐtate - not every note or 
brushstroke, but the broad outlines and the matters that concern them. They choose artists 
ǁho pƌoǀide ǁhat theǇ ǁaŶt͟. Theƌe ŵight Ŷot ďe patƌoŶs, as suĐh, iŶ soĐial sĐieŶĐe ďut it 
would be a mistake to believe that there are no equivalents (Wolcott, 1995). Anyone with an 
active interest in, or has contributed to, the project can be considered a stakeholder – that is, 
someone who invested in the outcome.  As the old saying goes, there is no such thing as a free 
lunch, and this is particularly important when dealing with large, powerful organisations like 
the police.  
 
Initially, the question of access was approached by trying to formulate a proposal which 
simultaneously met my research interests and appeared attractive to police forces. In practice 
the pilot force was unsure about the research methods and only peripherally interested in the 
research questions (2.9). However, when I presented research aims and questions based upon 
my interpretation of the underlying problems and knowledge gaps the attitude changed. 
Apparent disinterest became enthusiastic interest; not in all police forces but in the majority as 
demonstrated by the number of positive responses and engagement exhibited. Consequently, 
there are significantly more police forces participating than first anticipated.  
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People often want something in return for their time; particularly experts (May, 2002). As 
Wolcott (1995) points out, you need to understand what the participants want in return and 
whether it is a gift you are able to give. In some cases this might be monetary compensation, in 
others they may request a copy of the results. Some, however, may wish to become 
stakeholders or patrons in your research in order to obtain some control or influence over the 
direction or results of your work. It is this last group which can be particularly problematic.  
 
All police forces were offered a copy of the research findings if they agreed to participate. This 
seemed to be sufficient inducement for the majority of forces to agree to an interview. 
Cooperation both during and after the interview from these forces varied although a 
noticeable, if unsurprising, trend emerged where the more interested the interviewee was in 
my research the more cooperative, helpful and engaged they were with the interview process 
and in keeping in contact afterwards. Conversely, in the forces where the interviewee 
appeared to be almost humouring the research the interviews were harder, engagement 
strained and the interviewees disinterested in receiving a copy of the findings or participating 
in follow up questions.  
 
Only two interviewees sought to renegotiate this offer. One interviewee wished to alter the 
research parameters to include several additional aspects which he was interested in, while 
the second one wished to see the results section ahead of publication so that he could ensure 
his force was represented accurately.  
 
This raised an intriguing dilemma: how far should one compromise and comply with demands 
in the quest of obtaining access? There is no simple answer to this question as every piece of 
research is different and the source of funding often plays a large part in how flexible the 
research aims and methods can be. This research was funded by a university scholarship which 
avoided some of the potential conflicts of interest and the politics associated with government 
and research council funding (Fleming, 2010).    
 
In both the above cases the desires motivating the requests were discussed with the 
participants in order to ascertain what they were actually looking for. In the second case the 
interviewee was concerned about the accuracy of the transcript and being misquoted or 
misrepresented. Rather than an advance copy of the results the participant was seeking 
reassurance that the information he gave in the interview would be dealt with fairly and 
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faithfully. In light of this I offered to send him a copy of his interview transcript so that he 
could suggest amendments if he was unhappy with something. The offer was accepted and the 
participant emailed an annotated version back with his corrections (2.5). The former case was 
more difficult to resolve as the direction the participant wished to include did not fit with the 
research aims or methodology settled on. There was also a concern raised that allowing this 
level of influence from one police force could be damaging to the data collection process and 
results. In the end, after a long discussion about the practicalities, the participant accepted 
that his request was not possible and agreed to continue with the research as stated in the 
invitation letter. In both cases the situation was resolved quickly and with minimal impact on 
the research however such issues can escalate into serious conflicts between the researcher 
and participants and need to be carefully monitored (Silverman, 2007).   
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2.5 Transcription and Reliability  
 
According to Silverman (2011) there are three main threats to validity in qualitative research.  
1. The impact of the researcher on the interviewee and interview environment 
(sometimes known as the Hawthorne effect); 
2. The values of the researcher – what they consider important or not important, 
their views of the phenomena being studied and credibility as narrators, 
interpreters and commentators on the data;  and 
3. The aĐĐuƌaĐǇ aŶd tƌuthfulŶess of the ƌespoŶdeŶt͛s aĐĐouŶt.  
 
The central problem, as Bosk (1979 cited in Wolcott, 1995, p.127) shrewdly observed is that 
͞all field ǁoƌk doŶe ďǇ a siŶgle field-worker invites the question, ͚WhǇ should ǁe ďelieǀe it?͛͟ 
Transcription is a weak point in any methodology. It is the bridge between the raw data from 
the field work and the interpretations reached and requires that anybody using these 
conclusions can trust the integrity and credibility of the researcher. If the researcher appears 
untrustworthy then the reader will not trust the findings and that would pose a serious 
problem.  
 
Silverman (2011) argues that accurate transcription is about more than getting the word order 
right. It is about capturing the emotions and nuances of communication which is often best 
conveyed through body language and tone rather than verbal speech, and therefore not as 
easy to record, capture or describe in the transcription process. Murdock and Scutt (2003), for 
example, estimate that only a very small part (7%) of communication is made up of the words 
actually used the rest is conveyed through body language (55%) and tone (28%). 
 
An unknown amount of data is lost in the transcription process due to the inherent limitations 
with transcription (May, 2002). Tone of voice, proved to be particularly important in the three 
telephone interviews carried out as without visual cues I was left to judge the receptiveness 
and attitudes of the other person based on tonality. Murdock and Scutt (2003) argue that tone 
can change the meaning of a comment from a threat to a joke, or from advice to a criticism. It 
can change a statement of fact to a conjecture and can alert the interviewer to when the 
participant is nervous, or excited; cautious or candid. Tone can also affect how we interpret 
and react to new information and whether we believe it or discard it. Yet capturing and 
conveying these vital contextual details are incredibly difficult (Silverman, 2011). Bryman 
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(1988) suggests that in order to avoid the pitfalls of academic anecdotalism and taking 
interview data out of context full transcripts and recording should be made available by 
researchers so that others can check the accuracy, credibility and the veracity of their 
interpretation
13
.   
 
Leaving aside the obvious ethical problems around participant confidentiality in offering open 
access to the interview data (2.6.4), Bryman (1988) raises a valid point; how can qualitative 
researchers claim validity for their findings when so much vital contextual data is either lost in 
the process, not recorded, not reported or not made available to the readers? Pink (2004, 
p102) suggests that one possible way of resolving this difficulty is to use respondent validation.  
 
As Pink points out ͞iŶfoƌŵaŶts do Ŷot alǁaǇs agƌee ǁith ouƌ aŶalǇsis of theŵ aŶd theiƌ 
ĐoŵŵeŶts͟. BǇ seŶdiŶg a ĐopǇ of the tƌaŶsĐƌiptioŶ aŶd ouƌ iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of it to the 
participants to see if they agree with the analysis, researchers can gain vital insight and 
information into the conceptual framework and perception of the participant and increase the 
probability of faithful and accurate interpretations and conclusions.  
 
Respondent validation offers a simple method of avoiding some of the difficulties raised by 
Bryman (1988). One of the great dangers of qualitative research is of mistaking unintentional 
iŶteƌpƌetatioŶs foƌ the iŶteŶded ŵessage ;MoƌgaŶ ϮϬϬϬͿ. “Đott poiŶts out that ͞iŶ iŶteƌpƌetiŶg 
texts three aspects of meaning should be recognised. Three moments in the movement of the 
teǆt fƌoŵ authoƌ to audieŶĐe…the iŶteŶded ĐoŶteŶt, the ƌeĐeiǀed ĐoŶteŶt aŶd the iŶteƌŶal 
ŵeaŶiŶg͟ ;ϭϵϵϬ Đited iŶ MaǁďǇ ϮϬϬϮ p.80). Respondent validation can mitigate to an extent 
some of the risk of this as it gives the interviewee the opportunity to correct the researchers 
interpretations. However, it is by no means an easy or clear-cut solution to the fundamental 
problem of conveying highly textured experiences in a way that translates into written 
language. In much the same way as a film might convey more information than the radio, it 
remains incapable of actually translating an object, event or experience in its totality and 
imagination or experience can only partially compensate for this.  
 
Furthermore, respondent validation has two fundamental limitations which render the 
concept significantly more attractive in theory than in practice. Firstly, it requires the 
agreement and cooperation of the participants to give up their time to check their transcript 
                                           
13
 Excerpts from the transcript data are available in Appendix 2.5b. See 2.6.4 for more information.  
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for errors or misinterpretation; such a task can be a frustrating and ultimately futile effort as 
proved to be the case in this research. Secondly, as Cho and Trent (2006) warn that relying on 
the respondent to act as a self-check for validity is only appropriate in those situations where 
the researcher can unreservedly trust the respondent to answer truthfully. Given that it is 
quite common for people to say things in interview situations which they would later prefer to 
be erased or readjusted to be less contentious, or fear being censured for, respondent 
validation far from improving the validity of the interpretation could act to undermine the 
credibility of the research.  
 
At the beginning and end of each interview the interviewees were asked if they would like a 
copy of the transcript, or recording (if they agreed to one) both for their own records and to 
ensure they were satisfied with the interview data. All but one of the participants refused 
outƌight aŶd said that theǇ saǁ Ŷo Ŷeed ͞foƌ suĐh a tiŵe ĐoŶsuŵiŶg aĐtiǀitǇ͟ ;PI.ϳͿ. OŶe 
participant (PI.15) replied when asked about respondent validation that she trusted my 
integrity as a researcher and therefore this was not something she thought was either 
necessary or helpful. The only respondent who did request a copy of the transcript emailed 
back within a week requesting an amendment to one of their answers as they thought on 
reflection that the response was not appropriate as it was outside his area of expertise. As the 
comment had no bearing on the research topic it was removed.  
 
This experience raised three interesting questions: firstly, once the participant has agreed to 
validate the transcript how long do you give them to do it; secondly, how do you get them to 
return it within a reasonable amount of time so that the waiting does not have a negative 
impact on your project. It became increasingly clear during this research that police 
communications departments are exceptionally busy and the heads of these departments 
often have tight and demanding schedules. Checking a transcript can be exceedingly time-
consuming and difficult for participants to fit into their lives (Silverman 2007). The question is 
what constitutes a reasonable length of time and how do you chase respondents without 
becoming what Gillham (2005 p.ϮϰͿ Đalls a ͚ŶuisaŶĐe faĐtoƌ͛ - the inconvenience to be avoided 
which can have a negative impact on any future working relationship with that person? 
FoƌtuŶatelǇ foƌ this ƌeseaƌĐh the oŶlǇ ͚ƌespoŶdeŶt ǀalidatoƌ͛ ƌetuƌŶed the tƌaŶsĐƌipt ƋuiĐklǇ; 
however it did demonstrate a potential time management problem with respondent 
validation. The request to make an amendment also raised a third question one - which 
potentially poses a significant threat to the validity and credibility of the research. 
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Hammersley (1990, p.57) defines ǀaliditǇ as ͞the eǆteŶt to ǁhiĐh aŶ aĐĐouŶt aĐĐuƌatelǇ 
ƌepƌeseŶts the soĐial pheŶoŵeŶa to ǁhiĐh it ƌefeƌs͟. The ƋuestioŶ is, does alloǁiŶg the 
participant the authority to change what they said after the fact improve the validity of the 
results by giving the participants the responsibility for how they are recorded and interpreted, 
or does it undermine the validity of the findings because the account is no longer faithful to 
what happened but to what the participant wishes to be presented?   
 
There is no easy or obvious answer to this dilemma as both sides have valid points. Perhaps, as 
with all such considerations regarding a concept as intangible as validity there is nothing to do 
but be aware that the problem exists and take steps to make the process as transparent as 
possible so that any mistakes or flaws can be identified (Wolcott, 1995).  
 
Moisander and Valtonen (2006) argue that there are two ways of improving reliability in 
qualitative research. Firstly, by making the research process as transparent as possible through 
creating an audit trail the audience can follow to understand how and why decisions were 
made; and secondly, by explicitly stating the theoretical and conceptual framework which 
informed the interpretation of the data and how this affected the results.  
 
Spradley (1979) likewise proposed that the best method to improve reliability, accuracy and 
validity of qualitative research is for the observer to create a transparent audit trail of ideas 
and thinking by keeping four sets of notes in addition to the usual interview transcript. 
1. Short notes made during the interview; 
2. Expanded notes made as soon as possible after each interview or field session; 
3. A record in a field Journal of any problems, ideas or unusual events that 
occurred during each stage of fieldwork; and 
4. An initial, or provisional, record of analysis interpretation (annotated 
transcripts).  
 
Each set of notes brings an additional layer to the transcript to help researchers separate what 
they thought, when they thought it, how the ideas connect to the raw data and what 
influences there might be on their interpretation. Keeping separate notes is time-consuming 
ďut it does pƌoduĐe aŶ auditaďle Ŷaƌƌatiǀe aŶd ĐoŶĐeptual tƌail. ͞‘eseaƌĐh does Ŷot oĐĐuƌ iŶ a 
metaphorical germfree, antiseptiĐ zoŶe͟ ;Hughes, ϮϬϬϲ p.247), it does not exist independent 
of the researcher who designed and collected it or the knowledge base which informed and 
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directed it. Being able to trace the provenance of the ideas and theories directing the research 
is of vital importance for protecting the validity of the findings whether it is qualitative or 
qualitative research methods.  
 
FuŶdaŵeŶtal to this appƌoaĐh is the Ŷeed to diffeƌeŶtiate ďetǁeeŶ ǁhat Pike Đalled ͚etiĐ͛ aŶd 
͚eŵiĐ͛ aŶalǇsis ;ϭϵϱϰ Đited iŶ “ilǀeƌŵaŶ Ϯ011, p.366). Etic analysis is based on, or identifies, the 
researcher͛s concepts and interpretations while emic analysis is grounded in understanding 
the conceptual, theoretical, social and structural framework of those being studied. In essence 
by separating these two approaches Pike was trying to get researchers to acknowledge that 
how the outsider/observer understands, codes and interpret social phenomena is often quite 
different from how local/insiders perceive, categorise and interpret the world around them 
and that in transcripts and analysis these two aspects need to be considered independently of 
the other as well as together as part of the whole experience.  
 
In recognition of the above, this research adopted a tripartite approach similar to the one 
suggested by Spradley (1979). Where possible interviews were recorded (2.6.3). The 
transcripts of the early interviews were typed up within a month of the interview date. 
However, due to a car accident midway through the fieldwork I was unable to transcribe all of 
the interviews myself as intended. The remaining recordings were instead transcribed by a 
reputable transcription service who specialise in post graduate academic transcription. All 
recordings were subject to a legal confidentiality agreement and were uploaded onto the 
ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s seĐuƌe Đloudďase. These tƌaŶsĐƌiptioŶs ǁeƌe theŶ ĐheĐked agaiŶst ďoth the oƌigiŶal 
audio recording and the notes. Annotations were added as necessary using different colours to 
denote which set of notes was the source of the alteration.  
 
Short notes of ideas, new concepts or questions were taken during the interviews. 
Immediately after the interview concluded expanded notes were written recording my 
interpretations of how the interview went, what worked, what did not, initial impressions of 
rapport with the interviewee and how this may have affected the answers and if there were 
any problems. 
 
The eǆpaŶded Ŷotes ǁeƌe theŶ ƌeoƌgaŶised aŶd tǇped up foƌ iŶĐlusioŶ iŶ the foƌĐe͛s Đase file. 
At this time any additional thoughts/concerns would be included in the typed notes with 
annotations to show if I made amendments to my initial impressions and thoughts. By 
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organising transcriptions this way I could compare as much contextual data as possible in an 
auditable way to show how my thinking and theories developed over the course of the project 
while also ensuring a report as accurate and faithful to the process as possible. 
 
Transcribing telephone interviews was more complicated due to there being no recording of 
the interview to refer to later. Accurate transcription in such cases is virtually impossible; in 
light of this in these situations detailed notes were taken during the interview. Due to the 
more informal nature of telephone interviews these notes were then reordered when typed 
up into two sets: one chronological, detailing the order of comments made, and the second 
reordered the comments thematically in a table. Additional notes relating to my perception of 
the interview, ideas and problems followed the same system as used in the face-to-face 
interviews.  
 
In doing this, the intention was to mitigate as far as possible the limitations of not recording 
the interview. Telephone interviews rendered significantly less contextual, or deep data, than 
the in-person counterparts. Body language and the nuances one can capture in a face-to-face 
interview are absent in telephone conversations which can raise significant concerns over 
accuracy and interpretation. Tone presented a further issue as it has been well documented 
that electronic forms of communication (e.g. Skype or telephones) can distort voices and tonal 
variation which can lead to misunderstanding and faulty interpretations (Murdock and Scutt, 
2003). This difficulty is further compounded by the loss of visual cues.  In light of this it was 
strongly suggested to the interviewees that they read a copy of the thematic transcript to 
ensure that my interpretation of their comments was as accurate a representation of their 
views as possible. As discussed earlier, however, only one of the three telephone interviewees 
agreed to this.  
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2.6 Ethics and Data Protection 
 
2.6.1 Ethics  
All iŶteƌǀieǁs ǁeƌe ĐoŶduĐted iŶ aĐĐoƌdaŶĐe ǁith the Bƌitish “oĐietǇ of CƌiŵiŶologǇ͛s staŶdaƌd of 
ethics (2015) and with approval granted by the University of CaŶteƌďuƌǇ Chƌist ChuƌĐh͛s ‘eseaƌĐh 
Governance Manager (Appendix 3.2).  
 
2.6.2 Disclosure and Informed Consent 
Problems have arisen in the past from researchers either covertly studying the police or not fully 
disclosing their research aims which has resulted in a difficult relationship characterised by 
friction and concealment between the academic community and the police (Hughes, 2006). 
Fleming (2010) suggests that one of the most significant and long standing tensions present 
when academics are conducting research on or with the police is in managing the expectations of 
everyone involved. Failure to do so can cause considerable problems during the research and 
lead to misunderstandings and dissatisfaction for both the police and the research team. The 
tension arises, Kelty and Julian (2012, p.ϰϭϰͿ oďseƌǀe, ďeĐause eǆpeĐtatioŶs ͞aƌe idiosǇŶĐƌatiĐ 
which in a research team means it is possible to have as many research expectations for the 
project as there are police practitioners, industry partners and acadeŵiĐs͟.  FleŵiŶg ;ϮϬϭϬͿ 
suggests that the solution to this difficulty is to ensure good communication of the research aims 
and offering full and open disclosure to the participants so that they can make an informed 
decision about whether or not to take part in the research.  
 
This ƌaises the ƋuestioŶ, hoǁeǀeƌ, of ǁhat ĐoŶstitutes ͚iŶfoƌŵed ĐoŶseŶt͛. The ĐoŵŵoŶ 
assumption is that asking for and receiving consent at the beginning is sufficient and can 
thereafter be forgotten about (May, 2002). There is an argument, however, that consent, like 
access, is something which must be continuously renegotiated over the course of the research 
project. Silverman (2011) disagrees with this simplistic understanding of informed consent. 
Instead he argues that interviews can be so different from one another that it would be 
impossible explain comprehensively to the interviewee what you will be studying which calls into 
ƋuestioŶ the ŶotioŶ of ͚iŶfoƌŵed͛ ĐoŶseŶt.  
 
Furthermore, there is the problem that most people are not familiar with academia or academic 
practice. Concepts such as publishing research findings, conferences and academic jargon can act 
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as a barrier between researchers and their participants. What people think they are agreeing to 
can be only a part of what they are actually consenting to allow the researcher to do (Wolcott, 
1995).  
 
With regards to this research police forces were offered a copy of the research findings if they 
participated in the research. It was, however, made clear to them in the initial letters and again 
prior to the interview that this research was part of the field work for a doctoral thesis which 
would be published in academic circles. At this stage all participants were offered the 
opportunity of withdrawing their consent. No participant chose to withdraw from the study due 
to this reason.  
 
In recognition of the sometimes difficult history between the police and academics (Reiner, 
2010), full disclosure of the research aims and methods was made in the initial letters sent to the 
Chief Constables so the participants were fully aware of the research aims, questions and 
methods employed before agreeing to this research. Prior to the interview this information was 
again made available in the form of the Participant Information Sheet (Appendix 2.4b). This 
document was sent to each interviewee upon receipt of their email confirming their agreement. 
A paper copy was also given to each interviewee at the start of their interview. Given the 
evolving nature of research questions all participants were warned at the start of the interview 
that while the research subject would remain the same the research questions would likely 
change over the course of the process to reflect the data received during the interviews.  
 
2.6.3 Recording Interviews and Data Protection 
Recording and transcribing data can pose a serious problem for research validity and credibility 
(2.5). To mitigate this as far as possible the majority of interviews were recorded using a digital 
recording device and all participants were offered the opportunity for respondent validation to 
check their transcripts for errors or misinterpretations. 
 
At the start of each interview, the interviewee was asked if they would prefer to opt out of being 
recorded. 23 interviewees agreed to being recorded and signed the consent form (Appendix 2.3). 
Each interviewee was offered a copy of the transcript at the beginning and end of the interview. 
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With regard to the data itself, all interview sound files, transcript data and research data was 
kept in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998) on a secure cloud system and one 
password protected laptop.   
 
2.6.4 Anonymity and Results 
One of the concerns with regard to interviews is that what people are willing to say, and what 
they are willing to be quoted on, can be two very different things (Gillham, 2005). In the course 
of an interview, particularly one where there is good rapport, the interviewee might be more 
candid and open and say things that they would later wish they had not said. The opposite is also 
tƌue; paƌtiĐipaŶts ĐaŶ ďeĐoŵe guaƌded aŶd suspiĐious of the iŶteƌǀieǁeƌ͛s iŶteŶtioŶs aŶd hoǁ 
they are going to be portrayed which can affect how honest they are and, therefore, the validity 
of the results you receive.  
 
One method of limiting these challenges is to anonymise the results (Silverman, 2013). 
Anonymity, in effect, grants people in interviews a free pass on what they say because it cannot 
be attributed or traced back to them. While promising anonymity can reduce the likelihood that 
participants will lie, obfuscate, evade or regret their answers it does not guarantee truthfulness, 
honesty or good faith.  
 
Prior to the start of the interview participants were given a consent form to read and sign 
(Appendix 2.3). The consent form explicitly stated the rights of the interviewee to anonymity, a 
copy of their transcript and their right to withdraw from the research at any time. Each 
interviewee was given a unique id code during the transcription process (e.g. PI.1). Information 
about the interviewee such as gender, age, position with the department, job description and 
general location were kept as important contextual data. All potentially identifying details such 
as the name of police force, job title and the name of the interviewee were removed.  
 
12 of the interviewees requested that the full transcript be available only to the primary 
researcher as some of the contextual background information they wished to talk about and 
opinions expressed were of a sensitive nature.  Three interviewees stated that their consent was 
conditional upon this. As such, only interviewees who did not request this have been included in 
the excerpts available in Appendix 2.5b.  
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2.7 Scope, Generalisability and Limitations 
 
2.7.1 Scope 
It is often the temptation when undertaking a project of the scope and length of a PhD to try 
to incorporate as much as you can. Silverman (2013) suggests that this is partly to give the 
illusion of validity to the research but mostly because of the excitement and enthusiasm new 
projects generate and the desire to find something of importance.  
 
As discussed later (2.9), this project has taken several unanticipated and sometimes scenic 
detours before arriving at the final structure and research questions; and with these 
meanderings the scope of this research has continuously shifted. The intention in the final 
methodology was to interview the heads of as many police Communications departments as 
possible. This research was restricted to the territorial English police forces for two reasons. 
Firstly, time: there are 39 police forces in England at present
14
 with 37 individual 
communications departments. Given the depth and breadth of the research and the expertise 
of people to be interviewed it was estimated that interviews would likely be between 60 and 
90 minutes. With this in mind the focus was restricted to police forces in England as there 
were travel, time and cost implications with including Welsh, Scottish or the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland (PSNI).  
 
Secondly, there is also to consider the culture and organisational setup. Despite their many 
and varied differences every English police force is based on the same model: they all answer 
to the same laws and authorities, have the same hierarchical structure, operate in broadly 
similar ways and face similar problems. Internal cultures and histories may be subtly different 
but fundamentally the 39 English police forces are comparable organisations. The same cannot 
be said for the Police Scotland nor the PSNI. The police forces in these countries have unique 
historical and socio-political tensions vastly different to the situation in England. Other non-
geographic police forces were considered but discounted due to their dissimilarity in structure, 
organisation, power, visibility and iconographic status to the territorial police. As such, to 
include culturally different entities would likely prove more of a hindrance than a help and only 
confuse the object of the study.   
                                           
14
 Not including non-geographic police forces such as The British Transport Police, The Ministry of 
Defence Police and the National Crime Agency.  
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Chapter 1 observed that police public relations is a global phenomenon. Given globalisation 
and the socio-political situation here in England
15
, an international comparison of how 
different police forces across the world are managing and improving their public 
communications in the age of global communications is much needed.  Such an ambition is 
however beyond the scope of the current study.  
 
2.7.2 Generalisability  
What constitutes enough in research? As Gertz (1973, cited in Wolcott 1995, p127) points out 
ƌeseaƌĐheƌs ŵaǇ ĐoŶsole theŵselǀes that ͞it is Ŷot ŶeĐessaƌǇ to kŶoǁ eǀerything in order to 
uŶdeƌstaŶd soŵethiŶg͟, ďut the ŶaggiŶg douďt ƌeŵaiŶs that ͞ǁe aƌe Ŷeitheƌ Ŷoƌ Đould eǀeƌ 
possiďlǇ ďe ͚thoƌough eŶough͛͟. It is diffiĐult to aĐĐept that Ŷo ŵatteƌ hoǁ aĐĐuƌate the 
transcriptions, or how faithfully we try to capture the phenomenon under investigation, that 
our research is only ever partial knowledge at best. 
 
This raises the question of what counts as a representative sample when talking about a 
phenomenon as complicated as the British police? The previous chapter touched on the point 
that the English police are not a homogenous organisation but a national concept made up of 
individual and often fiercely independent units that can have widely different demographics, 
geographic, social, historical, organisational and financial experiences (Miller, 2005). When 
researching such organisations it is not simply a case of selecting a reasonable number of 
poliĐe foƌĐes aŶd theŶ geŶeƌalisiŶg the theŵes, data, ƌesults aĐƌoss the ƌest siŶĐe oŶe foƌĐe͛s 
experience and use of public relations might be completely different than another forces. One 
iŶteƌǀieǁee ;PI.ϭϯͿ ƌaised this pƌoďleŵ at the staƌt of theiƌ iŶteƌǀieǁ: ͞I͛ŵ Ŷot suƌe ǁhat use 
Ǉouƌ ƌeseaƌĐh ǁill ďe to ŵe aŶd [ŵǇ poliĐe foƌĐe] as ǁe͛ƌe Ŷot like otheƌ foƌĐes aŶd I ĐaŶ͛t see 
what ǁoƌks iŶ otheƌ plaĐes ŶeĐessaƌilǇ ǁoƌkiŶg heƌe͟.  
 
May (2002) remarked that qualitative researchers often seem to want their research to be 
simultaneously unique and universal; to be both subjective explorations of the individual 
experience and also generate generalisable data which can use inductive logic to build 
nomothetic rather than ideographic theories (DiChristina, 2006). Gillham (2005) explains this 
dichotomy by using a builder as a metaphor: A builder, he suggests, may be very similar to any 
other builder and have near identical experiences to others in his trade and yet what the 
                                           
15
 See for example The Times article 02/02/2015, p2 
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individual builder brings to the research is a unique perspective to the situation as he is the 
difference rather than the job.  
 
The same is true of the police. This research demonstrates that the experiences, direction and 
strategies used in police communications departments can vary considerably. As such it is 
recognised in this research that, despite the large sample covering 68% of police forces in 
England, the findings may not be generalisable to other police forces; particularly those who 
did not take part in the project (2.4.1). Furthermore, this study restricts itself to the police 
forces in England and hence can make no claim with respect to non-territorial police forces or 
other police forces outside England.  
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2.8 Validity and Bias 
 
2.8.1  Validity in Qualitative Research 
Historically, validity is a positivist concept more closely aligned to quantitative than qualitative 
research. Recently, however, there has been a move to adopt the principles of validity in 
qualitative methods. As a result of this a number of difficulties have arisen for qualitative 
ƌeseaƌĐheƌs ǁho aƌe iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ eǆpeĐted to ͚pƌoǀe͛ ǀaliditǇ iŶ theiƌ ƌeseaƌĐh.  
 
Part of the problem, however, with adopting quantitative principles like validity is in how they 
can be applied to something that is inherently unverifiable in an objective sense. Validity is a 
concept that has an intuitive rallying appeal and yet is also one which continues to frustrate 
ƌeseaƌĐheƌs iŶ hoǁ to deŵoŶstƌate its pƌeseŶĐe. Maǆǁell ;ϭϵϵϲ, p.ϳϵͿ, defiŶes ǀaliditǇ as ͞the 
correctness or credibility of a description, conclusion, explanation, interpretation, or other 
souƌĐe of aĐĐouŶt͟. DeŵoŶstƌatiŶg that soŵethiŶg is ĐoƌƌeĐt oƌ credible is challenging at the best 
of times but it is particularly complicated when applied to interview data (2.5). Interviews are 
fundamentally subjective and unique in nature and cannot be objectively verified in the same 
way as statistics. As such it is easy to get stuck trying to prove the unprovable (Silverman, 2013). 
This subjectivity, however, is one of the unique strengths of qualitative research.  
 
Qualitative research celebrates the individual, the idiosyncratic and the singular and allows 
researchers to understand phenomena through the interpretative lens of the research subject 
and investigate how people perceive and react to their environment. Wolcott (1995) argues that 
interviews are better understood as an art rather than as a science and that they need to be 
treated as interpretative or surreal performances. Charmaz and Bryant (2011 cited in Silverman 
ϮϬϭϭ p.ϮϬϰͿ agƌee ǁith WolĐott ;ϭϵϵϱͿ aŶd suggest that all iŶteƌǀieǁs aƌe a ͞peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe 
whether stories tumble out or are strategically calculated aŶd eǆaĐted͟ aŶd haǀe to ďe tƌeated as 
soĐial aƌtefaĐts ƌatheƌ thaŶ faĐts that ĐaŶ ďe ǀeƌified. “uĐh aŶ appƌoaĐh ƌeŶdeƌs ͚ǀaliditǇ͛ of 
dubious applicability in qualitative methods by focusing on documenting perception rather than 
͚soĐial faĐts͛.  
 
Cho and Trent (2006) suggest that, at its heart, the culture of anxiety over validity which has 
gƌoǁŶ iŶ Ƌualitatiǀe ƌeseaƌĐh iŶ ƌeĐeŶt Ǉeaƌs has less to do ǁith ǁhetheƌ the ƌeseaƌĐh is ͚ǀalid͛ 
and more about trying to demonstrate the credibility and trustworthiness of the researcher 
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themselves. This observation taps into two of the greatest potential weaknesses of qualitative 
methods: namely (1) researcher reliability/credibility, and (2) subject honesty.  
 
One way of improving the apparent credibility of the data is by improving the accuracy of the 
data collection methods. The most common means of achieving this is to record the interview. 
Recording interviews provides a record that can be verified of what was said by other parties – 
particularly if the transcripts are made available as well. This is the approach used in this 
research (see 2.5). While using this strategy gives you a factual vocal account, however, it does 
not mean that the information or opinions expressed were either an accurate representation of 
the interviewee or the reality of the situation. This is one of the perennial concerns with 
qualitative research: why should we believe the interviewees?  
 
Interviewees are naturally going to be concerned over how they are represented; particularly it 
could be said with regard to the police. Prior experience with researchers and journalists has, 
according to Reiner (2000) fostered a negative and distrustful relationship between the police 
and potential researchers. Police officers have become reluctant to open themselves and their 
institution to examination. This can have a profound impact on the results collected from 
interviews in two ways (Hughes 2006). Firstly, it can motivate interviewees to lie, conceal or omit 
information they believe could have a detrimental effect on their job and workplace. Secondly, it 
ĐaŶ Đƌeate ͚iŶfoƌŵal gate-keepeƌs͛ so eǀeŶ though the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ has gaiŶed aĐĐess to the 
iŶstitutioŶ theǇ aƌe still ďaƌƌed fƌoŵ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg the ͞ŵiĐƌo-politiĐs͟ aŶd thus the Đultuƌe aŶd 
nuances they are observing (ibid, p241). Both of these points can bias the results or the 
conclusions drawn from them.  
 
Some bias is unavoidable (2.8.4). However, the crux of the matter is that qualitative research 
requires trust to work properly. The participant needs to feel that the interviewer is a 
trustworthy person to confide honestly in and the interviewer needs to trust that the 
interviewee is being as honest and candid as possible in their answers. The question of honesty is 
further compounded by the difficulty that interviews are by nature a cross-sectional snapshot of 
knowledge and opinions which can and do change very quickly. 
 
Knowledge, Raynor (2012) points out, is a complicated concept. It is not simply a question of 
knowing what we know, but also knowing where and how we learnt it, and being aware of what 
ǁe do Ŷot kŶoǁ. CopeƌŶiĐus faŵouslǇ oďseƌǀed: ͞to kŶoǁ that ǁe kŶoǁ ǁhat ǁe kŶoǁ, aŶd to 
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kŶoǁ that ǁe do Ŷot kŶoǁ ǁhat ǁe do Ŷot kŶoǁ, that is tƌue kŶoǁledge͟ ;ϭϰϳϯ-1543 cited in 
Proctor, 2008 p.28). Copernicus (ibid) highlighted one of the central difficulties in research, that 
there is no such thing as certain or complete knowledge (McGoey, 2012a). One of the challenges 
facing the interviewer is interpreting the answers given to determine the relevance, truthfulness 
and credibility of the interviewee. This suggests an unavoidable and deeply problematic 
epistemological bias with knowledge production and raises the concerning implication that the 
conclusion taken from the internal meaning could be wrong because the picture formed by the 
evidence may be incorrect.  
 
FouĐault ;ϭϵϵϰ, p.ϭϯϭͿ desĐƌiďed this dileŵŵa as the ͞politiĐal eĐoŶoŵǇ of tƌuth͟. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to 
FouĐault theƌe is a paƌadoǆ suƌƌouŶdiŶg tƌuth as it is iŶ ͞ĐiƌĐulaƌ ƌelatioŶ ǁith the sǇstems of 
poǁeƌ that pƌoduĐe aŶd sustaiŶ it͟ ;ibid, p.ϭϯϮͿ. As suĐh ͚tƌuth͛ is iŶ a ǁaǇ uŶkŶoǁaďle eǆĐept 
thƌough the liŵited aŶd ĐoƌƌuptiŶg disĐouƌses ǁith ǁhiĐh ǁe uŶdeƌstaŶd it. FouĐault͛s appƌoaĐh 
to knowledge is closely aligned with constructionism (Cho and Trent, 2006).  
 
Constructionism argues that social phenomena and their meaning are constructed through the 
interaction and interpretation of the actors involved or those observing it. It rejects the positivist 
and objectivist approaches which hold that theƌe is aŶ oďjeĐtiǀe ͚tƌuth͛ to ďe disĐoǀeƌed aŶd 
iŶstead pƌoposes that ͚tƌuth͛ is ǁhat people ďelieǀe at the tiŵe ;Beƌgeƌ aŶd LuĐkŵaŶ, 
1966).Given the personal and nuanced nature of interviews this is the ontological approach that 
was deemed best suited to analysing the data collected.  
 
Validity is a difficult and often contentious topic for researchers – even from the constructivist 
staŶd poiŶt. That theƌe is Ŷot ͚oŶe͛ tƌuth ďut ŵaŶǇ tƌuths depeŶdeŶt upoŶ suďjeĐtiǀe 
understanding is not necessarily a serious problem to the validity of academic argument (Jewkes 
2004). According to Cho and Trent (2006) there is a troubling preoccupation with validity in 
modern research. They argue that in focussing on the possible validity of the research we will be 
constantly trying to prove the unprovable. The difficulty is that both sides have valid points. 
Research that is erroneous, untruthful or lacking in credibility is not just useless it can do a great 
deal of damage in propagating fallacious information and it can have profound consequences on 
decision making and governmental policies (Smithson, 2008). However, debating the eristic 
nuances involved in validity and what constitutes a valid conclusion has the potential to paralyse 
academia in a sea of epistemological doubt. 
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“ilǀeƌŵaŶ͛s ;ϮϬϭϭͿ solutioŶ to this dileŵŵa is to ďe highlǇ ĐƌitiĐal of aŶǇ souƌĐe uŶless it appeaƌs 
to be corroborated by outside information. Mergel (2014), for example, in her research into 
Government online communication in America used a triangulated method of comparing the 
answers given in the interviews against the observable behaviour of the departments in order to 
compare what they said were doing and against what their policies said they should be doing. 
 
Perhaps, the crux of the difficulty is that research requires a leap of faith from both the 
researcher, the research subject and also the reader. Numerous safeguards and techniques were 
used in order to try to improve the credibility and trustworthiness of this research. In recognition 
of the point raised by Silverman (2011) and Mergel (2014), a combination of different sources 
and methods were used as a means of comparison and corroboration. Interview data is 
compared to organisational intent to give focus and context to the perceptions and decisions 
discussed during the interview. 
 
2.8.2 Surveys, Statistics and Official Documents 
Surveys and the statistics they generate also have limitations and problems associated with them 
(Moulton, 2013). Coleman and Moyihan (2000) observe that statistics are open to manipulation 
and misrepresentation as they are records of interaction and are dependent on counting rules 
and the questions asked. Indeed, Hough et al (2010) conclude, surveys, and by extension 
statistics, are inherently problematic because the researcher cannot know what is influencing the 
way respondents are answering questions.  
 
The above point is a particularly pertinent and important reminder when dealing with any 
government affiliated organisation. Tombs (2000) warns that the data and information made 
available to those researchers who gain access to the police will be subject to personal, 
organisational and political agendas, security clearance, the integrity of the original collators and, 
in the case of qualitative research, the openness and lack of concealment in those observed or 
interviewed. There is, therefore, the inherent possibility that our knowledge and understanding 
of this area is either incomplete or mis-constructed. Difficulties around official statistics and 
information are further complicated by the fact that the Government and government 
institutions, like the police, have much to lose if their authority and legitimacy is undermined 
which means it is often not in their interest to publicise anything which could potentially show 
them as corrupt, untrustworthy or ineffective (Morgan, 2000). Use of these methods, however, 
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are unavoidable in academic work. Hughes (2000) argues that the only possible compromise to 
reach is to use these methods with caution while making it clear what the parameters are.  
 
This research uses a combination of official reports, policies, guidance documents and statistics 
recorded and interpreted by local police forces as a yard stick by which to assess the officially 
expressed strategy against what the police forces think they are doing and what they are actually 
doing. Using the statistics and documents in this way reduces some of the risk associated with 
them because they are not being used as an objective measure or as an accurate representation 
of reality but as a comparison point to look at how people are interpreting and acting on their 
perceived social realities.   
 
2.8.3  Literature Review 
While the problems discussed above cannot be completely avoided and must be taken into 
consideration, the risk they pose can be reduced. In order to minimise these risks a diverse range 
of sources to compare interpretations and ideas were selected from multiple reputable 
institutions, publications, journals and websites. The previous chapter touched upon the global 
nature of police communications. Public relations practices are not restricted to the English 
police but present in most, if not all, police forces across the developed world. As such, due to 
the limited research that has been conducted on this in England, American, Australian, Canadian 
and European, as well as English research on police communication and connected areas were 
systematically examined. Although there are embedded cultural and ideological differences 
between the English police and foreign police forces the international aspect is highly intriguing 
and provides a valuable point of comparison (1.3).    
 
America was chosen as it is similar enough to Britain that a comparison is both interesting and 
practical.  Given that the practice of professional public relations originated in America it was 
important to examine their understanding of police public relations particularly as there is an 
observable trend that where America leads the UK often follows (Bratton, 2005).  Indeed, 
Radzinowicz oŶĐe astutelǇ desĐƌiďed AŵeƌiĐa as ͞the eǆpeƌiŵeŶtal laďoƌatoƌǇ of ĐƌiŵiŶologiĐal 
sĐieŶĐe aŶd BƌitaiŶ is its Hoǀis ďakeƌǇ͟ ;ϭϵϲϰ Đited iŶ GaƌlaŶd, ϮϬϬϮ p.ϳͿ.   AustƌaliaŶ, CaŶadiaŶ 
and European research was included to provide a wider, global context.  The social, cultural and 
legal differences between the countries examined in the literature review also highlighted the 
universal nature of some of the issues and points raised during the interviews.  
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2.8.4  Bias and Researching the Police 
One of the problems with researching an organisation like the police is that it is virtually 
impossible not to have preconceived ideas about the police - who they are, what they do, how 
they are going to behave and what you can expect from them (Bayley, 1994). Indeed, Gourley 
(1954) argues that this is a vital aspect of policing – and that one of the main functions of the 
Communications team is to build and maintain a public image. It is here that the strength and 
benefits of qualitative methods becomes apparent.   
 
The very concept of the police particularly, it could be claimed, in Britain is steeped in 
historical, cultural, social and emotional symbolism (Loader, 1997). They are not just another 
government agency but part of an intricate, pervasive and arguably hegemonic web entangled 
in and around our lives and in the way we think. One only needs to look at the number of 
books, TV shows and films focused on the police to see how deeply embedded the institution 
is in our society (Peelo, 2005).  
 
This fascination with the police, however, creates an interesting set of difficulties when it 
comes to research. There is a good deal of information and misinformation circulating about 
the police (Reiner, 2010). As researchers around the world have lamented over the last thirty 
years – popular culture has created a myth around policing which has led to the public having 
an unrealistic expectation of what the police actually do and what they can achieve (Leishman 
and Mason, 2003).  
 
To complicate matters still further, the police are rarely out of the news. Whether it is in 
relation to an appeal for information, a good publicity story or a scandal; the police, and by 
extension policing, is continuously kept in the everyday lives of people in the UK. According to 
Loader (1997) and Manning (1971) public awareness of and interest in the police exists at a 
peculiar, almost visceral, level in England. This is particularly interesting, if problematic, when 
one is studying one of the most outward facing police departments – ͚Coƌpoƌate 
CommuniĐatioŶs͛.  
 
Critical theorists, such as Becker (1967) argue that objective, value free knowledge is a myth 
and that the actual threat to validity originates not in the presence of bias but in the pretence 
that it does not exist. Indeed, it could be argued that bias is essential to provide focus, drive 
and a lens through which to interpret phenomena without which the researcher would 
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flounder and ultimately drown in a sea of data (Wolcott, 1995). Daymon and Holloway (2011) 
concur with this argument and but suggest that what is more important is accounting for 
researcher bias in order to protect the credibility of the research. Qualitative methods allow 
ƌeseaƌĐheƌs to eǆploƌe the ƋuestioŶ of ďias ;ouƌ oǁŶ aŶd the suďjeĐt͛sͿ iŶ a ǁaǇ aŶd to a 
degree that is not possible in quantitative methods.  
 
Qualitative researchers are taught that the best way to mitigate the dangers posed by bias is to 
be as transparent about the conceptual framework and methods as possible. In practice, 
however, this often proves to be quite challenging and can, at times, work against the instinct 
to protect the superficial integrity of the research and ourselves as apparently objective 
researchers by demanding a greater amount of public introspection and reflexive criticality 
than might be comfortable (Wolcott, 1995). Gillham (2005, p.6) believes that this drive to 
conceal the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of research has led to the researcher distancing, 
themselves in their findings as if they were an unseen observer in research that is ͞ĐuƌiouslǇ 
aŶoŶǇŵous͟ ƌatheƌ thaŶ a ǀaƌiaďle ǁhiĐh ŵust ďe ĐoŶsideƌed.  
 
The iŵpaĐt of the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ oŶ the ƌeseaƌĐh is ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ Đalled the ͚iŶteƌǀieǁeƌ effeĐt͛ oƌ 
observers paradox (Jupp, 2000). This theory posits that the very act of observing something 
inherently changes the nature of the phenomena under observation (Daymon and Holloway, 
2011). The interviewer themselves is an integral part of the interview process to which the 
interviewee will respond; the gender of the researcher, how they present themselves, the 
clothes they wear can all influence how the interviewee perceives and interacts with the 
researcher (Johnson, 2013). This convoluted, and arguably tautological, paradox surrounding the 
researcher is compounded by what Klockars (1985, p.8) terms ͞Ŷoƌŵ deƌiǀatiǀe͟ ďias. KloĐkaƌs 
(1985) argues that all research is fundamentally biased. It is determined, defined and driven by 
the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ͛s iŶteƌests aŶd opiŶioŶs aŶd ultiŵatelǇ tells Ǉou ŵoƌe aďout the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ 
than about the subject being studied. Daymon and Holloway (2011, p.1) observe that there is a 
fuŶdaŵeŶtal diffiĐultǇ ͞iŶ taĐkliŶg the thiŶkiŶg that dƌiǀes the ƌeseaƌĐh ƋuestioŶ iŶ the fiƌst 
plaĐe… ďeĐause hoǁ ǁe stƌuĐtuƌe ouƌ ideas ĐoŶĐeƌŶiŶg ǁhat ǁe ƋueƌǇ deteƌŵiŶes fiƌstlǇ, 
what we find to be relevant or what we discard and, more importantly, the answers we get (as 
ǁell as those ǁe oǀeƌlookͿ͟.  
 
The questions asked and directions taken in this research were informed by the gaps identified 
in the existing body of literature discussed in Chapter 1 and new insights gained through the 
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interviews. Perhaps more importantly, however, this project was driven by my long standing 
interest in all things criminological and police related which inevitably played a part and was 
commented on by several of the participants during the interview stage. For example, both 
PI.11 and PI.16 initially expressed their reluctance to agree to a face-to-face interview. After 
discussing their concerns and talking about why I was interested in this topic, both interviewees 
not only agreed to an interview but also offered tours of their departments and to set aside 
several hours for the interview as they both professed excitement about an interview they had 
hitherto shown reluctance about.   
 
Appreciating the impact the researcher has had upon their research is of vital importance, 
however, it is often complicated and obscured by the more apparent difficulties in an 
interview situation around obtaining truthful answers from the participants. Reiner (2000, 
p.225) asks how do Ǉou ͞get iŶfoƌŵatioŶ fƌoŵ people ǁho [aƌe] ;ofteŶ ƌightlǇͿ suspiĐious of 
Ǉouƌ ŵotiǀes, [haǀe] ŵuĐh to hide, aŶd ŵuĐh to lose fƌoŵ its disĐoǀeƌǇ͟. It is easǇ duƌiŶg aŶ 
interview to form a sympathetic rapport with the participants as people tend to respond 
positiǀelǇ to aŶ iŶteƌested oƌ sǇŵpathetiĐ iŶteƌǀieǁeƌ. ͞“ĐeptiĐisŵ ŵaǇ ďe aďsolutelǇ esseŶtial 
to all aspeĐts of fieldǁoƌk͟, as WolĐott ;ϭϵϵϱ, p.ϭϭϴͿ ƌightlǇ oďseƌǀes, ďut it ĐaŶ ďe diffiĐult to 
apply rigorously in interviews where you spend time building rapport and getting to know the 
people involved. Qualitative research textbooks all talk about the importance of the 
interviewer building rapport and trust with the interviewee to make them feel comfortable 
and more likely to answer questions candidly and truthfully. Few of these texts, however, 
discuss how to manage the consequences of having built this rapport after the interview when 
analysis requires a level of criticality and objective reporting that can sometimes feel like 
disloyalty towards the interviewee.  
 
This was one of the aspects I struggled with most during the research. It is much easier to be 
ĐƌitiĐal fƌoŵ a distaŶĐe thaŶ it is to a peƌsoŶ͛s faĐe oƌ iŶ the ƌeseaƌĐh fiŶdiŶgs. The teŵptatioŶ 
was at times to soften some of the comments and concerns because it felt like a betrayal of 
the participant with whom I had spent time building rapport and a level of trust. A trend the 
interview notes revealed is that the interviews I initially felt went better were where I got on 
well with the participant and felt that the interview had progressed smoothly and honestly. 
The interviews with the better rapport were also the interviews where I found it more difficult 
during the analysis stage to be objectively critical. This difficulty was further compounded by a 
respect for the police as an institution and as a concept; which again made scepticism and 
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criticality a challenge at times as my baseline view of the police was fundamentally positive 
and therefore prone to optimistic rather than hyper-critical analysis of events and information 
relating to them. 
  
As discussed above there is no getting around or avoiding bias. There are, however, techniques 
I found which helped to manage them. The primary method used was leaving transcription and 
analysis of the interview data for a few weeks after each interview occurred so that there was 
emotional and intellectual distance from the interview itself. Doing so allowed me time to 
reflect on the interview, how it had gone, the problems which occurred to me after it had 
finished and where the weaknesses were in the interview technique. Most importantly, 
however, the time gap allowed me to listen to the interview with fresh ears as sufficient time 
had passed to dull some of the recollections and emotions associated with that interview.  
 
 
2.8.5 Interview Techniques and Method 
The interviews were conducted between January 2014 and February 2015 and lasted between 
40 and over 150 minutes with the average length around 90 minutes.  The majority of the face-
to-face interviews took plaĐe iŶ the iŶteƌǀieǁees offiĐe iŶ theiƌ foƌĐe͛s headƋuaƌteƌs aŶd 
involved only the head (or representative) and myself as the interviewer. In four cases, 
however, the interviews were not conducted in an office environment; three were held in the 
canteen and one off site completely in a coffee shop.  
 
It is difficult to accurately determine the effect location has on an interview. Quiet, private 
office type environments are the ideal recommended in books on qualitative research because 
they reduce the possibility of distractions and ensure a level of confidentiality for anything 
participants might say which can encourage them to be more open. Conducting those four 
interviews in noisy, busy public areas certainly proved to be challenging at times; however, all 
four of the participants remained relaxed and quite candid throughout their interviews. They 
clearly felt comfortable and confident in their surroundings and if the interviewees were 
concerned about the loss of privacy they made no mention of it and did not seem overly 
concerned when asked. Indeed, two of the interviewees (P1.11 and P1.21) told me that they 
felt more comfortable talking about their work outside of their department and away from 
their colleagues who might overhear or interrupt. 
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The noise of being in a public environment did undeniably cause a few issues; it made hearing 
questions and answers more difficult for both parties and the presence of other people 
walking around, and in one case dancing, music and televisions were distractions I had not 
previously anticipated or experienced. The distractions caused by the above meant that there 
were times in the interviews where either the interviewee or myself were interrupted while 
we were talking or the interviewee stopped midway through an explanation as they were 
distracted by something and needed prompting to return to what they were saying. The 
background noise and sometimes disjointed sentences made it difficult in places to accurately 
transcribe the interview. 
 
A semi-structured approach was used during the interviews. The questions used during the 
interviews can be found in Appendix 2.5a. The same basic questions/topics were discussed in 
each interview but the method of gaining the information often differed depending upon the 
rapport developed with the interviewee. 2.9 discusses how research does not spring from the 
ether fully formed – but is a constant process of change, evolution and (re)negotiation. The 
same is true of the questions you ask during the research. It seems to be a natural, if at times 
frustrating, part of any study to realise that you are heading in the wrong direction. The result 
is that often the questions you answer at the end of the project are not the same ones you set 
out with at the beginning (Silverman, 2007).  
 
I found early on that trying to impose the same structure on each interview was ultimately 
unhelpful as often the most interesting nuggets of information that came out of these 
conversations was not the result of my rattling through the question sheet but by listening to 
the connections the interviewee was making and adapting my responses to coax and tease out 
answers rather than demanding them.  As a result, as the interviews progressed and new 
avenues were discovered and my understanding of police communications developed the 
questions/prompt sheet was reviewed and revised to reflect this.  
 
Over the course of these interviews I found they could be summarised into three basic types; 
͚CoŶǀeƌsatioŶal͛, ͚DiƌeĐt QuestioŶs͛ aŶd ͚PaƌtiĐipaŶt DiƌeĐted͛. IŶ the first, the interviewee 
responded much better to a loose structure and just being allowed to talk with a few prompts 
to guide them. The tone was conversational and kept informal which seemed to relax the 
respondent and help them feel comfortable and maintain a good flow of information. One of 
the unexpected benefits of this more unstructured and grounded approach was the wealth of 
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additional information and connections or ideas I had not previously considered. As Fig 2.1 
shows this was the approach used most frequently and seemed to work better with the female 
interviewees than the male ones. In some situations a combination of fully formed, structured 
questions was required initially but once the ice was broken the structure became looser as 
the interviewees warmed up to me and I settled into the new interview dynamic. 
 
Male respondents, on the whole, seemed to respond better to the second approach; 
preferring direct, structured, properly articulated questions rather than relying on 
conversational prompts. It is interesting to note that of the three female interviewees who 
required this approach two of them were telephone interviews. These interviews proved to be 
more like a question and answer session rather than a conversation and could feel quite stilted 
and overly formal at times. In these situations I generally found that, unlike the 
͚CoŶǀeƌsatioŶal͛ appƌoaĐh, fuƌtheƌ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ ǁas Ŷot offeƌed ďǇ the iŶteƌǀieǁee ǁheŶ 
answering; if I wished for clarification or a more in-depth answer I had to specifically request 
what I was interested in.  
 
At the beginning of the interview process I thought it was either because of a lack of interest in 
my research or some deficiency on my part which was alienating the interviewee or causing 
them to dislike me. Over time, and from several follow up conversations, it became apparent 
that this was not the case. What I had initially interpreted as frosty dislike was their attempt at 
helping my research by letting me control the interview to get what I needed out of it. As one 
iŶteƌǀieǁee ;PI.ϰͿ told ŵe at the eŶd of theiƌ iŶteƌǀieǁ ͞ŵeŶ teŶd to like the diƌeĐt appƌoaĐh͟; 
as PI.4 explained - I knew what I was looking for and so left it to me to find it by asking him the 
questions. The idea that I was looking to him as the expert to offer some guidance in this area 
had not occurred to him. 
 
Such an approach was not always easy or comfortable, particularly when the interviewee was 
evasive on a topic. However, structured questions proved very useful for telephone interviews 
where there was only a disembodied voice rather than facial cues and body language to help 
keep a conversation progressing. Silverman (2011) and Yin (2012) suggest the use of a more 
structured style of questioning for telephone interviews precisely because they are lacking in 
the wealth of visual data and the emotional connection you can forge during an in person 
interview as without these two things carrying a conversation with a stranger over the phone 
can be very difficult.  
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Fig. 2.1                                      Interviewee Analysis Table 
Police Force 
Code 
Gender of 
Interviewee 
Interviewer Directed Participant 
Directed Informal/ 
Conversation 
Formal/  
Direct Question 
PI.1 M   Y 
PI.2* M  Y  
PI.3 M  Y  
PI.4 M  Y  
PI.5 M  Y  
PI.6 F  Y  
PI.7 F  Y  
PI.8 F Y   
PI.9 F Y   
PI.10 F Y   
PI.11* M Y   
PI.12 M Y   
PI.13 M   Y 
PI.14 M   Y 
PI.15* F Y   
PI.16 F Y   
PI.17 F Y   
PI.18 M  Y  
PI.19a# 
PI.19b# 
F and  
M 
Y   
PI.20a# 
PI.20b# 
F and  
M 
Y  Y 
PI.21* F Y   
PI.22 M   Y 
PI.23 F Y   
PI.24 M  Y  
PI.25a# 
PI.25b# 
F and  
M 
Y  Y 
PI.26 F  Y  
PI.27 M   Y 
PI.28 F Y   
Blue background   =  Telephone interview         White background   =  Face-to-Face interview 
*                     =  Interview took place in public place (Canteen/Coffee shop) 
#                               =  Multiple person / group interview 
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The final typology also proved to be the most difficult. These were the interviews where the 
interviewee tried to control the direction of the interview and questions I should be asking; or, 
as was the case with PI.22, the interviewee was so excited and passionate about his subject 
that his enthusiasm made asking questions very difficult through sheer talkativeness. Through 
tƌial aŶd eƌƌoƌ the ďest ŵethod I fouŶd foƌ ĐopiŶg ǁith ͚PaƌtiĐipaŶt DiƌeĐted͛ iŶteƌǀieǁs ǁas to 
͚go ǁith the floǁ͛, alloǁ these iŶdiǀiduals to diƌeĐt the iŶteƌǀieǁ aŶd slip iŶ the ƋuestioŶs at aŶ 
opportune moment if they did not cover them. This approach was not ideal, as it often left me 
feeling wrong footed during the interviews and gave far greater control to the interviewee; it 
proved to be, however, an example of what Hughes (2000) terms necessary compromises as 
engaging in an all-out battle of wills was unlikely to have been conducive to building a good 
working relationship or encouraging forthcoming answers. 
 
MǇ eǆpeƌieŶĐe ǁith ͚PaƌtiĐipaŶt DiƌeĐted͛ iŶteƌǀieǁs eĐhoed a ǁaƌŶiŶg ŵade ďǇ Gillhaŵ 
;ϮϬϬϱͿ oŶ the diffiĐulties assoĐiated ǁith ǁhat he Đalled ͚elite͛ iŶteƌǀieǁs. As Gillhaŵ ;ϮϬϬϱͿ 
points out getting truthful answers out of people is an omnipresent challenge in any research 
ďut it ĐaŶ ďe paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ diffiĐult ǁheŶ iŶteƌǀieǁiŶg eǆpeƌts oƌ ͚elite iŶteƌǀieǁees͛. Gillhaŵ 
(2005, p.54) defines elite interviewees as people in positions of authority or power by virtue of 
their experience or job and identified five potential problems that can occur with elite 
interviews.  
1) The participants are political creatures more aware of the implications of the 
questions asked which will colour their responses; 
2) Access is usually contingent upon them seeing a use for the research; 
3) Hidden agendas may underpin what they say and how they try to construct 
information; 
4) Elite interviewees are more likely to require concessions from the researcher in 
return for their time;  
5) It can be significantly more difficult to challenge what someone says when you 
view them as an authority, authority figure or in a position of control over your 
research.  
 
The saŵple gƌoup seleĐted foƌ this ƌeseaƌĐh fit Gillhaŵ͛s Đƌiteƌia ;ϮϬϬϱͿ foƌ ͚elite͛ iŶteƌǀieǁs. 
The paƌtiĐipaŶts ǁeƌe ĐhoseŶ pƌeĐiselǇ ďeĐause of theiƌ ͚eǆpeƌt͛ kŶoǁledge of poliĐe 
communications and their position of seniority with the police Communications department 
(2.4.1). It is interesting to note that while all those  interviewed during this research technically 
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fall uŶdeƌ the tǇpologǇ of ͚elite͛ iŶteƌǀieǁs the pƌoďleŵs ideŶtified ďǇ Gillhaŵ ;ϮϬϬϱͿ ǁeƌe Ŷot 
present in all interview situations. There were, however, several occasions where the 
power/knowledge imbalance and its associated problems were particularly problematic; most 
notably problems 1, 3 and 5 were experienced in the Participant Directed and some of the 
more structured interviews. 
 
In most interviews, the interviewer is in control and the dynamic is clear cut in the sense that 
the interviewer asks questions and the interviewee responds. This is not always the case with 
elite interviews where the expert in question might have decided on how they wish the 
interview to play out. Maintaining or regaining control in these situations can be very difficult 
particularly as it can mean having to corral an uncooperative authority figure.  
 
This proved to be the case with the Participant Directed interviews. Challenging an authority 
figure is not always easy, even when the individuals concerned are not being deliberately 
obstructive, and combined with the expert knowledge of the interviewee these situations 
proved difficult to manage and, at times, highly frustrating. Interviews PI.13 and PI.27 were 
particularly challenging albeit for different reasons. With PI.27 the interviewee was forceful, 
used to being listened to and used to controlling the direction of conversation. He would 
frequently interrupt while I was asking a question in an attempt to redirect my interest to 
where he thought it should be. PI.13, however, was quite a different experience. While there 
was no overt attempt to control the direction of the interview PI.13 was increasingly negative, 
obstructive and surly during the interview. This behaviour was particularly interesting as prior 
to the actual interview PI.13 had been cheerful, overly helpful and accommodating in the 
emails and telephone exchange to set up the interview.  
 
Social psychologists argue that it is a natural result of life-long conditioning that humans find it 
diffiĐult to ƌefuse ĐoŵŵaŶds fƌoŵ authoƌitǇ. Milgƌaŵ͛s ;ϭϵϲϯͿ highlǇ ĐoŶtƌoǀeƌsial oďedieŶĐe 
studies during the 1960s showed that even when the participants thought something was 
ethically questionable the majority of them obeyed the authority figure instigating the 
behaviour. Problems with challenging authority might be common place but it does have 
implications for the reliability of the answers gained in qualitative research which need to be 
acknowledged.  
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In an ideal interview situation the participant will answer all questions regardless of how 
sensitive or critical they are in honestly. In reality, however, communication is a labyrinth in 
which it is easy to get lost. Evasion, partial explanation, tangents, redirection and terse short 
answers designed to make you back off from a topic are all common conversational tactics. 
The question is, how far do you go to get the participant to answer the questions?  
 
This is a crucial dilemma in interviews. In pushing for answers participants do not wish to give 
on one topic it might adversely affect how they respond to you in the rest of the interview and 
if follow up information is required. There is also to consider that under pressure participants 
might be more inclined to untruths, part-truths or obfuscations. In such a situation the real 
question seems to be:  does it really matter if this is actually how the participant perceives 
things or if it is how they wish to be seen?  
 
Earlier in this section the constructivist approach was discussed. Gillham (2005 p.6) believes 
that ͞iŶ aŶ iŶteƌǀieǁ, the iŶteƌǀieǁee is ͚ĐoŶstƌuĐtiŶg͛ theŵselǀes iŶ ǁhat theǇ saǇ… ďut so 
also is the iŶteƌǀieǁeƌ͟. OŶe of the ŵost iŵpoƌtaŶt Ƌualities of Ƌualitatiǀe ƌeseaƌĐh is its aďilitǇ 
to ďe fleǆiďle ǁith the ĐoŶĐept of ͚tƌuth͛. 
 
Constructivism suggests that by recognising the performance-like nature of reality what is 
more important is how people wish to portray or represent things rather than what they are 
actually saying. This is the approach which has been used in this research. Anonymity is 
thought to be one possible solution to this problem as that people are more likely to answer 
without reservation if they perceive there to be no consequences to what they say (Silverman, 
2013).  In light of this, all results in this research were anonymised to prevent identification; 
the assurance of which did seem to visibly affect the openness and engagement of some of the 
participants (2.6.4).  
 
A further complication was that three of the interviews conducted involved multiple 
participants. It had always been the plan to conduct the interviews in person where possible 
and on a one-to-one basis. The concept of interviewing multiple people in a group interview 
had not occurred to me as particularly viable considering the reaction of the pilot force to 
interviewing their junior members of staff (2.4.2 & 2.9). As such, it came as quite a surprise 
that three forces arranged, without prior consultation, for two members of their 
communications team to be present in the interview.  
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These multi-person interviews were an unexpected windfall in many ways. Talking to both the 
head of the department and/or several of their managers added considerable contextual data 
and unusual perspectives to the wealth of information they were able to give me about various 
aspects of their work which made for a more comprehensive understanding of their 
department and aims.  
 
Group interviews did, however, pose some interesting new challenges. 
1.) Personalities: in a one-on-one interview the only dynamic is between interviewer and 
the interviewee. In group interviews there are multiple personalities playing off and 
interacting with each other which can create a challenging dynamic. This is where 
personality types come into play and becomes particularly important (Belbin, 2010). In 
one-on-one interview you can adjust your style to balance or counteract difficult, 
dominant, shy, reserved and challenging personalities in order to build the rapport 
necessary for a successful interview – it is much harder to manage people in groups. 
 
In two of the group interviews I had an interesting dynamic develop between the 
interviewees which required careful handling. In the first case, PI.19a was very quiet 
and subdued during the initial part of the interview while PI.19b was very loud, 
boisterous and prone to interjecting or interrupting her when she was talking. The pair 
evidently got on well together and had an established working dynamic but it was 
difficult to balance the two personalities so that PI.19a answered the questions as well 
as her colleague. In the second case the second respondent (PI.20b) was reluctant to 
talk very much in the presence of his boss (PI.20a). After PI.20a left part way through 
the interview PI.20b was much more open and candid about answering questions and 
talking about their work. As to whether these interviews would have been different 
had I known and prepared beforehand for a group interview is a difficult question to 
answer. Ultimately a good level of rapport was built with all of the interviewees in the 
group interviews, but the dynamic was different and challenging.  
 
2.) Air time: The more people there are the more careful you have to be about making 
sure that all participants have a chance to answer the questions and raise the topics 
they need to. Otherwise there is the danger that participants might feel left out or 
marginalised, as occurred at times during interview PI.20. Alternating the questions 
between the interviewees and aiming for a conversational rather than structured Q&A 
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approach seemed to work very well in encouraging a fluid and inclusive discussion that 
involved all the interviewees and prevented anyone from feeling alienated or left out.  
 
3.) Time: multiple people answering questions takes significantly longer than if there is 
only one person being interviewed. The multi-person interviews were longer than the 
average one-to-one interview (120 minutes on average).  
 
4.) Transcription and data analysis: the process of transcribing the content of an 
interview is something of a weak link in the process, even with a good quality audio 
recording (2.4). All the multi-person interviews were recorded which proved to be 
essential as transcribing one-to-one interviews are complicated and time consuming 
enough without adding in the further complexity of multiple speakers, at times 
speaking over each other, and interacting with each other. Accurately capturing the 
interviewees opinions and interactions for analysis proved to be one of the most 
significant challenges with group interviewing particularly during analysis.  
 
To complicate matters further, there were also difficulties around the terminology used on 
tǁo oĐĐasioŶs. IŶ ďoth Đases the teƌŵs oƌigiŶallǇ used ǁeƌe eitheƌ ĐoŶsideƌed ͞iŶaĐĐuƌate͟ 
;PI.ϭͿ, oƌ ͞too diffiĐult to uŶdeƌstaŶd͟ ;PI.ϭϰͿ, aŶd ǁeƌe suďseƋueŶtlǇ alteƌed. The first 
example involved the three models of public relations in the police suggested by Mawby 
(2002, p181): ͚MaƌgiŶal͛, ͚“uppoƌtiǀe͛ aŶd ͚Coƌe͛ ;ϭ.ϰ.1). After consultation with the pilot force, 
the terminology and models were adapted slightly following advice from various interviewees 
to become: 
1) ͚OptioŶal͛: police communications is considered non-essential or an optional extra by 
police officers. This is reflected in lack of inclusion at senior levels and avoidance or a 
dismissive attitude from investigating officers.  
2) ͚CoŵpleŵeŶtary: police communications is considered important and is used/accepted 
by most police officers although there remains a sense of exclusion and not being a 
part of operational policing.  
3) ͚Eŵďedded͛:  police communications is considered an essential part of operational 
policing and is included at all levels of police management (e.g. has a seat on the 
management board). 
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The second case involved communications terminology. The Interviewees were asked to 
choose which terŵ theǇ felt ďest desĐƌiďed theiƌ depaƌtŵeŶt͛s ĐuƌƌeŶt ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ 
stƌategǇ; ͚Push͛, ͚Pull͛, ͚NetǁoƌkiŶg͛ oƌ ͚TƌaŶsaĐtioŶal͛. The teƌŵs theŵselǀes ǁeƌe takeŶ fƌoŵ 
Meƌgel͛s ;ϮϬϭϮͿ aŶalǇsis of soĐial ŵedia use in government institutions (1.5). This model was 
initially chosen as it was specifically designed to accommodate social media and has been used 
as an evaluation tool before in police communications research  (Meijer and Thaens, 2014).  
 
It quickly became apparent however, that it was not the most accurate or suitable model for 
discussing communications in the English police. While interviewees quickly understood and 
ideŶtified eleŵeŶts of ͚Push͛, ͚Pull͛ aŶd ͚NetǁoƌkiŶg͛ the iŶteƌǀieǁees felt that the 
͚TƌaŶsaĐtioŶal͛ ŵodel ǁas ďoth ĐoŶfusiŶg aŶd Ŷot appƌopriate for their police force. PI.16 
suggested during her interview that a more appropriate model would be transformative, or 
behavioural change based, as for her the foundation of all police communications was to effect 
a change in the behaviour of their audiences; whether this was through prevention, witness 
appeals or reporting crimes that they might otherwise not have. Similar ideas were expressed 
by PI.25b, PI.8, PI.11 and PI.17 who all thought that the central aim of communications should 
be behaviour change (3.2.4). GiǀeŶ the ĐoŶfusioŶ suƌƌouŶdiŶg the ͚TƌaŶsaĐtioŶal ŵodel͛, this 
ǁas suďstituted iŶ lateƌ iŶteƌǀieǁs foƌ a Ŷeǁ ͚TƌaŶsfoƌŵatiǀe͛ ŵodel; ǁhiĐh ǁas ďased oŶ 
PI.ϭϲ͛s suggestioŶ of iŶĐludiŶg a ďehaǀiouƌal ĐhaŶge eleŵeŶt.  
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PART THREE: Tracing the Research Story 
 
Research does not spring fully formed from the ether – nor do the questions asked or the 
thinking which drives it (Silverman, 2013). The following section discusses the conceptual 
framework underpinning this project; mapping the evolution it has undergone from a simple 
research question asking why police forces have Corporate Communications departments to a 
doctoral thesis. 
 
2.9 Conceptual Framework 
 
The poet Robert Burns (2011, p.110) once famously commented that ͞the ďest laid sĐheŵes o͛ 
ŵiĐe aŶ͛ ŵeŶ gaŶg aft agleǇ͟ ;do ofteŶ go astƌaǇͿ. The saŵe Đould ďe said foƌ doĐtoƌal 
research.  
 
Upon starting this research further reading quickly demonstrated that the predominant 
methodologies used in this area were divided neatly into two types: ethnographic type 
observation examining police public relations departments, and quantitative based surveys 
and regression analysis for public opinion, public confidence and research looking at the 
impact of specific strategies on these two variables (1.3). The popularity of these methods in 
investigating this subject area seemed to confirm the direction and plan I had selected in my 
thesis proposal
16
  
 
The emphasis in this first draft was twofold. The first part was designed to determine what the 
poliĐe puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs depaƌtŵeŶts aĐtuallǇ do ;ĐoŶtiŶuiŶg MaǁďǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϮͿ ƌeseaƌĐhͿ. The 
seĐoŶd ǁas aiŵed at fiŶdiŶg out ǁhetheƌ these effoƌts aŶd aĐtiǀities ǁeƌe effeĐtiǀe. ͚PuďliĐ 
ĐoŶfideŶĐe͛ Đaŵe to the foƌe iŶ aĐadeŵiĐ aŶd politiĐal disĐourse during the late 1990s 
ĐulŵiŶatiŶg iŶ ϮϬϬϵ iŶ Neǁ Laďouƌ͛s ͚OŶe NatioŶal CoŶfideŶĐe Taƌget͛ ǁhiĐh ŵade puďliĐ 
confidence the common measure (for a time) by which policing, and police forces, in England 
were to be judged (Fleming and McLaughlin, 2012). Given the close theoretical alignment 
between public confidence initiatives and police public relations it seemed at the time like the 
                                           
16
 See Appendix 2.6 for a comparison of methodology plans considered.  
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best possible measure by which to assess the impact of police communications in relation to 
public opinion (1.3).  
 
The plan was to use a broadly ethnographic approach, involving short periods of observation 
and semi structured interviews with key members of the communication team, in three police 
forces. Ideally these police forces would be a mixture of rural, urban and metropolitan so as to 
provide insight into how police communications worked and differed across different policing 
environments and different audiences.  
 
Ethnographic research has long been considered something of the gold standard in qualitative 
academic research. Gillham (2005) believes that the appeal of ethnography is that it appears to 
be the most naturalistic of all the approaches and lets one investigate how, what and why a 
phenomenon exists. Such an approach, according to Gillham (2005) provides the researcher 
with a more comprehensive understanding of the wider context than can otherwise be 
reached, even by in-depth interviews (Silverman, 2013).  
 
The trade-off for such depth is the cost – both in terms of time and money – that ethnography 
requires. For this reason the number of police forces to be examined was restricted to three 
with the acknowledgement that such a restriction would have a significant impact on the 
generalisability of the findings. The findings from the ethnography would then have been 
contrasted against a statistical analysis of public confidence and satisfaction levels in order to 
determine if the actions and strategies of the departments were having a discernible effect on 
confidence and satisfaction levels within these areas. This method of statistical analysis is very 
popular and has been used to some success by the advocates of the Procedural Justice model 
of public confidence (Bradford, 2011).   
 
It was also becoming increasingly evident, however, that there were several significant 
concerns about the quantitative aspect of my methodology. Regression analysis has 
traditionally been used in this area to try to demonstrate causal or correlative links between a 
specific stimulus (e.g. newsletters/media reporting) and public opinion. As a research method 
it has dominated the area of police public relations for the last decade. Consequently, 
atteŶtioŶ has shifted aǁaǇ fƌoŵ the ͚diagŶostiĐ͛ aŶd ͚ĐoŶteǆtual͛ ƋuestioŶs ;‘itĐhie aŶd 
Spencer, 1994) examined in the work of Mawby (2002) and Terris (1967) on understanding the 
role and purpose of these departments. Instead research has focused almost exclusively on the 
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͚stƌategiĐ͛ aŶd ͚eǀaluatiǀe͛ ƋuestioŶs ;‘itĐhie aŶd “peŶĐeƌ, ϭϵϵϰͿ aiŵed at assessiŶg the 
effectiveness of a specific strategy in improving public confidence.   
 
Understanding trends in public opinion, however, is notoriously difficult (Roberts, 1992; 
Friedman, 1998; Warr, 1995; Salem, 2000; Nir, 2011; Harkin, 2015) even without the added 
complication of attempting to understand such a nebulous concept as confidence (Decker, 
1981; Frank, Smith and Novak, 2005; Waddington, Williams, Wright and Newburn, 2015). This 
difficulty is further compounded by the inherent limitation of regression analysis in being able 
to account for, or even acknowledge, all of the variables and influences which might be 
iŶflueŶĐiŶg ƌespoŶdeŶt͛s aŶsǁeƌs ;HaƌkiŶ, ϮϬϭϱͿ.  
 
CaǀadiŶo aŶd DigŶaŶ oďseƌǀe that ͞iŶ pƌiŶĐiple, at least, ŵultiǀaƌiate ŵodelliŶg ĐaŶ ďe Đaƌƌied 
out to test for the presence or absence of the pƌoposed ƌelatioŶship… IŶ pƌaĐtiĐe, it is still 
difficult to establish a comparative database with sufficient observation points and sufficient 
ǀaƌiaďles to alloǁ a Đleaƌ piĐtuƌe to eŵeƌge͟ ;Đited iŶ Hough ϮϬϭϮ, p.ϯϯϳͿ. This poses a 
considerable challenge for the results of these methodologies. If you cannot be sure of what it 
is you are testing then can you be sure of the correlations and conclusions you draw from the 
results (Bamford, 1993).  
 
Furthermore, according to Ditton, Farrall, Bannister and Gilchrist (2000) there is a 
characteristic problem with using quantitative surveys as there is no way to determine the 
reliability of the answers you receive or to determine whether how respondents say they 
would feel/react in a situation is an accurate predictor of how they would actually behave in 
real life. Statistical relationships are particularly problematic when it comes to understanding 
something as complicated and uniquely individual as human behaviour (Roberts, 2010; 
Friedman, 1998; Jobs, 2005). Silverman (2011, p.368) argues that a common mistake in 
ƋuaŶtitatiǀe ƌeseaƌĐh is to assuŵe that ͞just ďeĐause X seeŵs alǁaǇs to ďe folloǁed ďǇ Y, it 
does not mean that X necessarily causes Y. There might be a third factor, Z, which produces 
both X and Y. AlterŶatiǀelǇ, ) ŵight ďe aŶ ͚iŶteƌǀeŶiŶg ǀaƌiaďle͛ ǁhiĐh is Đaused ďǇ X aŶd theŶ 
iŶflueŶĐes Y͟. The diffiĐultǇ is that theƌe is alǁaǇs the poteŶtial foƌ ) aŶd this ƌeŶdeƌs it 
impossible to know exactly what you are measuring, or why, without thorough, contextual 
understanding of both the situation and of the individual respondent (Sturgis and Smith, 
2010).   
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Hough ;ϮϬϭϮ, p.ϯϯϳͿ ĐoŶĐedes that uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg puďliĐ opiŶioŶ ͞is pƌoďaďlǇ ŵoƌe of aŶ 
iŶteƌpƌetatiǀe aƌt thaŶ a soĐial sĐieŶĐe͟. Hoǁeǀeƌ, the luƌe of this sort of research and the 
ephemeral answers it gives has led to a marked change in the wider research community. As 
my primary interest in public opinion was in trying to understand these influences I decided to 
move away from regression analysis and towards a more qualitative approach to gauging 
public opinion. 
 
Version 2, like version 1, was centred on an ethnographic approach. I decided to increase the 
number of forces to be included in the case studies in order to generate a better data set for 
comparison purposes. Regression analysis was replaced by an online survey that was aimed at 
eǆploƌiŶg the puďliĐ͛s eǆpeĐtatioŶs of the poliĐe, aǁaƌeŶess of poliĐe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs 
activities and whether they thought these activities had an impact on their opinion of the 
police. The focus of the research was now firmly centred on what people knew, what they 
ǁeƌe aǁaƌe of, ǁhat people͛s eǆpeĐtatioŶs/ǀieǁs of the poliĐe ǁeƌe. EffeĐtiǀe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ 
relies on both parties engaging in a dialogue. To this end the aim at this time was to address 
the two greatest research gaps I had identified through my reading: namely understanding (1) 
the police PR department and (2) public expectation of the police – the former through 
interviews and participant observation and the latter through an online survey.  
 
One of the biggest challenges during this process has been learning when and how to say no to 
other people influencing my research interests and direction. This particular challenge was 
highlighted when in January 2013 I approached a constabulary in order to test the likely 
probability of police forces agreeing to take part in my research.  
 
The intention behind this meeting was to ascertain: 
1) Whether the pilot Constabulary were interested in my research questions and ideas; 
2) If they were, would they agree to my proposed research methodology; and 
3)  The likely reaction of other police forces and possible uptake.  
 
A letter was sent to the Chief Constable of the pilot constabulary in January 2013 and 
subsequently a meeting was arranged for later that month. The answer to all three questions 
ǁas ͚Ŷo͛.  
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This was my first experience talking to a Chief Constable about my research ideas and I was 
aware of the necessity of gaining his interest and support if I was to be allowed access. This 
combined with the long-standing desire to ensure my research had a practical use meant I 
went into the meeting eager to be directed into avenues that would benefit the police.  
 
The Chief Constable had his own ideas about what research they wanted and the methods that 
would be most useful to them - my original interest in exploring the public relations 
department through ethnographic observation and interviews did not coincide with this. The 
pilot constabulary were more interested in the business community; their relationship with the 
police, their interests and expectations and how to improve this partnership.  
 
During that meeting it was made clear to me that the constabulary would be more likely to 
grant access if I incorporated an examination of the police-business relationship in my research 
design. This raised an interesting question over the extent to which I should attempt to satisfy 
police agendas in order to gain access to that particular constabulary.  
 
At the time it seemed prudent to accommodate as much of the police agenda as possible in 
order to gain access and ensure that the results could be of practical value to the participating 
forces; this is reflected in the direction taken in version 3. In hindsight by trying to satisfy this 
agenda it changed the direct of the research and broadened the focus to an unmanageable 
degree. This problem was picked up during a supervisory review in April 2013 which led to 
version 4. Where version 3 was overwhelmingly dominated by the public opinion element 
aimed at understanding the differences between online, offline and business audiences, 
version 4 had a far tighter focus and restricted aims. Public opinion had been limited to an 
examination of online audiences using police social media sites and the principle aim was once 
more on understanding the role and purpose of the police Communications department albeit 
with the new addition of a social media lens.  
 
Version 4 was sent to the pilot force in June 2013 and in July I received a response rejecting my 
research proposal. The reason cited was that the ethnographic component was too time-
consuming for them to commit to and that the social media survey was unnecessary as they 
already recorded some of this information through Google analytics.  
 
109 
 
This refusal was probably the single most useful event of my first year. It was a much-needed 
impetus for me to realise four key things: firstly, that this was my research project and giving a 
police force too much influence could and almost certainly would lead to problems (Bottoms, 
2000). Secondly, my project was getting too ambitious and the research questions too 
nebulous. The research gap I had initially identified when I first began looking at this area in 
2009 was in understanding what these departments do and what they are actually trying to 
achieve – and this was where the focus of the study should remain.  
 
Thirdly, that while replicating Mawby's (2002) highly successful ethnographic observation of 
South Yorkshire police in other police forces would be interesting it was not a necessary 
strategy for answering my core research interests. And finally, that I was more interested in a 
national comparison of how different police forces were communicating than an in-depth but 
isolated examination of one or two constabularies. This new awareness is reflected in versions 
five, six and seven which reverted back to my core questions; what do police communications 
departments actually do? Why do they do it? And, are they achieving the desired outcomes?  
 
There are three key differences between versions five and six: firstly, version 6 removes the 
limit on only nine police forces being examined in the case studies; secondly, in version 5 one 
of the people to be interviewed is the Chief Constable of the participating force - this is 
removed in version 6 as it became apparent that not only was it difficult to get Chief 
Constables to agree but that they had limited knowledge about the topics covered in my 
research questions; and thirdly version 6 introduces the use of in-depth questionnaires/email 
interviews with other department staff members.  
 
What also became clear with the versions 5-6, however, was that my original interest in 
understanding what these departments do and why was not only an interesting question to 
me but was also an important one for the police. For a department which specialises in, and is 
meant to manage, internal and external communications awareness of what other police 
forces are doing and whether it works is sporadic at best. It has created a disparate patchwork 
of communications related activities and strategies across England with little to no 
commonality or consistency between different areas; and sometimes even within the same 
police force (3.2.4). This disparity became the focus of version 6 - particularly regarding social 
media and other Internet based platforms.  
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One of the most significant shifts in the direction this research has taken was the inclusion of 
police use of social media as a core focus. In 2009 all police forces in England had a website but 
only 26 police forces had a Twitter account and 24 had a Facebook page. By 2012 the online 
landscape had changed considerably with all forces increasing their online presence (1.5 and 
3.1.6). The inclusion of social media as one of the central aspects of this research reflects the 
importance that online communities and communications now have for the police forces in 
England.  
 
It was while drafting V6 that I started wondering about the potential for questionnaires or 
email interviews in order to access the junior members of the Corporate Communications 
team/PR Department. The idea was to canvas their views on the apparent shift in the official 
documents which showed an increasing emphasis on social media.  Increasing the sample to 
include the views of junior staff promised an interesting and previously unexplored source of 
contextual information which could then be compared to the answers given by the heads of 
these departments during their interview.  
 
There comes a point, however, in all research wheƌe Ǉou haǀe to Đoŵpƌoŵise ďetǁeeŶ ͞ǁhat 
is desiƌaďle… aŶd ǁhat is pƌaĐtiĐal iŶ teƌŵs of Đost, tiŵe, politiĐs aŶd ethiĐs͟ ;Jupp, ϮϬϬϬ p.ϭϬͿ. 
The necessary balance every researcher has to juggle between the ideal and the actually 
achievable.  Due to a series of unfortunate events during 2014 involving family illness and a car 
accident it became necessary to refine my focus further in order to create an achievable plan; 
the result was version 7 (Appendix 2.6). 
 
In essence version 7 is very similar to version 6 in that the focus, case study element and 
document analysis remained the same. The difference lies in the research questions and the 
questionnaire. The research questions were rewritten to give a much tighter focus and to 
separate what I had come to consider the primary and the secondary questions which followed 
on from them.  
 
The questionnaire and survey element was removed entirely and replaced by a series of FOI 
requests submitted by email to each of the police forces in England (Appendix 3.1). This 
decision was made for five interconnected reasons:  
1) Given how busy Police Communications departments are the likelihood of receiving a 
representative response for these questionnaires was quite slim without a lot of time 
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consuming chasing. The additional concern here was the danger of becoming a 
nuisance factor in the department (Gillham, 2005) which would likely have a negative 
impact on my working relationship with the heads of department I was interviewing.  
 
2) Further to this, the data analysis from the questionnaires would require an unfeasible 
amount of time given the significantly higher number of police forces engaging with 
this research than had originally been estimated. When V6 was written the anticipated 
number of police forces agreeing to take part was between 10 and 15 out of the 39 
available in England. By May 2014 27 forces had confirmed that they wished to take 
part with a further five forces still deliberating and five forces who had not yet replied. 
Given that the interviews were expected to last between 60 and 90 minutes and the 
estimated time for transcription and analysis, trying to incorporate more data in the 
form of questionnaires seemed unnecessarily problematic; especially when 
considering the low average response rate for questionnaires (Silverman, 2010).    
 
3) While it would have been an interesting source of contextual data the questionnaires 
were not essential for answering the research questions; particularly in light of the 
interviews with the heads of department which were generating significant amounts of 
rich data far exceeding initial expectations.  
 
4) Most of the factual information I required about the departments (e.g. budget, staff 
levels and training) could be obtained under the Freedom of Information Act (2000) 
which would, in theory at least, guarantee the data within 20 working days of receipt 
of the request.  
 
5) Due to the unlimited number of FOI requests you can make, replacing the survey with 
FOIs meant that I could request further information or clarification as and when it 
became relevant rather than trying to anticipate what information I would need in 
advance of sending the survey to the police forces.  
 
It is important to note, however, that while the reasoning above appeared sound in theory, in 
practice there were unanticipated difficulties with using this resource which had to be 
managed. Under the Freedom of Information Act (2000) all requests should be dealt with 
within 20 working days of submission.  Three rounds of FOIs were submitted to each of the 39 
police forces in England between February and July 2015 which should have yielded 117 
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comparable responses. As Fig. 2.2 shows, however, this was not the case. Of the 117 requests 
only 96 replies were received; with 16 responses either incomplete or only partly answered, 
and 14 late responses – some by several months. 20 police forces acknowledged receipt of the 
request but then failed to send the information or answer follow up emails, while one force 
refused the request under section 17 of the Freedom of Information Act.  Fortunately, with 
regard to the missing FOI data, most of the information required was available from previous 
FOI ƌeƋuests stoƌed iŶ the ŵissiŶg foƌĐe͛s disĐlosuƌe logs; ǁhile Ŷot ideal, as this iŶfoƌŵatioŶ 
was not as up to date as the actual responses from the FOI request, it still yielded useful 
context.  
 
Fig 2.2        Freedom of Information Request Response table 
 Reply 
On Time 
Reply 
Late 
No 
Reply  
Request 
Refused 
Part 
Answered 
Total 
Replies 
Received 
Response 
Rate % 
1
st
 FOI  
Feb 
2015 
32 4 3 0 0 36 92% 
2
nd
 FOI 
March 
2015 
20 6 13 
 
0 10 26 67% 
3
rd
 FOI 
July 
2015 
30 4 4 1 6 34 87% 
 
Bourke, Worthy and Hazell (2012) warn about the difficulties regarding how the questions are 
interpreted and the disparity in record keeping between different government bodies. While 
the individual police forces are independent geographical units united under a common name 
they are also held to account with the same rules and run in broadly similar ways. Given this, 
and the factual nature of the information requested, the hypothesis was that the FOI requests 
would yield broadly similar data. This held true for several of the questions. However, for 
otheƌs suĐh as ďudget aŶd staff Ŷuŵďeƌs Ƌuite a feǁ of the ƌespoŶses Đaŵe ďaĐk ǁith ͚Ŷo 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ held͛ – which was surprising given that other forces had this information available. 
The degree in variation with how the questions were interpreted was also surprising on some 
occasions – with some forces giving far more detail than requested and others providing 
information for a different question entirely. 
 
A further complication with using FOI data became apparent when writing the results chapter. 
Despite the legislation coming into force over a decade ago and the popular uptake it has had 
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in the academic community no system or established practice for how to reference this data 
has yet been created (Bourke et al, 2012). Including individual FOI reference numbers in the 
aggregated data in Chapter 3 quickly became cumbersome and impractical. As such, a full copy 
of the FOI data was included in the Appendix complete with the FOI reference numbers and 
name of the police force it originated from so that the results chapter remained a brief 
summary of overall trends and themes.  
 
 Version 7 then, draws on a combination of semi-structured interviews, FOI data and official 
documents to create a case study level of information about the participating forces. Interview 
data was at first analysed in Nvivo 10; however, it became apparent during the early stages of 
analysis that Nvivo was proving more a hindrance than a help when it came to understanding 
the trends and themes. As such, interview data was transferred to an Excel spreadsheet where 
aŶalǇsis ǁas Đoŵpleted usiŶg a ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ of BƌauŶ aŶd Claƌke͛s ;ϮϬϬϲͿ theŵatiĐ aŶalǇsis 
and Ritchie aŶd “peŶĐeƌ͛s ;ϭϵϵϰͿ fƌaŵeǁoƌk aŶalǇsis.  
 
BƌauŶ aŶd Claƌke ;ϮϬϬϲ, pϳϳͿ aƌgue that theŵatiĐ aŶalǇsis is a ͞ƌaƌelǇ-acknowledged, yet 
ǁidelǇ used Ƌualitatiǀe aŶalǇtiĐ ŵethod… that offeƌs aŶ aĐĐessiďle aŶd theoƌetiĐallǇ-flexible 
approach to analysing qualitatiǀe data͟. It is aŶ appƌoaĐh ǁhiĐh eǆpliĐitlǇ ƌeĐogŶises the 
implicit bias present when researchers code and present data. The greatest strength of this 
approach is that it allows for a combination of inductive and deductive analysis. Inductive 
analysis is a process of coding the data without trying to fit the data into a pre-existing 
framework or set of ideas. By comparison, deductive analysis is a top down approach where 
the researcher codes the data into a set of themes/framework already established.  
 
Framework Analysis, on the other hand, was specifically designed for applied policy research. 
Srivastava and Thomson (2009 p73) argue that while it is conceptually similar to grounded 
theory, framework analysis is: 
͞ďetteƌ adapted to ƌeseaƌĐh that has specific questions, a limited time frame, a 
pre-designed sample (e.g. professional participants) and a priori issues (e.g. 
organizational and integration issues) that need to be dealt with. Although 
framework analysis may generate theories, the prime concern is to describe and 
iŶteƌpƌet ǁhat is happeŶiŶg iŶ a paƌtiĐulaƌ settiŶg͟. 
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Fig 2.3 
Braun and Clarke (2006) Six Phases of Thematic Analysis ‘itĐhie aŶd SpeŶĐer͛s ;ϭ99ϰͿ Fiǀe Stages of Fraŵeǁork AŶalysis 
1 Familiarising yourself with the data: 
The first phase requires the researcher to immerse themselves in their data 
in order to search for themes, patterns and meanings. 
1 Familiarisation: 
This is usually completed during the transcription/reading of the data. During 
this, researchers become familiar with their data and start to identify themes.  
2 Generating initial code: 
Once the researcher is familiar enough with their data to have identified 
preliminary areas of interest a coding framework is produced. 
2 Identifying a thematic framework: 
This is where the initial coding framework is developed from a combination of 
a priori and emergent themes identified during the first stage. 
3 Searching for themes: 
Phase three involves making sense of the coded and collated data to analyse 
the codes and consider how the data may fit together. 
3 Indexing: 
Also known as coding during this phase the data is applied to the thematic 
framework established during phase 2.  
4 Reviewing themes: 
During this phase the themes identified in 3 are interrogated to see if the 
theme withstands testing. If the theme does not withstand this then either 
the theme itself or one of the data sets needs to be re-evaluated. The end 
result of this stage should be a thematic map of the coded data.  
4 Charting: 
Headings from the thematic framework are then used to create charts to aid 
easy comparison of the whole dataset. It is a very useful way of identifying the 
relevant passages from the transcripts which you might want to include in the 
writing up.  
5 Defining and naming themes: 
This phase begins once the thematic map has been completed. The themes 
going forward to be analysed are then defined and further refined.  
5 Mapping and interpretation: 
During the last stage the researcher looks for patterns, associations, concepts 
and explanations in the data. Ritchie and Spencer (1994) advocate the use of 
diagrams, graphs and charts as means of simplifying complicated patterns in 
an easy to understand way. The central aim of this phase is to identify and 
then test developing interpretations.  
6 Producing the report: 
The final phase is the writing up of the report. During this the coded themes 
identified from the data are analysed and discussed. 
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As Fig 2.3 shows, Framework Analysis is more streamlined than thematic analysis. This is due in 
part to the fact that it is designed to meet research aims and provide outcomes or 
recommendations within a short time scale. Although the general approach in this method is 
inductive like thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006) it also differs in that it allows for the 
͞iŶĐlusioŶ of a pƌioƌi as ǁell as eŵeƌgeŶt ĐoŶĐepts͟ ;LaĐeǇ aŶd Luff, ϮϬϬϳͿ. While these tǁo 
approaches are conceptually very similar (both having their roots in grounded theory) there 
are sufficient differences between them that combined they offer a complimentary and more 
robust method for analysing interview data.     
   
Given the purposive sample used in this research, the early identification of a priori issues that 
needed to be factored in and the specific subject area under examination, this approach 
seemed ideal; especially as it has been used with great success in similar areas (Silverman, 
ϮϬϭϭͿ. BǇ ŵeƌgiŶg BƌauŶ aŶd Claƌke͛s ;ϮϬϬϲͿ theŵatiĐ appƌoaĐh ǁith ‘itĐhie aŶd “peŶĐeƌ͛s 
(1994) framework the result was a flexible and organic way of collating, coding and making 
sense of a large body of complicated information while allowing for both a priori and emergent 
concepts (Lacey and Luff, 2007).  
 
Official documents and reports produced by the NPIA, College of Policing, HMIC and the Home 
OffiĐe ǁeƌe theŶ aŶalǇsed to eǆtƌaĐt ǁhat Meƌgel ;ϮϬϭϰ, p.ϯϬͿ Đalls ͞foƌŵallǇ aƌtiĐulated 
oƌgaŶizatioŶal iŶteŶt͟ to Đoŵpaƌe agaiŶst the peƌĐeptioŶs of the iŶteƌǀieǁees aŶd the 
observable behaviour of these departments to see if they are conforming to official 
expectations.   
  
Version 7 produced a highly flexible methodology which combined the most effective 
elements of the previous versions of the methodology in a practical, versatile and achievable 
way while not compromising on the depth, quality or research focus. A similar methodology 
has been used by Meijer and Thaens (2013) in their study of social media strategies in North 
American police departments and by communications expert Mergel (2010) in her work over 
the last decade into government online engagement in America.  
 
The path this research project has taken can best be described as diamond shaped (Fig. 2.4). It 
started in the proposal (V1) with a narrow scope intending to focus on three police forces. As I 
learnt more about the area the shape of my proposed research evolved and grew (V2-4), 
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before time, practicalities and other considerations required me to focus on my core interests 
in order to design an attainable methodology (V6 and V7).  
 
 
 
  Fig 2.4 
 
 
The American philosopher, William DuƌƌaŶt ;ϭϵϲϱͿ, ǁƌote that ͞eduĐatioŶ is the pƌogƌessiǀe 
disĐoǀeƌǇ of ouƌ oǁŶ igŶoƌaŶĐe͟. This proved to be particularly appropriate when researching 
an area as convoluted and contentious as the English police. Policing, particularly perhaps in 
England, is a subject on which everyone seems to have a ready opinion (Wright, 2002). 
However, as Benson (1981) points out while there is a lot of information available about the 
police there is an equal, if not greater, amount of misinformation interwoven in popular and 
academic knowledge. The challenge is to separate the two; a task which is often far more 
complicated than it might seem at the outset (Galison, 2008).  
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The more I read and learnt about the English police, public relations, public confidence and 
communications the bigger and more complicated the area became. What started out initially 
as a small under-researched area became a cog in a much larger and far more complicated 
machine. With this increased understanding came a corresponding shift in my research 
questions and methodology as they expanded to incorporate new interests and the 
connections revealed by a systematic review of the published literature and developments in 
the field research (V1 - 3). Versions 4 - 6 by contrast show a distinct funnelling to a much 
tighter focus resulting in version 7; which, in a sense, has come full cycle returning to the 
fundamentals in the original research questions (V1) only with a different methodology better 
suited to tackling this area.  
 
Two important, albeit difficult, lessons learnt during this process were not to be too ambitious, 
aŶd to Ŷot alloǁ ŵǇself to get distƌaĐted oƌ peƌsuaded iŶto ƌeseaƌĐhiŶg otheƌ people͛s 
interests at the expense of my own. It is interesting to note that it was only at the end of this 
funnelling process, when I had abandoned the well-worn public opinion path and reduced my 
research ambitions back to the fundamental questions I started with as an ignorant outsider, 
that police forces became interested in my research and started granting access.
17
  
 
  
                                           
17
 More detail on how the methodology and research questions have evolved is included in Appendix 
2.6. 
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2.10 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has discussed the methodological and conceptual framework underpinning this 
research and critically analysed the associated problems and limitations of using these 
methods. As 2.9 showed, the planning involved in how to undertake this research has 
deǀeloped thƌough a ŵiǆtuƌe of tƌial aŶd eƌƌoƌ, pƌaĐtiĐal liŵitatioŶs aŶd ͞ƌeseaƌĐh ďaƌgaiŶs͟ 
(Hughes, 2000, p.241).  
 
The second part of this chapter (2.4 – 2.8) discussed these methodological limitations and the 
problems experienced during the course of this research. The scope of this project is one such 
limitation which must be acknowledged. 25 police communications teams, covering a range of 
policing environments (3.2.1), were interviewed as part of this research; but the extent to 
which the data gathered from these policing environments, the lessons learned and the ideas 
generated can be generalised to other police forces (both in England and abroad) or different 
policing environments such as the British Transport Police is debatable. There will always be 
the ƋuestioŶ of the ͚stoŶe left uŶtuƌŶed͛; of ǁhetheƌ a deepeƌ, ďetteƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg oƌ 
essential knowledge is just around the next corner – it is this quest which drives all research.  
 
The question of transferability is a recurrent problem for qualitative research which is, by its 
nature, subjective and open to interpretation (Mouzelis, 2008). Denscombe (1998) and Stake 
;ϭϵϵϰͿ aƌgue, hoǁeǀeƌ, that ǁhile eaĐh Đase ŵight ďe ĐoŶsideƌed ͚uŶiƋue͛ oŶ aŶ iŶdiǀidual 
level it is also part of a wider phenomenon which means that some degree of generalisation is 
possible. According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), as the researcher can only know the context of 
his or her own research the responsibility for generalisation lies with the reader who is in a 
ŵuĐh ďetteƌ positioŶ to judge the eǆteŶt to ǁhiĐh ͞the pƌeǀailiŶg eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt is siŵilaƌ to 
another situation with which he or she is familiar and whether the findings can justifiably be 
applied to the otheƌ settiŶg͟ ;“heŶtoŶ ϮϬϬϰ, p.63). Ryle (1949) and later Lincoln and Guba 
(1985), proposed that one way of improving the potential for generalisation would be to 
iŶĐlude suffiĐieŶt ͚thiĐk data͛ to pƌoǀide a thoƌough uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg aŶd ĐoŶteǆt foƌ the ƌeadeƌ 
so that they can make this decision. Where possible, this is the method that was adopted in 
the collection, collation and writing of the results. 
 
 Every effort was made during the course of this research to guard against possible problems 
around the reliability and credibility of the data. Multiple methods were used in order to cross 
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reference and act as a comparison point for the data gathered from the interviews, FOIs and 
literature review. Most of the interviews were recorded on a digital recording device and a 
three stage notes system similar to the one advocated by Spradley (1979) was used to capture 
as many contextual and emotional details about and from the interviews as possible.  
 
No method is fool proof, however, and no matter how accurately one tries to record or convey 
the interview experience such measures will inevitably fall short in describing the situation 
with total precision and truthfulness. Transcription and analysis are always a matter of 
interpretation and perception of relevance (Daymon and Holloway, 2011). This means that 
there can be as many different versions of the same event or data set as there are interpreters 
looking at it (2.5).  
 
There has been a considerable amount written regarding the fundamental importance of 
methodological transparency and in declaring any bias, prejudices and influences that have 
guided and affected the research (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Gillam (2005) argues that 
it is often only in the telling of the story that you can start to appreciate the way different 
developments, experiences and ideas during the course of a project influence the thinking and 
direction that the researcher takes. This narrative aspect of the research story was addressed 
in the third part of this chapter which chronicled the influences and changes this research has 
undergone and the rationale behind them as well the problems and hiccoughs experienced 
along the way. 
 
All research begins with questions. Whether they are the same questions you answer at the 
end of the project is another matter entirely; particularly in seldom researched areas where 
little is kŶoǁŶ as the ͚ƌight͛ ƋuestioŶs ŵaǇ Ŷot ďe iŵŵediatelǇ appaƌeŶt. IŶ a seŶse this is ǁhat 
occurred during this research. It started in one place and then, informed by the literature and 
field research, took several interesting detours before ending up in a conceptually very similar 
place to where it started but with a significantly different methodology.  
 
The project began with an idea to look at police communications through the lens of public 
confidence (V1). It then grew and developed as my understanding of the area changed through 
reading about and interacting with experts working in this field. The final methodology (V7) is 
the culmination of 18 months of confusion, planning, research, evaluation and revision upon 
revision in order to pin point the most important questions and focus on these areas. V7 offers 
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a practical and integrated methodology that proved to be attractive to the police, workable 
with the large number of forces who wished to participate, sensitive and robust with regards 
to the issues surrounding validity and a more than acceptable compromise between what was 
ideal and what was actually achievable.  
 
The data generated from this research is examined in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3:           Results 
 
The following chapter presents the findings from this research. In total 31 people were 
interviewed as part of this research. As discussed in the previous chapter, 25 police 
communications teams were interviewed over an 11 month period between February 2014 
and January 2015. The interviews included 25 one-on-one interviews and three group/joint 
iŶteƌǀieǁs. The iŶteƌǀieǁ data ǁas aŶalǇsed usiŶg ‘itĐhie aŶd “peŶĐeƌ͛s ;ϭϵϵϰͿ Fƌaŵeǁoƌk 
Analysis.  
 
Given the amount of data collected during this project the results have been organised into 
two thematic parts.  
1) Background data, and 
2) Interview data. 
 
The first part sets out information gathered from police force websites and FOI requests. A 
total of 117 FOI requests were sent to English police forces receiving 96 replies (2.9). The FOIs 
were designed to gather essential background information about each of the police forces in 
order to provide a context for the interview data in part two. This included gathering 
information on: 
 Staffing: number of current and past employees, job posts and paygrades, staff 
training/experience and whether the department was staffed by civilians or warranted 
staff.   Budget: what the department budget was 2009-2016, whether this was expected to 
increase or decrease over the next three years and a breakdown of how this budget 
was used (e.g. marketing).  Name of the department: current and previous names including year of any name 
changes.  Website: Year the current website was launched, how much it cost to develop and 
whether it was designed in collaboration with any other forces/organisations.   Policies: whether the force had in place a media policy and/or a social media policy.  Strategy: whether the force had a communications strategy in place and since when.  
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 Operational Position: where the department sits within the wider structure of the 
force, who line manages the head of department, whether the head of department sits 
on the force executive command team.  Head of department: how long they have been in post.  
 
 Due to the amount of data gathered, only the aggregate data has been included in Part 1 and 
only a small selection of quotes has been included in Part 2. The full FOI results and references 
are available in Appendix 3.1 and 3.2 and full quotations are available in Appendix 3.8.  
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3.1 Part One:    FOI Data 
 
3.1.1 Department Names  
The FOI data shoǁs that Ϯϱ depaƌtŵeŶts ;ϲϰ%Ϳ aƌe ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ usiŶg the Ŷaŵe ͚Coƌpoƌate 
CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͛ ǁith a fuƌtheƌ eight depaƌtŵeŶts ƌefeƌeŶĐiŶg ͚CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͛ as paƌt of 
their name; fiǀe foƌĐes use ͚Media͛ aŶd oŶlǇ tǁo iŶĐlude ͚MaƌketiŶg͛. No depaƌtŵeŶts Ŷoǁ 
ŵake ƌefeƌeŶĐe to ͚PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs͛ oƌ ͚Pƌess͛ iŶ theiƌ Ŷaŵe ;Fig ϯ.ϭͿ. It is iŶteƌestiŶg to Ŷote 
that ǁhile ͚PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs͛ has disappeaƌed fƌoŵ depaƌtŵeŶt Ŷaŵes seǀeŶ foƌĐes still have 
public relations in their job titles (FOI 1 Appendix 3.2).  
 
 
Fig 3.1 
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3.1.2 Staff and Staffing Levels 
In March 2015 two thirds of English police communications teams had between five and 20 
members of staff, with most departments employing between 11 and 15 full time equivalent 
(FTE) positions.  Only four departments had more than 30 FTE staff in their current structure 
and one department reported that they are currently operating with vacant posts (Appendix 
3.3).   
 
The largest communications department was the Metropolitan Police Service with 98 FTE 
posts; followed by West Midlands Police with 36.6, Greater Manchester Police with 35 and 
Devon and Cornwall Police with 31. The smallest communications departments were in rural 
forces Durham Police (5.6 FTE) and Cumbria Constabulary (6 FTE).  
 
 
Fig 3.2 
 
The most common department size was 14 (4 forces) followed jointly by 13 (3) and 12 (3) with 
no departments having fewer than 5 FTE. Although the data is incomplete, as several forces 
did not answer this question, Fig 3.3 does suggest a general pattern of growth across police 
communications departments from 2004 to 2010; particularly when the 2004 data is 
compared against the staff numbers from 2015 (Fig 3.4).  
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Fig 3.3 
 
 
Fig 3.4 
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From 2010, however, the growth of these departments slowed considerably – with only four 
forces replying that their number of staff had increased (Fig 3.5). In comparison, 61% of 
respondents reported that their departments had decreased in size from the 2010 Figures, 
often by a substantial number.  
 
Fig 3.5 
 
The decrease in department size ranged from 3.7% in the case of Sussex Police (27 FTE to 26 
FTE) to 54% in Derbyshire Police, where their department was reduced from 17 FTE down to 
7.8 FTE. 11 forces reported a decrease of between 20% and 35% (Fig 3.6). A further five forces 
indicated that they expected further reductions in staff levels of their communications 
departments for budgetary reasons. Only two forces said that they expected this number to 
increase, and one of those was in order to fill several currently vacant posts and return to 
normal operating levels.  
 
Overall, the number of staff employed in police communications has increased since the 1990s 
and even with the budget cuts has not returned to pre-2004 levels.  Part of the reason for this, 
however, could be the result of centralisation; as most forces have relocated their externally 
based communication staff, such as those out in the divisions back to the police headquarters.  
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Fig 3.6 
There has also been a change in who is employed in these departments. Historically, the 
departments have been staffed and run by warranted officers with limited communications 
training (1.2). Fig 3.7 shows that of the 30 forces who answered this question all current heads 
are civilian staff and only two forces report warranted officers currently in their 
communications department.  
 
Fig 3.7                Civilian and Warranted Staff 
 Yes No Not 
Answered 
Are there any warranted police officers currently 
working in the communications relations 
department? 
2 
(5%) 
32 
(82%) 
5 
(13%) 
Has the position of head of the communications 
department ever been held by a warranted police 
officer?  
16 
(41%) 
16 
(41%) 
7 
(18%) 
Is the current head of the communications a 
warranted officer? 
0 32 
(82%) 
7 
(18%) 
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3.1.3 Department Heads 
The current heads of the communications department have been for between nine months 
and over 10 years, with one head being in post since the 1980s. Over half of the current 
department heads (59%) have held their position between 0 and 3 years which is an increase 
fƌoŵ MaǁďǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϳͿ fiŶdiŶgs of ϯϴ% iŶ ϮϬϬϲ. Theƌe has also ďeeŶ a ĐoƌƌespoŶdiŶg deĐƌease iŶ 
the number of heads who have been in post for longer periods. This change is in keeping with 
the pattern of restructuring since 2010 (3.1.4).  
 
Fig 3.8               Length of Time in Post 
<1 Year 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 – 9 
Years 
10+ 
Years 
Post 
Vacant 
Not 
Answered 
4 9 6 4 5 3 3 5 
 
In 17 forces the head of department reports to the DCC, with a further 10 reporting to a 
Superintendent (7) or a fellow civilian head of department (3). In four forces the head either 
reports directly to the PCC for that force or to both the PCC and their Chief Constable (Fig 3.9).  
 
Fig 3.9  
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In 21 forces the head of the communications department sits on the force executive command 
team with six of these heads there as a voting member (Fig 3.10).  
 
Fig 3.10          Command Team               
 Yes No Not 
Answered 
Does the head of the 
communications department 
sit on the force 
executive/command team? 
21 
(54%) 
12 
(30%) 
6 
(16%) 
If yes, is this as a voting 
member or in an advisory 
capacity? 
6 (voting) 
(16%) 
15 (advisory) 
(38%) 
18 
(46%) 
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3.1.4 Oversight and Current Structure 
Nine police forces were sharing their communications department either with another force 
;ϭϬ%Ϳ oƌ ǁith theiƌ PCC͛s offiĐe18 (13%) (Fig 3.11). Suffolk and Norfolk Constabularies 
announced the merger of their communications departments in 2010 and West Mercia and 
Warwickshire finalised the merger of their departments in 2013. While the majority of 
departments (77%) have remained independent several interviewees expressed considerable 
concern over the future of police communications departments (3.2.13).  
 
Fig 3.11 
 
As Fig 3.12 shows, the majority of communications departments (77%) have gone through a 
restructure since the budget cuts were announced in 2010; only three forces have a 
department structure that has remained unchanged since 2010.  
 
                                           
18
 Data collected from FOI data and information available on force websites.  
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Fig 3.12 
Department structure is not the only aspect to have changed in the last few years – the 
question of who has operational control, or oversight, of the communications department has 
also been revised in some forces (Fig 3.13). FOI data from 32 forces in England shows that 
while the majority of departments sit within the traditional structure, three forces are now 
managed by the PCCs office and five departments are shared between the Chief Constable and 
PCC (see 3.2.11).  
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Fig 3.13 
3.1.5 Department Policies and Strategy 
Over two thirds (72%) of police forces confirmed that they have a current media policy or are 
in the process of drafting one (see Fig 3.14). While six forces did not reply to this question, five 
forces stated that they did not have a media policy – a reduction from the HMIC (2011a) report 
of at least 13%.  
 
 
Fig 3.14 
 
With regards to social media, 77% stated that they have a policy on social media use and one 
force replied that they are in the process of drafting a policy (Fig 3.15). Given that four forces 
did not answer this question it is possible that more forces have created social media policies; 
however, at least four forces still do not have a policy on social media use.  
 
Of the 30 forces who said that they had a social media policy, 27 made these publically 
available either including a copy with their FOI response or by publishing the policies on their 
133 
 
websites. The policies ranged in length from two pages
19
 to 30 pages
20
 covering a variety of 
points in varying levels of depth and thoroughness (Fig 3.16). Some policies, like those from 
Derbyshire, Durham, Norfolk, Suffolk and Wiltshire police were very detailed - covering a lot of 
information and practical advice for staff; while others such as Avon and Somerset, 
Bedfordshire and Leicestershire contained considerably less detail (See Appendix 3.4).  
 
Fig 3.15 
 
Most policies (22) outlined the purpose of the policy, 8 had specific guidance on Twitter, seven 
on Facebook while five had guidance on other social media sites. 21 policies had detailed 
guidance on acceptable posts, 17 on the legal restrictions on post content, 15 discussed the 
potential risks of social media in a policing context and seven had a section on what to do in 
the event of a mistake or an online situation going awry. Nine policies, however, did not 
mention rules/guidelines for officers using social media as part of their professional duties.  
 
                                           
19
 Avon and Somerset Police 
20
 Durham Police 
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Discussion on the increasing public trust and confidence (20) and protecting the 
brand/reputation of the force was also present in just under half the policies (49%); suggesting 
that these aspects are a concern for police forces. 
  
 
Fig 3.16 
 
14 forces confirmed that their communications department has a written document which 
sets out long term objectives and aims for communications activities (including public 
relations, media, marketing and internal communication). An additional four forces stated that 
their strategy document was either under development or being redrafted (Fig 3.17).    
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Fig 3.17 
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3.1.6 Social Media Sites 
Data captured from the social media accounts of all English police forces show how social 
media use has evolved since the first official police Twitter account launched in 2008. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, police adoption of this new medium has been sporadic and 
inconsistent at times. In December 2008, seven forces had Facebook and YouTube accounts 
while only one force was maintaining a Twitter account (Fig 3.18).  
 
 
Fig 3.18 
 
This number grew considerably over the next two years, so that by December 2010 the vast 
majority of police forces (95%) had a registered corporate Twitter account, 72% (28 forces) had 
a Facebook page and over half (64%) had a YouTube channel (Fig 3.19). It is of note that while 
Facebook and YouTube appeared to be the more popular social media sites in 2008 the uptake 
for these sites between 2008 and 2010 was considerably slower than the growth of police 
Twitter accounts. It should also be noted at this point that police creation of police social 
media sites is not indicative of the level or type of use. Crump (1.5) found that while police 
forces might have social media accounts many of them were either rarely or inconsistently 
updated. By 2010 police forces were also starting to branch out and experiment with other 
social media sites – such as Flickr (9 forces) and AudioBoom (4 forces). Two police forces also 
published links to official blogs on their websites. 
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Fig 3.19 
Social media use continued to grow between 2010 and 2012 with the final two forces joining 
Twitter in 2011, and more forces joining Facebook and YouTube (Fig 3.20). More forces also 
started using alternative social media platforms in audience specific ways; such as advertising 
lost/stolen property on Flickr and uploading audio clips in pod cast format for people to listen 
to on AudioBoom and Storyfy. The number of official blogs also increased from two in 2010 to 
five in 2012 and five forces launched their own Apps for mobile users. 
 
Fig 3.20 
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As official use of social media evolved, police forces also started encouraging individual officers 
and local policing teams to maintain their own local Twitter accounts so that they could 
communicate directly with residents. This was seen as a significant shift from the previous 
communication system where all communication was meant to be managed by the 
communications team (4.3). However, there is evidence that this also represents a 
continuation of the historic tensions in policing around who controls the flow of information.  
 
In 2014 the number of local twitter accounts ranged from one account (e.g. Merseyside police) 
to over a hundred (e.g. West Mercia) with most forces operating between 30 and 80 area 
specific Twitter accounts (Table 4 part 2 Appendix 3.2).  Locating these local police accounts, 
however, is not always straightforward with over half of police forces only providing a direct 
link to their corporate pages on their websites. 
 
In December 2015 all police forces had at least one corporate Twitter account and Facebook 
page with 34 forces using at least one other social media site (Fig 3.21). Police presence on 
other social media sites has also grown since 2012 with the exception of YouTube which has 
remained steady at 33 forces. 
 
 
Fig 3.21 
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3.2 Part Two: Interview Data 
 
3.2.1  Interviewee Information 
The 31 interviewees held a range of senior posts within the police force; including that of Head 
of Department, Deputy-Head and Manager; and in the case of two interviewees, Chief 
Constable (Fig 3.22). It is important to note, however, that while in 20 cases (64%) it was the 
Head of Department themselves that was interviewed, in four cases (13%) this was delegated 
to a member of their management team as the most appropriate person to talk to.  
 
Fig 3.22         Position in Department 
Heads of 
Department 
Deputy Heads of 
Department 
Managers in the 
Department 
Other 
20 2 6 3 
 
Gender and Ethnicity 
The gender of the interviewees was almost evenly split with 15 female interviewees (48%) and 
16 male interviewees (52%)  (Fig 3.23).  Gender was again fairly evenly represented in the 
senior positions in the department both with the Heads of Department and the Managers 
interviewed (Fig 3.24). There was no variation in ethnicity in the interviewees; all participants 
were white British.  
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3.23 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.24 
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Warranted Officers and Police Staff 
As discussed earlier, there has been an observable trend in police communications 
departments in recent years which has seen these departments increasingly run and managed 
by civilian professionals rather than warranted officers (1.4.1). In keeping with this movement, 
the majority of interviewees (87%) were civilian police staff. Only four interviewees were 
warranted officers; however only two of the four interviewees actually worked in the 
department, in the other two cases the interviewees were Chief Constables and therefore not 
responsible for the day to day running of the communications department (Fig 3.25).  
 
It is important to note that at the time of interview, 23 of the 25 (92%) communications teams 
interviewed were managed by civilians while two (8%) were still managed by warranted police 
officers. The FOI results discussed in 3.1.2 show that within nine months of these interviews 
these two forces had employed civilian staff to run their communications departments.  With 
regard to warranted officers working in the department 92% of the forces interviewed said 
they employed only trained professionals to work in communications. Two forces (PI.9 and 
PI.15), however, said that their departments did occasionally have police officers on 
secondment to cover maternity and long term sick leave.  
 
 
3.25 
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Number of years in post 
The length of time the interviewees had been in post at the time of the interviews ranged from 
under a year in five forces to over 15 years; with the two longest serving having been in post 
since the 1980s (Fig 3.26).  
 
In keeping with the trend identified in the FOI results (3.1), just under half (45%) had been in 
post between 0 and 2 years and over half (61%) had been in post since 2011. This change is in 
keeping with the pattern of restructuring that occurred after 2010 (see 3.1.4) and the results 
from the APComm survey (2014).  
 
 
Fig 3.26 
 
Fig 3.26 shows a distinct gender grouping; especially when managers and Chief Constables are 
excluded (Fig 3.27). Just over half the female interviewees (54%) had been in their current post 
between four and nine years with the longest having been in post for 14 years. This increase 
has a corresponding decrease in the male interviewees; with no male interviewees having 
been in post between three and nine years and with 44% having been in their post for longer 
than ten years compared to just 9% for female Heads of Department.  
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Fig 3.27 
 
Training and Experience 
This gender difference also carries over into training and experience.  Interviewees were asked 
to describe their background experience and how they became involved in police 
communications (Fig 3.28). The most common route into police communications was through 
experience in the corporate communications industry. 46% said that their background was in 
corporate communications either in private or public sector companies; this route accounted 
for 60% of female interviewees compared to 30% of male interviewees.  
 
25% trained as journalists working in police communications. PI.4 described this transition as 
͞The poaĐheƌ tuƌŶiŶg gaŵekeepeƌ͟. Fouƌ iŶteƌǀieǁees ƌeported that they had no professional 
qualifications or previous experience in the wider communications industry but had instead 
worked their way up to their management position in the department; while another four 
participants had professional qualifications and had joined police communication department 
as their first job. Both of these latter two routes had a 3:1 ratio when it came to gender. In 
total, nine interviewees (five male, four female) said that they had either a degree in 
communications/marketing/public relations or were professionally accredited with an 
organisation like the CIPR (Chartered Institute of Public Relations). 
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Fig 3.28 
 
The majority of interviewees, when asked about the differences in background and experience, 
thought that the diversity in professional skill sets was an important part of professionalising 
police communications. Three interviewees (PI.2, PI.11 and PI.13), however, argued that while 
they agreed with the need for professionalisation they disagreed with what they considered 
the ͞pƌaĐtiĐe of eŵploǇiŶg jouƌŶalists to ƌuŶ poliĐe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs like a Ŷeǁspapeƌ͟ ;PI.ϭϯͿ. 
PI.2 and PI.11 in particular felt that it was very important for the head of police 
communications to rise through the ranks of the communications department so that they 
understand both it and policing in general.   
͞I thiŶk it's gƌeat ǁheŶ ǁe do shake up the ďusiŶess ďǇ ďƌiŶgiŶg people iŶ fƌoŵ 
outside.  But, I thiŶk theƌe's ďeŶefit iŶ soŵeoŶe ǁho kŶoǁs the joď of poliĐiŶg… I'ǀe 
also got 12 years of policing experience... I know how things stick together politically, 
I get the Đultuƌe of the plaĐe, I get ǁhat… [the poliĐe aƌe] opeƌatioŶallǇ tƌǇiŶg to do.  
“o… I haǀe seeŶ… peeƌs Đoŵe iŶ fƌoŵ outside the iŶdustƌǇ aŶd fiŶd Ƌuite a leaƌŶiŶg 
Đuƌǀe… I doŶ't thiŶk bringing in people with strong journalism background is right for 
this kind of role.  Sometimes people will be brought in because they've got a strong 
journalistic background, actually they haven't worked in the wider communications 
and engagement so, that foƌ ŵe is a ĐoŶĐeƌŶ. [it͛s] Less of a ĐoŶĐeƌŶ if theǇ aƌe 
people fƌoŵ a diffeƌeŶt seĐtoƌ ŵoǀiŶg ǁith Đoŵŵs eǆpeƌieŶĐe.͟ ;PI.ϭϭͿ 
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3.2.2 Overview of Department  
Interviewees were asked a range of questions about the structure of their department, staff, 
professionalisation and operational position within their force and how they thought these 
had changed over their tenure. The 28 communications professionals interviewed identified 14 
principal changes in their departments ranging from the size of the department, to their 
budget, to whom the police are now communicating and the channels they are using to 
achieve this (Fig 3.29)
21
. These changes are dealt with over the course of this chapter while the 
implications of these developments are discussed in Chapter 4. This section concentrates on 
the changes to the department itself; staff levels, professionalisation, location of staff and the 
operational position of the department.  
 
 
Fig 3.29 
                                           
21
 The two Chief Constables and PCC opted not to answer these questions as they felt they were 
outside of their expertise. 
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Staff 
All but one of the departments interviewed (PI.8) had seen reductions in staff levels. The 
decrease in staff numbers ranged from 3% in one case (PI.25) to over 50% in another (PI.14) 
with most departments losing over 30% of their staff (14).  
 
In 80% of the forces interviewed, communications staff had been centralised and were based 
completely at police headquarters.  Only in three forces were communications staff still on 
placement in divisions (Fig 3.30).  
͞ǁe had stƌuĐtuƌes ǁheƌe ǁe had aƌea ďased ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs teaŵs iŶ ouƌ fiǀe ďasiĐ 
command units... So you would have had a comms manager, plus one or two comms 
officers and we had a central bit here at HQ where the internal comms sat and where 
this team, the graphic design, etc. sat. So in order to reduce costs and to take that 
budget hit they centralised the service, so we took all of the area people, brought 
theŵ iŶ house.͟;PI.ϲͿ 
 
 
Fig 3.30 
 
With regard to specialism within the department, the majority of departments interviewed 
(88%) still used dedicated roles within the communications team (e.g. Press Officer, Public 
Relations Officer – see Appendix 3.2). Three forces had, however, adopted a generic model in 
which team members rather than having a specific role (e.g. Press Officer) were instead part of 
a pool of people who could cover all aspects and needs of the team. At the time of the 
interviews this model was also under consideration by four other forces (Fig 3.31) 
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͞ǁe'ǀe got aŶ assistaŶt pool of people, theǇ pƌoǀide ǁhat ǁe Đall ouƌ Ŷeǁs huď aŶd 
theǇ aƌe ĐeŶtƌal, eǀeƌǇthiŶg ĐoŵiŶg iŶ… theǇ aƌe split ďǇ the oƌgaŶisational 
operational need as opposed to you're a press officer, you're a web content, you're a 
ŵaƌketeƌ.͟ ;PI.ϭϳͿ 
 
 
Fig 3.31 
 
Professionalisation 
As noted in the previous section, there has been an observable trend over the past decade 
which has seen police communications increasingly run and managed by civilian professionals 
rather than warranted police officers (Fig 3.32).  The interviewees were asked why they 
thought this change had occurred. The interviewees unilaterally saw professionalisation as 
both necessary and beneficial for police communications; even the warranted officers 
interviewed agreed with this stance. Most interviewees (80%) expressed a belief that police 
officers were not qualified to either work in or manage police communications.  
͞I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ǁhǇ ǁe haǀe poliĐeŵeŶ iŶ Đhaƌge of Đoŵŵs oƌ ǁoƌkiŶg iŶ these 
departments; they are not qualified, they don't know what they are talking about, 
aŶd that's ǁhǇ it's a ŵess… ǁe doŶ't haǀe uŶtƌaiŶed ĐiǀiliaŶs poliĐiŶg the stƌeets, so 
why should we have untrained police officers running the business side of 
thiŶgs?͟  (PI.5) 
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Fig 3.32 
 
For PI.10 and PI.2, the most significant problem with warranted officers being employed as the 
head of communications was that these officers were often at the end of their careers or using 
the position as a stepping stone for quick promotion. As such the officers were in the role long 
eŶough to staƌt ĐhaŶgiŶg thiŶgs, ofteŶ aĐĐoƌdiŶg to PI.Ϯ to ͞ŵake theiƌ ŵaƌk͟, ďefoƌe ŵoǀiŶg 
on without completing the changes. The new head would then start and any sense of 
continuity would be lost: 
͞oŶe of the pƌoďleŵs that I see ǁith haǀiŶg poliĐe offiĐeƌs iŶ the ƌole is that theǇ teŶd 
to Đoŵe iŶ… ĐhaŶge thiŶgs aŶd ŵoǀe oŶ foƌ pƌoŵotioŶ. “o theƌe is ǀeƌǇ ŵuĐh a 
culture that if you want to get promoted you have to have appeared to have changed 
things, so they would tinker with the way that communications was done, which 
meant there was no stability, there was no understanding throughout the 
organisation of the way that communications should be dealt with, so yes, I think 
theƌe has ďeeŶ a ƌeal ŵoǀe toǁaƌds pƌofessioŶalisatioŶ of it.͟ ;PI.ϭϬͿ 
 
Although, according to PI.21, employing civilian professionals has not always been an 
unalloyed success or an improvement on the previous situation - which is why in her force they 
replaced the professional head of communications with an experienced police officer.   
͞Ǉou should ďe ƌeallǇ Đaƌeful aďout ǁhat skills aŶd ǁhat tǇpe of depaƌtŵeŶt Ǉou 
ǁaŶted to ďe.  BeĐause… ǁheŶ theǇ fiƌst had a pƌofessioŶal head of comms seven or 
eight years ago, the advert created a post where somebody was a bit of a media 
personality, as opposed to running a professional corporate comms department. So 
despite them wanting a head of corporate comms to be a professional role, they 
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didŶ͛t get oŶe… it ǁas soŵeďodǇ ǁho ǁas ŵoƌe iŶteƌested iŶ ŵedia spiŶ… “o that͛s 
hoǁ ǁe eŶded up goiŶg ďaĐk to a poliĐe offiĐeƌ ƌuŶŶiŶg it.͟ ;PI.ϮϭͿ 
 
Counter to the assumption underlying the above perspectives that professionalisation was the 
end goal, PI.4, however, suggested that professionalisation was more of a convenient side 
effeĐt of poliĐe foƌĐes͛ ŵaiŶ Ŷeed to ŵake fiŶaŶĐial saǀiŶgs thaŶ aŶ iŶteŶded stƌategǇ:  
͞I͛ŵ the fiƌst pƌofessioŶal head as faƌ as ǁe kŶoǁ, iŶ foƌtǇ Ǉeaƌs. Theƌe ǁas a Chief 
Inspector or a Superintendent to do this job. And you might think, why would you 
ŵake a Đhief iŶspeĐtoƌ head of Đoŵŵs?… Well Ŷoǁ all these joďs aƌe Đoǀeƌed ďǇ staff 
coz warranted officers are given jobs where you have to be a trained, warranted 
officer to do it. AŶd Ǉou ŵight saǇ ǁell, that souŶds pƌettǇ oďǀious doesŶ͛t it? But 
there was never any need for the police to think differently till the money started 
dƌǇiŶg out.͟ ;PI.ϰͿ 
 
PI.ϰ͛s opiŶioŶ ǁas aŶoŵalous – one not agreed with by the majority of interviewees who, with 
the exception of PI.15 and PI.22, all (90%) considered professionalisation to have been a 
deliberate part of the police communications strategy. In the case of PI.15, while she agreed 
ǁith PI.ϰ͛s assessŵeŶt that pƌofessioŶalisatioŶ ǁas more of an accident than a planned for 
outcome, PI.15 was also quick to clarify that she thought it was it was symptomatic of the 
evolving nature of public relations and the change in how police forces both understood and 
utilised this skill set: 
͞puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs has ďeeŶ a soƌt of eǀolǀiŶg skill hasŶ͛t it aŶd as it͛s eǀolǀed it͛s 
ďeĐoŵe ŵoƌe sophistiĐated aŶd as it͛s ďeĐoŵe ŵoƌe sophistiĐated it͛s ďeeŶ oďǀious 
you need specialised people to do it.  Whereas I think when it was in its infancy there 
was this assuŵptioŶ that aŶǇďodǇ Đould take it oŶ. ͟ ;PI.ϭϱͿ 
 
A similar view was expressed by PI.22 who suggested that professionalisation had occurred as 
a result of police forces recognising that they need to properly invest in communications 
rather than simply use it as a formality: 
͞“o I thiŶk theƌe is a leǀel of ƌeĐogŶitioŶ aƌouŶd the faĐt that this is a ǀeƌǇ speĐialist 
seƌǀiĐe that͛s ďeiŶg pƌoǀided aŶd Ǉou eitheƌ iŶǀest iŶ it pƌopeƌlǇ oƌ… Ǉou doŶ͛t do it 
at all… go ďaĐk to pƌoďaďlǇ ϭϬ, ϭϱ Ǉeaƌs ago… Ǉou pƌoďably could argue that a comms 
fuŶĐtioŶ ǁithiŶ a poliĐe foƌĐe ǁas ŵaǇďe a ďit of a luǆuƌǇ… aŶd I thiŶk Đoŵŵs teaŵs 
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ǁeƌe pƌoďaďlǇ seeŶ as a ďit of a delaǇ taĐtiĐ ƌatheƌ thaŶ soŵethiŶg of aĐtual use͟. 
(PI.22)  
 
Operational Position 
A connection frequently raised was the link between the professionalisation of police 
communications and the change in the operational position of the department. There was a 
feeling amongst those interviewees who had been with the police for over ten years that there 
had been a significant culture change in how police communications was viewed internally by 
police officers.   
͞BaĐk iŶ the ϵϬs, the ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs offiĐe ǁas ŵostlǇ left out of opeƌatioŶal 
policing. Police officers had preferred journalists and it was very common that the 
first thing the press office would hear of a situation would be from the newspaper 
the Ŷeǆt daǇ… “oŵe offiĐeƌs still doŶ't like the ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs depaƌtŵeŶt, ďut theǇ 
kŶoǁ theǇ haǀe to talk to us Ŷoǁ͟. ;PI.ϮϲͿ 
 
The interviewees were asked to describe how they understood the operational position of 
their department within their police force and which term they thought best captured this 
positioŶ: ͚OptioŶal͛, ͚CoŵpleŵeŶtaƌǇ͛ oƌ ͚Eŵďedded͛ ;Ϯ.ϴ.ϱͿ.  
 
The majority of interviewees (58%) felt that their departŵeŶts ǁeƌe ͚Eŵďedded͛ ;Fig ϯ.ϯϯͿ. 
OŶlǇ tǁo ƌepoƌted that theiƌ depaƌtŵeŶt ǁas still ĐoŶsideƌed ͚OptioŶal͛ aŶd siǆ said that theiƌ 
depaƌtŵeŶts ǁeƌe ͚CoŵpleŵeŶtaƌǇ͛.  Fouƌ paƌtiĐipaŶts suggested that the opeƌatioŶal 
position of their departments was currently in the process of changing. In all of these cases, 
the depaƌtŵeŶts had ďeeŶ ͚OptioŶal͛ ďut ǁeƌe Ŷoǁ ŵoǀiŶg toǁaƌds ͚CoŵpleŵeŶtaƌǇ͛ oƌ iŶ 
oŶe Đase ͚Eŵďedded͛ ;PI.ϮϮͿ. A ĐoŵŵoŶ theŵe ǁas a seŶse of fƌustƌatioŶ ǁith poliĐe offiĐeƌs 
ǁho, as PI.ϳ said ͞still doŶ͛t get it͟, eǀeŶ ǁheŶ the teaŵ is ĐoŶsideƌed ͚Eŵďedded͛. Theƌe ǁas 
also concern raised by PI.10 that budget cuts could lead to communications teams losing their 
embedded position in police forces: 
͞I thiŶk [ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs] is aďsolutelǇ seeŶ as paƌt of ǁhat ǁe do… ďeĐause it helps, 
so they understand you can put out witness appeals and do things like that, so that 
aĐtuallǇ it ĐaŶ help theŵ ǁith solǀiŶg soŵe issues ďut also theǇ͛ǀe seeŶ a lot of Đases 
where it goes wrong and reputation gets, you know, daŵaged, iƌƌepaƌaďlǇ… aŶd I 
thiŶk that͛s, soƌt of, ĐhaŶged ƌight aĐƌoss the ĐouŶtƌǇ. Although iŶteƌestiŶglǇ, the Đuts 
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have meant in some areas it has gone back to where it was before and I think that 
they will, quite honestly, live to regret that because I just doŶ͛t thiŶk that it͛s a 
sustaiŶaďle ǁaǇ of dealiŶg ǁith thiŶgs ƌeallǇ͟. ;PI.ϭϬͿ 
 
 
Fig 3.33 
 
There was also frustration over how the communications department is classified. As PI.6 
explained, the Home Office classifies police communications as a back office function. This is 
counter to how many interviewees (75%
22
) perceived their role in the police: 
͞We haǀe ǀeƌǇ stƌoŶg liŶks iŶto the opeƌatioŶal side of the ďusiŶess. We aƌe 
effeĐtiǀelǇ aŶ opeƌatioŶal depaƌtŵeŶt. Theƌe͛s Ƌuite a ƌuď, I thiŶk, ďetǁeeŶ us and 
the Home Office - around the Home Office including comms in what you would call 
ďaĐk offiĐe suppoƌt. Well ǁe͛ƌe Ŷot. We aƌe aŶ opeƌatioŶal teaŵ, ǁe͛ƌe deploǇaďle. 
WheŶeǀeƌ theƌe͛s soŵethiŶg happeŶiŶg, ǁe͛ƌe paƌt of that ƌesouƌĐiŶg, ǁe͛ƌe paƌt of 
the opeƌatioŶ… ǁe aƌe theƌe to suppoƌt the iŶǀestigatioŶ teaŵ, to suppoƌt fƌoŶt liŶe 
policing and to help get the intelligence and the witness appeals and information 
ďaĐk to help pƌogƌess iŶǀestigatioŶs͟. ;PI.ϲͿ 
 
                                           
22
 This percentage refers to the 28 communication staff interviewed only.  
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Interviewees who felt that their department was ͚Eŵďedded͛ ǁeƌe less likelǇ to ƌepoƌt 
frustrations around how they thought police officers treated the department and reported a 
better relationship with their senior management team. PI.12, for example, commented on the 
close working relationship he had with senior police officers:  
͞I see the Chief CoŶstaďle eǀeƌǇ MoŶdaǇ ŵoƌŶiŶg foƌ half aŶ houƌ aŶd take all the 
senior officers through what public relations and comms activity we've got planned 
foƌ the Ŷeǆt eight daǇs eǀeƌǇ MoŶdaǇ ŵoƌŶiŶg.͟ ;PI.ϭϮͿ 
 
Similarly, PI.14 emphasised how his department has become interwoven with all aspects of 
policing: 
͞The ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs teaŵ is iŶǀolǀed at all leǀels of opeƌatioŶ, Đultuƌe ĐhaŶge, 
improvements and changes. We're not just broadcasting message for police officers 
we're part of crafting them, setting the communications strategy and fully involved in 
all aspeĐts of poliĐiŶg͟. ;PI.ϭϰͿ 
 
IŶ foƌĐes ǁheƌe the ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs teaŵ ǁas desĐƌiďed as ͚CoŵpleŵeŶtaƌǇ͛ oƌ ͚OptioŶal͛, 
however, the interviewees often reported frustrations around how the department was 
͞ŵisuŶdeƌstood͟ ;PI.ϭϱͿ, ͞ŵaƌgiŶalised͟ ;PI.ϮϭͿ oƌ oŶlǇ ďƌought iŶto soŵethiŶg ͞at the eŶd oƌ 
if soŵethiŶg had goŶe ǁƌoŶg͟ ;PI.ϮϴͿ. As PI.ϭϴ eǆplaiŶed: 
͞I thiŶk Ƌuite ofteŶ - I think too often to be honest – it͛s a ďit of an add on. So 
something that is kind of pulled out of the box when they need it.  A lot of activity 
that goes oŶ iŶ the foƌĐe ǁe Ƌuite ofteŶ get ďƌought iŶto too late iŶ the daǇ…͟ ;PI.ϭϴͿ 
 
An apparent trend with regard to the operational position of the department was that all five 
of the departments interviewed who were either currently, or had been, managed by their PCC 
ǁeƌe ĐoŶsideƌed ͚optioŶal͛; although thƌee of these depaƌtŵeŶts ǁeƌe thought to ďe iŶ 
transition at the time of the interview.  The view of the departments controlled by the Chief 
CoŶstaďle, oŶ the otheƌ haŶd, all plaĐed theŵselǀes as eitheƌ ͚CoŵpleŵeŶtaƌǇ͛, ͚Eŵďedded͛, 
or in transition between the two.  
 
Interviewees were asked who, or what, they thought was responsible for the differences in the 
operational position of communication departments (Fig 3.34).  The responses varied 
ĐoŶsideƌaďlǇ. The ŵajoƌitǇ of iŶteƌǀieǁees said that the depaƌtŵeŶt͛s aĐĐeptaŶĐe iŶ a poliĐe 
force depended upon the tone set by the senior leadership; with over a third of participants 
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plaĐiŶg the ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ oŶ the Chief CoŶstaďle. As PI.ϭϮ eǆplaiŶed ͞Ǉou do Ŷeed the seŶioƌ 
officer buy-in and one of the difficulties facing forces and it faces us as well is having enough 
influence at the top table in terms of Đoŵŵs.͟ A siŵilaƌ ƌeŵaƌk ǁas ŵade ďǇ PI.Ϯϯ ǁho 
ĐoŵŵeŶted that she ǁas aǁaƌe of heƌ Đolleagues iŶ otheƌ foƌĐes stƌuggliŶg ǁith  ͞a seŶioƌ 
ĐoŵŵaŶd teaŵ that thiŶk it͛s just a ďit of fluffǇ P‘͟ aŶd as suĐh teŶded Ŷot to listeŶ to the 
professionals in the department. It is interesting that even in the forces where the PCC was 
involved in the department only two (6%) thought that they had an impact on the 
depaƌtŵeŶt͛s opeƌatioŶal positioŶ.  
 
 
 
Fig 3.34 
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3.2.3 Public Relations in the Police 
Role and Purpose of Police Communications 
IŶteƌǀieǁees ǁeƌe asked ǁhat theǇ thought the ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs depaƌtŵeŶt͛s ƌole oƌ 
purpose was in their police force. There were two types of answer to this question; some, like 
PI.2, PI.6 and PI.7, listed what they considered the key responsibilities/activities their 
department managed while others, like PI.4, PI.9 and PI.12, approached this question from a 
more ideological perspective
23, oƌ as PI.ϵ poetiĐallǇ desĐƌiďed it ͞I'd saǇ ǁe'ƌe the guaƌdiaŶ of 
the ďƌuŶt.͟ ;AppeŶdiǆ ϯ.ϴͿ.  
 
The disparity in the nature of the answers made identifying a list of shared responsibilities, or 
traits, difficult. However, through analysis of the data and comparison against the 
responsibilities listed in the APComm survey (APComm, 2014) a set of sixteen core activities 
was created (Fig 3.35). Due to the aforementioned variation in answers, this should be taken 
as a rough guide only and not as a complete list of activities.  
 
Some activities like campaigns, public engagement, social media/web and media relations 
were consistent across all police communications teams interviewed. Others like internal 
communications and tactical advice/briefings for police officers were common but not 
included by all interviewees. Seven teams (28%) had responsibility for FOI requests and a 
further seven had Reprographics as part of their department. Public confidence was 
considered a key responsibility by just over half of the teams (56%). The operational nature 
and responsibilities of the department in assisting with the solving of crimes and what was 
ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ ƌefeƌƌed to duƌiŶg the iŶteƌǀieǁs as ͚ŵaŶagiŶg Đƌisis ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͛ ǁeƌe 
stressed by a significant proportion of the interviewees (88%). The operational nature of 
modern police communications became a strong and consistent theme throughout the 
interviews.  
 
Reputation management and what the interviewees considered image making tasks were 
included by 11 (44%) of the participant teams as part of their responsibilities; with some 
interviewees, like PI.6 drawing a strong distinction between what they considered the 
operationally essential work of police communications and public relations:  
                                           
23
 Three participants opted not to answer this question: PI.1, PI.19b and PI.20b 
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͞I see the puƌpose of the Đoŵs depaƌtŵeŶt to ǁoƌk ǁith fƌoŶtliŶe poliĐe offiĐeƌs aŶd 
investigators to prevent and reduce and solve Đƌiŵe. That͛s ouƌ fuŶdaŵeŶtal as faƌ as 
I͛ŵ ĐoŶĐeƌŶed… We aƌe Ŷot Ŷoƌ should ǁe ďe a puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs depaƌtŵeŶt oƌ a 
marketing department. We want to promote the successes of the police, absolutely, 
ďut ouƌ fuŶdaŵeŶtal ƌeasoŶ foƌ ďeiŶg is that ǁe͛ƌe aŶ opeƌatioŶal depaƌtŵeŶt͟. 
(PI.6) 
 
 
Fig 3.35 
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Most Important Aspects of Modern Police Communications 
The interviewees were asked to identify which of the functions in Fig 3.35 they thought were 
the most important. Internal communications was the most frequently cited (55%); community 
based external communications came a distant second (34%) with crime prevention 
campaigns, marketing and publicity ranking 10th (13%), 11th (10%) and 13th respectively (6%). 
Managing issues around police brand, identity and reputation were only listed by six (19%) 
interviewees (Fig 3.36). 
 
 
Fig 3.36 
 
Keeping the public informed was considered fairly central by just under a third (29%), although 
this did not carry over to media relations which was listed as a priority by only five (16%); 
ŶeaƌlǇ half the Ŷuŵďeƌ ǁho iŶĐluded ͚ǁaƌŶ aŶd iŶfoƌŵ͛. This suppoƌts the tƌeŶd ideŶtified iŶ 
ϯ.Ϯ.ϰ aŶd ϯ.Ϯ.ϲ of the ĐhaŶge iŶ poliĐe foƌĐe͛s ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ stƌategǇ aŶd ŵedia ƌelatioŶship 
(4.2).   
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As with the previous question there was a strong emphasis on the operational element (23%). 
PI.6, for example, felt strongly that police communications did not just assist operational 
policing but was an essential part of it: 
͞pƌiŵaƌilǇ ǁe aƌe theƌe to suppoƌt the iŶǀestigatioŶ teaŵ, to suppoƌt fƌoŶt liŶe 
policing and to help get the intelligence and the witness appeals and information 
ďaĐk to help pƌogƌess iŶǀestigatioŶs.͟ ;PI.ϲͿ 
 
The final point of note is that public relations was not included by any interviewees. Given the 
level of discomfort displayed by some interviewees with regard to defining the concept and 
the move away from such terminology, this was not unexpected. Interestingly, over half (52%) 
lateƌ said that puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs ǁas still a ƌeleǀaŶt aŶd iŵpoƌtaŶt aspeĐt of theiƌ depaƌtŵeŶt͛s 
work. 
 
Definitions of Public Relations 
The interviewees were asked to define public relations. As Fig 3.37 shows, there were a variety 
of responses and a considerable degree of confusion and disparity in how public relations was 
understood by communications professionals. This is consistent with the observation made in 
Chapter 1 that there is in general a high degree of confusion around this term.    
 
Almost half (45%) replied that either it was too difficult a concept to define (29%) or that they 
did not know how to (16%). PI.5, PI.7 and PI.27 in particular, struggled with defining public 
relations. 
͞I doŶ't ƌeallǇ kŶoǁ… I suppose It's aďout ŵaŶagiŶg the puďliĐ aŶd ouƌ ƌelatioŶship 
ǁith theŵ so that eǀeƌǇoŶe is happǇ͟. ;PI.ϳͿ 
͞I doŶ't use the phƌase to ďe peƌfeĐtlǇ hoŶest… I ǁouldŶ't ƌeallǇ kŶoǁ hoǁ to defiŶe 
public relations which doesn't mean that I'm not interested in our relationship with 
the public, obviously that's what we're all about. It just feels a little bit redundant as 
a ĐoŶĐept.͟ ;PI.ϮϳͿ 
 
PI.13 suggested that the reason why public relations is difficult to define, especially in a 
policing context, is the abstract nature of the concept. Words like marketing or 
communications provide people with a visceral, instant understanding complete with tangible 
examples – which is the opposite of public relations.  
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͞You kŶoǁ if Ǉou said to people ǁhat is puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs ǁell theƌe isŶ͛t aĐtuallǇ 
anything they could point at and say that was public relations... It can be what you 
Đhoose to ŵake it aŶd it͛s aŶ iŶeǆaĐt sĐieŶĐe isŶ͛t it?͟ ;PI.ϭϯͿ 
 
 
Fig 3.37 
 
Six (19%) interviewees thought that public relations was essentially the same thing as 
communication.  This opinion was most clearly explained by PI.12 who argued forcefully that 
public relations is fundamentally about engagement and service delivery. 
͞PuďliĐ ƌelatioŶs, doŶe pƌopeƌlǇ, is aďout listeŶiŶg aŶd eŶgageŵeŶt… Well, ǁe'ƌe 
listeŶiŶg aŶd eŶgagiŶg all the tiŵe… You'ƌe ĐƌeatiŶg a ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ. You'ƌe taƌgetiŶg 
an audience. You're understanding what you're trying to deliver. Have they 
understood it? have they changed their behaviour? Have they changed their opinion? 
Those are the things you're doing. That's public relations work, isn't it, at the end of 
the daǇ͟. ;PI.ϭϮͿ 
 
PI.12 then went on to explain the difference between marketing and public relations.  
͞MaƌketiŶg, I thiŶk, is ŵoƌe output ďased… MaƌketiŶg is a tool ǁithiŶ the puďliĐ 
relations mix to reach an audience, but we don't like to see marketing purely as the 
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end result. It's the engagement that marketing can generate that turns it, in my view, 
into the public relations or engagements and content all  engagement is marketing in 
soŵe ǁaǇs, isŶ't it?͟ ;PI.ϭϮͿ 
 
The distinction drawn between marketing and public relations by PI.12 is particularly 
interesting given the synonymous use of those terms by seven (23%) interviewees. For 
eǆaŵple, ǁheŶ asked to defiŶe puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs PI.ϲ gaǀe the suĐĐiŶĐt ƌeplǇ of ͞puďliĐitǇ aŶd 
ĐaŵpaigŶs͟. OŶe possiďle ƌeasoŶ foƌ this, ǁhiĐh is highlighted ďǇ PI.ϭϮ͛s eǆplaŶatioŶ, is that 
marketing and publicity are both output orientated examples of public relations activities. As 
such both provide tangible evidence with which to understand them and as activities used in 
public relations it is easy to position the activities/products as the whole of public relations.   
 
The ĐoŶfusioŶ aƌouŶd puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs aŶd ͚spiŶ͛ ǁas a ĐeŶtƌal theŵe ǁithiŶ soŵe of the 
interviews even before this question arose. Only two of the eight interviewees who expressed 
this concern, however, defined publiĐ ƌelatioŶs as ͚spiŶ͛. PI.ϭϭ, iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, ǁas Ƌuite aǀeƌse 
to the idea of police communications being linked to public relations as he saw it as 
͞iŶfoƌŵatioŶ pƌoǀisioŶ aŶd ƌeputatioŶ ŵaŶageŵeŶt, spiŶ.͟  
 
PI.22, however, distinguished between his own positive opinion and what he perceived to be 
the organisational understanding of public relations. It is important to note here that PI.22 
ƌeplied ͚Yes͛ ǁheŶ asked if puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs ǁas still ƌeleǀaŶt to poliĐe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs.  
 ͞I thiŶk the puďliĐ ƌelations element of it can have quite negative connotations to a 
uŶit itself if Ǉou͛ƌe deeŵed to ďe ŵoƌe iŶteƌested iŶ ŵakiŶg suƌe ǁe spiŶ the ƌight 
level of information at the right time or we keep back as much as we can do until we 
potentially put it out there.͟ ;PI.ϮϮͿ 
 
Is PR Still Relevant to Police Communications? 
Despite confusion around the definition and the level of discomfort exhibited by some 
interviewees on this matter, just over half (52%) emphasised the continued importance of 
public relations in their jobs. Considering the definite undercurrent present during the 
interviews at times which sought to dismiss and minimise the public relations aspect of police 
communications this was a surprising, and intriguing, result. Fig 3.38 shows that there were 
two distinct groups of opinion split between the 16 interviewees (52%), like PI.7, PI.8, PI.9 and 
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PI.12, who thought that public relations was still important and the 11 (36%), such as PI.6, 
PI.16 and PI.27, who did not.  
͞PoliĐe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs is still fuŶdamentally public relations - we just don't call it 
that aŶǇŵoƌe͟. ;PI.ϳͿ 
 
͞DefiŶitelǇ Đoŵŵs. DefiŶitelǇ… I͛ǀe ǁoƌked iŶ P‘ so I kŶoǁ. I Đoŵe fƌoŵ a P‘ 
ĐoŶsultaŶĐǇ ďaĐkgƌouŶd, so aŶd that͛s Ŷot ǁhat ǁe do.͟ ;PI.ϲͿ 
 
 
Fig 3.38 
 
Change of Department Name 
Following the trend identified in 3.1.2 the interviewees were asked to explain why they 
thought a significant proportion of police communications departments had changed their 
name.  The answers given were varied and sometimes confused as several interviewees had 
inherited their current name and were not involved in the decision to change it. Overall, 
however, from the 27 responses five basic categories emerged (Fig 3.39).  
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Fig 3.39 
 
Department Priorities 
The reason given by the largest proportion of interviewees (29%) was that departments had 
changed their names in order to more closely align with their priorities. As the 
communications team moved from being primarily a reactive media service so they changed 
their name to reflect this. Interviewees in this group
24
 were often keen to draw a distinction 
ďetǁeeŶ ǁhat theǇ do Ŷoǁ aŶd the ͚puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs͛ aĐtiǀities of the past ǁhile 
simultaneously stating that this move was not to do with a desire to distance the departments 
fƌoŵ the Ŷegatiǀe ĐoŶŶotatioŶs of ͚puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs͛.  
 
This distinction was particularly important for PI.4 and PI.22 who made a point of emphasising 
that it was functional rather than ideological.  
͞I doŶ͛t thiŶk theƌe͛s aŶǇ ĐuŶŶiŶg plaŶ ďehiŶd ǁhǇ it͛s ďeeŶ ĐhaŶged… ǁho ƌeallǇ 
uses public ƌelatioŶs aŶǇŵoƌe?... it͛s all a ďit ŵisleadiŶg. “o Đoƌpoƌate Đoŵŵs 
aĐtuallǇ does saǇ it͛s aďout ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs aŶd ǁe͛ƌe Đalled Đoƌpoƌate Đoz ǁe͛ƌe a 
Đoƌpoƌate fuŶĐtioŶ aŶd Ŷot a loĐal fuŶĐtioŶ. It aĐtuallǇ ŵakes seŶse͟. ;PI.ϰͿ 
                                           
24
 7 of  the 9 in this group 
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͞No, I doŶ͛t thiŶk it͛s a ĐoŶsĐious thiŶg, I doŶ͛t thiŶk it͛s ďeeŶ doŶe deliďeƌatelǇ, 
ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ hasŶ͛t fƌoŵ ouƌ poiŶt of ǀieǁ… Ŷoǁ ǁe͛ǀe goŶe iŶto Đoƌpoƌate 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs aŶd that͛s ŵaiŶlǇ ďeĐause ǁe͛ǀe got that ŵaŶǇ platfoƌŵs ǁe͛ƌe 
Ŷoǁ lookiŶg to seƌǀiĐe… “o foƌ us it͛s aďout Đhanging into corporate 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͟. ;PI.ϮϮͿ 
 
Distancing from Associations with Public Relations 
This theme was of particular interest given the title of this thesis and the general level of 
discomfort that some interviewees had demonstrated up to this point on the subject. Given 
that seven (23%) of interviewees dismissed the idea that the name had been changed because 
of this it was curious that five (16%) interviewees later contradicted this and asserted the 
opposite.  
͞I doŶ't like to use the teƌŵ P‘… people rightly or wrongly associate PR with spin and 
politicians. PR itself is all about open communication but the negative connotations is 
ǁhǇ ǁe use CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs foƌ a Ŷaŵe aŶd Ŷot PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs͟. ;PI.ϮϲͿ 
 
Part of Professionalisation 
A further five (16%) interviewees felt that the change in name was simply another aspect of 
the professionalisation that police communications had undergone. For PI.15, however, 
professionalisation was only part of the change in name: 
͞“o I do ǁoŶdeƌ if the Ŷaŵe Đoƌpoƌate communications came out to almost 
suďliŵiŶal effoƌt to ĐoŶtƌol ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs… ǁhat aĐtuallǇ Ƌuite iŶteƌests ŵe is 
that… has all the ƌiŶg of ǁe͛ll tell Ǉou like Đoƌpoƌate ǁhat the ĐoŵpaŶǇ liŶe is…͟ 
(PI.15) 
 
Easier to Understand 
Four (13%) suggested that ͚Coƌpoƌate CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͛ is aŶ easieƌ ĐoŶĐept to eǆplaiŶ to 
poliĐe offiĐeƌs aŶd the puďliĐ thaŶ soŵethiŶg like ͚puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs͛ oƌ ͚ŵaƌketiŶg͛.  
͞Đoƌpoƌate ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs is aŶ easieƌ Ŷaŵe to eǆplaiŶ… puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs giǀes 
people ideas that are then haƌd to soƌt out.͟ ;PI.ϳͿ 
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͞Theƌe is a ŵisĐoŶĐeptioŶ eǀeŶ ǁithiŶ the foƌĐe that pƌeǀiouslǇ ǁe ǁeƌe paƌt of the 
press. Still, people would say 'can I tell you that?' 'Yes, you can tell us that'. So it was 
breaking down the barriers internally, but also recognising that communications is so 
ŵuĐh ďƌoadeƌ thaŶ just pƌess aŶd puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs Ŷoǁ͟. ;PI.17) 
 
Aspirational 
The final category was that communications teams had adopted names which better suited 
their aspirations and how they wished to be seen and understood by the police officers they 
worked alongside.  This was the least popular explanation given with just three (10%) 
interviewees suggesting this as the reason for the change in department names. As PI.23 
explained corporate communication better reflects ǁhat theǇ aƌe tƌǇiŶg to do; ͞ǁe͛ǀe goŶe 
ďƌoadeƌ so [Pƌess aŶd PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs] it didŶ͛t ƌefleĐt a lot of it͟.  
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3.2.4 Communications Strategy  
IŶteƌǀieǁees ǁeƌe asked to Đhoose ǁhiĐh teƌŵ theǇ felt ďest desĐƌiďed theiƌ depaƌtŵeŶt͛s 
current communicatioŶ stƌategǇ; ͚Push͛, ͚Pull͛, ͚NetǁoƌkiŶg͛ oƌ ͚TƌaŶsfoƌŵatiǀe͛. The teƌŵs 
themselves were based on the models proposed by Mergel (2012) (2.8.5).  
 
The iŶteƌǀieǁees ideŶtified eleŵeŶts of ͚Push͛ aŶd ͚Pull͛ iŶ theiƌ stƌategies; hoǁeǀeƌ, the 
͚NetǁoƌkiŶg͛ ŵodel was considered separate and often positioned as part of engagement or 
operational policing. The reason given for this was that it covered appeals for information and 
maintaining their virtual intelligence network rather than part of their core strategy which was 
ŵostlǇ ĐhaƌaĐteƌised ďǇ ͚Push͛ aŶd ͚Pull͛.  
 
 
Fig 3.40 
 
All of the 25 teams interviewed reported using hashtags and some level of monitoring when it 
came to their social media accounts to ensure that there was nothing inflammatory being 
posted by members of the public (see Fig 3.40); although the degree of monitoring differed 
considerably between departments. Just over half of the interviewees (55%) felt that their 
departments were either starting to engage with or had been engaging in conversations with 
online audiences for some time; however, 12 (39%) stated that they had not yet reached that 
point or were not yet able to offer that service, often due to capacity and predicted demand.  
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With regard to current strategy there were a variety of responses from the interviewees; 15 
iŶteƌǀieǁs ;ϰϴ%Ϳ felt that theiƌ depaƌtŵeŶts ǁeƌe oŶlǇ usiŶg ͚Push͛, eight ;Ϯϱ%Ϳ ͚Pull͛, thƌee 
;ϭϬ%Ϳ felt that theiƌ depaƌtŵeŶts used a ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ of ͚Push͛ aŶd ͚Pull͛, thƌee ;ϭϬ%Ϳ that theiƌ 
departments used a combination of ͚Push͛ aŶd ͚TƌaŶsfoƌŵatiǀe͛ aŶd oŶlǇ oŶe ;ϯ%Ϳ desĐƌiďed 
theiƌ ǁhole stƌategǇ as ͚TƌaŶsfoƌŵatiǀe͛ ;Fig ϯ.ϰϭͿ.   
 
Interviewees were then asked what they thought their communications strategy ought to be 
and whether they thought they had achieved it (Fig 4.41). With the exception of one 
interviewee (PI.13), all interviewees who answered the question thought that their 
communications strategy should move away from simply pushing information out and into 
eitheƌ ͚Pull͛ ;ϭϭͿ, ͚TƌaŶsfoƌŵatiǀe͛ ;ϭϬͿ oƌ ͚Pull aŶd TƌaŶsfoƌŵatiǀe͛ ;ϯͿ. Fouƌ iŶteƌǀieǁees 
thought that ǁhile soŵe eleŵeŶt of ͚Push͛ ǁas iŶeǀitaďle it should ďe ĐoŵďiŶed ǁith eitheƌ 
͚Pull͛ oƌ ͚TƌaŶsfoƌŵatiǀe͛ stƌategies to iŵpƌoǀe effeĐtiǀeŶess.  As PI.Ϯϲ eǆplaiŶed, the diffiĐultǇ 
when discussing communicatioŶ stƌategies is that ͞theƌe aƌe alǁaǇs goiŶg to ďe eleŵeŶts of 
'Push' iŶ hoǁ ǁe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate siŵplǇ ďeĐause of the Ŷatuƌe of poliĐiŶg͟.  
 
 
Fig 3.41 
 
PI.Ϯϲ͛s opiŶioŶ ǁas aŶoŵalous. The ŵajoƌitǇ of iŶteƌǀieǁees suggested iŶ theiƌ aŶsǁeƌs that 
͚Push͛ should be eliminated in favour of a more interactive and symmetrical model of 
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ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs.  PI.ϭϮ, foƌ eǆaŵple, aƌgued that ǁhile ͚Push͛ had ďeeŶ the stƌategǇ, Ŷoǁ it 
was all about engagement and dialogue.  
͞If Ǉou go up to the fouƌ ŵodels of puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs… ǁe ǁeƌe ǀeƌǇ ŵuĐh pƌess 
agency. We shout out what we did. That's how police comms was, and particularly 
ǁheŶ Ǉou had poliĐe offiĐeƌs ƌuŶŶiŶg it… Ŷoǁ ǁe'ƌe Ŷot sǇŵŵetƌiĐal, ďut ǁe'ƌe Ŷot 
faƌ off at tiŵes. We ǁill ƌespoŶd to deŵaŶd… If ǁe'ƌe piĐkiŶg up ƌuŵours of child 
abductions, we will put posts out there to provide the facts and that people make the 
deĐisioŶ. We tƌǇ aŶd ďe the ŵost Đƌediďle, tƌusted ǀoiĐe͟. ;PI.ϭϮͿ  
 
The disparity between communications teams with regard to strategy was considerable; with 
some interviewees, like PI.2 and PI.15, explaining that in their force "police communications is 
still ďasiĐallǇ aďout ďƌoadĐastiŶg. ͞We ŵight talk aďout iŶĐƌeasiŶg eŶgageŵeŶt ďut at the 
ŵoŵeŶt ǁe just doŶ't haǀe the ĐapaĐitǇ to aĐtuallǇ ŵaŶage it͟ ;PI.2). While others (for 
example PI.6, PI.12, PI.23, PI.25), described a much higher level of activity and engagement 
and a different approach to communications in general. PI.25a, for example, felt very strongly 
that social media is about talking and forging community networks, particularly for the police.  
͞It's aďout haǀiŶg those ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶs. “o Ǉes, ǁe push stuff out, ďut ǁe should also 
be jumping into conversations that are happening in our local communities. So a big 
part of the local social media accounts is to keep an eye out about what's your local 
council saying and what are local people saying. Are they talking about something 
that actually, we should be talking about too. Is there a way for us to jump into the 
conversation and be part of that community?... that's what all our social media 
aĐĐouŶts should ďe aďout. It should ďe aďout talkiŶg.͟ ;PI.ϮϱaͿ  
 
When discussing whether they thought they had achieved the ideal communications strategy 
in their team almost twice the number (19) reported no, this had not been achieved (Fig 3.42). 
The two most common reasons given for this was firstly, demand and not having the time and 
resources to facilitate a more interactive communications strategy and secondly, that it was a 
work in progress as the team was ͞still ĐoŵiŶg to gƌips ǁith soĐial ŵedia͟ ;PI.ϭϭͿ.   
 
PI.28, however, suggested an alternative explanation which was unusual both in content and 
how candid the interviewee was about this issue:  
͞it͛s a peƌsoŶal ǀieǁ, ďut I thiŶk ǁe aspiƌe to ďe pull… ďut I doŶ͛t thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe aĐtuallǇ 
ǀeƌǇ good at it… I thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe ǀeƌǇ used to telliŶg people, I thiŶk it Đoŵes fƌoŵ a 
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ĐoŵŵaŶd ethos that͛s iŶ the poliĐe, Ǉou kŶoǁ, ǁe͛ll tell Ǉou ǁhat ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg, ǁe 
doŶ͛t aĐtuallǇ eŶgage Ǉou iŶ the deďate aďout ǁhat ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg.͟ ;PI.ϮϴͿ  
 
A siŵilaƌ ƌeasoŶ ǁas giǀeŶ ďǇ PI.ϭϭ ǁho thought that paƌt of the pƌoďleŵ ǁas that a ͞lot of 
poliĐe offiĐeƌs still see effeĐtiǀe Đoŵŵs as deliǀeƌiŶg that aǁaƌeŶess, just the uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg.͟ 
which was impeding change in communication model.   
 
 
Fig 3.42 
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4.2.5 Social and Digital Media  
The interviewees were asked a series of questions about their online presence covering;  
1) Which social media sites they were using,  
2) How social media is being utilised as part of their communications strategy,  
3) The level of engagement; and  
4) Any limitations, or problems, they had experienced with these platforms.  
 
Interviewees Stance on Social Media 
The majority of interviewees (75%) were either very positive or generally positive about social 
media. Six (19%) replied that while they were in favour of social media as a concept, they had 
reservations about the risks associated with it; only two (6%) were actively against social 
media but both PI.7 and PI.13 also acknowledged that it was a necessary, and unavoidable, 
part of modern policing (Fig 3.43).  
 
A teŶsioŶ iŶ ϭϬ of the iŶteƌǀieǁs ǁas the diĐhotoŵǇ ďetǁeeŶ the iŶteƌǀieǁees͛ pƌofessioŶal 
opinion regarding the business uses of social media and their personal opinion about using it 
themselves. This was excellently encapsulated by PI.8 who was very keen on police use of 
social media: 
͞PeƌsoŶallǇ, I'ŵ Ŷot oŶ FaĐeďook. I'ŵ Ŷot oŶ Tǁitteƌ. AŶd I haǀe aďsolutelǇ Ŷo idea 
ǁhǇ aŶǇďodǇ ǁould ǁaŶt to ďe, hoŶestlǇ.͟ ;PI.ϴͿ 
 
Pro Social Media 
For most interviewees the principal benefits offered by social media were improving public 
engagement (PI.17), expanding the police audience to include traditionally hard to reach 
groups (PI.26), managing the often conflicting needs of multiple audiences (PI.6), and 
encouraging transparency (PI.1). PI.6 pithily captured the essence of these points:  
͞This is the ďiggest tool aŶd the ďiggest oppoƌtuŶitǇ the poliĐe haǀe had to diƌeĐtlǇ 
eŶgage ǁith the puďliĐ that theǇ seƌǀe. It͛s ďƌilliaŶt. Yes it has ƌisks, ďut it͛s aĐtuallǇ 
you know, brilliaŶt aŶd ǀaluaďle ďeǇoŶd aŶǇthiŶg else ƌeallǇ͟. ;PI.ϲͿ 
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The final benefit of social media was initially raised by PI.4 although it was later reiterated by 
PI.2, PI.12 PI.20A and PI.21. For PI.4, one of the most important aspects of social media was 
improving police visibility and providing reassurance in a non-invasive way. 
͞Theƌe aƌe soŵe aƌeas ǁheƌe theǇ ǁaŶt to folloǁ us oŶ Tǁitteƌ aŶd folloǁ soĐial 
ŵedia, ďut theǇ doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to see a poliĐe Đaƌ… Đoz it ŵight iŵplǇ theƌe͛s a Đƌiŵe iŶ 
theiƌ ƌoad… “o soŵe aƌeas theǇ ǁaŶt to see poliĐe patƌolliŶg, Đoz that͛s ƌeassuƌiŶg. IŶ 
otheƌ aƌeas, people aƌe put off… “o it͛s Ŷot eǀeŶ as siŵple as get ŵoƌe Đops out, Đoz 
iŶ soŵe aƌeas it doesŶ͛t ǁoƌk.͟ ;PI.ϰͿ  
This was a very interesting point as the common consensus is often that people feel reassured 
by the visible presence of the police in their area (see Chapter 1) and yet, according to this 
group, this does not seem to be the case.  
 
Against 
Of the two interviewees who were vocally quite opposed to social media, PI.7 offered the more 
ĐoŵpƌeheŶsiǀe pƌeĐis. Foƌ PI.ϳ soĐial ŵedia is ͞like a glitteƌǇ toǇ… Ŷoise the poliĐe haǀe to put 
out to keep the door open to virtual engagement – 99% of it passes people by, but 1% might 
get ŶotiĐed aŶd ƌeŵeŵďeƌed͟. As PI.ϳ ǁeŶt oŶ to eǆplain, people, in her experience, tend to 
skim social media rather than absorb it, this inattention is further compounded by the fact that 
even the most popular posts only reaches a specific online audience whereas radio and 
newspapers reach more people and tend to sink in. 
͞ǁhat I'ǀe fouŶd oǀeƌ the last feǁ Ǉeaƌs is that ŵost of the iŶfoƌŵatioŶ poliĐe put out 
oŶ soĐial ŵedia is just ͞Ŷoise͟ that doesŶ͛t get ŶotiĐed, oƌ if it does, it gets igŶoƌed oƌ 
foƌgotteŶ aďout ǀeƌǇ ƋuiĐklǇ… the oŶlǇ thiŶgs that seeŵ to capture attention and are 
likelǇ to ďe ƌetǁeeted aƌe ŵissiŶg peƌsoŶs ĐaŵpaigŶs aŶd if theƌe is a ŵuƌdeƌ͟. ;PI.ϳͿ 
A similar point was made by PI.13 who thought that too much emphasis was being placed on 
virtual engagement to the detriment of operational requirements.  
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Fig 3.43 
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Engagement and Dialogue 
Interviewees were asked to assess how successful they thought their team was with public 
engagement.  As Fig 3.44 shows, results were mixed with only five interviewees (16%) stating 
that they thought their teams had achieved the aspiration set out in Engage (NPIA, 2010; see 
1.5). ϭϮ ;ϯϵ%Ϳ iŶteƌǀieǁees thought that theiƌ teaŵs ǁeƌe ͞gettiŶg theƌe͟ ;ϲͿ oƌ ǁeƌe ŵeetiŶg 
the ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts to ͞soŵe eǆteŶt͟, ďut aŶ eƋual Ŷuŵďeƌ ;ϯϵ%Ϳ ƌeplied that their teams were 
a long way off this ideal.  
 
The most commonly given reason for poor levels of engagement (48%) was lack of time and 
resources to be able to manage the level of demand replying to public interaction on social 
media sites would create. Another frequently given reason (29%) was inexperience using social 
media which was hampering active online engagement.  
 
Yes 
͞We do get a lot of iŶteƌaĐtioŶ, so oďǀiouslǇ ǁhat ǁe do is eŶgage ǁith theŵ, aŶd I 
think with the messages we put out, we do attract ĐeƌtaiŶ audieŶĐes… ǁe doŶ͛t just 
put the stuff out theƌe aŶd thiŶk oh it͛s out theƌe, ǁe tƌǇ to ƌespoŶd to eǀeƌǇthiŶg 
that ǁe get iŶ ŵedia oƌ a liǀe Đall, if theƌe͛s a ƋuestioŶ asked ǁe tƌǇ to haǀe that 
engagement side of social media rather than just pushiŶg lots of iŶfoƌŵatioŶ out͟. 
(PI.19A) 
 
Getting There 
͞It͛s ǀeƌǇ hit aŶd ŵiss aŶd… ǁe͛ƌe still leaƌŶiŶg ǁhat ǁoƌks aŶd ǁhat doesŶ͛t.͟ ;PI.ϲͿ 
 
Starting To 
͞To soŵe eǆteŶt ǁe do. MostlǇ soĐial ŵedia is still used as a ŵeaŶs foƌ gettiŶg the 
police message out.͟ ;PI.ϭͿ 
 
No 
 ͞ǁe͛ǀe ƌealised ǁe͛ǀe got to get ďetteƌ at  ƌespoŶdiŶg oŶ Tǁitteƌ, so Ŷot just puttiŶg 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ out theƌe ďut aĐtuallǇ ƌespoŶdiŶg to people ǁho aƌe ĐoŵiŶg thƌough͟. 
(PI.10) 
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͞ǁe doŶ͛t at the ŵoŵeŶt haǀe the ƌesouƌĐes to ƌespoŶd to those tǁeets.͟ ;PI.ϭϱͿ 
 
User Data and Analytics 
Interviewees were asked if their team currently collects information about their online 
audiences (e.g. demographic data, location, click throughs and objects of interest) and which 
analytical software they use (Fig 3.45). Responses to this question were inconsistent across 
police forces. 
 
User Data 
ϭϭ teaŵs ;ϰϰ%Ϳ ƌoutiŶelǇ ĐolleĐted useƌ data to ŵap theiƌ oŶliŶe audieŶĐe. PI.ϭϮ͛s teaŵ had 
the most comprehensive breakdown of user demographic data to the point where he could 
target strategies by address within a specific community. In five forces they had only started 
collecting this data a few months before the interview took place. A common concern raised 
by all the interviewees in these forces was with regard to how to evaluate the data (3.2.8). Of 
the remaining nine communications teams, seven (28%) were not yet collecting or looking at 
user data while the interviewees from the two other teams (8%) were not sure whether this 
data was collected or not.    
 
Analysis Software 
Over half of the teams (60%), used some form of analytical software to track and evaluate 
their activity on social media. An additional four teams (16%) had just started using such 
software.  A further four teams (16%) had not yet started analysing social media content and 
interviewees from two teams again were not certain whether their team used analytical 
software or not. There was a clear connection in the answers between those teams that used 
analysis software and those who also collected user data; all but one of the teams who had 
just started to collect user data had also just started to use analysis software, and the two 
teaŵs ǁho ͚did Ŷot kŶoǁ͛ ǁeƌe the saŵe foƌ useƌ data aŶd aŶalǇsis. The oŶlǇ sigŶifiĐaŶt 
discrepancy arose with those who answeƌed ͚Ŷo͛; seǀeŶ teaŵs did Ŷot ĐolleĐt useƌ data, ďut 
only four did not use analysis software – the missing three had been using analysis software 
for some time. No explanation was given at the time for this discrepancy.  
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Purpose of Social Media 
Interviewees were asked to identify what they thought the primary uses of social media were 
;Fig ϯ.ϰϲͿ. The ŵost fƌeƋueŶtlǇ giǀeŶ ƌespoŶses ǁeƌe ͚to eŶĐouƌage puďliĐ eŶgageŵeŶt͛ ;ϰϴ%Ϳ 
aŶd, as PI.Ϯ put it, ͞to ǁaƌŶ aŶd iŶfoƌŵ the puďliĐ so that theǇ aƌe kept up-to-date oŶ ǁhat͛s 
goiŶg oŶ͟ ;ϰϴ%Ϳ.  Cƌisis ŵaŶageŵeŶt ǁas also a populaƌ use ǁith ϭϮ iŶteƌǀieǁees ;ϯϵ%Ϳ 
including it in their list and was closely followed by community reassurance and 
campaigns/appeals (32%). Less common uses included a tool for self-promotion/publicity 
(16%), a means for improving police visibility (16%), crime prevention or behavioural change 
(13%), a means of networking with key audience groups (10%), driving online users to the 
foƌĐe͛s ǁeďsite ;ϭϬ%Ϳ, iŶteƌŶal Đoŵŵs ;ϳ%Ϳ, aŶd ƌuŵouƌ ŵaŶageŵent (3%).    
 
 
Fig 3.46 
 
Preferred Platform 
The interviewees were asked if they, or their team, had a preferred social media site (e.g. 
Facebook) and if so, why that was. The results were relatively even in their distribution (Fig 
3.47). Twitter, Facebook and YouTube were the three most commonly used sites (see 3.1.6); 
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with 12 (39%) preferring Twitter, nine (29%) Facebook, and eight (26%) stating that they did 
not prefer one of the other as they used the sites differently.  
   
Twitter 
͞ŵoƌe people teŶd to eŶgage oŶ Tǁitteƌ thaŶ oŶ FaĐeďook͟ ;PI.ϮͿ. 
 
͞ǁe͛ǀe got our biggest following is on Tǁitteƌ. It͛s the easiest ǁaǇ to eŶgage, 
particularly when we talk about doing the multimedia kind of package of the photos, 
etĐ. IŶstaŶt ƌespoŶses fƌoŵ people͟. ;PI.ϲͿ 
 
Facebook 
͞We͛ƌe fiŶdiŶg FaĐeďook͛s takiŶg off ƌeallǇ ƌeallǇ ǁell foƌ us.͟ ;PI.ϰͿ 
 
 
Fig 3.47 
 
Facebook and Twitter 
͞I thiŶk theǇ aƌe ďoth ƌeallǇ iŵpoƌtaŶt ďut theǇ ƌeallǇ diffeƌ foƌ ǁhat Ǉou ǁaŶt to get 
out of theŵ, so I doŶ͛t thiŶk I ǁould put oŶe aďoǀe the otheƌ, to ďe hoŶest… ďoth aƌe 
of equal importance but it depends who you are trying to reach and what your 
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ĐaŵpaigŶ͛s aďout oƌ ǁhat Ǉouƌ appeal oƌ ǁhateǀeƌ is aďout as to ǁhiĐh oŶe is the 
ďest oŶe.͟ ;PI.ϭϬͿ 
 
͞the diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ the FaĐeďook aŶd Tǁitter audience is really clear in one of 
those papers about only 15% of our Facebook audience use Twitter and similar 
proportion back. Everybody thinks you just use social media, you use both. They're 
diffeƌeŶt audieŶĐes… AŶd ǁhat ǁe fouŶd thƌough tƌial aŶd eƌƌoƌ… is that Tǁitteƌ 
works better on a geographic approach. Facebook works on a big mass and because 
the ǁaǇ people liǀe͟. ;PI.ϭϮͿ 
 
Some, like PI.9 and PI.12, thought however that there had been a channel shift as to which 
platform worked best: 
͞I thiŶk different things for different jobs and I would say historically, it's been 
Twitter. I personally and from a department perspective, I would say that Facebook 
has a gƌeateƌ poteŶtial… I ǁould saǇ, ǁe get ϵϬ% ŵoƌe iŶteƌaĐtioŶ oŶ FaĐeďook thaŶ 
ǁe do Tǁitteƌ͟. (PI.9) 
 
PI.27 suggested that Twitter and Facebook are platforms designed to do fundamentally 
different things: 
͞“o MaƌtiŶ “oƌƌell suŵs it up iŶ a ƌeallǇ good ǁaǇ… he said FaĐeďook͛s foƌ Ǉouƌ ďƌaŶd, 
Twitter's for public relations. I think that's quite a good ǁaǇ to put it͟. ;PI.ϮϳͿ  
 
This was not found in any of the other interviews, however. A pattern that emerged during the 
interviews is how different social media sites are utilised and the communications strategy 
adopted by the department. For the most paƌt, those foƌĐes ǁhiĐh used the ͚Push͛ 
communications model also preferred Twitter to Facebook. The reverse of that was also true, 
that those teams that prioritised Facebook did so because of the additional engagement 
benefits they found with the site. These teaŵs ǁeƌe also ŵoƌe likelǇ to ďe usiŶg ͚Pull͛ aŶd 
͚TƌaŶsfoƌŵatiǀe͛ ŵodels ;see ϯ.Ϯ.ϰͿ. With the eǆĐeptioŶ of PI.Ϯϳ, Tǁitteƌ ǁas ǀieǁed as a 
broadcast channel best used in crisis management situations and for quick news updates. 
Appeals, recruitment and engagement achieved the best results from Facebook.   
͞IŶ teƌŵs of eŶgageŵeŶt, FaĐeďook is ďetteƌ. We get ŵoƌe eŶgageŵeŶt thƌough 
FaĐeďook thaŶ ǁe do thƌough Tǁitteƌ. I haǀe Ŷo idea ǁhǇ that is… Tǁitteƌ's good foƌ 
the quick time. Let's just get stuff out, so the road closures. Yeah, from a reactive 
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point of view, certainly, Twitter is preferred, whereas Facebook is better for giving a 
ďit ŵoƌe iŶfoƌŵatioŶ, a ďit ŵoƌe detail.͟ ;PI.ϴͿ 
 
Other platforms 
While Twitter, Facebook and YouTube are the three main social media sites used by police 
forces, some communications teams are using other social media sites (3.1.6). Use of these 
across the interviewed forces was inconsistent and patchy. 12 forces (48%) had a Flickr 
account, six (24%) Google+, five (20%) were using Pinterest and one force was using Instagram 
and SoundCloud (4%).  
 
Some, like PI.4 were keen to experiment with all social media sites to find out what works: 
͞We͛ƌe usiŶg IŶstagƌaŵ, ǁe͛ƌe usiŶg eǀeƌǇthiŶg ǁe ĐaŶ. We͛ǀe doŶe ThuŶdeƌĐlap, 
ǁe͛ǀe doŶe “toƌifǇ. We͛ƌe tƌǇiŶg lots of diffeƌeŶt ǁaǇs of eŶgagiŶg aŶd I thiŶk ǁhat it 
ŵeaŶs is, Ǉou͛ƌe ƌeaĐhiŶg lots of diffeƌeŶt gƌoups of people.͟ ;PI.ϰͿ 
 
Others were far more conservative in their approach.  
͞I kŶoǁ that I͛ǀe had a Đouple of ƌeƋuests of ǁhǇ doŶ͛t we use Instagram or why 
doŶ͛t ǁe get iŶǀolǀed ǁith “ŶapĐhat, ďut ƌeallǇ foƌ us foƌ IŶstagƌaŵ ǁe doŶ͛t ƌeallǇ 
haǀe a lot of piĐtuƌes to put oŶ it aŶd I thiŶk IŶstagƌaŵ foƌ ŵe is a Đƌeatiǀe, it͛s I 
dunno, mass images, I think West Midlands are using it and it͛s ǁoƌked ǁell foƌ theŵ, 
theǇ͛ǀe got soŵe gƌeat piĐtuƌes aŶd theǇ͛ǀe got a ďig teaŵ so ŵaǇďe theǇ͛ǀe got 
soŵeoŶe ǁho͛s just dealiŶg ǁith that͟. ;PI.ϭϵAͿ 
Time, difficulties managing the demand, inexperience using social media, and lack of suitable 
content were the most reasons most often cited for not branching out beyond Twitter and 
Facebook.  
͞if ǁe had ŵoƌe ƌesouƌĐes ǁe͛d pƌoďaďlǇ use it [FliĐkƌ] ŵoƌe ƌegulaƌlǇ… theƌe͛s this 
pƌessuƌe ǁheŶ a Ŷeǁ oŶe Đoŵes out that takes off… that oh Ǉou haǀe to do that 
beĐause it͛s so populaƌ ďut Ǉeah, ǁheŶ Ǉou aĐtuallǇ take a ďaĐk step aŶd go ǁell, is it 
goiŶg to ďeŶefit us that ŵuĐh, is theƌe aŶǇthiŶg ǁe ĐaŶ do oŶ that that ǁe ĐaŶ͛t do 
oŶ these?͟ ;PI.ϭϵBͿ 
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Limitations and Problems with Social Media 
Social media is not, however, without its problems and limitations as all but one interviewee 
(PI.5) were eager to discuss; sometimes in considerable detail (Fig 3.48). The problems 
identified ranged between difficulties around audiences (13%), engagement (5%) and problems 
with evaluation (15%), to difficulties with managing demand (8%), changing the sometimes 
anti-engagement risk averse police culture (5%), and the potential for unintended 
consequences, such as increasing fear of crime instead of providing reassurance (5%).  
 
The general consensus, however, was that despite the risks and problems associated with 
social media, these channels had improved police visibility, accountability and relationship with 
their audiences. Efforts at improving engagement were apparent during the interviews and 
reinforced by the additional functionality many forces are redesigning their websites to include 
(see Appendix 3.10).  
 
Fig 3.48 
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4.2.6 Traditional Media  
IŶteƌǀieǁees ǁeƌe ƋuestioŶed oŶ fiǀe aspeĐts ƌelatiŶg to the iŶteƌǀieǁee͛s eǆpeƌieŶce with 
journalists and news media.   
1) How the interviewee would describe the police-media relationship in their area; 
2) How the relationship has changed with the success of social media; 
3) Whether there has been a decrease in local journalism; 
4) What the intervieǁee thought of the Ŷeǁ ͚self-seƌǀiĐe͛ ŵodel of iŶteƌaĐtiŶg ǁith 
the media which has been adopted in some forces; and 
5) Whether journalists are still able to provide a watchdog function (see chapter 1) in 
light of these changes. 
 
The Police-Media Relationship 
How interviewees described the police-media relationship varied considerably (Fig 3.49); 
ƌaŶgiŶg fƌoŵ ͚VeƌǇ Good͛ to ͚Hostile͛. OŶe poiŶt that ďeĐaŵe appaƌeŶt duƌiŶg the gƌoup 
interviews in particular was the subjective nature of this assessment, as in two of the three 
gƌoup iŶteƌǀieǁs the paƌtiĐipaŶts disagƌeed ǁith the otheƌ͛s desĐƌiptioŶ. Foƌ eǆaŵple, PI.ϮϬA 
Đlassed the ƌelatioŶship ďetǁeeŶ the loĐal pƌess aŶd heƌ foƌĐe as ͞ǀeƌǇ good͟ ǁhile PI.ϮϬB, 
ǁho ǁas Ŷeǁ to the foƌĐe, said it ǁas ͞okaǇ, ďut iŵpƌoǀiŶg͟. A siŵilaƌ situatioŶ oĐĐuƌƌed 
during interview PI.25; where PI.25A thought the relationship could be difficult with the media 
often being overly critical, while PI.25B replied:  
͞I thiŶk ǁe'ƌe Ƌuite highlǇ ƌegaƌded ďǇ ŵedia, iŶĐludiŶg ŶatioŶals, ďeĐause they know 
theǇ ǁill get a ƌespoŶse fƌoŵ us. We Ŷeǀeƌ do a Ŷo ĐoŵŵeŶt aŶd ǁe'ƌe pƌettǇ sǁift.͟ 
 
Just uŶdeƌ half of the iŶteƌǀieǁees Đlassed theiƌ foƌĐe͛s ƌelatioŶship ǁith the ŵedia as ďeiŶg 
͚VeƌǇ Good͛ oƌ ͚Good͛, although soŵe ;PI.Ϯ, PI.ϴ, PI.ϵ, PI.ϭϭ, PI.21) made a point of 
distinguishing between pre and post Leveson inquiry. 
͞I thiŶk ǁe geŶeƌallǇ do haǀe Ƌuite Đlose ƌelatioŶships ǁith theŵ, ďut post LeǀesoŶ 
it's a lot ŵoƌe Đautious͟. ;PI.ϵͿ 
 
Other interviewees, like PI.8, drew a distinction between newspapers where there was a 
certain stability or permanence to the staff and those where there was a high staff turnover: 
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͞“oŵe of the papeƌs ǁe haǀe ǀeƌǇ good ƌelatioŶships ǁith aŶd, if theǇ'ƌe shoƌt oŶ the 
front page or two, they'll come and ask if we've got anything and we're still trying to 
haǀe that Ƌuite opeŶ dialogue… Theƌe aƌe a Đouple of papeƌs ǁheƌe the tuƌŶaƌouŶd 
in staff is so high that you never really get to know [them]. They're just a name and an 
eŵail addƌess ǁith the odd phoŶe Đall.͟ ;PI.ϴͿ 
 
Fouƌ iŶteƌǀieǁees thought that theiƌ ƌelatioŶship ǁith jouƌŶalists ǁas ͚okaǇ oƌ iŵpƌoǀiŶg͛. OŶe 
interviewee, PI.20B, was a former journalist and explained how in his opinion part of the 
communication difficulty between the press and police was in the police not knowing what the 
press were looking for and so not providing it. This led to journalists investigating or 
speculating on their own, which in turn frustrated and aggravated the police and thus soured a 
relationship which should be positive and mutually beneficial. As PI.2 summarised – ͞the poliĐe 
are news, but we need to be in the news to do our jobs the problem is managing that 
ƌelatioŶship so ǁe ďoth get ǁhat ǁe ǁaŶt͟.  
 
 
Fig 3.49 
11 interviewees, however, described their relationship with the press as eitheƌ ͚diffiĐult͛ ;Ϯϯ%Ϳ 
oƌ ǁhat PI.ϰ teƌŵed ͞ĐƌitiĐallǇ hostile͟ ;ϭϯ%Ϳ. PI.ϭϱ, foƌ eǆaŵple, felt that the pƌess ǁeŶt out of 
theiƌ ǁaǇ to ͞put a Ŷegatiǀe slaŶt oŶ eǀeƌǇthiŶg͟, eǀeŶ positiǀe stoƌies. “iŵilaƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐes 
were reported by five other interviewees PI.1, PI.6, PI.13, PI.21 and PI.23. Part of the reason 
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given for this was again the transient, high turnover nature of modern journalism identified by 
PI.8 which as PI.7 explained meant that:   
͞it's haƌd to ďuild ƌappoƌt like ǁe used to ǁheŶ it's a diffeƌeŶt faĐe eǀeƌǇ ǁeek… We 
doŶ't kŶoǁ theŵ aŶd theǇ doŶ't kŶoǁ us͟. ;PI.ϳͿ 
 
For PI.10 the problem with the press was twofold; on the one hand the constant stream of 
unknown reporters made it difficult to build rapport and trust but on the other the static 
journalists often had long entrenched links with various police officers which meant that they 
often by-passed the communications department to get information.  
͞ǁe͛ǀe got Ƌuite a feǁ Đƌiŵe ƌepoƌteƌs... ǁho haǀe ďeeŶ statiĐ, theǇ haǀe ďeeŶ theƌe 
for ϭϬ/ϭϱ Ǉeaƌs… theǇ haǀe ƌeallǇ good ĐoŶtaĐts ǁithiŶ the foƌĐe ďeĐause theǇ haǀe 
been here for so long, they met somebody when they were a PC, who is now a Chief 
“upeƌiŶteŶdeŶt aŶd… that͛s Ƌuite diffiĐult foƌ us iŶ teƌŵs of ŵaŶagiŶg that͟. ;PI.ϭϬͿ 
 
Changes to the Police-Media Relationship 
Another point that became apparent was how this relationship had changed; particularly since 
the Leveson report. There was a relationship between the length of time the interviewee had 
been in post, or working for the police, and the amount of time they spent dwelling on the 
changes in the press-police relationship. Some, like PI.6 and PI.12, talked of how social media 
had created a shift in the power dynamic of this relationship. This shift had changed police 
communication from being a principally one channel to a multichannel model and thus ended 
the traditional monopoly of the print press.  
͞eǀeƌǇthiŶg that Ǉou did aŶd eǀeƌǇthiŶg that ǁas aƌouŶd aŶ iŶĐideŶt oƌ opeƌatioŶ, it 
was all focussed on media management, press manageŵeŶt… But the poǁeƌ ďalaŶĐe 
has shifted dramatically and you see it even with the chief officers now. Once upon a 
tiŵe a Ŷegatiǀe stoƌǇ iŶ ouƌ loĐal Ŷeǁspapeƌ… ǁould seŶd theŵ iŶto disaƌƌaǇ. TheǇ͛d 
ďe ǁaŶtiŶg to kŶoǁ hoǁ that happeŶed. But Ŷoǁ, it͛s kiŶd of like, Ǉeah theǇ͛ǀe 
written a negative story, they kind of do that, but what we can now do is we can put 
our side out through our channels or we can put some good news out to counter 
ďalaŶĐe it.͟ ;PI.ϲͿ  
 
͞I had a ŵeetiŶg ǁith the loĐal papeƌ oŶlǇ a Đouple of months ago, to discuss how 
they were feeling left out and it's not that they're less important than they were. It's 
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that our communities are more important than they were and they've got more, as a 
sort of press function because we can communicate diƌeĐt ǁith theŵ.͟ ;PI.ϭϮͿ 
 
PI.26 suggested that part of the reason for this change was because of the Leveson Report, 
which discouraged close relationships between police officers and members of the press, and 
partly because of the constraints reporters were now feeling with regard to resources and 
time.  
͞[the pƌess used to] see us as a ďloĐk to the poliĐe offiĐeƌs ǁho ǁill giǀe theŵ ŵoƌe 
aŶd ďetteƌ stoƌies… Noǁ ǁe aƌe a ŶeĐessaƌǇ eǀil as loĐal jouƌŶalists Ŷo loŶgeƌ haǀe 
time to go investigating on their own and post Leveson has placed restrictions of 
these ƌelatioŶships͟. ;PI.ϮϲͿ 
 
Local journalists 
A theme identified in the literature was the general decrease in reporters, particularly 
dedicated crime reporters, following the widespread success of social media which had 
encouraged the rise of citizen journalism (1.3). When asked about this, just under half (48%) of 
the interviewees said that they had seen a decrease in the number of local journalists; a 
significantly smaller number of interviewees (23%) thought that reporters had stayed roughly 
the same, while five said that counter to even their expectations newspapers were expanding 
in their area (Fig 3.50).    
 
It is of note that all five interviewees (PI.10, PI.11, PI.19A, PI.19B, PI.20B) who remarked on this 
worked for predominantly rural police forces with a small static population and a high number 
of transient tourists during peak times. It is also interesting that with the exception of PI.20B 
the other four interviewees felt that traditional media was still a more effective channel for 
reaching the majority of their audience than social media – which was reflected in the way 
resources were allocated in their teams.  
 
In the case of PI.20B, the interviewee suggested an alternative interpretation. PI.20B thought 
that the reason why newspapers in his area were able to expand was because they were 
moving away from the traditional in-person reporter presence towards an online model. In this 
new model investigative work and information sourcing was completed through online 
ĐhaŶŶels, takiŶg adǀaŶtage of ͞so Đalled ĐitizeŶ jouƌŶalists͟ to eǆpaŶd aŶd supplǇ theiƌ 
network.  
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͞Ouƌ loĐals [aƌe] still doiŶg ƌeallǇ ǁell, theǇ'ǀe just ĐhaŶged the ŵodel so papeƌs haǀe 
now gone to a digital-first model, where it's basically everything is online, first and 
foremost. So the paper's only one edition during the day. It used to be four or five 
when I was there. But it's gradually deteriorated because the circulation has dropped. 
But the online has just gone through the roof. So they have now five or six, we call 
theŵ spikes, thƌough the daǇ ǁheƌe theiƌ hits at the ŵoƌŶiŶg [go up]… BasiĐallǇ, Ǉou 
hit those spikes with different content. So it's almost like having different editions of 
a Ŷeǁspapeƌ.͟ ;PI.ϮϬBͿ 
 
The opinions expressed ďǇ the ͚iŶĐƌease gƌoup͛ pƌoǀided a distiŶĐt ĐoŶtƌast to the iŶteƌǀieǁees 
who had reported a decrease. The apparent decline in journalists was reported across the 
country irrespective of population type or number. According to PI.4 ͞it͛s Đleaƌ the Ŷeǁspapers 
aƌe all dǇiŶg, ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ loĐallǇ͟; PI.ϰ pƌediĐted that ǁithiŶ a feǁ Ǉeaƌs loĐal Ŷeǁspapeƌs ǁould 
have moved completed online and only the nationals would be producing a daily print version. 
A similar remark was made by PI.8 who said that one of the reasons why they were looking to 
increase interest in their social media sites was because there were so few journalists to speak 
to now that getting the local papers to pick up stories was proving difficult.  
͞iŶ ƌealitǇ, theƌe's haƌdlǇ aŶǇ jouƌŶalists to speak to… We had pƌoďaďlǇ at least thƌee 
crime reporters 10 years ago. We've got one and he has to do everything else as well. 
Yeah, theǇ'ƌe just Ŷot theƌe͟. ;PI.ϴͿ 
 
It is important to note that the difference between the local and national situation was again 
raised in this topic. As PI.1 explained in his area the number of journalists had remained about 
the same, where the difference was noticeable was in the style/content of reporting (see 
following sections) and the numbers of local journalists which meant that stoƌies fƌoŵ ͞the 
sŵalleƌ, less iŶteƌestiŶg foƌĐes͟ ofteŶ didŶ͛t ŵake it iŶto the Ŷeǁs.  
͞It͛s aďout the saŵe ƌeallǇ. We haǀe aĐtiǀe loĐal jouƌŶalists aŶd loĐal Ŷeǁspapeƌs 
ƌouŶd heƌe. NatioŶal is pƌoďaďlǇ ǁheƌe ǁe͛ǀe seeŶ the ďiggest ƌeduĐtioŶs iŶ 
dediĐated Đƌiŵe jouƌŶalists͟. ;PI.ϭͿ 
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Fig 3.50 
 
Implications of there being Fewer Local Journalists 
Opinion was divided among the interviewees as to whether or not the implications of this 
change would be to the benefit of the police or merely create new problems for them. Six 
interviewees (19%) thought that the decrease in reporters and their stretched resources had 
actually made more work for his department, not less, and that it was increasingly difficult to 
maintain that level of service especially if resources were reduced further.  
͞ǁheƌeas Ǉou thiŶk Ŷeǁspapeƌs goiŶg out of ďusiŶess that͛s good foƌ us as faƌ as 
ďusiŶess is ĐoŶĐeƌŶed it͛s Ŷot. It͛s aƌguaďlǇ eǀeŶ ŵoƌe ďusǇ Ŷoǁ ďeĐause theǇ͛ƌe all 
ǁaŶtiŶg to keep theiƌ ǁeďsites up to date. That͛s ǁhǇ ǁe͛ve moved to this almost 
self-seƌǀe sǇsteŵ ǁheƌeďǇ aŶǇthiŶg that͛s ǀaguelǇ ďig that ǁe ǁaŶt to giǀe out ǁill 
ďe oŶ ouƌ Ŷeǁs ĐeŶtƌe… I thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe gettiŶg to the stage ǁheƌe ǁe͛ƌe goiŶg to haǀe 
to tell theŵ to go aǁaǇ ďeĐause ǁe͛ǀe Ŷot got tiŵe to deal ǁith that kiŶd of thiŶg.͟ 
(PI.13) 
 
͞LoĐal Ŷeǁspapeƌs aƌe ĐlosiŶg. Theƌe's feǁeƌ aŶd feǁeƌ ƌepoƌteƌs so theǇ doŶ't get 
out. “o theǇ eǆpeĐt to ďe fed͟. ;PI.ϮϱBͿ 
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It is significant, however, that the majority (68%) agreed with PI.16 and saw the reduction 
of journalism as a decided benefit: 
͞That ǁould ďe like the ďest thiŶg aĐtuallǇ if ǁe had Ŷo Ŷeǁspapeƌs aŶǇŵoƌe aŶd, 
you know, I think the more we can get people to receive information directly from 
the poliĐe ƌatheƌ thaŶ thƌough the ŵedia the ďetteƌ, so foƌ ŵe it͛ll be like okay if 
people haǀe to ƌeĐeiǀe theiƌ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ fƌoŵ us theǇ͛ƌe heaƌiŶg it fƌoŵ the hoƌse͛s 
ŵouth, theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot heaƌiŶg ǁhat paƌt of a ƌepoƌt the ŵedia͛s ĐhoseŶ to foĐus oŶ, 
theǇ͛ƌe heaƌiŶg the ďit that ǁe ǁaŶt to kŶoǁ this tiŵe.  “o it ĐaŶ͛t ďe a Ŷegatiǀe.͟ 
(PI.16)  
A common theme in this topic was that the greater problem was the poor training and 
inexperience of the journalists the interviewees were now working with. 
͞ǁe͛ǀe ŶotiĐed that the kiŶd of ƋualitǇ of the Đƌiŵe ƌepoƌteƌs iŶ teƌŵs of their 
tƌaiŶiŶg has ƌeallǇ ƌeduĐed, Ǉou kŶoǁ, ǁe͛ll haǀe ƌepoƌteƌs askiŶg us ǀeƌǇ oďǀious 
legal ƋuestioŶs that Ǉou thiŶk ǁell suƌelǇ Ǉou should͛ǀe leaƌŶt that ǁheŶ Ǉou tƌaiŶed 
to ďe a jouƌŶalist… “o Ǉeah, I thiŶk the ǁaǇ that loĐal jouƌŶalists kiŶd of ƌepoƌt has 
defiŶitelǇ ĐhaŶged.͟ ;PI.ϭϲͿ 
 
Self-service model 
EaƌlǇ iŶ the fieldǁoƌk, PI.ϵ ƌaised the ĐoŶĐept of ǁhat she ƌefeƌƌed to as the ͚self-seƌǀiĐe͛ 
model of managing enquiries from the press. This model repositioned police communications 
teams as the publishers of police news rather than simply being the source, continuing the 
trend of self-publication through newsletters identified by Mawby (2002) and others (e.g 
Bradford, 2012).. Under this model, the communications team would publish information and 
press releases first on their website and social media sites; thereby redirecting the bulk of 
ŵedia eŶƋuiƌies to ǁhat ǁould esseŶtiallǇ ďe a ͞self-seƌǀiĐe aƌea͟ ǁheƌe jouƌŶalists Đould 
make use of police information without needing to contact the press office directly.  
 
The interviewees were first asked whether they were aware of this model, what they thought 
of the idea (Fig 3.51) and whether this was something their team had already adopted or was 
currently considering (Fig 3.52).  All but four interviewees were aware to some extent of the 
self-service model; the two Chief Constables and the PCC were three of the four who were not 
aware – the fourth being PI.19A, who admitted she had very few dealings with the media side 
of her team.   
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Over two thirds of the communications staff (71%) approved of the concept. The remaining 
five interviewees (16%) liked the concept but felt it would not work in their teams due to the 
high level of media activity and demand; it is important to note that all five of these 
interviewees were working for rural forces where they had seen a growth in their local media.   
͞We ĐouldŶ't ŵoǀe to the tiŵe kiŶd of ǁeď fiƌsts, ďƌeakiŶg Ŷeǁs ouƌselǀes, it just 
ǁouldŶ't ǁoƌk heƌe.͟ ;PI.ϭϭͿ 
 
This is in keeping with the explanation suggested by PI.26 who thought that it was the 
reduction of local journalists and constraints the remaining ones found on their time that had 
encouraged and allowed police forces to start providing a less personal and more mechanistic 
service to the media. 
͞Most jouƌŶalists no longer have time to go out and find stories on their own now, so 
theǇ ďasiĐallǇ ƌeguƌgitate aŶd ƌeǁƌite pƌess stateŵeŶts͟. ;PI.ϮϲͿ 
 
The final question asked interviewees whether this was a model they had either adopted 
already or were considering. Eight (32%) teams interviewed had changed to the self-service 
system. Almost half of the forces were considering it (48%) and of the remaining five who said 
in their previous answers that it was not yet viable in their areas, four expressed hope that 
they would be able to change the system in the future. For some, like PI.8 and PI.17, the 
benefits of this model were clear cut.  
͞if Ǉou go ďaĐk fiǀe, siǆ Ǉeaƌs, a lot of poliĐe foƌĐes ǁould ǁƌite a pƌess ƌelease, theǇ 
would issue it to an email distribution list of media. We don't issue anything to the 
ŵedia, eǀeƌǇthiŶg that ǁe put out oŶ the puďliĐ doŵaiŶ goes oŶ ouƌ ǁeďsite… ďut 
we're putting out public information now, so we can tell the public what we're saying, 
as opposed to relying on the media to interpret that. So our website and social media 
haǀe pƌoǀed a ŵassiǀe oppoƌtuŶitǇ foƌ us to tell the puďliĐ thiŶgs iŶ ouƌ ǀoiĐe͟. 
(PI.17) 
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Fig 3.51 
 
 
Fig 3.52 
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A similar reason was given by PI.2, who was trying to steer his department and reluctant senior 
management team towards this model: 
͞We'ƌe tƌǇiŶg to keep up ǁith the deŵaŶd, ďut it͛s a stƌuggle aŶd likelǇ to ďe ŵoƌe so 
if there are further budget cuts. Self-service press releases would save us time and 
mean that the investigating officer can just add the relevant details to a template 
which they then put on the website rather than contacting the comms departments 
and giving us the information which we then have to write up and put in a press 
release that we've probably already confirmed verbally to five journalists by the time 
ǁe get ƌouŶd to puďlishiŶg it.͟ ;PI.ϮͿ 
 
For PI.4, however, the self-service model also raised a significant concern from a journalistic 
poiŶt of ǀieǁ as it eŶĐouƌaged ǁhat PI.ϰ desĐƌiďed as the uŶĐƌitiĐal, ͞spooŶ fed͟ Ŷatuƌe of 
modern crime journalists.  
͞Noǁ, jouƌŶalistiĐallǇ I ǁould alŵost ƋuestioŶ that aŶd saǇ ǁell aĐtuallǇ, theǇ 
shouldŶ͛t alǁaǇs take eǀeƌǇthiŶg ǁe saǇ foƌ gƌaŶted, ďeĐause theǇ should ƋuestioŶ it. 
I mean I know we do a professional job and I know we do it as well as we possibly 
can, but is that short changing their public? Their readers? By always accepting what 
ǁe do?͟ ;PI.ϰͿ 
 
Watchdog function 
It has long been thought that the news media act as a watchdog for police forces; alerting the 
public to mistakes, scandals oƌ iŶĐideŶts of ͚poliĐe spiŶ͛, suĐh as duƌiŶg the ƌeĐeŶt Hillsďoƌough 
Inquiry (Conn, 2016), and thus help hold police forces to account. When asked whether they 
thought journalists were still able to perform a watchdog function for police forces in light of 
these ĐhaŶges, ŶiŶe iŶteƌǀieǁees ;Ϯϵ%Ϳ thought  ͚Ǉes͛, the Ŷeǁs ŵedia aƌe still peƌfoƌŵiŶg this 
function while an almost equal number (26%) disagreed. Five interviewees (15%) thought that 
the press were still, to an extent, able to provide a watchdog function while eight (26%) opted 
not to answer the question and one interviewee (3%) replied that they did not know (Fig 3.53).   
 
Yes 
There was a distinct relationship between those interviewees who answered yes to this 
question and those who said earlier that they thought either the number of journalists had 
increased or stayed the same. PI.10 is a prime example of this, her force were still prioritising 
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individual media services, rather than moving towards a more self-service model, as they had 
seen an increase in the number of local journalists over recent years. For PI.10, social media 
had allowed local journalists to increase and improve their ability to criticise and hold the 
police to account.  
͞ǀeƌǇ ĐƌitiĐal… aŶd ǁhat͛s ƌeallǇ loǀelǇ Ŷoǁ is that theǇ are not only critical in the 
papeƌ theǇ aƌe also ĐƌitiĐal oŶ soĐial ŵedia so… Ǉou get a douďle hit fƌaŶklǇ aŶd 
online because they have all the papers online, so yeah, they definitely still do the 
watchdog function and, as I say, they are not shy at puttiŶg thiŶgs up oŶ Tǁitteƌ… if 
theǇ feel theǇ aƌe Ŷot gettiŶg a good seƌǀiĐe as ǁell… aŶd aĐtuallǇ that ĐhaŶges the 
ƌelatioŶship a little ďit as ǁell͟. ;PI.ϭϬͿ 
 
Fig 3.53 
 
It is also of note that over two thirds of the interviewees who thought that local journalism had 
increased or stayed the same worked in rural forces. Interviewees from metropolitan and 
urban forces were much more likely to say that they had seen a decrease in local journalism. 
For example, PI.4 is the head of communications in a large urban based force. One of the 
topics he continually returned to during the interview was how the police-media relationship 
had changed over the last decade particularly since 2010 with the rapid decline of daily 
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newspapers and dedicated crime reporters. Despite this reduction and the move in his force to 
a self-service model of dealing with the press, PI.4 thought that the media were still able to 
hold his force to account.  
͞OŶe of the editoƌs… had a ŵeetiŶg ǁith ŵe aŶd the Chief CoŶstaďle, just a ƌegulaƌ 
meeting and he said to both of us, I accept our job is never to break the news about 
poliĐe stuff aŶǇŵoƌe. He said I kŶoǁ Ǉou͛ƌe goiŶg to do that… I kŶoǁ ouƌ joď… is to 
aŶalǇse aŶd ƋuestioŶ aŶd ĐheĐk the ǁoƌk of the poliĐe aŶd I said Ǉeah I thiŶk that͛s 
right. BeĐause… theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot goŶŶa get sĐoops aďout the poliĐe. TheǇ͛ƌe Ŷot goŶŶa 
fiŶd out fiƌst Đoz ǁe͛ƌe goiŶg to puďlish it fiƌst, ďut theǇ͛ƌe ƌight to theŶ saǇ, is this 
ƌight? To ƋuestioŶ it, Đoz ǁe should ďe ƋuestioŶed, ǁe should ďe ĐheĐked.͟  ;PI.ϰͿ 
 
No 
Not all interviewees agreed with the above assessment, however. PI.11, for example, was 
ǀoĐifeƌous iŶ his ĐoŵplaiŶts aďout the ŵedia. His foƌĐe had, like PI.ϭϬ͛s, seeŶ aŶ iŶĐƌease iŶ the 
number of local journalists. Unlike PI.10, however, PI.11 felt that the media had long ago 
ceased to be an effective watchdog, which he agreed police forces need, and had instead 
ďeĐoŵe lazǇ ͞feƌŵeŶteƌs of pƌoďleŵs͟.  
͞I thiŶk theƌe's ďad jouƌŶalisŵ aŶd I thiŶk theƌe's good jouƌŶalisŵ aŶd theƌe's a lot of 
lazy journalism these daǇs uŶfoƌtuŶatelǇ ďeĐause … ƌesouƌĐiŶg is ďeiŶg ƌeduĐed so 
much that good investigative journalism is much thinner on the ground than when I 
staƌted.͟  ;PI.ϭϭͿ 
 
A similar theme was captured by PI.8 and PI.18 who both agreed that the reason why the press 
had ceased to be a watchdog was because of this move to the self-service model. Like PI.11, 
PI.8 and PI.18 thought that journalists relying increasingly upon regurgitating police press 
releases in order to generate news content had led to a lazy brand of journalism where 
journalists would rarely question or challenge the official police account.  
͞foƌ the oŶes ǁe haǀe a ƌelatioŶship ǁith, Ŷot so ŵuĐh, ďut the oŶes that ǁe doŶ't 
have a relationship with, then yeah, very often they'll just print what we give. Very 
rarely do they come back with questions or a challenge. The two main newspapers 
that ǁe haǀe, theǇ do… AŶd ǁe doŶ't haǀe ŵasses of iŶteƌaĐtioŶs ǁith ŶatioŶals 
anymore. We used to have quite a bit. It's only on the odd story whereas now a lot of 
it goes thƌough FOI.͟  ;PI.ϴͿ 
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͞I just ƌeŵeŵďeƌ soŵe people ǁho used to ďe soƌt of old sĐhool I soƌt of suppose iŶ 
the past who would dig up some fairly interesting stories and sometimes not very 
positiǀe foƌ the foƌĐe...  I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ if that͛s ďeĐause of Leǀeson or they are just a 
diffeƌeŶt ďƌeed Ŷoǁ ďut theǇ aƌe ǀeƌǇ ƌeliaŶt oŶ ǁhat Đoŵes out of the ĐeŶtƌe Ŷoǁ.͟ 
(PI.18) 
 
For PI.15, PI.21, PI.23 and PI.27, however, the more important question was not whether 
newspapers were still able to provide a watchdog function for the police, but whether they 
had ever provided this service in the first place. PI.23 summarised this perfectly with her point 
that ͞ĐƌitiĐisŵ isŶ͛t ŶeĐessaƌilǇ the saŵe thiŶg as ďeiŶg a ǁatĐhdog͟. A siŵilaƌ poiŶt ǁas ŵade 
by PI.15 who felt that by calling the press a watchdog there was an assumption that journalists 
and news reporters were a benevolent force acting for the disinterested good of the public. 
PI.ϭϱ͛s ĐoŶĐeƌŶ, hoǁeǀeƌ ǁas that this ǀieǁ oǀeƌlooks the faĐt that Ŷeǁspapeƌs aŶd jouƌŶalists 
are very often agenda and consumption driven; in which case, should they be viewed as a 
watchdog.  
͞I thiŶk that ĐeƌtaiŶ Ŷeǁspapeƌs haǀe ĐeƌtaiŶ ageŶdas… I thiŶk the issue pƌoďaďlǇ is 
that at the eŶd of the daǇ I doŶ͛t ďelieǀe that the ŵedia ŶeĐessaƌilǇ works for the 
good of the ĐouŶtƌǇ, it ǁoƌks foƌ the good of its oǁŶ doesŶ͛t it iŶ that theǇ ǁaŶt to ďe 
seen to be the first and exclusive or they want to be seen to be being bold and brave 
iŶ ďƌeakiŶg Ŷeǁs aŶd I͛ŵ Ŷot suƌe that that Đoŵes ǁith a lot of sense of responsibility 
to ƌealise ǁhat the iŵpaĐt of that ŵight ďe.͟ ;PI.ϭϱͿ 
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3.2.7 Audience 
The interviewees were asked three questions regarding audience: 
1) Who did the interviewee think was their audience? 
2) Did their department use targeted communications? 
3) How effective or successful did the interviewee think their team is at communicating 
with these audiences?  
 
Who is the Audience? 
Answers to this question again varied considerably (Fig 3.54); with several interviewees 
expressing confusion over how to talk about the topic and four  stating that they did not know: 
͞I thiŶk the easiest aŶsǁeƌ is at the ŵoŵeŶt ǁe doŶ͛t kŶoǁ eŶough to stipulate ǁho 
our audiences are.  Broadly speaking, everyone is potentially a stakeholder at some 
point, you know, while they liǀe ǁithiŶ the aƌea͟. ;PI.ϮϮͿ 
 
Just uŶdeƌ half ;ϰϴ%Ϳ said that theiƌ audieŶĐe ǁas ͞eǀeƌǇoŶe͟ ;PI.ϭͿ; soŵe iŶteƌǀieǁees like 
PI.Ϯϰ Ƌualified that stateŵeŶt ďǇ saǇiŶg that theǇ ŵeaŶt ͞aŶǇoŶe ǁho Ŷeeded to ĐoŶtaĐt the 
poliĐe foƌ aŶǇ ƌeasoŶ͟ ǁhile otheƌs like PI.6 differentiated between audiences and clients:  
͞Ouƌ audieŶĐes? Theƌe͛s a diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ audieŶĐes aŶd ĐlieŶts. “o I ǁould saǇ 
our audiences are the public. Just the general public of [our area] and I think we have 
client relationships with everyoŶe iŶteƌŶallǇ aŶd the ŵedia… as opposed to aŶ 
audieŶĐe. I ǁould saǇ audieŶĐes aƌe the puďliĐ ǁe seƌǀe. That͛s got to ďe ouƌ ŵaiŶ 
audieŶĐe.͟ ;PI.ϲͿ 
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Fig 3.54 
 
Only four interviewees expressly identified the media as one of their principal audiences (PI.3, 
PI.4, PI.2 and PI.27) and even then most often as secondary to the general public and internal 
communications. The reason for this was best summarised by PI.3 who explained that his 
stƌategǇ ǁas to ͞ŵoǀe the diƌeĐtioŶ aǁaǇ fƌoŵ jouƌŶalists aŶd to ĐitizeŶs, ouƌ puďliĐ͟.  
 
PI.4 suggested that the press had become only one avenue instead of the only one and so their 
attention had to be divided now between these different channels and opportunities. 
According to PI.4 there are three main audiences, the general public, the press and what he 
ƌefeƌƌed to as the ͚thiƌd ǁaǇ͛.  
͞“o fiƌstlǇ ǁe haǀe the geŶeƌal puďliĐ, theŶ ŵeŵďeƌs of the pƌess – those people 
ǁoƌkiŶg iŶ jouƌŶalisŵ. TheŶ theƌe͛s the thiƌd ǁaǇ [blogs]- which is for people who 
aƌeŶ͛t Ƌuite the puďliĐ aŶd aƌeŶ͛t Ƌuite Ƌualified jouƌŶalists, ďut haǀe ŵassiǀe 
folloǁiŶgs... AŶd of Đouƌse ŵostlǇ people aƌe uŶtƌaiŶed so theǇ͛ƌe aŵateuƌs at it, so 
theǇ'ƌe Ŷot as ǁell ǁƌitteŶ. TheǇ͛ǀe ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ Ŷot got aŶǇ jouƌŶalistiĐ ƋualifiĐatioŶs. 
TheǇ ǁouldŶ͛t kŶoǁ a lie if it came and bit them. But they know if it comes from us, it 
giǀes theŵ the liteƌal legal pƌiǀilege to puďlish that iŶfoƌŵatioŶ, theǇ kŶoǁ theǇ͛ƌe 
pƌoteĐted ďǇ us.͟ ;PI.ϰͿ 
 
Other interviewees, however, thought that audience depended very much on the message. For 
eǆaŵple, PI.ϮϱA thought that ͞it depeŶds ĐoŵpletelǇ oŶ ǁhat ǁe'ƌe talkiŶg aďout͟. A siŵilaƌ 
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opinion was expressed by PI.11 who used cybercrime to illustrate his point about the 
importance of understanding target audiences:   
͞We haǀe ǀeƌǇ, ǀeƌǇ liŵited defined audiences.  So in the case of cybercrime who is 
your audience?  Everyone in county?  Well no, it's not.  The audience is going to be 
probably anyone that actually engages online, so if they're not using the internet, 
they're not going to be at risk of cybercrime.  And let's be more specific your risk 
gƌoup is ǀeƌǇ diffeƌeŶt foƌ poteŶtial oŶliŶe ǀiĐtiŵs of seǆual eǆploitatioŶ aŶd that͛s 
going to be a very big difference to those at risk of financial exploitation versus those 
at risk of identity fraud.͟ ;PI.ϭϭͿ 
 
The difficulty communicating with audiences who do not wish to engage with the police was a 
recurrent theme across all the interviews. Opinion was split between PI.20B, who argued for 
the need to try everything to reach alienated/disinterested audiences through careful 
taƌgetiŶg, aŶd PI.Ϯϭ͛s ƋuestioŶ of ǁhetheƌ it ǁas a seŶsiďle use of liŵited ƌesouƌĐes to tƌǇ aŶd 
connect with people who do not wish to talk to the police: 
͞It͛s ǀeƌǇ ŵuĐh people aƌe piĐkǇ aŶd theǇ deĐide this is the ŵethod of 
coŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ I ǁaŶt aŶd that͛s kiŶd of ǁhat theǇ stiĐk ǁith, so ǁe tƌǇ ouƌ ďest to 
offeƌ diffeƌeŶt kiŶds of ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͟. ;PI.ϮϬBͿ 
 
͞The ǀast ŵajoƌitǇ of tiŵe people doŶ͛t aĐtuallǇ ǁaŶt ĐoŶtaĐt fƌoŵ the poliĐe.  “o 
that͛s a haƌd sell fƌoŵ a ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ peƌspeĐtiǀe, isŶ͛t it, if Ǉou͛ƌe tƌǇiŶg to get a 
message out... No matter how many communication campaigns we do to stop people 
leaǀiŶg thiŶgs iŶ Đaƌs, theǇ eitheƌ doŶ͛t uŶdeƌstaŶd it [oƌ] doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to ƌead it 
ďeĐause it͛ll Ŷeǀeƌ happeŶ to ŵe͟. ;PI.ϮϭͿ  
 
Targeted Communications 
Interviewees were asked if their departments differentiate between audiences depending on 
the message and target them using specific channels (see Fig 3.55). Over half of the 
interviewees (61%) thought that their departments did use some form of targeting to 
communicate with specific audiences while seven (19%) said that targeting was not really used 
(PI.3, PI.7, PI.16), used infrequently (PI.9, PI.21) or used in a haphazard fashion (PI.26). Five 
interviewees said that their departments did not use targeting at all (PI.2, PI.11, PI.20A, PI.20B, 
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PI.28) although both PI.11 and PI.20B said that this was something they wished to change in 
the next year.  
 
 
Fig 3.55 
 
There is also variation in how different teams are targeting audiences. Some, like PI.6 and 
PI.12, target by community, geographic location, age and gender; while other departments, 
like PI.16 and PI.22, are only using geographic targeting. 
͞Theƌe͛ll ďe ĐeƌtaiŶ Đƌiŵes that affeĐt ĐeƌtaiŶ ĐoŵŵuŶities aŶd theŶ ouƌ Đoŵŵs is 
targeted. It might be different languages; it might be where we send information, 
which publications we use, where we might send out officers to deliver leaflets. So 
ǁe defiŶitelǇ taƌget the diffeƌeŶt audieŶĐes aŶd ĐoŵŵuŶities ǁheŶ ǁe Ŷeed to͟ 
(PI.6). 
 
͞IŶ general targeting is only done by geographic location, so targeting a town for a 
ǁitŶess appeal ǁheƌe soŵeoŶe ǁas huƌt/ǁeŶt ŵissiŶg. But if it͛s just like a geŶeƌal 
ŵessage eaĐh daǇ theŶ ǁe͛ƌe Ŷot thiŶkiŶg ƌight ǁell this ŵessage has to ďe ƌeleǀaŶt 
for a speĐifiĐ audieŶĐe gƌoup͟. ;PI.ϭϲͿ  
 
When asked to explain the rationale behind targeting communications to specific audiences, 
PI.8 explained: 
͞ǁhǇ ǁould ǁe ďlaŶket eǀeƌǇďodǇ aďout soŵethiŶg that aĐtuallǇ is oŶlǇ goiŶg to hit a 
sŵall peƌĐeŶtage of the ĐitǇ?͟  
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This theme was expanded upon by PI.21 who raised the point that audiences want to be 
communicated with in different ways depending upon the message, the sender and the 
ƌeĐipieŶt. PI.Ϯϭ͛s ĐeŶtƌal ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ǁas that Ŷot taƌgetiŶg ŵessages Đƌeated ǁhite Ŷoise, or spam 
effect, which was lessening the impact of the messages.  
 
How Effective is the Team at Reaching These Audiences? 
The final question interviewees were asked was to estimate how effective or successful they 
thought their team was at communicating with their audience (Fig 3.56). Answers ranged from 
͚VeƌǇ Good͛ ;ϭϵ%Ϳ to ͚Pooƌ͛ ;ϭϯ%Ϳ, ǁith tǁo iŶteƌǀieǁees ;ϲ%Ϳ ƌeplǇiŶg that theǇ did Ŷot kŶoǁ 
and only one participant refusing to comment. Just under half (42%) thought that their 
departments were either ͚VeƌǇ Good͛ oƌ ͚Good͛ at ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatiŶg aŶd eŶgagiŶg ǁith theiƌ 
audieŶĐes ǁhile eleǀeŶ ;ϯϱ%Ϳ Đlassed theiƌ effoƌts as ͚Faiƌ͛ oƌ ͚ModeƌatelǇ͛ suĐĐessful. The 
majority of interviewees (71%), however, reported that they thought their departments 
needed, or had room, to improve when it came to how they communicated with sections of 
the public; this included several departments like PI.10s who rated their success/effectiveness 
as ͚Good͛: 
͞I doŶ͛t thiŶk ǁe ƌeaĐh eǀeƌǇďodǇ as suĐĐessfullǇ as ǁe should do… aŶd I think we are 
gettiŶg a lot ďetteƌ at taƌgetiŶg theŵ ďut I still doŶ͛t thiŶk ǁe do eǀeƌǇthiŶg that 
peƌhaps ǁe should do͟. ;PI.ϭϬͿ 
 
For PI.27 one of the central problems facing police forces was in getting the level of targeting 
right. As PI.27 explained, in his opinion what communications needs is a two pronged 
approach in order to be more effective in reaching specific audiences; which was something 
his team were currently exploring, but until they found the right balance effective 
communication would always be difficult. 
͞“o Ǉou Ŷeed that soƌt of douďle laǇeƌ of ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ stƌategies. KeǇ oŶe is 
probably always going to be a geographical one, but you need another layer which is 
ďased oŶ ethŶiĐitǇ oƌ diffeƌeŶt tǇpes of ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ.͟ ;PI.ϮϳͿ 
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Fig 3.56 
 
PI.28 felt that there was a lot of confusion in her team, and across policing in general, about 
how to communicate in a reassuring way that reduced fear of crime: 
͞I ŵeaŶ ǁe͛ƌe telliŶg people theǇ should feel ƌeassuƌed, ďut aĐtuallǇ aƌe theǇ 
reassured by being given information or do they have to be told and the R word used, 
Ǉou ĐaŶ ďe ƌeassuƌed.͟ ;PI.ϮϴͿ   
 
This theme was raised by several of the other interviewees as well (PI.7, PI.10, PI.11, PI.15, 
PI.17, PI.21, PI.23) who were concerned that campaigns, awareness appeals, and even 
stateŵeŶts ŵeaŶt to ďe ƌeassuƌiŶg Đould uŶiŶteŶtioŶallǇ iŶĐƌease feaƌ of Đƌiŵe ďǇ ͞ŵakiŶg it 
more visible, more immediate and seem more frequent than they might have been previously 
aǁaƌe͟ ;PI.ϳͿ.  
 
How to engage audiences and create an impact was also a recurrent theme (3.2.8) that many 
interviewees kept returning to during their interviews. As PI.24 pointed out: 
͞“o ǁhǇ aƌeŶ͛t ǁe ĐhattiŶg? WhǇ aƌeŶ͛t ǁe doiŶg ŵoƌe of this? Theƌe͛s  alǁaǇs ďeeŶ 
ĐoŵŵuŶities ǁe ĐaŶ͛t ƌeaĐh. We͛ǀe alǁaǇs struggled to reach communities; whether 
theǇ͛ƌe itiŶeƌaŶt aŶd tƌaǀelliŶg ĐoŵŵuŶities, ǁhetheƌ theǇ͛ƌe people that doŶ͛t ǁaŶt 
to ƌeaĐh us… “o the thiŶg is, theƌe Đoŵes a push ďaĐk, ǁhat aďout the people that 
doŶ͛t get it? Theƌe ǁill alǁaǇs ďe people ǁho doŶ͛t get it.͟ ;PI.ϮϰͿ 
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Similarly, PI.9 commented that: 
͞ModeƌatelǇ suĐĐessful, I ǁould saǇ. I thiŶk ǁe do pƌettǇ ǁell ĐaptuƌiŶg soƌt of ŵid-
twenties probably and then older because even the people not captured through 
digital media are captured in traditional media but I would say it's our younger 
generation that are the hardest to capture. That's a mixture of them being apathetic-
safe or 'Why would I have any interest in the police force?' because they are not 
hoŵe oǁŶeƌs, theǇ doŶ͛t see theŵselǀes as haǀiŶg many assets, so there is no risk in 
it foƌ theŵ. “o ǁhǇ ǁould theǇ ǁaŶt oƌ haǀe aŶ iŶteƌest iŶ the poliĐe?͟ ;PI.ϵͿ 
 
PI.ϵ͛s poiŶt ǁas ƌefleĐted iŶ a ƌeŵaƌk ŵade ďǇ PI.Ϯ that oŶe of his gƌeatest ĐhalleŶges ǁas iŶ 
knowing whether anything they were doing was actually making an impact: 
͞We get the ŵessage out ďut ǁhetheƌ aŶǇoŶe is aͿ iŶteƌested, ďͿ aĐtuallǇ paǇiŶg 
atteŶtioŶ oƌ ĐͿ goiŶg to do aŶǇthiŶg ǁith it, ǁe doŶ't kŶoǁ.͟ ;PI.ϮͿ 
 
PI.21, however, felt that the effectiveness/success at reaching audiences depended entirely on 
whether or not that audience wished to engage with them rather than how they, the police, 
were communicating: 
͞I thiŶk uŶless that peƌsoŶ ǁaŶts ĐoŶtaĐt ǁith the poliĐe, ǁhǇ aƌe ǁe eŶfoƌĐiŶg 
ouƌselǀes oŶ theŵ?  “o that ǁe ĐaŶ saǇ ǁe͛ǀe eŶgaged with that hard to reach 
ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ, ǁhetheƌ theǇ ǁaŶted to ďe eŶgaged ǁith oƌ Ŷot.  It͛s like… iŵagiŶe if the 
pharmaceutical society said we want to be more inclusive in our communities as a 
phaƌŵaĐist.  UŶless I Ŷeed a phaƌŵaĐist, I doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to go and engage with the 
phaƌŵaĐist͟. ;PI.ϮϭͿ 
 
The general trend that emerged from the interviews, however, was that the introduction of 
soĐial ŵedia has had a positiǀe iŵpaĐt upoŶ poliĐe foƌĐe͛s aďilitǇ to ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate aŶd eŶgage 
with different audiences (3.2.5); particularly with 20 – 40 year olds. Although young people, 
oldeƌ geŶeƌatioŶs, ŵiŶoƌitǇ aŶd ǁhat PI.ϮϮ ƌefeƌƌed to as ͞fƌiŶge gƌoups͟ ƌeŵaiŶ a ĐhalleŶge. 
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3.2.8   Measuring Effectiveness and Success 
Interviewees were asked to explain the methods their team employ for measuring the 
success/effectiveness of their strategies and activities using both news/traditional media and 
social media channels.  
 
News/Traditional Media 
Just over half of those interviewed (52%) had a formal strategy in place to evaluate the success 
of campaigns/activities that involved the traditional communication channel of the news 
media. The activities included campaigns, appeals and good news stories. There were two 
main methods identified by the interviewees for assessing the success of these initiatives; 
measuring output and assessing outcomes
25
. All of the teams who said that they had a formal 
strategy had moved away from output to outcome based measures for traditional media. 
Outcome based measures were again divided into two groups; those which measured an 
increase/decrease in reporting/information (28%) and those that did an impact assessment 
comparing the campaign/appeal against the intended outcomes (24%).  Of the remaining 12 
teams, three opted not to answer the question and nine said that they did not have a formal 
evaluation strategy at the time of the interview (Fig 3.57).  
 
Fig 3.57 
                                           
25
 Output foĐus͛ oŶ the Ŷuŵďeƌ of aĐtiǀities ǁheƌeas outĐoŵe is lookiŶg at ďehaǀiouƌal ĐhaŶge 
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Social Media 
With regard to social media there was an increase (76%) in the number of forces who had 
metrics in place to assess the success of their activities and initiatives (see HMIC, 2014). This 
increase is most likely due to the widely available, if basic, free online assessment tools that 
are available through the social media sites themselves.  For assessing social media four basic 
methods were identified during the interviews (Fig 3.58, 3.59).  
 
Fig 3.58    Evaluation Typologies 
Output Based Interaction Based Outcome Based 
Reach / Retweets Interaction / 
Engagements 
Increase in Reporting 
Impact / Behavioural Change 
 
The most commonly used assessment metric (36%) was based around measuring reach, 
retweets and reposts. Five forces (20%) did not measure reach but instead assessed the impact 
of the campaign/appeal in terms of whether there had been a corresponding change in 
behaviour of the audience it was directed at while three forces (12%) measured 
interaction/engagement on their sites to determine the reaction of the users to their posts.  
 
Fig 3.59 
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Assessing the Effectiveness of the Evaluation Metrics 
The interviewees were next asked how effective or useful they thought their assessment 
measures were (Fig 3.60). Nearly two thirds (61%) replied that in their opinion their current 
ŵeaŶs of eǀaluatiŶg theiƌ teaŵ͛s aĐtiǀities ǁeƌe iŶadeƋuate, pƌiŶĐipallǇ ǁith ƌegaƌd to soĐial 
media; while a fuƌtheƌ thƌee ;ϭϬ%Ϳ stated that theǇ thought eǀaluatioŶ stƌategies ͞ƌeduŶdaŶt 
aŶd poiŶtless͟ ;PI.ϳͿ. IŶ ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ oŶlǇ thƌee ;ϭϬ%Ϳ ƌeplied that theƌe ǁeƌe satisfied ǁith 
their assessment methods. With regard to the three interviewees who deemed their methods 
͚adeƋuate͛ PI.ϭϵA used iŵpaĐt ďased ŵeasuƌeŵeŶts, PI.ϵ used output ǁhile PI.ϭϮ used a 
combination of all output, interaction and impact. 
 
Fig 3.60 
 
Dissatisfaction around measuring effectiveness was a prevalent theme. There was a general 
feeling across the interviewees that evaluation was a difficulty faced by most police 
communications teams, and was not something unique or that only a few struggled with.  
͞The oŶe aƌea that all poliĐe foƌĐes stƌuggle ǁith is aƌouŶd eǀaluatioŶ aŶd ŵaƌketiŶg 
campaigns.͟ ;PI.ϯͿ 
 
"That͛s oŶe aƌea ǁheƌe I thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe ďad aŶd I thiŶk ŵost Đoŵŵs teaŵs aƌe ďad.͟ 
(PI.6)  
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It is indicative of a wider systemic issues around effectiveness that this view was not just held 
by the 19 (61%) who classed their strategies as inadequate but across the group as a whole; 
even by those who thought their strategies were sufficient. For example, PI.12 was concerned 
ďǇ ǁhat he saǁ as the ͞eŶdeŵiĐ͟ diffiĐultǇ poliĐe foƌĐes had ǁith desigŶiŶg aŶd iŵpleŵeŶtiŶg 
suitable assessment measures. There was a Đleaƌ diǀide iŶ PI.ϭϮ͛s aŶalǇsis of this situatioŶ 
between how he viewed his team and how he perceived evaluative methods in other forces; 
particularly with regard to social media, which was his specialty.  
͞the ǁhole thiŶg aďout digital is Ǉou ĐaŶ eǀaluate it too much. The trick is to work 
out what you want to evaluate when you're starting to plan. What are you trying to 
geŶeƌate? WhǇ aƌe Ǉou doiŶg it? What's Ǉouƌ oďjeĐtiǀe?͟ ;PI.ϭϮͿ 
 
Problems with evaluation can be divided into five broad categories: measurement, analysis, 
cultural antipathy, time and apathy.  
 
Measurement 
Confusion around how or what to measure was one of the two most commonly cited 
difficulties interviewees were finding with evaluation (35%). According to PI.2 and PI.26 the 
fundamental question facing communication teams was what does effectiveness look like and 
once identified, how do you measure it. 
͞Paƌt of the pƌoďleŵ is that ǁe just doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ǁhat effeĐtiǀe looks like iŶ soĐial 
media. With the press it was easier, but with social ŵedia ǁe͛ƌe tƌǇiŶg to do so ŵaŶǇ 
diffeƌeŶt thiŶgs at the saŵe tiŵe…͟ ;PI.ϮͿ 
 
͞suĐĐess is a tƌiĐkǇ ĐoŶĐept to ŵeasuƌe. Is it ƌeaĐh? The Ŷuŵďeƌ of folloǁeƌs? The 
Number of retweets/reposts? Likes? Comments? - I don't know! The traditional 
methods of assessiŶg suĐĐess aƌeŶ't Ǉet suitaďle foƌ usiŶg oŶ soĐial ŵedia͟. ;PI.ϮϲͿ 
 
How interviewees judged their success appeared to be based upon the metric they used. 
Output based was generally considered easier to assess, particularly as both Facebook and 
Twitter provide in-site tools for this sort of analysis. Where problems arose was in determining 
interaction and outcome based assessments.  
202 
 
͞It͛s ƌeallǇ haƌd, Ǉou'll see ǁe put soŵe ŵeasuƌes iŶ theƌe. “oŵe aƌeas, the ĐhalleŶge 
is measuring the outcomes and not the activity and policing is very good at 
ŵeasuƌiŶg aĐtiǀitǇ aŶd Ŷot so good at ŵeasuƌiŶg outĐoŵes.͟ ;PI.ϮϳͿ 
 
The interview data shows that there is a division in how assessment strategies were perceived; 
with those who used interaction or outcome based metrics vocally dismissive of what PI.8 
ƌefeƌƌed to as ͞ǀaŶitǇ stats͟: 
"We've started to move away from what I call the vanity stats. So we're not 
measuring how many followers we've got. We're measuring the engagement that 
we're having and actually making what we're doing on those channels more 
ŵeaŶiŶgful… Just ďeĐause soŵethiŶg appeaƌs iŶ a papeƌ, it doesŶ't ŵeaŶ Ǉou ƌead it. 
So because something appears in your Facebook feed, it doesn't mean you read it. If 
you like it, you comment on it. If you put it as a favourite it suggests that you've done 
soŵe soƌt of iŶteƌaĐtioŶ ǁith it aŶd ǁe ǁould Đlass that as aŶ eŶgageŵeŶt͟. ;PI.ϴͿ 
 
This difficulty is further complicated by the problem identified by PI.21 and PI.27 of knowing 
what it is that you are actually measuring.  
͞UŶless Ǉou ĐaŶ pƌoǀe the thiŶg Ǉou͛ƌe ŵeasuƌiŶg has had aŶ iŵpaĐt, theŶ it doesŶ͛t 
hold aŶǇ suďstaŶĐe.  You ĐaŶ͛t eǀaluate the ďeŶefits of soĐial ŵedia uŶless Ǉou Đƌeate 
a sterile environment and you can attribute that behaviour to doing that social media, 
aŶd I doŶ͛t thiŶk ǁe ĐaŶ iŶ ŵost ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes͟. ;PI.ϮϭͿ 
 
"Trying to separate out the impacts of that from other changes to legislation, alcohol 
liŵits aŶd all that is alǁaǇs ǀeƌǇ ǀeƌǇ haƌd͟. ;PI.ϮϳͿ 
 
There is also the further complication, as PI.10 pointed out, that in communications much of 
their success is in either deterring potential offenders or in preventing an issue from arising; 
the question then becomes how can you accurately measure or assess an absence?.  
͞I thiŶk it͛s ƌeallǇ haƌd to saǇ aĐtually because a lot of your bigger successes are things 
that doŶ͛t happeŶ…͟  
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Analysis 
Seven interviewees (23%) identified analysis as a significant problem. As PI.4 explained – 
having identified your methods and what you want to assess and having collected the data, 
how do you make sense of it? 
͞I suppose it͛s the iŵpossiďle thiŶg, ǁhiĐh is the hoǁ ǁe eǀaluate the suĐĐess of 
soĐial ŵedia iŶ poliĐiŶg. That͛s ŵǇ ďig issue. I ĐaŶ shoǁ Ǉou the Ŷuŵďeƌs… I ĐaŶ giǀe 
Ǉou eǆaŵples of suĐĐess… Noǁ ouƌ tƌouďle is, is how do you evaluate? How do you 
saǇ, ǁe aƌe ƌeaĐhiŶg these people?͟ ;PI.ϰͿ 
 
Culture of Antipathy 
“eǀeƌal iŶteƌǀieǁees ;ϮϬ%Ϳ eǆpƌessed fƌustƌatioŶ at ǁhat PI.Ϯϭ ƌefeƌƌed to as ͞the Đultuƌal 
ƌoadďloĐks͟ ǁhiĐh had led to heƌ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs depaƌtŵeŶt tƌaditionally ignoring 
evaluation. PI.11 reported a similar problem where because of the disinterest shown in 
communications by the senior management team in his force, communications had suffered 
both in terms of resourcing and in the cultural attitude towards it which had led to the 
department being marginalised. PI.11 explained that this culture in the wide force had infected 
the internal culture of his team and the level of expectation that both his team and officers 
had with regard to what comms does and can achieve.  
͞theƌe's a lot of that iŶ [heƌe] ǁheƌe, eǀeŶ people iŶ ŵǇ teaŵ, theǇ'll ďe paƌt of a 
project team and success for them is doing what they're asked, creating a post that 
they were asked for, writing a leaflet they were asked for, not what are you trying to 
aĐhieǀe, hoǁ aƌe ǁe goiŶg to get theƌe, ǁhat do Ǉou ǁaŶt to do?͟ ;PI.ϭϭͿ 
 
Time and Resources 
One of the essential aspects of evaluation is the time and resources that are necessary in order 
to do it. For 11 (35%) interviewees this was a significant problem. As PI.6 explained, in order to 
evaluate how successful/effective their efforts are communications teams require the time, 
money and manpower to do the evaluation. However, as almost all communications teams 
have seen significant reductions recently in both their budget and in their staff 
communications teams rarely have the resources or ability to do a full evaluation.  
͞eǀaluatioŶ is soŵethiŶg ǁe ƌeallǇ Ŷeed to do that ŵoƌe aŶd I thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe kiŶd of 
struggling with that at the moment just because of sheer numbers of people that we 
doŶ͛t haǀe.͟ ;PI.ϭϴͿ 
204 
 
One alternative PI.6 had started exploring was outsourcing the evaluation to a specialist.   
͞The last ĐaŵpaigŶ ǁe did... ǁe paid to haǀe a pƌopeƌ eǀaluatioŶ doŶe ďǇ aŶ 
evaluation company. And I thiŶk ǁe͛ll ďe doiŶg ŵoƌe of that ŵoǀiŶg foƌǁaƌds ǁith 
thiŶgs like that. BeĐause otheƌǁise, it͛s kiŶd of like, Ǉou doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ǁhetheƌ it͛s doŶe 
ǁhat it Ŷeeds to do. AŶd geŶeƌallǇ Đoŵŵs teaŵs doŶ͛t haǀe the ƌesouƌĐes oƌ the 
abilities as such to do much evaluatioŶ theŵselǀes͟. ;PI.ϲͿ 
 
Apathy 
CoŶŶeĐted to the ͚Đultuƌe of aŶtipathǇ͛ desĐƌiďed aďoǀe, three interviewees (10%) said that 
they thought evaluation was not particularly important for police communications. There 
difference here was that unlike those in previous group these interviewees agreed with the 
cultural indifference to evaluation. For PI.26 it was a question of prioritisation and recognising 
that extensive evaluation would have an impact on the operational capacity of her team. PI.14 
and PI.23, howeǀeƌ, felt that ͚taƌget ĐhasiŶg͛ iŶ the poliĐe distƌaĐted atteŶtioŶ aŶd ƌesouƌĐes 
from the victims and service users who should be their primary concern; particularly as success 
in communications is very often subjective rather than objective: 
͞ultiŵatelǇ in policing it [success] is a very personal, subjective thing, which means 
we can't properly, and shouldn't, put a measurement on it as this inevitably draws 
atteŶtioŶ aǁaǇ fƌoŵ the ǀiĐtiŵ ǁho should ďe the fiƌst aŶd oŶlǇ ĐoŶĐeƌŶ… The thiŶg 
is, communications can't be target driven - it ends up destroying, or at least 
iŵpediŶg, ǁhat Ǉou aƌe tƌǇiŶg to do͟. ;PI.ϭϰͿ 
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3.2.9   Areas that need Improvement 
 
The interviewees were asked to identify aspects of their team or strategies which they felt 
needed improvement. In total 15 interconnected categories were identified (Fig 3.61); ranging 
fƌoŵ ͚soĐial ŵedia͛ as the ŵost ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ Đited ;ϰϱ%Ϳ aƌea ŶeediŶg iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt, to oŶe 
iŶteƌǀieǁee ƌeplǇiŶg ͞pƌettǇ ŵuĐh eǀeƌǇthiŶg͟ ;PI.ϭϭͿ.   
 
 
Fig 3.61 
 
The following areas were the top ten areas requiring improvement identified.  
 
Social Media 
Nearly half of the interviewees (45%) felt that social media was an area that needed to be 
improved – particularly with regard to keeping up with changes in the channels and the tone 
and content of posts.  
͞“o I thiŶk ǁe did ǀeƌǇ good at the staƌt to get to this stage ďut ǁheŶ ǁe look at 
soŵe of the otheƌ foƌĐes theǇ͛ƌe ƌeallǇ flǇiŶg ǁith it [soĐial ŵedia] aŶd I thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe 
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maybe a little bit behind now, but that will hopefully change when we get the tools in 
plaĐe.͟ ;PI.ϭϵAͿ 
 
YouTube 
All but four of the forces interviewed had a YouTube channel. While YouTube, as a social 
media site, should have been included in the above category in 11 of the interviews a 
distinction was made by the interviewee between improving their social media presence on 
Twitter and Facebook and YouTube.  
 
The general consensus regarding YouTube was that it is currently underused and seldom used 
effectively by most police forces.  While there was some evidence of intelligent and integrated 
use of YouTube as an integral part of the wider communications strategy in four forces (PI.4, 
PI.ϲ, PI.ϭϮ, PI.ϮϯͿ, foƌ the ŵost paƌt YouTuďe ǁas ĐoŶsideƌed a ͞ǀideo duŵpiŶg gƌouŶd͟ 
;PI.ϮϲͿ, aŶd fƌeƋueŶtlǇ aŶ ͞afteƌ thought͟ ǁheŶ it came to designing and implementing 
campaigns (PI.7). For PI.17, one of the problems with using YouTube was the change in style it 
Ŷoǁ ƌeƋuiƌed ǁhiĐh had ŵoǀed fƌoŵ the ͞foƌŵal, Đoƌpoƌate ǀideos aŶd stuff. It's Ŷot Ŷoǁ, Ǉou 
need to be able to take quick, little, shoƌt sŶap shots͟. 
 
Websites 
Police websites were another area that seven interviewees (22%) were concerned about. In all 
ďut oŶe of the teaŵs, the ǁeďsite ǁas ĐoŶsideƌed as the esseŶtial ͞ďase foƌ eǀeƌǇthiŶg͟ 
;PI.ϭϵBͿ, a ͞ĐeŶtƌal huď of aĐtiǀitǇ aŶd iŶfoƌŵatioŶ͟ that soĐial ŵedia should diƌeĐt people 
toǁaƌds ;PI.ϰͿ. ϭϭ teaŵs desĐƌiďed theiƌ ǁeďsites as ͞iŶadeƋuate to ŵeet ĐuƌƌeŶt Ŷeeds͟ 
(PI.27); with the seven who identified this problem actually in the process of redesigning the 
website (See Appendix 3.10). The remaining four teams were dissatisfied but thought that the 
website was not a significant issue for them at present.  
 
Problems with antiquated technology were again highlighted here by five (16%) interviewees; 
PI.28 summarised this dilemma - ͞the ǁeďsite should ďe a oŶe stop shop ďut ǁe͛ƌe ǁoƌkiŶg 
ǁith aŶ aŶtiƋue ĐoŶteŶt ŵaŶageŵeŶt sǇsteŵ, I ŵeaŶ it͛s aǁful͟. MoŶeǇ ǁas also aŶ issue 
cited by some with PI.27 lamenting that: 
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͞I doŶ't thiŶk ǁe'ǀe got a ǀeƌǇ good ǁeďsite at the ŵoŵeŶt. It's pooƌly designed, 
doesn't get a massive amount of traffic and certainly since I've been here I've not 
iŶǀested a lot of tiŵe iŶ iŵpƌoǀiŶg it ďeĐause it's ǀeƌǇ eǆpeŶsiǀe to do so͟. ;PI.ϮϳͿ 
 
Evaluation 
How to evaluate the effectiveness or success of strategies and campaigns is something of an 
historic issue for police forces (3.2.8). While this was a problem identified by 19 interviewees, 
only seven included it on their lists of areas needing improvement.  
 
Engagement 
See 3.2.7 
 
Effective Campaigns 
Three interviewees reported problems with designing effective campaigns. For PI.6 and PI.18 
this was due to limited resources.  
͞ǁe just doŶ͛t haǀe eŶough ƌesouƌĐe at the ŵoŵeŶt foĐussiŶg oŶ the Đƌeatiǀe 
ĐoŶteŶt side of the ďusiŶess.͟ ;PI.ϲͿ 
 
PI.16, however, thought the problem around designing campaigns was far more widespread 
than communications professionals often liked to admit. For PI.16 the central issue was that in 
her opinion most police forces were confusing crime awareness campaigns with prevention 
campaigns.  
͞when lots of communications departments are designing campaigns they are 
foĐussiŶg oŶ a ŵiǆtuƌe of aǁaƌeŶess ƌaisiŶg aŶd ďehaǀiouƌ ĐhaŶge aŶd theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot 
foĐussiŶg ĐleaƌlǇ eŶough oŶ ǁhetheƌ theǇ ǁaŶt oŶe oƌ the otheƌ… ďeĐause 
awareness raising is a completely different type of communication to actually making 
soŵeďodǇ ĐhaŶge the ǁaǇ that theǇ ďehaǀe aŶd thiŶgs that͛ll ŵotiǀate people to 
ĐhaŶge theiƌ ďehaǀiouƌ ǀaƌǇ depeŶdiŶg oŶ ǁhat that ďehaǀiouƌ is… lots of foƌĐes 
aƌeŶ͛t ƌeallǇ doiŶg this.͟ ;PI.ϭϲͿ 
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Internal Communications 
The absence of effective internal communications was another problem felt strongly by some 
interviewees (19%). This was particularly interesting as internal communications was identified 
by 17 (55%) as one of the most important aspects of modern police communications. A 
common theme was that interviewees felt that the importance of internal communications 
was dismissed by the senior management as unnecessary (PI.16) or taken away in order to 
resource something else (PI.3).  
͞What is ƌeallǇ iŶteƌestiŶg is that iŶteƌŶal ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs used to ďe… alŵost ŶoŶ-
eǆisteŶt… “o I pƌoduĐed this ƌeǀieǁ saǇiŶg theǇ Ŷeeded that aŶd ŵǇ liŶe ŵaŶageƌ at 
the tiŵe, the DeputǇ CoŶstaďle… said to ŵe poliĐe offiĐeƌs doŶ͛t Ŷeed iŶteƌŶal 
communications they do what theǇ͛ƌe told.͟ ;PI.ϭϲͿ 
 
͞We ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ haǀe Ŷo iŶteƌŶal Đoŵŵs fuŶĐtioŶ ďeĐause the ǀieǁ ǁas takeŶ that it 
ŵade seŶse to Đƌeate a ďig ĐaŵpaigŶs teaŵ…  aŶd Ŷot haǀe aŶ iŶteƌŶal Đoŵŵs 
fuŶĐtioŶ.͟ ;PI.ϯͿ 
 
Collaboration and Resource Sharing 
See 3.2.13. 
 
Policy and Guidance 
Three interviewees (10%) felt that there was a lack of coherent guidance available to police 
forces regarding what was expected of communications and what strategies were working. 
Guidance around social and digital media was felt to be particularly lacking.  
͞theƌe is soŵe guidaŶĐe oŶ it ƌatheƌ thaŶ aĐtual poliĐǇ ďut it͛s so loose ƌeallǇ that Ǉou 
can just do whatever you want really.  The impact area is if it comes under the area of 
you could make it fit pretty much anything.  I just think that everybody should be 
ǁoƌkiŶg to soŵe faiƌlǇ fiǆed ƌules.͟ ;PI.ϭϴͿ 
 
This was particularly frustrating for PI.22 who spent a considerable amount of time talking 
about the savings, both in terms of time and resources, that communications teams could be 
making if there were standardised procedures, campaign templates and website templates 
available from one of the oversight bodies; such as the College of Policing or Home Office.  
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͞This is a ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ that happeŶs a lot at the ŵoŵeŶt, iŶ aŶ age of ŵassiǀe Đuts 
aŶd austeƌitǇ… Ǉou ǁould thiŶk Ŷoǁ ǁould ďe the tiŵe to saǇ heƌe͛s Ǉouƌ liteƌatuƌe, 
ďeĐause ďuƌglaƌǇ͛s ďuƌglaƌǇ, doesŶ͛t ŵatteƌ ǁhat foƌĐe Ǉou͛ƌe iŶ, Đaƌ Đƌiŵe is Đaƌ 
Đƌiŵe, heƌe͛s Ǉouƌ liteƌatuƌe, stiĐk Ǉouƌ Đƌest oŶ theƌe, go aǁaǇ aŶd use it.  Heƌe aƌe 
your website templates, we need you to tackle these areas, these are the core issues, 
so siŵplǇ dƌoppiŶg Ǉouƌ pƌioƌities aŶd that ǁaǇ ǁe kŶoǁ that eǀeƌǇoŶe͛s ǁeďsite 
meets with whatever the Home Office require us to meet... and there are some 
forces across the country that are spending thousands on various different forms of 
public engagement and consultancy in order to try and establish what people want 
fƌoŵ oŶliŶe ĐhaŶŶels.͟ ;PI.ϮϮͿ 
 
Changing the Communications Strategy 
See 3.2.4 
 
Listening to Audiences 
PI.28 suggested that one of the main reasons why police forces were struggling with changing 
theiƌ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs stƌategǇ fƌoŵ ͚Push͛ to ŵoƌe dialogue aŶd iŶteƌaĐtioŶ ďased ŵodels ǁas 
because of the historic problems police forces have with listening to their audiences.  
͞I doŶ͛t thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe ǀeƌǇ good at listeŶiŶg soŵetiŵes [pause] I thiŶk it Đoŵes oŶ the 
ďaĐk of telliŶg, ǁe͛ƌe good at telliŶg, ǁe͛ƌe Ŷot so good at listeŶiŶg.͟ ;PI.ϮϴͿ 
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3.2.10   Threats  
Interviewees were asked what threats they believed were currently facing their teams. In total 
fourteen threats were identified (Fig 3.62). 
 
 
Fig 3.62 
 
 The most commonly agreed upon threat was the danger that budget cuts posed to the 
efficient and effective running of police communications teams (74%). This was a significant 
concern and was frequently referenced by some interviewees with regard to other questions. 
As PI.18 explained, inadequate funding is the nexus point from which other threats and 
problems arise: 
͞I thiŶk ŵoŶeǇ is the pƌiŵaƌǇ thƌeat ďeĐause money is dwindling and will continue to 
do so for the foreseeable future. So I think that is the one threat and everything else 
comes after that because from that we could see our team reducing or almost 
disappeaƌiŶg altogetheƌ ƌeallǇ.͟ ;PI.ϭϴͿ 
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Demand was another frequently raised threat; with interviewees concerned about how they 
would manage increased demand with smaller teams. For PI.10, the main threat facing 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ teaŵs ǁas the teaŵ͛s iŶaďilitǇ to ŵeet puďliĐ deŵaŶd foƌ seƌǀiĐes ǁith heƌ 
current resources: 
͞I͛ǀe had to ƌeduĐe iŶ otheƌ aƌeas aŶd I just doŶ͛t haǀe the people to ďe aďle to 
pƌoǀide the seƌǀiĐe that people ǁaŶt, so I thiŶk that is oŶe of the ďiggest thƌeats͟. 
(PI.10) 
 
The pressure identified by PI.10, however, was only part of the problem with demand. As PI.7 
explained, budgetary constraints and the growing popularity of social media meant that police 
officers, and particularly senior officers, were expecting more and more from the 
communications department in terms of the services they can deliver and the audience they 
can reach. According to PI.7, such expectations created a high level of pressure and 
dissatisfaction with the results and outcomes often achieved by these departments. Similar 
concerns were raised by PI.8, PI.11 and PI.28 who felt that often more was expected of their 
departments then they were able to realistically deliver.  
͞The ďudget is ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ gettiŶg sŵalleƌ aŶd as people/poliĐe offiĐeƌs get ŵoƌe used 
to new technology they expect more from it for less. Over the last few years, I've 
noticed that there is a lot more pressure being put on the function of corporate 
communications in policing – police officers are learning and developing new 
expectations for what they want out of communications and we're struggling to keep 
up͟. ;PI.ϳͿ 
 
For PI.11, the increasing disparity between available resources and demand for services meant 
that engagement and confidence levels would sooner or later decrease.  
͞ǁe'ǀe goŶe fƌoŵ haǀiŶg had Ϯϳ people doiŶg Đoƌp Đoŵŵs iŶ ϮϬϬϵ to having 10 now 
so … Ǉeah I'ǀe doŶe the ĐoƌƌelatioŶs, the dƌop iŶ ĐoŶfideŶĐe leǀels totallǇ Đoƌƌelates 
the laĐk of iŶǀestŵeŶt iŶ the gaps iŶ Đoƌp Đoŵŵs aŶd eŶgageŵeŶt aĐtiǀitǇ.͟ ;PI.ϭϭͿ 
A similar point was raised by PI.12 and PI.14 who both raised concerns over how their teams 
would cope with increased demand and meeting the changing needs of growing, often diverse, 
audiences.  
͞It's a huge aŵouŶt of ǁoƌk aŶd this is the ĐhalleŶge Ŷoǁ faĐiŶg poliĐiŶg aŶd ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ 
a challenge for us, how do we cope with the demand, 24/7. People are beginning to 
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report incidents and calls for assistance though social media and how does the force 
ƌespoŶd to that. Hoǁ ĐaŶ ǁe ŵake suƌe ǁe piĐk theŵ up iŶ a tiŵelǇ fashioŶ?͟ ;PI.ϭϮͿ 
 
PI.14, was particularly keen to emphasise what he considered one of the fundamental 
dilemmas facing police forces; that the more you engage, the more resources you need in 
order to sustain and respond to it. Police forces looking to optimise communications and 
engagement through social media are, therefore, taking on a resource intensive channel that is 
only going to need more investment, not less.    
͞the ŵoƌe Ǉou eŶgage ǁith people the ŵoƌe theǇ eǆpeĐt aŶd ǁaŶt out of the seƌǀiĐe 
- requiring more resources in order to deal with expectation management. Social 
ŵedia is Ŷot ͚the easǇ optioŶ͛ Ŷot ǁheŶ it Đoŵes to loŶg teƌŵ ŵaŶageŵeŶt͟. ;PI.ϭϰͿ 
 
PI.ϭϰ ďelieǀed that soĐial ŵedia is ǀieǁed ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ as a ͞ŵagiĐ ďullet solutioŶ͟; a palliatiǀe 
answer to the need to improve public engagement while simultaneously reducing budgets. The 
difficulty, as PI.8 explained, is that while there has been a culture shift which has seen social 
ŵedia ŵoǀe fƌoŵ ͞ŶiĐe to haǀe͟ to ͞aŶ esseŶtial͟; ǁhat has Ŷot Ǉet Đaught up is the 
oƌgaŶisatioŶ͛s aďilitǇ to ͞deliǀeƌ agaiŶst that eǆpeĐtatioŶ͟. “oĐial ŵedia Đƌeates deŵaŶd foƌ 
services which with restricted resources are difficult to meet.  
 
For PI.23 and PI.25A, however, increased demand was also a potential threat because of the 
impact on staff morale and wellbeing: 
͞the ďottoŵ liŶe is people aƌe oǀeƌ ǁoƌked, people feel the ƌeal pƌessuƌe͟. ;PI.ϮϯͿ 
 
"And we're all extremely busy and it's not just the comms that are busy. Every police 
officer, every staff member have got extra work on. We're all too busy." (PI.25A) 
 
Budget and working environment were also linked by several (7) interviewees to what they 
described as the high turnover in communications staff.  
͞ǁe doŶ͛t haǀe the ŵoŶeǇ, so people leaǀe ǁheŶ theǇ get a ďetteƌ offeƌ͟. ;PI.ϮϴͿ  
 
This loss of trained police communication professionals was a growing concern with some 
interviewees. High turnover was blamed for the loss of expert knowledge, increased likelihood 
of mistakes (PI.23) and contributed to the intra-departmental difficulty with collaboration as 
the informal sharing network that had previously existed was eroded (PI.2, PI.25A).   
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͞I thiŶk a lot of the tiŵe theǇ aƌe ĐoŶĐeƌŶed aďout loss of skills ďeĐause of the 
ƌeduĐed ďudgets…͟ ;PI.ϮϯͿ 
 
͞ďut I do fiŶd it a lot haƌdeƌ thaŶ ǁhat it used to ďe ďeĐause people doŶ͛t haǀe the 
time to share information as much, I used to know all the actual names of the Web 
MaŶageƌs iŶ diffeƌeŶt FoƌĐes ǁheƌeas Ŷoǁ I͛ǀe just lost it.͟ ;PI.ϮϱAͿ 
 
Other less commonly mentioned threats included: Lack of appropriate guidance from the 
College of Policing or Home Office regarding universal aspects like website templates, 
communication policies and best practice (19%).   
͞theƌe isŶ͛t oŶe ǁeďsite teŵplate foƌ the foƌĐes, oŶe set of ŵaƌketiŶg ŵateƌial, ďut 
theƌe͛s also Ŷot oŶe set of ďest pƌaĐtiĐe foƌ soĐial ŵedia.͟ ;PI.ϮϮͿ 
 
“iǆ iŶteƌǀieǁees ;ϭϵ%Ϳ ǁeƌe ĐoŶĐeƌŶed aďout theiƌ depaƌtŵeŶt͛s aďilitǇ to ŵaŶage the Ŷeeds 
of diverse audiences: 
͞EǆteƌŶallǇ, it's a huge ĐhalleŶge foƌ us to seƌǀiĐe the diffeƌeŶt ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts of ouƌ 
deŵogƌaphiĐs͟. ;PI.ϵͿ 
 
Four interviewees (13%) thought that one of the threats they faced was not being listened to 
when it comes to senior management making decisions about the communications 
department: 
͞MǇ oŶlǇ ǁoƌƌǇ is  ǁe tell theŵ this soƌt of stuff ǁe told Ǉou… aŶd theǇ͛ƌe like, Ŷo 
ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg this, shut it doǁŶ aŶd theǇ eŶd up iŶ a pƌoďleŵ ďeĐause theǇ haǀeŶ͛t 
ƌeallǇ listeŶed to the people ǁho aƌe aĐtuallǇ doiŶg it.͟ ;PI.ϭϵBͿ 
 
19% said that not being able to keep up with the fast moving developments and innovations in 
technology was a threat to poliĐe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to PI.ϭ ͞poliĐiŶg ĐaŶŶot affoƌd to 
ďe a diŶosauƌ͟, ďut that ǁas eǆaĐtlǇ ǁhat theǇ ǁeƌe iŶ daŶgeƌ of ďeĐoŵiŶg ǁith out of date IT 
systems and a reactive rather than proactive mentality. A further difficulty, PI.9 explained, that 
her team kept struggling with was how to keep pace with technological and social 
developments when it comes to social media. PI.9 was concerned that police forces would fail 
to keep their online audience due to lack of planning and remaining on sites when the 
audience had moved on to something new.  
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͞just keepiŶg paĐe… pƌeseŶts ĐhalleŶges opeƌatioŶallǇ foƌ poliĐiŶg ďut also foƌ us 
from a communications perspective actually, which channels we should be investing 
time and effort in versus those that ǁe doŶ͛t. Do ǁe keep it siŵple aŶd deǀelop 
certain channels massively and not worry about some of the other emerging ones but 
aĐtuallǇ theŶ ǁe Đould get left ďehiŶd the Đuƌǀe͟. ;PI.ϵͿ 
One example PI.9 gave of this dilemma was Facebook. Experts started suggesting in 2013 that 
FaĐeďook ǁould ďe a ͞dead site͟ ǁithiŶ a feǁ Ǉeaƌs. IŶstead of this oĐĐuƌƌiŶg as pƌediĐted, 
Facebook has continued to grow and is now their most promising tool for engagement.   
 
13% of interviewees thought that citizen journalism and ͞spot light ƌepoƌteƌs͟ posed a thƌeat. 
As PI.7 explained, one of the growing problems was the lack of legal knowledge around what 
can and cannot be posted regarding people and events.  
͞CitizeŶ jouƌŶalisŵ is ŵoƌe aŶ iŶĐoŶǀeŶieŶĐe thaŶ a pƌoďleŵ – the usual policy is to 
igŶoƌe it uŶless ǁe ĐaŶ͛t. BǇ ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ, hoǁeǀeƌ, the Ŷeǁ geŶeƌatioŶ of Đƌiŵe 
journalists are a big problem for [us]. With the death of the dedicated crime reporter 
ǁe͛ǀe seeŶ a ƌise of spotlightiŶg ƌepoƌteƌs – journalists who do a bit of this, a bit of 
that and a bit of crime on the side. The problem is with this approach is that these 
ƌepoƌteƌs ƌeallǇ doŶ͛t uŶdeƌstaŶd the ƌepoƌtiŶg ƌules iŶ plaĐe – especially since 
Leveson – and so report things wrongly, libellously, slanderously or on occasion 
illegallǇ͟. ;PI.ϳͿ 
 
The above concerns about budget and meeting the increasing demand for services raises the 
ƋuestioŶ: is theƌe a ͚ĐƌitiĐal ŵass͛ ǁheŶ it Đoŵes to depaƌtŵeŶt size; aŶd ďeloǁ ǁhiĐh a 
communications department significantly loses effectiveness? Given the current economic 
situation it also raises the question of whether police communication departments are, as PI.6 
and PI.25B believes, nearing the tipping point.  
 
The final threat identified by 16% is Police Crime Commissioners taking control of police 
communications: 
͞I guess a Đouple of thƌeats aƌe oďǀiouslǇ, soŵe haǀe got issues ǁith the poliĐe aŶd 
crime commissioners who have stolen some of the corporate communications 
teaŵs.͟ ;PI.ϲͿ 
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Although only 16% of the interviewees classed this as a ͚thƌeat͛, ĐoŶĐeƌŶ aďout this 
development was raised later by over half of the interviewees (58%) (see 3.2.10).  
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3.2.11 Police Crime Commissioners 
Following the data collected in 3.1.4 regarding who had operational oversight/control of police 
communications, interviewees were asked who had oversight in their force (Fig 3.63). Five 
;ϮϬ%Ϳ of the ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs teaŵs ǁeƌe eitheƌ paƌt of the PCC͛s poƌtfolio ;ϯͿ oƌ, iŶ the Đase 
of PI.ϭϴ aŶd PI.Ϯϴ, had ďeeŶ ǁith the PCC͛s offiĐe ďut had ƌeĐeŶtlǇ ŵoǀed ďack to the Chief 
Constable. The remaining twenty teams (80%) remained under the control of the Chief 
Constable.  
 
 
  Fig 3.63 
 
Interviewees were then asked what they thought of PCCs taking over control/oversight of 
police communication teams. As Fig 3.64 shows, reactions were mixed between those who 
supported the change and those who, to varying degrees, did not. 
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Fig 3.64 
 
For 
Four interviewees (13%) thought the situation was working well. It is important to note, 
however, that three of these four interviewees (PI.13, PI.18 and PI.28) were in the teams 
controlled by the PCC and the fourth (PI.9) felt that there was a high degree of overlap 
between police and PCC communication requirements: 
͞A lot of ouƌ ǁoƌk is stƌuĐtuƌed aƌouŶd – our proactive campaign work is structured 
around the PCC priorities but if I am honest, I'm quite comfortable with that because 
theƌe aƌe the thiŶgs that puďliĐ haǀe set theiƌ pƌioƌities ǁhat's keǇ to theŵ… “o, it 
ŵakes seŶse that ǁe adopt theŵ fƌoŵ a ĐaŵpaigŶ peƌspeĐtiǀe.͟ ;PI.ϵͿ 
 
A slightly different view was expressed by PI.18 who explained that while he had found little 
difference during his tenure under his PCC, he was concerned about possible problems come 
election time for the PCCs:  
͞[A]s it tuƌŶed out ǁith the daǇ to daǇ it didŶ͛t seeŵ to ŵake a lot of diffeƌeŶĐe at the 
time because we were still primarily doing things for the force. So I think the focus of 
all the work we were doing was all around delivery of the police and crime plan. Of 
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Đouƌse  the PCC͛s plaŶ is aĐtuallǇ the work the force should be doing anyway, so we 
didŶ͛t ƌeallǇ get ŵaƌƌed iŶ aŶǇ of the politiĐs of thiŶgs; that ŵight ďe diffeƌeŶt ǁheŶ it 
comes to the next PCC election because politics will come into play a bit then; but 
then they have their own comms lead Ŷoǁ.͟ 
 
PI.13 was by far the most definite in his support of joint communication teams for PCC and the 
police. Like others, PI.13 said he had initial concerns about the practicalities, but had found the 
situation worked in his force as the people involved wanted to make the situation work.  
͞I ǁas ďit ǁaƌǇ aďout it at fiƌst as to ǁhetheƌ it ǁould ǁoƌk… like I said at the staƌt it͛s 
all doǁŶ to iŶdiǀiduals iŶ the eŶd. AŶd if Ǉou ĐaŶ get oŶ ǁith the people that Ǉou͛ƌe 
dealiŶg ǁith theŶ Ǉou͛ƌe fiŶe ďut if theƌe͛s aŶǇ aǁkǁaƌdŶess oƌ theǇ͛ƌe doiŶg thiŶgs 
off the Đuff ǁithout ĐoŶsultiŶg Ǉou theŶ oƌ telliŶg Ǉou ǁhat͛s goiŶg oŶ theŶ it Đould 
ďe iŶĐƌediďlǇ aǁkǁaƌd. I kŶoǁ that happeŶs iŶ otheƌ plaĐes ďut as faƌ as I͛ŵ 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶed heƌe it͛s ǁoƌkiŶg aŶd ǁoƌkiŶg ǀeƌǇ ǁell…͟ ;PI.ϭϯͿ 
 
PI.28, on the other hand agreed that while the situation worked in her force and could work in 
others, she believed that this was largely down to their PCC being an Independent rather than 
affiliated with a specific political party.  
͞Yeah, it ǁoƌks, I ŵeaŶ, Ǉou kŶoǁ, ǁe͛ƌe pƌofessioŶals, Ǉou kŶoǁ, I ǁoƌk foƌ the 
Commissioner, the Commissioner has an agenda of what she needs to achieve 
during the year of what her responsibilities are, what she has to deliver on, so I will 
work to that agenda. But it ǁoƌks ďeĐause she͛s aŶ IŶdepeŶdeŶt. I͛ŵ Ŷot suƌe hoǁ it 
ǁould ǁoƌk if she ǁasŶ͛t.͟ ;PI.ϮϴͿ 
 
Neutral 
Five interviewees (16%) were neutral when asked for their opinion. In four cases, the 
interviewee was obviously uncomfortable with the question and refused to be drawn into 
giving a more in-depth answer. In the final instance (PI.1), he explained that his answer was 
evasive because he felt that he lacked the knowledge to comment on the situation.  It is 
important to note here that while these answers were all quite non-committal, all 
interviewees in this group stated their belief that PCC control of police communication would 
not work in their force.  
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͞It seeŵs to ǁoƌk iŶ soŵe foƌĐes. It's uŶlikelǇ to happeŶ heƌe as [the PCC] is keeŶ to 
keep his office separate from the police force. I think it needs to stay separate 
otheƌǁise hoǁ ĐaŶ the PCC hold poliĐiŶg to aĐĐouŶt aŶd eŶsuƌe tƌaŶspaƌeŶĐǇ?͟ ;PI.ϮͿ 
 
While PI.11 initially gave a neutral response he later returned to this topic to explain that he 
thought that PCC͛s had takeŶ ĐoŶtƌol of poliĐe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs depaƌtŵeŶts ďeĐause theǇ had 
ŵisuŶdeƌstood the ƌole of these depaƌtŵeŶts aŶd saǁ theŵ as a ͞politiĐal pƌess offiĐe͟; ǁhiĐh 
also aĐĐouŶts foƌ ǁhǇ seǀeƌal of the PCC͛s haǀe Ŷoǁ ƌetuƌŶed the depaƌtŵeŶt to the Chief 
CoŶstaďle͛s poƌtfolio.  
͞[the PCC heƌe] pƌesuŵed that the Chief CoŶstaďle ŵust haǀe like a pƌiǀate offiĐe 
managing their profile and managing their perception.  And when they came into 
being he said okay, we accept we can't have all corporate communications functions 
but can we have the part of it that delivers and drives the chief officer's personal 
pƌofiles, ǁell, ǁe doŶ't haǀe a fuŶĐtioŶ that does that.͟ ;PI.ϭϭͿ  
  
Against 
The ŵajoƌitǇ ;ϱϴ%Ϳ, hoǁeǀeƌ, ƌeplied that theǇ ǁeƌe eitheƌ ͞ǀeƌǇ agaiŶst͟26 (6) or thought the 
situation was a bad idea as it was untenable in the long run (12). Opposition to PCC control of 
police communications fell broadly into two distinct groups;  
1) Those who felt that police communications was part of operational policing and, 
therefore, not something the PCC should be involved in (PI.3, PI.4, PI.5, PI. 6, PI.8, 
PI.19A, PI.19B, PI.24, PI.25A, PI.25B and PI.26).   
2) Those who felt it compromised openness, transparency and encouraged politicisation 
of the police (PI.10, PI.12, PI.14, PI.15, PI.16, PI.17, PI.21, PI.22, PI.23). 
 
Operational Communications 
Communications has become an increasingly essential component of modern policing with the 
communications department now often viewed as part of operational policing (3.2.2). This 
change in perception has significant implications for PCC control of the department as the PCC 
is not meant to be involved in the operational aspects of the police force. As PI.26, however, 
pointed out: 
                                           
26
 PI.14 
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͞The PCC should haǀe Ŷo ĐoŶtƌol oǀeƌ opeƌational policing but when they take over 
the Đoŵŵs teaŵ it ǀeeƌs daŶgeƌouslǇ iŶto this teƌƌitoƌǇ͟. ;PI.ϮϲͿ 
 
This dilemma over the operational position of the police communications department was a 
frequently cited concern; particularly with regards to PCC control and whether it would, or 
could, lead to the politicisation of the police and what it meant in terms of openness and 
transparency.  
 
Openness, Transparency and Politicisation 
The central concern, however, appeared to be around whether communications professionals 
Đould ďe ͞the seƌǀaŶt of tǁo ŵasteƌs͟ ;PI.ϳͿ ǁithout ĐoŵpƌoŵisiŶg the iŵage of opeŶŶess aŶd 
transparency police forces had been working towards. As PI.12 explained, the PCC was brought 
in to hold the Chief Constable and police force to account; such a situation requires a level of 
distance between the two – distance which is eroded when the Chief Constable and PCC have 
the same voice.  
͞MǇ ǀieǁ is it Ŷeeds to [ďe sepaƌate] ďeĐause the PCCs ǁeƌe alǁaǇs to hold the Chief 
Constable on the force to account. So at times there may be issues where the PCC 
needs to be saying something negative about the police. So how can the police 
comms team be in that position and defend itself, or whatever, and the PCC is about 
strategic direction of the organisation. We'ƌe aďout the opeƌatioŶal deliǀeƌǇ.͟ ;PI.ϭϮͿ 
 
PI.22 expanded upon the idea of there being a conflict of interest by citing a recent example in 
Lincolnshire police where the Chief Constable had been fired by the PCC and there was a 
shared communications department. PI.22 was forceful in expressing his concerns over the 
ethiĐs of the situatioŶ aŶd the ƌetuƌŶ to ǁhat he ĐoŶsideƌed ͚ďad puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs͛ ǁith PCC͛s 
preoccupations with promoting themselves.  
͞Huge, huge ĐoŶfliĐt of iŶteƌest… CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs ǁas a huge bugbear, because it 
didŶ͛t take a geŶius to figuƌe out that theǇ ǁaŶted a ĐeƌtaiŶ aŵouŶt of ĐoŶtƌol of 
what went out, so they could be seen to be delivering on their manifestos and they 
could be seen to be meeting the needs of the public. We argued right from the word 
go that there would be a huge, huge impact on the level of trust between the police 
and the press, the PCC and the press.  There would be this massive conflict of 
iŶteƌest, ďeĐause it ǁasŶ͛t ďǇ aŶǇ ŵeaŶs uŶthiŶkaďle to ďe iŶ a situation where the 
PCC is ĐalliŶg the Chief to aĐĐouŶt, ďut ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg ďoth sets of Đoŵŵs foƌ it. “o 
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ǁe͛ƌe defeŶdiŶg the Chief, ďut ǁe͛ƌe also doiŶg the PCC stuff aŶd as if ďǇ ŵagiĐ LiŶĐs 
Police then went through that process where, you know, the PCC fired the Acting 
Chief Constable at the time and it just acted as the demonstration that we needed.  
“o hoǁ ǁould Ǉou deal ǁith that if Ǉou ǁeƌe oŶe Đoŵŵs offiĐe? BeĐause ethiĐallǇ it͛s 
all ǁƌoŶg…͟ ;PI.ϮϮͿ  
 
PI.23 was the most vociferously opposed to the idea of PCC control, stating several times that 
she had threatened to leave her job if the PCC took her department as she felt it would be 
impossible to successfully manage the dual nature of the role without compromising the 
integrity of at least part of the role. PI.23 was also concerned about the problems which would 
come with the PCC election – a concern that was echoed by both PI.18 and PI.21.  
͞I said I ĐouldŶ͛t do it. If theǇ did that heƌe I ǁouldŶ͛t ďe heƌe to do that dual ƌole.  I 
know lots of people that do, do a head of comms for both PCC and the force and I 
haǀe said heƌe Ƌuite opeŶlǇ I ǁould Ŷot ďe heƌe to do it, I ĐouldŶ͛t do it ďeĐause foƌ 
me I always see it as like doing PR for an energy company and for the energy 
ƌegulatoƌ, Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t pƌoǀide that leǀel of advice to both at the same time so no, 
people do the joď, soŵe do the joď pƌettǇ ǁell I͛ŵ Ŷot ĐoŶǀiŶĐed that ǁheŶ thiŶgs 
got haƌd that theǇ Đould still do that aŶd I thiŶk as ǁe head to the eleĐtioŶ it͛s goiŶg 
to get iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ diffiĐult… it͛s sad ƌeally and doomed for me to collapse at some 
poiŶt ďeĐause Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t opeƌate like that…͟ ;PI.ϮϯͿ 
 
These concerns came principally from forces where the department had not moved over to 
the PCC. It is, therefore, interesting that PI.13, whose department was one of those under PCC 
ĐoŶtƌol, felt that these ǁeƌe ultiŵatelǇ ͞ŶoŶ-issues͟ that Đould ďe ŵaŶaged: 
͞Well oŶe thiŶg that PoliĐe aŶd Cƌiŵe CoŵŵissioŶeƌs ĐaŶ͛t do ǁhateǀeƌ theǇ take 
over is deal with operational policing. So generally our news branch for want of a 
better phrase deals with operational policing so however big and bold they are if the 
Cƌiŵe CoŵŵissioŶeƌ Đoŵe iŶ aŶd said ͞I doŶ͛t ǁaŶt Ǉou to aŶsǁeƌ that͟ I ĐaŶ tell hiŵ 
to push off ďeĐause it͛s ŶothiŶg to do ǁith hiŵ.͟ ;PI.ϭϯͿ 
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3.2.12  Public Confidence 
One trend that became apparent very quickly during the early interviews was the connection 
the interviewees believed existed between public confidence and their work as the police 
voice. Interviewees were asked four questions relating to public confidence: 
1) Did the interviewee think that public confidence was still important for the police? 
2) Was public confidence still measured by their force? 
3) Did the iŶteƌǀieǁee thiŶk theƌe ǁas a ͚Đƌisis of ĐoŶfideŶĐe͛ iŶ poliĐiŶg? 
4) What did the interviewee think were the Đauses of this ͚Đƌisis͛?  
 
The results obtained from the interviewees were mixed and showed surprising disparity across 
all four questions considering the homogenous view often taken by the media, politicians and 
academics concerning public confidence (1.3).  
 
Is Confidence Still Important? 
Answers ranged from those who felt that public confidence was still very important as it is 
"one of the fundamental reasons behind our work" (PI.26) to those like PI.22 who said that 
they thought it was: "Yeah, stupid idea, let͛s get ƌid of it".  
 
Just under half (48%) of interviewees felt that confidence in the police was still important 
while 36% answered that they thought it was either no longer an issue for the police or too 
difficult and complicated to accurately measure or influence (Fig 3.65). Seven (23%) said that 
they thought confidence was more a political matter than a policing one.  For PI.1, confidence 
was still important "only because politicians have made it important". This view was reflected 
in the answers given by PI.13, PI.15, PI.17, PI.21, PI.22 and PI.24.  
 
For PI.23, confidence was a complicated issue, but it remained a central issue because her 
force had experienced what happened when certain communities were alienated from the 
police force.   
͞I do thiŶk it͛s a ŵassiǀe faĐtoƌ ďeĐause ǁe͛ǀe liǀed it.  IŶ aƌeas ǁheƌe ǁe͛ǀe had 
pƌoďleŵs ďeĐause people doŶ͛t feel as though theǇ͛ƌe goiŶg to get listeŶed to ŶoďodǇ 
tells us anything because they have no confidence that they will be protected, that 
we will be able to deal with it, that we are taking the issue seriously so you can see 
how that impacts. There are other factors affecting public confidence, absolutely the 
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stuff that ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg heƌe iŶ teƌŵs of ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ is iŵpoƌtaŶt ďut theƌe ǁill ďe 
otheƌ faĐtoƌs that iŵpaĐt oŶ peoples͛ ĐoŶfideŶĐe.͟  
 
 
Fig 3.65 
 
Is CoŶfideŶĐe Still Measured iŶ the IŶterǀieǁee͛s ForĐe? 
AŶsǁeƌs to this ƋuestioŶ ƌaŶged ďetǁeeŶ ͚Yes͛, ǁith just oǀeƌ half of the iŶteƌǀieǁees, to fouƌ 
saying they no longer measured it and eight either declining to answer or unsure of whether 
their force still collected this information or not (Fig 3.66). Several interviewees (PI.4, PI.6, PI.7, 
PI.8, PI.12, PI.15, PI.21, PI.28) used this question as a gateway in order to discuss the problems 
they had with measuring confidence, or using it as a target.  
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Fig 3.66 
 
Eight interviewees (28%) expressed serious misgivings and concerns over what PI.9 described 
as ͞deep ƌooted ŵethodologiĐal pƌoďleŵs͟ ǁith hoǁ ĐoŶfideŶĐe is ŵeasuƌed aŶd uŶdeƌstood . 
As PI.4 explained, one of the significant difficulties facing their current method is firstly, 
knowing what it is that you are measuring and secondly, understanding what the data means.    
͞I thiŶk it͛s ƌeallǇ haƌd ďeĐause it tells Ǉou ǁhat it tells Ǉou. I know that sounds stupid, 
ďut it tells Ǉou if this gƌoup of people, ǁho Ǉou͛ǀe appƌoaĐhed thiŶk this. I thiŶk ǁe 
pƌoďaďlǇ Ŷeed to get a ďit ŵoƌe sophistiĐated iŶ teƌŵs of hoǁ ǁe do it. But I͛ŵ Ŷot 
Ƌuite suƌe ǁhat that sophistiĐated ǁaǇ of doiŶg it is Ǉet.͟ ;PI.4) 
 
PI.9 discussed how she had recently changed the way confidence questions were asked and 
measured in her force as she felt that the old methodology was biasing the results.  A similar 
difficulty was reported by PI.15: 
͞That is a diffiĐult oŶe isŶ͛t it, ďeĐause… aĐtuallǇ phƌasiŶg the ƋuestioŶ iŶ a ǁaǇ that 
doesŶ͛t pƌoŵpt people to a positiǀe oƌ Ŷegatiǀe ƌespoŶse is aĐtuallǇ a sĐieŶĐe.͟ 
(PI.15) 
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For PI.28, however, problems with measurement had a far deeper root, and centred in 
understanding how people are defining and understanding confidence.  
͞You kŶoǁ, ǁhat is ĐoŶfideŶĐe? CoŶfideŶĐe that aŶ offiĐeƌ͛s goiŶg to tuƌŶ up?  
CoŶfideŶĐe that ǁheŶ Ǉou ƌiŶg Ǉou͛ƌe goiŶg to get Ǉouƌ ƋueƌǇ aŶsǁeƌed? If ǁe doŶ͛t 
kŶoǁ, theŶ ǁhat aƌe ǁe ŵeasuƌiŶg?͟ ;PI.ϮϴͿ  
 
PI.8, on the other hand, identified a different problem entirely with the concept of public 
confidence, that there was a question over whether the underlying assumption driving 
confidence as an issue was actually correct: 
͞We ŵeasuƌe it ďeĐause it's oŶe of the measures that we're measured against by the 
Hoŵe OffiĐe…Theƌe ǁas a ďig pieĐe of ǁoƌk doŶe ďǇ Caŵďƌidge UŶiǀeƌsitǇ that ǁas 
ƌeleased this ŵoŶth aƌouŶd aĐtuallǇ does eŶgageŵeŶt affeĐt ĐoŶfideŶĐe… [aŶd it] 
contradicts everything that we've put in place... basically, they conclude that there is 
no correlation between engagement and confidence, which kind of blows our 
ŵeasuƌes of eŶgageŵeŶt ƌight out the ǁateƌ.͟ ;PI.ϴͿ  
 
Over half of the interviewees (58%) suggested that engagement and victim satisfaction were 
more reliable and useful measures for police forces. Some, like PI.7, identified satisfaction as 
being more directly actionable for police forces: 
͞“atisfaĐtioŶ is ŵuĐh easieƌ to ŵeasuƌe aŶd of ŵoƌe use iŶ a pƌaĐtiĐal seŶse - we can 
do something to improve satisfaĐtioŶ; ĐoŶfideŶĐe oŶ the otheƌ haŶd…͟ ;PI.ϳͿ  
 
While others, like PI.20A, focused on using satisfaction as a way of improving trust and 
changing public perception 
͞ViĐtiŵ satisfaĐtioŶ is ƌeallǇ iŵpoƌtaŶt - it's at the heart of the circle of trust; if victims 
have a good experience of the police their friends and families know about it and the 
ĐiƌĐle of tƌust eǆpaŶds oƌgaŶiĐallǇ.͟ ;PI.ϮϬAͿ 
 
Is There a ͚Crisis͛ iŶ CoŶfideŶĐe?  
Again, answers to this question varied greatly and were at times quite contradictory (Fig 3.67). 
ϴϬ% of iŶteƌǀieǁees said that theǇ did Ŷot agƌee ǁith the ǁoƌd ͚Đƌisis͛ eitheƌ ďeĐause theǇ 
thought if there was a crisis then it was not affecting their area (39%), that it was 
manufactured by politicians and the media (13%), or that there was no crisis at all (29%). Only 
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tǁo thought that theƌe ǁas a ͚Đƌisis͛, PI.ϱ aŶd PI.ϮϬA, ďut eǀeŶ theǇ lateƌ Ƌualified theiƌ 
statements as confidence not being considered a particular problem for their force. 
͞theƌe aƌe issues ŶatioŶallǇ at the ŵoŵent as we all know, public confidence is not 
ǁheƌe it should ďe aŶd ǁheƌe it Ŷeeds to ďe, ďut it is pƌettǇ okaǇ heƌe.͟ ;PI.ϱͿ 
 
 
 
Fig 3.67 
 
With regard to those who did not think there was a crisis, the dominant opinion (39%) was 
that if there was then it was not affecting them locally.  
͞I thiŶk ĐoŶfideŶĐe is ƌeallǇ iŶteƌestiŶg ďeĐause I thiŶk the, soƌt of, ŶatioŶal stoƌies 
that ǁe͛ǀe had ƌuŶŶiŶg ƌeĐeŶtlǇ so Ǉou kŶoǁ, Pleďgate aŶd all of the [pause] 
Hillsďoƌough aŶd all of the iŶtegƌitǇ issues… theƌe͛s ďeeŶ a lot of issues recently but if 
you look at the confidence stats and satisfaction stats, actually people are still pretty 
happǇ ǁith theiƌ loĐal poliĐe foƌĐe, so I thiŶk people doŶ͛t thiŶk that this is theiƌ 
poliĐe͟. ;PI.ϭϬͿ  
 
Four interviewees expressed the opiŶioŶ that the ͚Đƌisis iŶ ĐoŶfideŶĐe͛ ǁas ŵoƌe a politiĐal 
invention than a reality:  
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͞Yes and No. Politicians certainly want us to think there is a crisis and maybe there is 
on a national level - but on a local one, in this county confidence has remained 
steadǇ͟. ;PI.ϭͿ 
͞No! No, it's Ŷot tƌue if Ǉou assuŵe that the puďliĐ attitude suƌǀeǇ that ǁe do eǀeƌǇ 
Ƌuaƌteƌ, is aĐĐuƌate… OŶe of ouƌ [seŶioƌ offiĐeƌs] last ǁeek… ŵade this poiŶt that 
journalese and political circles as well have referred to crisis of confidence in policing, 
it's Ŷot ďoƌŶ out ďǇ ǁhat the puďliĐ saǇ͟. ;PI.ϮϳͿ 
 
NiŶe iŶteƌǀieǁees thought theƌe ǁas Ŷo ͚Đƌisis͛; although as PI.ϲ poiŶted out theƌe aƌe aspeĐts 
which need improvement.  
͞I thiŶk ĐoŶfideŶĐe geŶeƌallǇ iŶ the poliĐe is still fairly high. If you look at all the polls, 
etĐ. TheǇ͛ƌe still pƌettǇ good. I doŶ͛t thiŶk that theƌe͛s a geŶeƌal seŶse that theiƌ 
ĐoŶfideŶĐe iŶ the poliĐe is laĐkiŶg… theƌe teŶds Ŷot to ďe a ŵassiǀe ĐoƌƌelatioŶ 
between a big national story about how bad the police are, with then how your local 
people feel aďout Ǉou as a foƌĐe. I thiŶk it͛s a ǀeƌǇ loĐalised thiŶg... But I geŶuiŶelǇ 
doŶ͛t ďelieǀe theƌe is a ŵassiǀe issue ǁith ĐoŶfideŶĐe iŶ the poliĐe iŶ this ĐouŶtƌǇ. I 
think there are pockets that need improving and we still need to do more work with 
our BME communities across the board... And I know a lot of forces are doing work 
oŶ that, ďut it͛s diffiĐult.͟ ;PI.ϲͿ 
 
One of the clearest themes that became apparent, however, was the distinction the 
interviewees felt eǆisted iŶ the ŵiŶds of the geŶeƌal puďliĐ ǁheŶ it Đaŵe to ͚the loĐal poliĐe͛ 
and policing in general. The essence of this was captured by PI.1 who was the first to propose 
that such a distinction existed: 
͞I thiŶk that theƌe aƌe tǁo leǀels of poliĐe identity - the local and the national, which 
is usually confused with the MPS͟ ;PI.ϭͿ 
 
This theme was later expounded upon by PI.10 who reported that in her area she had noticed 
that widespread confusion over how local policing sits within the national context had a 
significant impact on how people responded to questions around confidence in the police.    
͞I thiŶk it͛s ƌeallǇ iŶteƌestiŶg ďeĐause I thiŶk people do aŶd doŶ͛t thiŶk of it as a, kiŶd 
of, hoŵogeŶeous ďodǇ, I doŶ͛t thiŶk people uŶdeƌstaŶd hoǁ poliĐiŶg ǁoƌks… “o I 
thiŶk theǇ get a ďit ĐoŶfused, I thiŶk people thiŶk theƌe aƌe theiƌ loĐal poliĐe… aŶd 
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then I think, they think, there is some other sort of police that sits above that and I 
doŶ͛t thiŶk theǇ ƌeallǇ uŶdeƌstaŶd Ƌuite hoǁ that ǁoƌks… aŶd that leads to confusion 
ǁheŶ ǁe ask ƋuestioŶs aďout ĐoŶfideŶĐe͟. ;PI.ϭϬͿ  
This theme was followed on four occasions by the interviewee reflecting on the futility they 
felt iŶ tƌǇiŶg to alteƌ puďliĐ ĐoŶfideŶĐe, oƌ peƌĐeptioŶ, of the poliĐe as ͞ŶothiŶg ǁe tƌǇ heƌe 
seeŵs to ǁoƌk ǁheŶ Ǉou haǀe ŶatioŶal thiŶgs goiŶg oŶ iŶ the ďaĐkgƌouŶd ͟ ;PI.ϳͿ.  
 
According to PI.18, part of the problem around police identity is that police forces are trying to 
create and maintain two very different personas and present them to the same audience; that 
of reassurance and deterrence. For PI.18 police forces had, under New Labour, fallen into the 
trap of numbers chasing when it came to confidence levels and it has been a difficult mind set 
to leave behind; which is why some forces are still concerned about confidence figures. In 
chasing the elusive concept of improved confidence, PI.18 thought that police forces had 
forgotten or overlooked the natural dichotomy in their image and roles which meant that 
100% popularity and confidence was not only unachievable but also counterproductive.  
͞We doŶ͛t ǁaŶt eǀeƌǇďodǇ to like us ďeĐause theƌe aƌe soŵe people that ǁe ǁaŶt to 
be scared of us really.  I think some of that has been lost over the years because 
eǀeƌǇďodǇ kŶoǁs theiƌ ƌights Ŷoǁ doŶ͛t they... we will never win everyone over these 
days because not everyone are nice are they - that͛s the thiŶg.͟ ;PI.ϭϴͿ 
 
Similar thoughts were expressed by PI.7, PI.13, PI.14, PI.21, PI.22 and PI.28 who concurred 
ǁith PI.ϭϴ͛s stateŵeŶt. PI.ϳ aŶd PI.Ϯϭ pƌoposed that a reasonable level of fear was conducive 
and even essential for modern policing: 
͞ǁe Ŷeed people to ďe a ďit afƌaid, doŶ͛t ǁe – that ǁaǇ theǇ͛ll take the pƌopeƌ 
precautions, lock their doors and stuff, avoid speeding. So, yeah – a bit of fear is 
useful thiŶg͟ ;PI.ϳͿ 
 
This was not a unanimous view, however; PI.2, PI.11 and PI.20A well all vocal in their 
agreement that fear of crime was one of the most significant hurdles to improving the police-
public relationship.  
 
What also became apparent from the data collected was that there was no clear pattern 
emerging from the interviews with regard to the two forces who felt there was an issue with 
public confidence. From the literature research in Chapter 1, it was hypothesised that the 
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interviewees most likelǇ to ƌepoƌt a ͚Đƌisis iŶ ĐoŶfideŶĐe͛ ǁeƌe those ǁho had laƌge poĐkets of 
BME populations in poor districts. This was not the case. Of the two interviewees who 
aŶsǁeƌed ͚Yes͛, ďoth ǁeƌe fƌoŵ ƌuƌal ĐouŶties ǁith loǁ BME populatioŶs. The tǁo 
metropolitan forces and three urban forces interviewed all disagreed with the popular 
assessŵeŶt that theƌe ǁas a ͚Đƌisis of ĐoŶfideŶĐe͛.  
 
Causes of the ͚Crisis iŶ CoŶfideŶĐe͛ 
Opinion was again divided when it came to the factors interviewees felt contributed to the 
peƌĐeptioŶ of theƌe ďeiŶg a ͚Đƌisis͛ iŶ ĐoŶfideŶĐe. OŶlǇ ϮϮ iŶteƌǀieǁees felt Đoŵfoƌtaďle 
answering this question, with nine electing not to answer.  
 
Engagement 
Of those iŶteƌǀieǁees ǁho did aŶsǁeƌ the laƌgest gƌoup ;ϳͿ agƌeed ǁith PI.ϭϭ͛s assessŵeŶt 
that lack of adequate police engagement was at the root of problems around confidence.  
͞We'ǀe ŵoǀed fƌoŵ ďeiŶg – 2000 to 2010, the second highest confidence levels in 
the country out of 43 forces that were in that assessment to now 20.  All of that, yeah 
I've done the correlations, the drop in confidence levels totally correlates to the lack 
of iŶǀestŵeŶt iŶ the gaps iŶ Đoƌp Đoŵŵs aŶd eŶgageŵeŶt aĐtiǀitǇ.͟ ;PI.ϭϭͿ 
 
This view, however, was challenged by PI.9 and PI.21 who raised the question of whether 
knowledge increases confidence or fear. 
͞theƌe's ƌeseaƌĐh that saǇs that people feel ŵoƌe eŶgaged ǁheŶ theǇ haǀe ŵoƌe 
information but on the other side of it, there's also an awful lot of research which 
shows that more information people have about something, the less confident they 
feel. It's almost like are only more confident in ignorance. The 'apathetic safe' we call 
theŵ.͟ ;PI.ϵͿ 
 
Public Expectation 
Four interviewees thought that unmanageable public expectations were the greatest 
contributing factor, made worse by the unrealistic portrayals of policing in fiction. As PI.18 
succinctly summarised - the police are "victims of our own success" 
͞Ǉou kŶoǁ Ǉou ǁatĐh the IŶspeĐtoƌ Moƌse of this ǁoƌld oƌ ǁhateǀeƌ the ĐuƌƌeŶt oŶe 
is. It is obviously miles away from the realitǇ of eǀeƌǇdaǇ poliĐiŶg ďeĐause Ǉou͛ǀe got 
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a copper who spends all of his time leisurely investigating one incident where as in 
reality they would probably be investigating two dozen incidents at once and going 
from here to there and doing all sorts of thiŶgs… I thiŶk it͛s ǁe͛ǀe Ŷot ŵaŶaged 
expectations that well in the past because everybody knows when they ring the 
doĐtoƌs foƌ aŶ appoiŶtŵeŶt theǇ͛ƌe pƌoďaďlǇ Ŷot goiŶg to get iŶ that ŵoƌŶiŶg aƌe 
they?... People by and large tend to live with that really ďut that a poliĐe offiĐeƌ ǁoŶ͛t 
ďe theƌe iŵŵediatelǇ foƌ eǀeƌǇthiŶg still seeŵs to ǁiŶd people up a lot ƌeallǇ.͟ ;PI.ϭϴͿ  
  
Politicians 
PI.1 and PI.10 both thought that confidence was an issue created by politicians for their own 
benefit: 
͞PolitiĐiaŶs like having something they can fight for or against. Confidence is just one 
of theiƌ loŶg staŶdiŶg faǀouƌites͟. ;PI.ϭϬͿ 
 
Dual Identity 
For PI.18 and PI.12 the fundamental problem confronting the police was that they are trying to 
wear two irreconcilable hats simultaneously; that of beloved bobby and the law enforcer. As 
PI.12 explained:  
͞We aƌe the oŶes that Đoŵe ƌuŶŶiŶg toǁaƌds Ǉou ǁheŶ Ǉou Ŷeed us, ďut ǁe'ƌe also 
the ones who will come and, if you're breaking the law, deal with you and issue you a 
fine for speeding. And that's the classic divisive issue; one of the biggest issues of 
ĐoŶĐeƌŶ iŶ ouƌ ĐoŵŵuŶities is speediŶg aŶd paƌkiŶg…. Cƌiŵe haƌdlǇ eǀeƌ appeaƌs as 
being their issues that they want us to address. But nobody wants anybody to speed 
down their street, ďut Ǉou'ƌe happǇ to speed doǁŶ soŵeďodǇ else's.͟ ;PI.ϭϮͿ 
 
A similar point was mentioned by PI.24 who suggested that policing is something that 
͞eǀeƌǇoŶe likes iŶ pƌiŶĐiple, so loŶg as it doesŶ͛t affeĐt ŵe͟.  
 
Inherited Opinion 
PI.22, on the other hand, suggested that the central problem was inherited views about the 
police. As PI.22 explained, a lot of the engagement problems his force faced were caused by 
the inherited subculture of their audiences. These subcultures very often maintain an 
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antipathetic relationship with the police; which makes engagement and dialogue based 
communication difficult. 
͞a lot of it [ǁheŶ it Đoŵes to ĐoŶfideŶĐe] is iŶheƌited… “o Ǉou͛ǀe alŵost eŶded up 
ǁith ŵaǇďe tǁo oƌ thƌee geŶeƌatioŶs ǁhose ǁhole… peƌĐeptioŶ of poliĐiŶg is this 
ǁell theǇ͛ƌe just a goǀeƌŶŵeŶt heaǀǇ-haŶded ďuŶĐh of idiots that͛ll Đoŵe iŶ aŶd 
sǁeep up afteƌǁaƌds aŶd… it does tƌaŶslate doǁŶ, it is passed doǁŶ iŶto this 
generation. That child then grows up at least with no trust or confidence in the 
policing, theǇ͛ƌe ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ Ŷot goiŶg to ǁaŶt to ƌepoƌt aŶǇthiŶg to us oƌ speak to us 
aďout aŶǇ pƌoďleŵs that theǇ ŵight haǀe, ďeĐause theǇ͛ǀe ďeeŶ fed this staple diet 
of if Ǉou doŶ͛t paĐk it iŶ I͛ŵ goiŶg to haǀe Ǉou aƌƌested ďǇ that Đoppeƌ oǀeƌ theƌe...͟ 
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3.2.13   Collaboration and Awareness 
Collaboration has become an increasingly popular suggestion as a means of improving 
operational efficiency and reducing costs for police forces   (4.4). Four forces have a shared 
communications department; West Mercia and Warwickshire, and Suffolk and Norfolk. In 
order to determine the extent of collaborative efforts, or whether more department mergers 
are likely in the future interviewees were asked three questions.  
1) Whetheƌ the iŶteƌǀieǁee͛s foƌĐe ǁas iŶ a foƌŵal ĐollaďoƌatioŶ agreement with either 
another force or partner agency regarding communications.  
2) What the iŶteƌǀieǁee͛s staŶĐe ǁas oŶ ĐollaďoƌatioŶ foƌ poliĐe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs. 
3) Any potential problems with collaboration. 
 
Collaboration 
Interviewees were asked if their force was in a formal collaboration with another force or 
partner agency over communications and if they were not, whether this was something that 
they were considering (Fig 3.68). Nine departments (36%) are currently in a formal 
collaboration with either another force (28%) or partner agency (8%). Nearly two thirds of 
departments (64%), however, are not collaborating over communications although four forces 
(16%) were in discussions about collaboration at the time of the interview; two (8%) looking at 
collaboration with a neighbouring police force and the other two (8%) exploring the possibility 
of sharing resources with a partner agency. By far the largest group, at nearly half of the 
departments covered during the interviews, stated that they were not currently collaborating 
and did not expect this to change in the foreseeable future.  
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Fig 3.68 
  
Attitude towards Collaboration 
Interviewees were then asked how they felt about collaboration and whether they thought it 
was a practical solution to the problems faced by communications departments. Given the 
number of interviewees who reported that their force was not considering collaboration it was 
expected that there would be a corresponding attitude against collaboration in the answers to 
this question. As Fig 3.69 demonstrates this was clearly not the case. Only a very small minority 
(6%) said that they were against collaboration. For PI.5 the problem with collaboration was the 
pƌaĐtiĐalitǇ of ŵaŶagiŶg aŶ eƋual ƌelatioŶship; PI.ϱ͛s pƌiŵaƌǇ ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ǁas that ͞Ǉou Đan't be 
the seƌǀaŶt of tǁo ŵasteƌs͟ so oŶe paƌtǇ iŶ the ĐollaďoƌatioŶ ǁould alǁaǇs lose out to the 
other in some respect. A similar opinion was expressed by PI.20A who thought that while 
collaboration was a good idea in principle, it needed to be carefully managed to ensure that it 
is mutually beneficial to the parties involved: 
͞“o ǁe'ƌe Ŷot agaiŶst ĐollaďoƌatioŶ ďǇ aŶǇ stƌetĐh of the iŵagiŶatioŶ, ďut it's got to 
be beneficial for us. We won't do it just because it says collaboration is a good thing 
to do.͟ 
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PI.Ϯϳ͛s dislike of ĐollaďoƌatioŶ ǁas ŵoƌe ĐeŶtƌed oŶ ǁhat he ĐoŶsideƌed ͞ďƌaŶd aǁaƌeŶess 
issues͟, aŶd the diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ poliĐe foƌĐes ǁhiĐh ŵade ĐollaďoƌatioŶ oǀeƌ 
communication projects impractical.  A similar concern was raised by PI.12, who argued that 
the potential confusion around brand could reduce the effectiveness and impact of the 
message they were trying to convey. PI.12 explained that this concern was the principle reason 
why he preferred working with in-county partner agencies rather than other police forces.  
͞What ĐaŶ ǁe do ďetteƌ ǁith ouƌ ĐouŶtǇ ĐouŶĐil Đolleagues iŶ teƌŵs of ĐaŵpaigŶiŶg… 
Because of the geography, it means that we can use similar materials and messaging 
without the audience seeing it being similar because that's important. Otherwise, you 
can have difficulties with a regional campaign that its seen as a, for example, West 
MidlaŶds ĐaŵpaigŶ aŶd Ŷot a [Ǉouƌ] ĐaŵpaigŶ… if theǇ liǀe [heƌe] aŶd theǇ'ƌe seeiŶg 
a West MidlaŶds ďadge oŶ it, theǇ ŵight Ŷot thiŶk it's ƌeleǀaŶt.͟ ;PI.12) 
 
The vast majority (90%) of interviewees, however, reported a positive attitude towards 
collaboration; with some teams, like PI.25A, deeply involved in collaborative projects with 
multiple forces.   
͞Theƌe's a ƌegioŶal ďuƌglaƌǇ ĐaŵpaigŶ at the ŵoŵeŶt that we're collaborating with... 
there's four forces there, so somebody's doing the internal and we're doing the press 
ƌeleases aŶd theƌe's the posteƌs aŶd so oŶ, so that ǁe'ƌe ďeiŶg effiĐieŶt, I thiŶk.͟ 
(PI.25A) 
 
In contrast to earlier comments, however, collaboration was not viewed, as an unalloyed 
answer to problems facing police communications (3.2.4). 21 interviewees (68%), while 
supportive of the concept in theory, also expressed significant reservations and concerns 
about how to make it work in practice. 
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Fig 3.69 
 
Problems with Collaboration 
The potential problems with collaboration identified by the interviewees largely fell into eight 
categories:  culture around sharing resources, money, internal politics, perceived differences 
between departments, perceived differences between jurisdictions, confusion over police 
brand, poor communication/organisation between teams and lack of time (Fig 3.70). 
 
The most frequently cited problem was lack of time (42%) on the part of staff to arrange 
collaborative projects. Time constraints were also closely associated with what PI.10 referred 
to as the ͞ŶotoƌiouslǇ pooƌ͟ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ diffeƌeŶt ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs depaƌtŵeŶts 
which meant that projects and ideas were often raised too late to actually organise as 
departments had already arranged something else. 
͞ďut Ǉeah soŵetiŵes eǀeŶ ŵoƌe hassle thaŶ it͛s ǁoƌth… theǇ͛ll seŶd the desigŶ 
through and we can put [our] badge on it and stuff, but again that stuff all seemed 
easieƌ iŶ the past as ǁell Đos Ŷoǁ eǀeƌǇoŶe͛s so ďusǇ it͛s like ǁe haǀeŶ͛t got the 
tiŵe͟. ;PI.ϭϵBͿ 
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͞The AssoĐiatioŶ of Chief PoliĐe OffiĐeƌs atteŵpted last Ǉeaƌ… to do ŶatioŶal ǁeeks of 
aĐtioŶ to foĐus foƌĐes͛ atteŶtioŶ oŶ ĐeƌtaiŶ suďjeĐts all at the saŵe tiŵe, it Đaused a 
few issues, you know, that it ǁasŶ͛t ǀeƌǇ ǁell thought out, so a lot of foƌĐes opted out 
afteƌ the fiƌst feǁ͟;PI.ϮϮͿ  
 
 
Fig 3.70 
 
Time and poor organisation are often further compounded by a lack of awareness of what their 
counterparts in other forces are doing. Interviewees were asked how aware they felt they were 
of the activities, successes and problems faced by other police communication departments 
(Fig 3.71). Only three interviewees (PI.4, PI.6 and PI.17) said that they would class themselves 
as ͞ǀeƌǇ aǁaƌe͟.  
 
Just under half the iŶteƌǀieǁees ;ϰϴ%Ϳ felt that theǇ ǁeƌe eitheƌ ͚Ƌuite͛ oƌ ͚ŵodeƌatelǇ͛ aǁaƌe; 
ǁhile thiƌteeŶ ;ϰϭ%Ϳ stated that theǇ ǁeƌe eitheƌ ͚Ŷot ǀeƌǇ͛ oƌ ͚Ŷot aǁaƌe at all͛. Oǀeƌ half 
(55%) said that they were mostly aware of their neighbouring forces but once out of the region 
theiƌ kŶoǁledge of ǁhat otheƌ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ depaƌtŵeŶts ǁeƌe doiŶg ǁas ͞patĐhǇ͟;PI.ϮϱAͿ. 
Collaborative efforts and sharing of resources (e.g campaign material) was most likely to occur 
between neighbouring forces or those considered within the same region (PI.10). There was a 
considerable disconnect found between communications departments from different regions. 
PI.26 described the fact that most forces only forge ties to their neighbouring forces as 
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͞ŶoŶseŶsiĐal iŶ the digital age͟. Theƌe was a strong feeling with PI.17, PI.21, PI.22, PI.26 and 
PI.28 that police communications would benefit from forging ties with forces outside of these 
regional blocks that shared similar characteristics; e.g. demographics, policing priorities, similar 
audiences, policing environment (urban, rural, metropolitan).  
 
 
Fig 3.71 
 
Several interviewees (PI.10, PI.11, PI.15 and PI.26) referred to the benefits of networking at 
APComm conferences but were also keen to stress that the central problem facing any form of 
collaboration or resource sharing was lack of time. PI.26 in particular felt that she used to be "a 
lot more aware but I've slipped in the last couple of years - we're all just so busy". A similar 
difficulty was discussed at length by PI.19A who said that: 
͞I fiŶd it a lot haƌdeƌ to keep iŶ touĐh ǁith ǁhat eǀeƌǇthiŶg͛s goiŶg oŶ… I ƌeallǇ 
stƌuggle ŶoǁadaǇs to kŶoǁ ǁhat͛ƌe the keǇ ŵessages that ǁe should ďe doiŶg… I do 
fiŶd it a lot haƌdeƌ thaŶ ǁhat it used to ďe ďeĐause people doŶ͛t haǀe the tiŵe to 
share information as much, I used to know all the actual names of the Web Managers 
iŶ diffeƌeŶt FoƌĐes ǁheƌeas Ŷoǁ I͛ǀe just lost it.͟ ;PI.ϭϵAͿ.  
 
The question of brand was also raised again here, with seven interviewees expressing concerns 
over their audiences getting confused over different police brands:  
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͞But the otheƌ foƌĐes I'ǀe spokeŶ to, theǇ ǁeƌe like ͚Ŷo, ǁe doŶ't touĐh otheƌ 
people's campaigns, we do them all in-house, because if we had shared across the 
borders campaigns, people might get confused aďout the ďƌaŶdiŶg͛.͟ ;PI.ϭϳͿ 
 
This concern, however, was not shared by the majority. Indeed, PI.15 and PI.28 objected to 
brand being used as a reason against collaborating: 
͞I peƌsoŶallǇ alǁaǇs ǁoŶdeƌed ǁhǇ the poliĐe seƌǀiĐe doesŶ͛t just doesŶ͛t haǀe a 
ceŶtƌal uŶit doiŶg ŶatioŶal ĐaŵpaigŶs ďeĐause Ǉou͛ll fiŶd doŵestiĐ aďuse is Ƌuite high 
on the police agenda and everyone is doing individual campaigns and replicating it 
why does everybody not just make a contribution to the central unit which produces 
a national poster with the messages that the police services want to get out and then 
Ǉou͛ǀe got ĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ haǀeŶ͛t Ǉou.  “o Ǉou͛ƌe ŵoƌe likelǇ to get the ŵessage aĐƌoss.  
That has alǁaǇs puzzled ŵe… “oŵe foƌĐes aƌe ǁoƌƌied aďout ďƌaŶd ďeĐause the 
police serviĐe ƌeŵaiŶs Ƌuite paƌoĐhial isŶ͛t it, iŶ that iŶ geŶeƌal it has Ŷeǀeƌ had a 
paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ stƌategiĐ oǀeƌǀieǁ it hasŶ͛t looked iŶ the ǁhole ǁhat ŵessages Ǉou Ŷeed 
to get out to the public to reduce crime and they tend to be quite insular in saying 
this is The City of London Police or this is The Metropolitan Police and actually people 
doŶ͛t ƌeallǇ Đaƌe do theǇ.  TheǇ aƌe ŵoƌe iŶteƌested iŶ the ŵessagiŶg geŶeƌallǇ... I 
would be very surprised if people could pick out the individual logos for their county 
from the ϰϯ ǁoŶdeƌiŶg aƌouŶd the UK at the ŵoŵeŶt͟. ;PI.ϭϱͿ  
 
The question of internal politics preventing improved efficiency through collaboration was one 
which provoked the most heated responses. 11 interviewees expressed significant discontent 
with the internal politics and insular culture which often frustrated schemes and ideas which 
they felt could improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their teams. As PI.9 explained: 
͞ǁe ǁeŶt out to the ƌegioŶ aŶd said, 'Look, Ǉou aƌe pƌoďaďlǇ doiŶg Ǉouƌ oǁŶ thiŶg, 
this is what we are doing, here's our materials, if you want any of it, you know, grab 
away. Let us know what you want and we'll send it over.' There was [only one force] 
ǁho did. “o, Ǉeah, I thiŶk ĐultuƌallǇ ǁe haǀe got a ǁaǇ to go͟. ;PI.ϵͿ  
A similar experience was reported by PI.11, who felt that collaboration was being hampered by 
teams who were afraid that it would lead to more budget (and staff) reductions in their 
departments. 
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͞I'll ďet theƌe's ϰϯ ǀeƌsioŶs of the saŵe HalloǁeeŶ posteƌ ďeiŶg used aĐƌoss multiple 
forces, why the heck can't we be doing one version and sharing it?  That's not a 
ĐoŶteŶtious issue, theƌe's Ŷot a loĐalisatioŶ issue theƌe… Pƌoďleŵ ǁith this ǁas 
highlighted at a ƌeĐeŶt ŵeetiŶg ďetǁeeŶ fiǀe foƌĐes oǀeƌ ĐaleŶdaƌ shaƌiŶg… 
Potentially over time it would have led to staff reductions as well as you don't need 
five people all designing a Halloween poster or five people all doing a slightly 
different version of a drink-drive campaign.  That's is efficient comms for me, cutting 
those roles which is unpalatable when it's people losing jobs but, we have to be 
thiŶkiŶg iŶ that ǁaǇ aŶd a lot of foƌĐes doŶ't.͟ ;PI.ϭϭͿ  
 
For PI.16, difficulties with collaborating, and even sharing information, between police 
communication departments was a significant and long standing problem. 
͞I thiŶk it ǁould ďe ƌeallǇ aŵaziŶg if that [ĐollaďoƌatioŶ] Đould happeŶ, ďut ŵǇ 
experience of the police has been that a lot of police forces, particularly comms 
teams are really, really like insular... when I joined the police I found that there was 
Ƌuite a ͚this is ŵiŶe, ǁe do it this ǁaǇ͛; ǁe ƌeallǇ ǁaŶt to ǁoƌk ǁith otheƌ foƌĐes aŶd 
it͛s Ŷot ƌeallǇ helped at a ŶatioŶal leǀel eitheƌ ďǇ the thiŶgs like ACPO oƌ the College 
of Policing and even like the Home Office for example, so the Home Office have their 
own kind of policing comms team who will kind of like just put a campaign on you 
aŶd tell Ǉou that this is a ĐaŵpaigŶ that theǇ͛ƌe doiŶg aŶd theǇ haǀeŶ͛t eŶgaged 
forces across the country in that journey or look to work with you, they just sort of do 
thiŶgs to Ǉou, so foƌĐes haǀe ďeĐoŵe ǀeƌǇ like this is ŵiŶe aŶd this is ǁhat I͛ŵ goiŶg 
to deliǀeƌ͟. ;PI.ϭϲͿ  
 
PI.16 later went on to say that because of the insular culture and internal politics her force 
have looked to partner agencies instead as a means of cost saving through collaboration 
͞ďeĐause it is just so ŵuĐh easieƌ to ǁoƌk ǁith theŵ thaŶ otheƌ foƌĐes͟: 
͞Well the ǁaǇ that ǁe͛ǀe appƌoaĐhed it, ďeĐause ǁe haǀe at the ŵoŵeŶt a zeƌo 
marketing budget, but we ran our recent domestic abuse campaign with [our] County 
CouŶĐil… it Đost aďout £Ϯϳ,ϬϬϬ aŶd theǇ paid the ŵoŶeǇ aŶd ǁe put iŶ the… 
equivalent staff time, so we made the films, we did all the work, did all the graphic 
work, all the images, all the digital images, all the digital adǀeƌts etĐ etĐ…͟. ;PI.ϭϲͿ  
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PI.13 raised a further complication with regard to internal politics – that of the PCC. PI.13 was 
in favour of merging communication teams to create regional teams, like the one pioneered in 
West Mercia which covers four counties. When the idea was presented to his PCC, however, 
PI.ϭϯ said it had ďeeŶ disŵissed ďeĐause iŶ his ǀieǁ PCC͛s ͞all jealousǇ guaƌd theiƌ ďailiǁiĐk so 
to speak - so aƌe theǇ goiŶg to giǀe that up? Not ǁithout a Fight͟. This ǀieǁ ǁas suppoƌted ďǇ 
PI.23 who said: 
͞I thiŶk theƌe aƌe thiŶgs ǁe should aďsolutelǇ shaƌe aŶd Ǉou Đould do it, Ǉou 
aďsolutelǇ Đould do it, ďut Ǉou ǁould theŶ haǀe to saǇ that͛s Ǉouƌ teŵplate so 
effeĐtiǀelǇ soŵe PCCs ǁill get haĐked off… I thiŶk ǁe aƌe fuƌtheƌ aǁaǇ fƌoŵ theƌe 
[ĐollaďoƌatioŶ] Ŷoǁ thaŶ ǁe haǀe eǀeƌ ďeeŶ ďeĐause I just doŶ͛t see hoǁ Ǉou͛ll get 
PCCs to agƌee͟. ;PI.ϮϯͿ  
 
"It used to be a lot more coordinated. It's a lot more difficult now with PCCs involved 
because some PCCs wanted to lead on some of the campaign areas.͟ ;PI.ϭϮͿ 
 
Differences between department and jurisdiction were also cited as common reasons why 
collaboration might not work between some communication teams. The central concern 
expressed by these interviewees was that different areas have different audience 
requirements and prefer different methods of communication. As such what works in one area 
might not work in another rendering collaboration pointless. As PI.20A explained: 
͞WheŶ Ǉou'ƌe lookiŶg at ĐollaďoƌatioŶ, Ǉou haǀe to Đollaďoƌate alŵost fƌoŵ a similar 
baseline, particularly in policing and, when you look at funding arrangements in 
policing, the variability is massive... And then it's a case of, okay, so what baseline are 
Ǉou ĐoŵiŶg fƌoŵ… What's the appetite foƌ ĐollaďoƌatioŶ fƌoŵ Ǉouƌ PCC? Who do you 
want to collaborate with? Have you got the same kind of operating standards, 
poliĐies aŶd pƌoĐeduƌes ďeĐause foƌĐes ǁoƌk diffeƌeŶtlǇ?͟ ;PI.ϮϬAͿ  
 
͞The pƌoďleŵ is, oďǀiouslǇ, Ǉou'ǀe got diffeƌeŶt tǇpes of ďuƌglaƌǇ [heƌe] to LoŶdoŶ. 
You've got diffeƌeŶt ƌesideŶts, Ǉou'ǀe got diffeƌeŶt audieŶĐes.͟ ;PI.ϮϰͿ 
 
“iŵilaƌlǇ, PI.ϭϵB͛s pƌiŶĐiple ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ǁas that haǀiŶg pushed thƌough ŵeƌgiŶg ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs 
departments to save money, police forces would be stuck with a structure that turns out not to 
work as they thought, at which point things will have returned to how they were in the first 
place:  
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͞oh this ǁas a ďad idea, ǁhat ǁeƌe ǁe thiŶkiŶg. Let͛s go ďaĐk to hoǁ it ǁas, ďut it͛s 
too late ďeĐause Ŷoǁ ǁe͛ƌe liǀiŶg iŶ Gothaŵ CitǇ… At soŵe poiŶt the ǁheels ǁill 
pƌoďaďlǇ fall off if theǇ keep tƌǇiŶg to do this aŶd theŶ soŵeoŶe ǁill deĐide ͚haŶg oŶ 
a seĐoŶd this isŶ͛t ǁoƌkiŶg ǀeƌǇ ǁell, let͛s stiĐk ďits ďaĐk oŶ agaiŶ aŶd it͛ll go a ďig full 
ĐiƌĐle.͟ ;PI.ϭϵBͿ 
 
The final problem identified was money. This was raised by PI.19A and PI.20A who both felt 
that while collaboration is often positioned as a good way of saving money it did not always 
achieve this:  
͞AŶd theŶ the HMIC aŶd the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt aƌe pushiŶg it as a ŵoŶeǇ saǀiŶg 
opportunity, but often these things need funding to make them work and then who 
ƌeĐogŶises the saǀiŶgs aŶd ǁho ƌealises theŵ.͟ ;PI.ϮϬAͿ 
 
͞We͛ǀe doŶe the odd thiŶg ďut it hasŶ͛t ƌeallǇ ǁoƌked foƌ use, it eŶds up ďeiŶg ŵoƌe 
eǆpeŶsiǀe͟. ;PI.ϭϵAͿ  
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3.3 Part Three:      Chapter Summary: Emergent Themes 
 
A number of themes became apparent during the interviews.  
1) Evolution of the communications function. The function of the communications 
department is continuing to evolve. These departments have noticeably changed, over the 
last decade in particular, in form, structure and function. This change is reflected in the 
Ŷaŵe of these depaƌtŵeŶts ǁhiĐh has iŶ ŵaŶǇ Đases ŵoǀed aǁaǇ fƌoŵ ͚puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs͛, 
͚ŵaƌketiŶg͛ aŶd ͚ŵedia͛ aŶd iŶstead adopted the ŵoƌe ďusiŶess-like title of ͚Coƌpoƌate 
CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͛. This transformation has also been connected to the change in 
operational position and value placed on communications by police officers and the senior 
management over the last decade in particular.   
 
2) Change in Staffing: Communications teams are now significantly smaller in many forces 
than they were in 2010. These teams are now almost exclusively made up by professional 
civilian staff who are based at police headquarters rather than out in the divisions. While 
the majority of departments interviewed still have a delineated structure with specific roles 
(e.g. Press Officer) there are a growing number of forces who are adopting generic 
communications roles rather than maintaining the old specialist structure.  
 
3) Change of primary audience: A growing number of police communications departments 
are moving from principally communicating with, or through, the media to communicating 
directly with the general public using social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook. 
While this arguably represents a continuation of trends identified over 10 years ago, social 
media has accelerated these changes and is responsible for the extent of renegotiation 
described by the interviewees with regard to the power dynamics in the police-media 
relationship.  
 
4) Social Media: while use and reliance upon social media has grown substantially since 
Cƌuŵp͛s ;ϮϬϭϭͿ studǇ, it ƌeŵaiŶs iŶĐoŶsisteŶt iŶ teƌŵs of the appƌoaĐh, stƌategǇ aŶd 
channels used across different police forces. The principle strategy for police 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs ƌeŵaiŶs ͚push͛ oƌ ͚ďƌoadĐastiŶg͛ ;ϰϴ%Ϳ ǁith soŵe foƌĐes staƌtiŶg to tƌǇ 
dialogue ďased ͚pull͛ ;Ϯϱ%Ϳ aŶd soŵe Ŷoǁ ŵoǀiŶg toǁaƌds ͚tƌaŶsfoƌŵatiǀe͛ ďased 
communications (32%).  
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Twitter remains the preferred social media channel for the time being although there is a 
growing move towards Facebook as the preferred platform for engagement. This shift is 
consistent with the increasing emphasis being placed on engagement and the change in 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ stƌategǇ aǁaǇ fƌoŵ ͚push͛, ǁhiĐh the ďƌoadĐastiŶg tool Tǁitteƌ eǆĐels at, to 
͚pull͛ aŶd ͚tƌaŶsfoƌŵatiǀe͛.  
 
YouTube continues to be underutilised; with 44% of forces interviewed stating that they 
either rarely used it, needed to improve their video content, or used it in a non-strategic 
ǁaǇ as ͞a ǀideo ĐoŶteŶt duŵpiŶg gƌouŶd͟ ;PI.ϮϲͿ. 
 
There was also concern raised at what some interviewees perceived to be a growing over 
ƌeliaŶĐe oŶ soĐial ŵedia as ͞a ŵagiĐ Đuƌe-all͟ ;PI.ϭϰͿ ďǇ poliĐe offiĐeƌs; ǁhiĐh has, iŶ soŵe 
iŶstaŶĐes, alƌeadǇ led to soŵe foƌĐe͛s ƌeduĐiŶg, oƌ ĐoŵpletelǇ ƌeplaĐiŶg, traditional 
channels of communication with social media (e.g. PI.12). Social media channels have 
grown significantly over the last few years, and are still continuing to grow. However, they 
only account for a small proportion of the population each police force covers. There is a 
risk here of alienating or ignoring sections of the wider police audience.   
 
5) Measuring and Assessing Success/Effectiveness: The majority of interviewees (77%) 
described historic difficulty with measuring or assessing the impact or effectiveness of their 
communication attempts. Just over half of the forces (52%) had developed some means by 
which to measure print campaigns; although assessing the long term impact of those 
campaigns was often considered too costly to run frequently (PI.27).   
 
A more immediate concern raised by 19 (61%) interviewees was over how to create a 
suitable framework for evaluating activity on social media as they deemed their current 
strategies inadequate. Of the 19 forces (76%) who have an evaluation strategy in place for 
social media, nine (36%) had strategies based on measuring output based metrics, such as 
reach, while three (12%) used an interaction based metric which measured 
engagement/interaction (e.g. likes, retweets, comments). These measurement strategies 
are aided by both Facebook and Twitter releasing free, inbuilt measurement tools for 
tracking social media activity.  
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As PI.16, however, pointed out while output and interaction based assessments can tell you 
how many people have seen the post or liked it, neither of those methods can determine 
the outcome of those posts (i.e. whether those posts have led to behaviour change, people 
coming forward with information etc.) – which to PI.16 and several others is the 
fundamental reason that should be underlying all communications activities. The difficulty 
around measurement is further compounded by what several interviewees (10%) described 
as a lack of rigorous national guidance on these issues from senior bodies, such as the 
College of Policing and APComm.  
 
6) Collaboration: Collaboration and resource sharing between departments remains 
fragmented, patchy and inconsistent with most forces still doing their own campaigns 
independently. Where collaborative projects had been negotiated they were mostly with 
one, or a limited number of, neighbouring forces. Relatively few interviewees (26%) 
professed a good level awareness or understanding of what other communication 
departments were doing across the country.  
 
Lack of time was the most frequently cited reason as to why collaboration and resource 
sharing was not more common or widespread. Concern over potential brand confusion was 
also raised by some as an issue – although it was dismissed by other heads of department 
as ͞iƌƌeleǀaŶt͟ ;PI.ϮϴͿ.  
 
7) Confidence: Confidence still remains important to police communications, although not to 
the same extent as it did in 2009. Counter to expectations, only two agreed that there was 
a ͚Đƌisis of ĐoŶfideŶĐe͛ iŶ poliĐiŶg; ǁith the ǀast ŵajoƌitǇ saǇiŶg that if theƌe ǁas a pƌoďlem 
with confidence in the police then it was not an issue in their area. Seven (23%) 
interviewees suggested that the perception of crisis had been manufactured by politicians 
and the media for their own ends and did not reflect how people thought/felt about their 
local police. Similarly, three interviewees proposed that one reason for the discrepancy was 
that there is a difference between how people perceive their local police and the idea of 
policing in general, which is not adequately differentiated in many measurement models. 
Foƌ PI.ϭϬ aŶd PI.Ϯϳ, the ͚Đƌisis iŶ ĐoŶfideŶĐe͛ ǁas a politiĐal-ideological one and not actually 
related to local police forces. The interview data raises the question of whether there is a 
puďliĐ ͚Đƌisis of ĐoŶfideŶĐe͛ iŶ poliĐiŶg aŶd suggests the idea that ͚ŵoƌal paŶiĐ͛ ŵight ďe a 
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more accurate description of the cyclical fears that have plagued police forces in England 
for much of the last century. This is discussed further in the next chapter.  
 
8) Threats, Challenges and Problems: Restricted financial resources and meeting the 
increasing demand for services that departments are experiencing were identified by the 
interviewees as the two most significant threats facing communications departments 
currently, and going forward; especially as all but one of the teams interviewed had already 
lost a significant proportion of their staff. Concern around resources and meeting the 
growing demand for police services, raises the ƋuestioŶ of ǁhetheƌ theƌe is a ͚ĐƌitiĐal ŵass͛ 
when it comes to department size, below which a communications department significantly 
loses effectiveness. Given the current and continuing austerity measures it also raises the 
question of whether police communication departments are, as PI.25B and PI.6 believe, 
nearing this tipping point. 
 
A further difficulty identified was with PCCs taking control of police communications. There 
were significant concerns expressed by the interviewees around the politicisation of the 
police and transparency. Interviewees appeared particularly concerned over how one team 
can communicate for two entities that by their nature are unequal in power as one is 
responsible for holding the other to account.  
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Chapter 4:         Discussion 
 
 
4.1 Answering the Research Questions 
 
All research is driven by questions. This study began with three aims: 
1)  To provide a picture of the current state of public relations and communication in the 
English police; 
2)  To explore how police public relations has and continues to change in the age of social 
media; and 
3)  To investigate whether the concept of public relations is still relevant for the police 
today.  
 
Following an extensive literature review these aims evolved into nine research questions 
aimed at providing a comprehensive knowledge of modern police communications. To reflect 
the focus of the study the research questions were divided into two groups, the primary 
;ĐoŶteǆtualͿ ƋuestioŶs, ǁhiĐh ǁeƌe pƌiŶĐipallǇ ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg the ͚ǁhat͛ 
aspects, and the secondary (diagnostic/evaluativeͿ ƋuestioŶs ǁhiĐh looked at ͚hoǁ͛ aŶd ͚ǁhǇ͛ 
police communications differed across policing environments. When initially crafting the 
questions the intention had been to create a foundation from which to investigate this area 
and which would provide a suitable framework to then discuss a complex area in a clear and 
logical manner. Each primary question would focus on a core aspect of the department in 
order to lay the groundwork for the secondary questions which would then investigate specific 
elements and test the questions and assumptions raised in the literature review (1.8).  
 
Primary Questions 
1.1 What is the purpose of police communications? 
1.2 What are police forces trying to communicate? 
1.3 How are police forces communicating? 
1.4 With whom are the police trying to communicate? 
1.5 What are the threats and challenges currently facing police communications? 
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Secondary Questions 
2.1 Is the concept of public relations still relevant in modern police forces? 
2.2 To what extent do public relations strategies differ between policing environments? 
2.3 What position does communications hold within the operational side of policing? 
2.3 Is it possible to measure what, or whether, police communication strategies are having 
an impact? 
 
In practice, however, this proved difficult to implement. While the structure of the questions 
helped significantly with the interviews and maintaining the focus of the project, the 
delineated structure did not account for, or adapt well to, the intricately interwoven nature of 
police communications. The results resembled a highly complex web where everything was an 
interconnected part of the whole and investigating one aspect inevitably led to incorporating 
other superficially separate elements.  
 
One example of this is the close alignment between determining the purpose of the 
department and its operational position within the police force. Prior to the interviews it had 
appeared that the two were separate and not conditional upon the other. What the interview 
data showed, however, is that how the interviewees described the purpose of their 
departments was associated with how they, and the wider force, saw communications in 
terms of backroom function vs frontline policing. Those departments where communications 
was seen as an essential part of modern police work described their purpose as part of 
operational policing while interviewees who felt their departments and efforts were 
marginalised were more likely to talk about their purpose as being supportive, undervalued 
and side-lined iŶto dealiŶg ǁith the pƌess aŶd puďliĐ so that ͞poliĐe offiĐeƌs ĐaŶ get oŶ ǁith the 
ƌeal poliĐe ǁoƌk͟ ;PI.ϮͿ. The iŶteƌplaǇ ďetǁeeŶ these tǁo aspeĐts is disĐussed iŶ ŵoƌe detail 
later (4.2), what it demonstrates, however, is the complexity of convergence and divergence 
when researching multiple forces.  
 
A further challenge then presented itself in the form of managing the vast amount of data 
collected. When this project began the intention had been to interview three police forces, this 
was then expanded to include more forces as the methodology changed, and it was estimated 
that a sample of around 12 forces (30%) was achievable (2.9). What had not been anticipated 
was the extent of the interest which saw 27 forces (69%) agreeing to interviews – generating 
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an enormous amount of data and highlighting many exciting areas of interest ranging from 
police identity, questions around legitimacy and public confidence.  
   
Given these difficulties, the following chapter has been divided into four thematic sections. 
Each section deals with one or more of the research questions, to make cross referencing 
easier each section has a reference code for the relevant parts of Chapter 3 and which 
question(s) are being discussed. Due to the amount of data, however, this chapter has had to 
prioritise the core aspects relating to the research questions. As such there are themes and 
ideas present in Chapter 3 which are not discussed.  
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4.2 Purpose of Police Communications 
Questions: 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.3 
Results Ref: 3.1.1 – 3.1.5, 3.2.1 – 3.2.3, 3.2.12 
 
Police communications has changed considerably over the last century. These changes were 
the strongest and most frequently returned to theme throughout the interviews. While the 
extent of the changes identified depended partly upon the interviewees length of time in the 
department, it is significant that all of the interviewees without exception were determined to 
emphasise that police communications has changed – that ͞ŵodeƌŶ Đoŵŵs͟ is distiŶĐt, iŶ 
form, function, practice and ideologǇ fƌoŵ that ǁhiĐh ǁas ĐoŶsideƌed ͞old Đoŵŵs͟ ;PI.ϳͿ.  
 
From the 1990s onwards the official rhetoric with regard to police communications was one of 
apparent openness and transparency. According to Mawby (2002, p.21), under Sir Robert 
Mark, the MPS moved fƌoŵ ͞the pƌiŶĐiple ͚tell theŵ oŶlǇ ǁhat Ǉou ŵust͛… to ͚ǁithhold oŶlǇ 
ǁhat Ǉou ŵust͛͟ ;ϭϵϳϮ Đited iŶ iďidͿ. This tƌeŶd ǁas ĐeŵeŶted ďǇ the Wolff OliŶs ƌepoƌt aŶd 
continued through the 1990s as departments moved from an ad-hoc, reactive media service 
staffed ďǇ poliĐe offiĐeƌs ͞lookiŶg foƌ ƋuiĐk Đaƌeeƌ pƌogƌessioŶ͟ ;PI.ϮͿ to a pƌofessioŶal 
department run by trained experts (Chapter 1).  
 
This interpretation however was disagreed with by most of the interviewees, particularly those 
who had worked for the police for more than a decade. The general feeling was that far from 
adopting the spirit of the official rhetoric, police communications in the 1990s and early 2000s 
ǁas goǀeƌŶed ďǇ ǁhat PI.Ϯ Đalled a ͞ĐalĐulated aŶd ĐoŶtƌolled opeŶŶess͟. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to PI.Ϯ 
and others (e.g. PI.1, PI.13, PI.15, PI.27), this move was more about transforming the police 
image and re-legitiŵisiŶg the ͚poliĐe ǀoiĐe͛ iŶ aŶ iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ ĐǇŶiĐal aŶd suspiĐious 
environment than a cultural metamorphosis or substantive change either within the 
department or the wider police culture. As PI.22 remarked there is a reason why the police 
puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs depaƌtŵeŶt gaiŶed the ƌeputatioŶ of ďeiŶg the ͞spiŶ ŵaĐhiŶe͟.  
 
The interview data suggests that change occurred incrementally over the last 25 years and at 
different rates across the police forces interviewed. One aspect which was commonly 
associated with the substantive changes was the gradual professionalisation and civilianisation 
of these departments over this period (see Chapter 1).  
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Mawby (2002) noted that in 2007 90% of heads of communications were civilians compared to 
64% in 2001 and 52% in 1996/7. In 2014 only two of the communications staff interviewed 
were serving police officers; by 2015, the FOI data shows that all permanent communications 
staff across police forces in England were civilians.  
 
Professionalisation and the attendant civilianisation of the communications department was 
viewed unilaterally by the interviewees as a positive, important and highly necessary change in 
police communications; one which heralded a move away from the traditional isolationist 
mentality of policing and into a more connected and networked modern institution. 
IŶtƌoduĐiŶg ͚Ŷeǁ ďlood͛ iŶto poliĐe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs ǁas thought to haǀe ďƌought Ŷeǁ ideas 
and Ŷeǁ ǁaǇs of ǁoƌkiŶg. “uƌette ;ϮϬϬϭ, p.ϭϬϴͿ fouŶd that theƌe ǁas ͞stƌuĐtuƌal diǀisioŶ͟ 
between civilian and officer run departments. According to Surette (2001) civilian departments 
were more likely to be proactive and progressive than their officer run counterparts, who were 
characterised as reactive and slow to change (1.5). Surette (2001) suggested that 
professionalisation was driven by civilianisation (rather than the other way around) and 
therefore departments which embraced external experts would be substantively different 
from, and more evolved than, those departments which remained under the control of police 
officers.  
 
It had ďeeŶ the iŶteŶtioŶ to test “uƌette͛s ;ϮϬϬϭͿ hǇpothesis iŶ this ƌeseaƌĐh, hoǁeǀeƌ, this 
proved challenging as only two of the departments in the sample group had police officers as 
department head which provided insufficient data to assess the theory. What was apparent 
fƌoŵ the iŶteƌǀieǁ data, hoǁeǀeƌ, ǁas that the iŶteƌǀieǁees agƌeed ǁith “uƌette͛s ;ϮϬϬϭͿ 
theory. PI.4, PI.6 and PI.11 were particularly vocal in their arguments for how police 
communications has been stunted in their forces due to police officers being left in charge of 
the department. There was also a marked association between those departments which had 
adopted pƌogƌessiǀe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ stƌategies ;e.g. ͚Pull͛ oƌ ͚TƌaŶsfoƌŵatiǀe͛Ϳ aŶd those ǁho 
ǁeƌe still usiŶg the tƌaditioŶal ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs ŵodel ;͚Push͛Ϳ, this is disĐussed fuƌtheƌ iŶ 
section 4.3.  
 
A common belief espoused by the majority of the interviewees was that the tone of the 
department is set by the senior management team (e.g. Chief Constable) but also by the head 
of department who is responsible for driving innovation, development and expansion. The 
more dynamic and innovative the head the more progressive and open to new ideas the 
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department was likely to be. What is of interest, however, is whether professionalisation was 
the goal or merely an unintended outcome.  
 
The long held assumption has been that professionalisation was the result of a deliberate 
strategy and that civilianisation occurred as an expedient means by which to achieve this 
(Morgan and Newburn, 1997). For the most part this is corroborated by the interview data, 
nearly all the interviewees (90%) thought it was a planned outcome in recognition that the 
previous system was no longer adequate. For three of the interviewees, however, this was not 
the case. PI.4 thought professionalisation was the result of police forces realising that civilian 
staff are a less expensive alternative to police officers – and thus professionalisation was the 
͞seƌeŶdipitous ƌesult͟ of ͞ďeaŶ ĐouŶtiŶg͟ ĐiǀiliaŶisatioŶ. PI.ϭϱ aŶd PI.ϮϮ, oŶ the otheƌ haŶd, 
thought that professionalisation was a consequence of the growing awareness that 
communications should be at the heart of policing and not just used as a formality. As 
technologies and society changed police forces increasingly needed more specific expertise in 
order to meet new demands – expertise which were only available from outside police forces.  
 
This explanation supports the pattern observed in the FOI data (3.1.2). The FOI data shows a 
national trend of accelerated growth in department size and spending followed by a steep 
decline after the Government announced widespread budget cuts in policing. Between 2010 
and 2015 61% of police communications departments saw a considerable reduction in their 
staff levels. Reductions ranged from 3.7% in one force to 54% in another; with 16 forces 
(66.6%) reporting a decrease of between 20% and 40% (Appendix 3.3). The sudden growth of 
these traditionally small departments suggests a re-prioritisation in how they were perceived 
by police forces over the last two decades. It is also interesting to note that despite the 
austerity cuts, no communications department has returned to pre-2010 staff levels.  
 
One indication of this change can be found in what the interviewees perceived to be the key 
responsibilities of their department. According to the interviewees the function of their 
department has changed over the last decade. The primary focus now appears to on 
supporting frontline policing through a focus on public engagement and promoting virtual 
visibility. Indeed, it is of note that internal communications was the most frequently cited core 
function, with external communications being voted a distant second, as this marks a 
significant departure from previous priorities which in many departments has led to internal 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs ďeiŶg ͞dƌopped ďeĐause offiĐeƌs just doŶ͛t thiŶk it ŵatteƌs͟ ;PI.ϯͿ ;Fig ϯ.ϯϲͿ. 
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In comparison, traditional department activities like publicity, media relations and reputation 
were only included by 2 (6%), 5 (16%) and 6 (19%) of interviewees respectively. As Fig 4.1 
shows, however, while the functions have condensed over the last decade there is little 
evidence of a substantive difference between the core activities found by Mawby (2002) 
compared to those reported in the APCOM survey (2014) and by the interviewees in this study 
in 2015.  
 
One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that while the core activities have not changed 
significantly how they are perceived by the interviewees has. A recurrent theme raised during 
the iŶteƌǀieǁs ǁas the ideologiĐal diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ ͚Ŷeǁ͛ aŶd ͚old͛ poliĐe Đoŵŵs. “uĐh a 
change is likely to alter how the interviewees interpret and view their roles and their 
departments. This shift in ideology was clearly reflected in the way the interviewees described 
ďoth the depaƌtŵeŶt͛s Đoƌe aĐtiǀities aŶd the fuŶĐtioŶ theǇ thought poliĐe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs 
now had. Many of the interviewees were keen to stress the operational importance of 
communications in modern policing and it was a frequent frustration that the Home Office and 
HMIC Đategoƌised ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs as ͚ďusiŶess suppoƌt͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ a fƌoŶtliŶe seƌǀiĐe. 
Communications was described as essential for preventing, reducing and solving crime. 
AĐĐoƌdiŶg to PI.ϭ, poliĐe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs had ͞ŵoǀed oŶ fƌoŵ ďeiŶg a puďliĐitǇ ŵaĐhiŶe, 
theƌe to pƌoŵote the good ǁoƌk of the foƌĐe to distƌaĐt fƌoŵ the shit͟, iŶstead good puďliĐitǇ 
was considered a nice-to-have by-product of their work to educate and inform the public 
rather than the primary goal and raison d'être of the department.  
 
The shift iŶ ideologǇ is also appaƌeŶt iŶ ͚ǁhat͛ poliĐe foƌĐes aƌe tƌǇiŶg to ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate. ͚PuďliĐ 
eŶgageŵeŶt͛ ǁas a keǇ ĐoŶĐept aŶd oŶe ofteŶ ƌetuƌŶed to ďǇ the iŶteƌǀieǁees. The 
importance placed on this aspect is demonstrated by its inclusion as one of only six activities 
listed by all the interviewed teams as part of their core responsibilities (3.2.3).  It is also of note 
that aŶotheƌ aĐtiǀitǇ ƌaised ďǇ all iŶteƌǀieǁees ǁas ǁhat PI.Ϯ teƌŵed ͞ǁaƌŶ aŶd iŶfoƌŵ͟. 
According to PI.2, this involves not just crisis communication where an issue has arisen and the 
public must be informed in order to redirect traffic, create awareness or gain essential 
intelligence, but also more mundane matters such as keeping the general public up to date on 
what the police are doing, minor issues and forthcoming problems (e.g. football matches 
which will affect traffic). Such a tƌaŶsitioŶ is ƌeŵiŶisĐeŶt of Lee aŶd MĐGoǀeƌŶ͛s ;ϮϬϭϱͿ 
suggestion that risk has become one of the underlying influences which governs police 
communication.     
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Fig 4.1             Key Departmental Responsibilities / Functions 
2001                                (Mawby, 2002 p.95-96) 2006               (Mawby, 2007 p.13) 2014         (APCOMM Survey, 2014) 2015                     (see Section 3.2.3)   ͞PƌoŵotiŶg aŶd pƌoteĐtiŶg the ƌeputatioŶ 
and work of the force by clearly informing 
the public of its aĐtiǀities͟.  ͞MaiŶtaiŶiŶg ƌelatioŶships ďetǁeeŶ the 
force and the community, through the 
ŵedia ǁheƌe appƌopƌiate.͟  ͞MaiŶtaiŶiŶg aŶd deǀelopiŶg poliĐe-media 
ƌelatioŶs.͟  ͞‘espoŶdiŶg to ŵedia eŶƋuiƌies.͟  ͞PƌoaĐtiǀelǇ issuiŶg stoƌies aŶd iŶfoƌŵatioŶ 
to the media.͟  ͞CooƌdiŶatiŶg ŵedia aŶd puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs 
aĐtiǀities aĐƌoss the foƌĐe.͟  ͞PƌoǀidiŶg ƋualitǇ ĐoŶtƌol oŶ iŶteƌŶal aŶd 
eǆteƌŶal foƌĐe puďliĐatioŶs.͟  ͞PƌoduĐiŶg ǀideos aŶd otheƌ pƌoŵotioŶal 
ŵateƌials.͟  ͞OƌgaŶisiŶg opeŶ daǇs.͟  ͞DeǀelopiŶg aŶd ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg iŶternal 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs.͟  ͞PƌoǀidiŶg suppoƌt/ ĐoŶsultaŶĐǇ to foƌĐe 
peƌsoŶŶel oŶ ŵedia ƌelatioŶs.͟  ͞PƌoǀidiŶg iŶ-force training on media 
haŶdliŶg.͟ 
 ͞DealiŶg ǁith ŵedia 
enquiries, reactive and 
proactive media liaison.  Proactive marketing 
campaigns.  Promoting public reassurance 
messages.  Informing the public.  Managing media interesting 
in incidents.  Protecting and promoting the 
foƌĐe͛s ƌeputatioŶ.  Major incident and crisis 
communication.  Internal communications.  Delivering media training.  Facilitating interviews.  Partnership communications.  Responsibility for corporate 
communications strategies 
and media policies.  Public relations.  Marketing.  Corporate identity. 
 Advising other officers and 
staff.  Strategy and planning.  Social media work.  Evaluation and monitoring.  Internal communications.  Incident/operation 
communication.  Directly briefing senior officers  Crime prevention marketing 
and communication.  Training of staff.  Developing visual images, 
photography and videos.  Web and online developments.  Other.  Media/press duties.  Attend/organise meetings.  Communications.  Staff management/training.  Office management/admin.  Freedom of information act 
releases.  Policy work. 
 Visibility.  Reprographics (graphics, 
printing).  Replying to Freedom of 
Information Requests.  Identity, brand or image 
management.  Managing the intranet.  Improving public confidence.  Tactical advice and support on 
operational matters.  Support for frontline services 
and solving crimes.  Keeping the public informed 
about criminal and public order 
matters (e.g. traffic accidents).  Managing media requests and 
the police relationship with the 
media.   Marketing and campaigns.  Crisis management and incident 
or operations communication.  Public engagement.  Social media. 
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 ͞PƌoǀidiŶg iŶ-force advisory documentation.  Monitoring the media for police-related 
stoƌies.͟  ͞“uppoƌtiŶg foƌĐe initiatives and 
ĐaŵpaigŶs.͟  ͞‘espoŶdiŶg to ŵajoƌ iŶĐideŶts.͟  ͞AƌƌaŶgiŶg aŶd ĐooƌdiŶatiŶg pƌess 
ĐoŶfeƌeŶĐes.͟  ͞PƌoduĐiŶg the foƌĐe Ŷeǁspapeƌ.͟  ͞MaiŶtaiŶiŶg the foƌĐe iŶteƌŶet ǁeďsite.͟  ͞PƌoduĐiŶg the foƌĐe aŶŶual ƌepoƌt.͟   ͞The ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ of keǇ ŵessages.͟  ͞AdǀisiŶg the loĐal poliĐe authoƌitǇ oŶ 
corporate issues (ad-hoĐͿ.͟  ͞PƌoǀidiŶg ŵedia aŶd P‘ suppoƌt foƌ the 
loĐal poliĐe authoƌitǇ.͟  ͞PƌoǀidiŶg ŵedia aŶd P‘ suppoƌt foƌ loĐal 
ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ safetǇ paƌtŶeƌships.͟  ͞PƌoǀidiŶg eǆteƌŶal tƌaiŶiŶg oŶ ŵedia 
handling.͟  ͞DeǀelopŵeŶt aŶd ŵaiŶteŶaŶĐe of 
Đoƌpoƌate ideŶtitǇ.͟  ͞A ƌole iŶ the foƌĐe spoŶsoƌship aĐtiǀities.͟  ͞MaiŶtaiŶiŶg the foƌĐe ŵuseuŵ. ͞ 
 Merchandising.  Graphic design.  Audio-visual services.  Exhibitions and shows, event 
management.  Intra and internet 
development and 
management, e-
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͟ 
  Managing web content. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this study to explore the concept of risk and its implications in depth. 
However, the results do suggest a reorientation in communications away from traditional 
͚iŵage ŵakiŶg͛ aŶd toǁaƌds ƌisk, puďliĐ ƌespoŶsiďilisatioŶ aŶd puďliĐ ŵoďilisatioŶ iŶ oƌdeƌ to 
tackle crime and disorder. Certainly the work of Lee and McGovern (2015), Connor (2015) and 
Brainard and Edlins (2015) on how police forces are using Twitter suggests that there is an 
international trend in police forces to use social media as a means of communicating risk.  
 
When Crump (2011) examined social media use in England, however, he found no evidence of 
risk as a communicating logic; although there was a strong feeling from the police forces at the 
time that using social media was seen as a significant risk, which was why so few forces had 
prior to the August riots attempted to promote these channels. From his research, Crump 
(2011) suggested three models for how the police are using social media. 
1. BƌoadĐasteƌs: puďliĐitǇ aŶd iŶfoƌŵatioŶ ďased. The aiŵ of this ŵodel ǁas to ͚push͛ 
information into the public domain, whether this was regarding traffic accidents, 
alerts, success stories or appeals for information.  This model closely coincides with 
GƌuŶig͛s ;ϭϵϴϵͿ Pƌess AgeŶĐǇ ŵodel aŶd Meƌgel͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ͚Push͛.  
2. Local knowledge gathering:  intelligence monitoring and network building. The root 
of this model is in operational policing and includes covert social media police 
operations as well as using it to monitor tensions (see Williams et al, 2013; Trotter, 
2015), demographic information on audiences and using the police audience as an 
information network.  
3. Community facilitators: this is aimed at encouraging dialogue and community 
engagement. This is the most inclusive and engagement based model, closely 
ƌeseŵďliŶg the ͚Tǁo-WaǇ AsǇŵŵetƌiĐal͛ ;GƌuŶig, ϭϵϴϵͿ aŶd ͚Pull͛ ;Meƌgel, ϮϬϭϰͿ.   
 
The interview data however, suggests a further two possible typologies may now be in 
evidence – that of risk management and pacification. Interviewees with more active social 
ŵedia Ŷetǁoƌks ǁeƌe keeŶ to disĐuss ǁhat PI.Ϯϯ ƌefeƌƌed to as ͞ǀiƌtual people ŵaŶageŵeŶt͟. 
This, according to PI.23, involved successfully communicating with targeted audiences in order 
to manage a problem as it is occurring (e.g. traffic accident) or to respond to fears, worries and 
complaints in order to provide mass scale public reassurance and prevent panic. This strategy 
was about communicating risk in order to reduce the likelihood of greater risk and bigger 
pƌoďleŵs. ͚PaĐifiĐatioŶ͛, as PI.ϰ, teƌŵed his appƌoaĐh had ďeeŶ used to gƌeat suĐĐess ďǇ his 
force during the 2011 London Riots as a means of de-escalating local situations and managing 
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panicked demands for immediate police action. Since then PI.4 said the model had been 
regularly used by his team as a method of public engagement and was, he thought, a 
contributing factor in their high confidence levels. Similar approaches were mentioned by a 
significant number of the interviewees, although many of those from smaller or less developed 
teams agreed that in their case pacification was less of a proactive strategy and more reactive. 
The opposite, however, was found with regard to risk – in all but three teams communicating 
risk (accidents, alerts and appeals for information) was increasingly described as a proactive 
strategy. 
 
Fuƌtheƌ eǀideŶĐe of these ͚logiĐs of ƌisk͛ ideŶtified ďǇ Lee aŶd McGovern (2015 p.1) included 
police social media policies. According to Lee and McGovern (2015), police social media 
strategies were prime examples of how a culture of risk, and communicating risk, had become 
established and prominent in Australian police forces. In England, however, these policies are 
often inconsistent in terms of the breadth and depth of the topics covered; with some forces 
providing policies only a few pages long, with very little guidance and little concern with 
educating officers about risk (3.1.5). While there are exceptions to this, the variability in 
standard and level of concern is interesting and suggests that how social media is used and 
viewed varies considerably across police forces, both in terms of potential and risk (Appendix 
3.4).  
 
In general, while there were some references to risk apparent in the data
27
, there was less 
oǀeƌt eǀideŶĐe of it fouŶd thaŶ Lee aŶd MĐGoǀeƌŶ͛s ;ϮϬϭϱͿ ƌeseaƌĐh suggests is the Đase iŶ 
Australia. When this topic was broached around a third of the interviewees (10) declared a lack 
of interest in risk, preferring their officers to experiment with what works and get things wrong 
if necessary than to be overly cautious and prescriptive. PI.11 and PI.14 were particularly clear 
on this point as they felt that eŶĐouƌagiŶg poliĐe offiĐeƌs to ͞ƌeallǇ eŶgage͟ ǁith soĐial ŵedia 
ǁas ͞faƌ ŵoƌe iŵpoƌtaŶt iŶ the loŶg ƌuŶ͟ thaŶ ͞ďeiŶg a Đoƌpoƌate Ŷet-nanny always telling 
theŵ ǁhat to do͟ ;PI.ϭϰͿ. As PI.ϭϭ eǆplaiŶed: 
͞Ǉou'ǀe got offiĐeƌs out iŶ the stƌeet eǀeƌǇ daǇ of the week, probably tens of 
thousands if not hundreds of thousands of interactions, you would kill for a 
complaint ratio of only four or five complaints from all those interactions.  You know, 
you're talking hundreds or thousands of complaints a year.  So, what's the big risk.  
                                           
27
 Notably around social media use in those forces which were only just starting to use these channels in 
a more involved and strategic manner.  
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Just because it's visible and it's on social media, we either trust our people to use 
theiƌ ĐoŵŵoŶ seŶse to folloǁ the guideliŶes, kŶoǁ ǁhat the laǁ is oƌ ǁe doŶ't… ǁe 
doŶ't ŵoŶitoƌ… eǀeƌǇ oŶe of theiƌ iŶteƌaĐtioŶs ǁith the puďliĐ oŶ the streets or at 
ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ ŵeetiŶgs, so ǁhǇ do ǁe suddeŶlǇ get Ŷeƌǀous oŶ soĐial ŵedia?͟ ;PI.ϭϭͿ 
 
Such an approach seems to tie in closely with the apparent devolution of communications 
away from a central hub (Communications department) to rank and file police officers. This 
trend was remarked upon by many of the interviewees and is confirmed by the number of 
local social media accounts run by local police officers (3.1.6). Innes (1999), Boyle (1999), 
Kingshott (2011) and Ponsford (2014) all comment on the distance police forces tried to 
establish from the media and public through the employment of communications experts from 
the late 1980s up until comparatively recently. Devolution then marks a significant reversal in 
the pattern of increasing centralisation prevalent during the Twentieth Century. What the 
ŵedia haǀe teƌŵed ͚Boďďies oŶ the Tǁeet͛ ;Milleƌ, ϮϬϭϯͿ has Ŷot ďeeŶ ǁithout sĐaŶdal oƌ 
issues over the past few years. From 2012 onwards there has been a proliferation of 
journalistic attention over possible police misuse, professional misconduct and examples of 
inappropriate disclosure on social media sites (Laville, 2012a, 2012b; Hamilton and Bonner, 
2014; Spillet, 2014). That police forces have persevered with encouraging a devolved model of 
communications despite these issues is highly suggestive of a wider change in overall 
communications strategy and how communications is seen, understood and used by police 
forces. It is also arguably indicative of a shift in how police forces are responding to risk – with 
police communications becoming less demonstrably risk averse rather than more in some 
foƌĐes; the opposite of Lee aŶd MĐGoǀeƌŶ͛s ;ϮϬϭϱͿ fiŶdiŶgs.   
 
Peƌhaps the ŵost outǁaƌdlǇ ǀisiďle iŶdiĐatioŶ of this ŵoǀe aǁaǇ fƌoŵ the ͚old͛ ŵodel of 
communications, however, is in the names of these departments. Names are of fundamental 
importance on a symbolic level (Loader, 1997); particularly for dramaturgical organisations like 
the police who exist on the well-lit stage of public scrutiny. Names tell us not just what a thing 
is, or does, but what they strive to be and what they want to be seen as (Loader and Mulcahy, 
2001b).  
 
Mawby (2002) observed that through the 1990s and early 2000s, of these departments 
staƌtiŶg ƌeplaĐiŶg ͚Pƌess͛ aŶd ͚PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs͛ in their names and instead restyling themselves 
͚Coƌpoƌate CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͛. IŶ ϮϬϬϲ MaǁďǇ ;ϮϬϬϳͿ ƌeĐoƌded that ϭϳ EŶglish poliĐe foƌĐes 
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ǁeƌe usiŶg ͚Coƌpoƌate CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͛. As of MaǇ ϮϬϭϱ this had iŶĐƌeased to Ϯϱ; it is 
iŶteƌestiŶg that aŶǇ ƌefeƌeŶĐe to ͚PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs͛ iŶ the depaƌtŵeŶt Ŷaŵe has Ŷoǁ ďeeŶ 
phased out completely (Fig 3.1).  
 
MaǁďǇ ;ϮϬϬϴ, p.ϭϰͿ ĐoŶĐluded that ͞the ĐhaŶge iŶ Ŷaŵe iŶdiĐates the aspiƌatioŶs of these 
departments and the direction in which police communications has been moving over the last 
deĐade͟. WheŶ asked to eǆplaiŶ the Ŷaŵe ĐhaŶge, hoǁeǀeƌ, the ƌeasoŶs giǀeŶ ďǇ the 
interviewees were considerably more confused. Explanations generally varied between those 
who thought it was due to:  
1)  Aspiration (3: 10%); 
2)  To make the department less esoteric and easier to understand (4: 13%); 
3)  Another example of corporatisation and professionalisation (5: 16%); 
4)  Paƌt of a stƌategǇ to distaŶĐe the depaƌtŵeŶt fƌoŵ ͚P‘͛ ;ϱ: ϭϲ%Ϳ; oƌ  
5)  The new name better describes departmental priorities and function (9: 29%) (Fig 
3.39).  
 
There was an interesting divide in the answers between those who thought the change of 
name was ideological (reasons 1 and 4) and those who thought it was functional (2, 3 and 5) – 
with the majority of interviewees arguing for the latter rather than the former. Given the high 
leǀel of disĐoŵfoƌt eǆpƌessed ďǇ soŵe iŶteƌǀieǁees aƌouŶd the teƌŵ ͚puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs͛ it ǁould 
not have been surprising if the move had been driven by the change in ideology. What is 
particulaƌlǇ iŶteƌestiŶg though is the suďseƋueŶt sǁiŶg aǁaǇ fƌoŵ ͚ĐoƌpoƌatisatioŶ͛ oďseƌǀed 
by some of the interviewees. PI.15 and PI.28, for example, discussed how communication 
depaƌtŵeŶts ǁeƌe iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ losiŶg the ͚Coƌpoƌate͛ paƌt of theiƌ title aŶd Ŷoǁ iŶstead 
adoptiŶg ǁoƌds like ͚EŶgageŵeŶt͛ oƌ siŵplǇ usiŶg ͚CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ͛. This suppoƌts the idea 
that the name reflects the perceived functions of the department and lends credence to the 
ideology argument – as the department continues to change and evolve so does its name.  
 
In conjunction with this change in ideology there has been a corresponding shift in the 
operational position of the department within the wider policing context. Mawby (2002, 
p.181) proposed three models of public relations activity in poliĐe foƌĐes: ͚MaƌgiŶal͛, 
͚“uppoƌtiǀe͛ aŶd ͚Coƌe͛ ;ϭ.ϲ.ϭͿ. MaǁďǇ ;ϮϬϬϮͿ ĐoŶĐluded that ǁhile theƌe ǁeƌe tƌaĐes of all 
thƌee ŵodels, poliĐe puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs ǁas pƌedoŵiŶaŶtlǇ used iŶ ͚MaƌgiŶal͛ oƌ ͚“uppoƌtiǀe͛ 
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roles by the police. He hypothesised, however, that given the complex nature of 
communications and the growing importance of the department it was possible that while the 
thiƌd ŵodel ǁas ͞oƌgaŶisatioŶallǇ uŶfeasiďle͟ iŶ ϮϬϬϮ poliĐe puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs Đould ŵoǀe 
towards a more integrated and dialogued based approach across police functions instead of 
ƌeŵaiŶiŶg aŶ optioŶal ͞ďolt-oŶ͟ adǀisoƌǇ seƌǀiĐe ;ibid, p.198).   
 
Following consultation with the pilot force, however, these typologies were adapted to better 
suit current terminology and understanding, instead becoming
28
:  
1) ͚OptioŶal͛: police communications is considered non-essential or an optional extra by 
police officers. This is reflected in lack of inclusion at senior levels and avoidance or a 
dismissive attitude from investigating officers.  
2) ͚Coŵpleŵentary: police communications is considered important and is used/accepted 
by most police officers although there remains a sense of exclusion and not being a 
part of operational policing.  
3) ͚Eŵďedded͛:  police communications is considered an essential part of operational 
policing and is included at all levels of police management (e.g. has a seat on the 
management board). 
 
IŶ ĐoŶtƌast to MaǁďǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϮͿ fiŶdiŶgs, the ŵajoƌitǇ of poliĐe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs depaƌtŵeŶts 
ǁeƌe Đategoƌised ďǇ theiƌ staff as ͚Eŵďedded͛ ;ϭϴͿ ǁith oŶlǇ siǆ depaƌtŵeŶts desĐƌiďed as 
͚CoŵpleŵeŶtaƌǇ͛, tǁo as ͚OptioŶal͛ aŶd fouƌ iŶ tƌaŶsitioŶ ;ϯ.Ϯ.ϮͿ.  The ĐhaŶge iŶ opeƌatioŶal 
position of the department was highlighted as one, if not the, greatest change in the 
department over the last two deĐades. IŶ ͚Eŵďedded͛ depaƌtŵeŶts, the iŶteƌǀieǁees ǁeƌe 
keeŶ to talk aďout hoǁ theiƌ depaƌtŵeŶt had ŵoǀed fƌoŵ aŶ ͞aŶĐillaƌǇ ďaĐkƌooŵ fuŶĐtioŶ 
affiliated to ďut Ŷot paƌt of ƌeal poliĐe ǁoƌk͟ ;PI.ϭͿ to ͞opeƌatioŶallǇ esseŶtial͟ ;PI.ϭϲͿ, 
supported by the senior management team and accepted by police officers as a necessary part 
of policing.  
 
Part of the reason for this wider cultural change in perception was attributed by some to the 
decade of professionalisation which had helped transform the reputation of the department.  
AĐĐoƌdiŶg to PI.Ϯ, the ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs depaƌtŵeŶt had tƌaditioŶallǇ ďeeŶ ǀieǁed as ͞ǁheƌe 
Ǉou go foƌ a ƋuiĐk pƌoŵotioŶ͟, a depaƌtŵeŶt ǁhose pƌiŵaƌǇ fuŶĐtioŶ ǁas ŵaiŶlǇ seeŶ as 
                                           
28
 See 2.8.5 
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͞spiŶŶiŶg thiŶgs foƌ the pƌess to keep theŵ off Ǉouƌ ďaĐk so police officers could get on with 
ƌeal poliĐe ǁoƌk͟ ;PI.ϭͿ. CiǀiliaŶisatioŶ aŶd the adǀeŶt of soĐial ŵedia, hoǁeǀeƌ, has ƌeƋuiƌed 
police forces to adapt quickly to a new communications and virtual social landscape which has 
redefined the role of communicatioŶ iŶ the poliĐe. Noǁ, iŶstead of a depaƌtŵeŶt that is a ͞ďit 
of aŶ add oŶ͟ ;PI.ϭϴͿ, oƌ ͞luǆuƌǇ͟ ;PI.ϭϭͿ, ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs depaƌtŵeŶts aƌe iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ ǀieǁed 
as aŶ eǆpeƌt ƌesouƌĐe theƌe to ͞aid iŶ aĐtual poliĐe ǁoƌk ďǇ ŶetǁoƌkiŶg ǁith the ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ 
and assist iŶ aĐhieǀiŶg poliĐe ǁoƌk͟ ;PI.ϭϱͿ.  
 
This was not, however, the case with all the forces interviewed and there remained a 
sigŶifiĐaŶt Ŷuŵďeƌ of depaƌtŵeŶts ;ϰϮ%Ϳ ǁhiĐh ǁeƌe Ŷot ĐoŶsideƌed ͚Eŵďedded͛ – reporting 
long standing, and often considerable, frustrations with this situation. PI.2, PI.11, PI.15, PI.18 
and PI.21 were the most vocal on this matter, and felt strongly that their departments were 
͞ŵisuŶdeƌstood͟ ;PI.ϭϱͿ, ͞ŵisused͟ ;PI.ϮͿ, ͞ŵaƌgiŶalised͟ ;PI.ϮϭͿ,͞uŶdeƌ ƌesouƌĐed͟ ;PI.ϭϭͿ 
and usually onlǇ ďƌought iŶ ǁheŶ ͞soŵethiŶg had goŶe ǁƌoŶg͟ ;PI.ϮϴͿ.    
 
There was a very clear connection between reported satisfaction and operational position in 
the iŶteƌǀieǁ data. Those iŶteƌǀieǁees ǁho ďelieǀed that theiƌ depaƌtŵeŶts ǁeƌe ͚Eŵďedded͛ 
and accepted were far more positive about their contribution to policing and were keen to 
emphasise the importance and operational nature of their work. Those interviewees, however, 
ǁho desĐƌiďed theiƌ depaƌtŵeŶts ǁeƌe ͚OptioŶal͛ oƌ ͚CoŵpleŵeŶtaƌǇ͛ ǁeƌe less eŶthusiastiĐ 
about their activities, described their department roles in more traditional terms (e.g. media 
management) and eager to air their frustrations.  
 
The above discussion shows that how police communications is perceived and used has 
changed considerably over the last century, and especially over the last decade.  When the 
first official press office was introduced in 1919 the intention had been to create a central 
function for the MPS that would publicise the information senior officers wanted known, 
prevent corrupt practices, and standardise and manage press enquiries so that police officers 
could perform their duties undistracted and unimpeded (Wood, 2013). It was limited function 
iŶ a sŵall depaƌtŵeŶt that ǁas affiliated to ďut Ŷot paƌt of ͞pƌopeƌ poliĐiŶg͟ (PI.2). In 2014, 
oǀeƌ half of the iŶteƌǀieǁees ;ϱϴ%Ϳ desĐƌiďed theiƌ depaƌtŵeŶts as fullǇ ͚Eŵďedded͛ aŶd 
thought communications an essential part of operational policing rather than supportive 
backroom function. While the purpose and operational function of the department varied 
between the forces interviewed, the interviewees who described their departments as 
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͚optioŶal͛ oƌ ͚ĐoŵpleŵeŶtaƌǇ͛ ǁeƌe all optiŵistiĐ that this situatioŶ ǁould ĐhaŶge as poliĐe 
officers had to rely more on communications in order to bridge gaps in service delivery caused 
by the reduction in funding.  
 
Mawby (2002, p7) suggested that at the time of his research there were four periods in police 
public relations: Informal Image Work, Emergent Public Relations, Embedding Public Relations 
and The Professionalisation of Police Image Work. The changes and evolution described above, 
however, suggest that there is now evidence of a new era emerging; one which prioritises 
direct communication to (and more importantly with) individuals through digital channels (see 
4.3).  
Engage (NPIA, 2010) set out a vision of an inclusive, personal and direct dialogue based 
communications model that used social media as a vehicle to create and maintain virtual 
information and policing networks in local communities. The aim was to improve public 
confidence, user satisfaction and make use of the immense crime solving and intelligence 
gathering resource that these sites have the potential to be.  As will be discussed further in the 
next section (4.3) while the interviewees reported limited success with meeting these 
staŶdaƌds aŶd ideals aŶalǇsis shoǁs that theƌe is gƌoǁiŶg eǀideŶĐe of this ͚DiƌeĐt aŶd Digital͛ 
approach. Social media has rapidly expanded and embedded itself at the heart of police 
external communications strategies with some forces looking to use social media sites and 
websites as the primary means of non-emergency service provision. At the time of interview 
23 (74%) of the interviewees were exploring the potential resource and time saving benefits of 
moving more services online with many developing, or improving, their websites to allow 
online crime reporting and access to more key services
29
.  
 
The fifth era of police communications is characterised by the predominance of social media as 
the preferred channel for communication to the exclusion and diminution of journalists and 
traditional channels. There is a strong emphasis on public engagement and dialogue orientated 
police communications that is moving away from traditional communication models and 
ŵethods that ͞shout at eǀeƌǇoŶe iŶ the hope of hittiŶg the ƌight gƌoup͟ ;PI.ϭͿ iŶ oƌdeƌ to foƌge 
diƌeĐt aŶd peƌsoŶal ƌelatioŶships ǁith the iŶdiǀidual ƌatheƌ thaŶ ͚taƌget gƌoup͛.. IŶ paƌallel to 
this, increasingly sophisticated tactics for micro targeted communications are developed so 
that messages and content can be tailored to highly specific audiences and online networks 
are cultivated to aid operational policing requirements (e.g. appeals).  
                                           
29
 Such as gun licencing, crime tracking, media enquiries, FOI requests and social media updates.  
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Such strategies and tactics in many forces, however, were still in their infancy in 2015 but 
there are encouraging signs of development and growth in this area. The change in ideology 
and the increasing adoption of a devolved communications model offers compelling evidence 
in support of the advent of a new period in police communications. Of those interviewed 5 
(16%) thought that their teams had achieved the aspiration set out in Engage (NPIA, 2010) 
ǁhile ϭϮ ;ϯϵ%Ϳ thought that theiƌ teaŵs ǁeƌe ͞gettiŶg theƌe͟ oƌ ǁeƌe ŵeetiŶg the 
ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts to ͞soŵe eǆteŶt͟ – an improvement from the HMIC (2011b, p30) report which 
concluded that ͞the poliĐe haǀe ŵuĐh to leaƌŶ aďout soĐial ŵedia͟ aŶd that ͞ǁith soŵe 
Ŷotaďle eǆĐeptioŶs, the poǁeƌ of this kiŶd of ŵedia… is Ŷot ǁell uŶdeƌstood aŶd less ǁell 
ŵaŶaged͟.  
 
The emergence of a ͚DiƌeĐt aŶd Digital͛ peƌiodisatioŶ, hoǁeǀeƌ, does ƌaise the ƋuestioŶ of 
whether public relations can still be considered relevant in modern police communications. 
Certainly this was a concern raised with some frequency during the interviews. Of the 31 
people interviewed, 11 (36%) stated that they thought public relations was no longer relevant, 
either as part of their jobs or within the wider policing context. One interviewee explained that 
changing the department name to Corporate Communications was a rebranding exercise 
desigŶed to distaŶĐe the depaƌtŵeŶt fƌoŵ aŶǇ suggestioŶ of ͚spiŶ doĐtoƌiŶg͛ aŶd the 
connected concern that the department was the police propaganda machine only there to 
protect their reputation (PI.27); as another interviewee said - theiƌ ͞joď is to ͚ǁaƌŶ aŶd iŶfoƌŵ͛, 
Ŷot Đoǀeƌ up sĐaŶdals͟ ;PI.ϮͿ. LaĐk of ƌeleǀaŶĐe ǁas also Đited as oŶe of the ƌeasoŶs ǁhǇ puďliĐ 
relations departments had changed their names in order to better reflect their new functions 
and aspirations (3.2.4).  
 
Wright (2015), and others (see Bolger, 1983; Grunig, 1989; Morris and Goldsworthy, 2012), 
suggest that there is something of an industry, almost society wide anxiety around the concept 
of public relations – entangled as it is with notions of control, manipulation and examples of 
corporate malpractice – that frustrates attempts to define it. Something similar appears to be 
the case with the police as it was suggested by six of the participants that the title of this thesis 
should ƌeŵoǀe the teƌŵ ͚puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs͛ principally on these grounds (1.4).  
 
Public relations is often seen as existing in order to conceal, cover up, redirect and manipulate 
puďliĐ opiŶioŶ ;Cottle, ϮϬϬϯͿ. That it is a ͞ŵaŶifestatioŶ of poǁeƌ desigŶed to legitiŵate the 
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discourses, power and positioŶs of the doŵiŶaŶt ĐollatioŶ͟ ;MotioŶ, ϮϬϬϱ p.ϱϬϱͿ - the 
antithesis of the openness, transparency and accountability agenda currently pursued by many 
public institutions (Cornelissen, 2011).  
 
This belief was strongly apparent in several of the interviews. PI.6, PI.7 and PI.22, in particular, 
ǁeƌe ǀoĐifeƌouslǇ opposed to assoĐiatiŶg ͚puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs͛ ǁith theiƌ depaƌtŵeŶts pƌeĐiselǇ 
because of the negative connotations linked with the concept. As PI.6 explained, police 
communications, in her department, was about meeting the operational requirements of the 
force; helping to solve crimes and alert the general public to problems or issues that they 
needed to be aware of. 
͞I see the puƌpose of the Đoŵs depaƌtŵeŶt to ǁoƌk ǁith fƌoŶtliŶe poliĐe offiĐeƌs aŶd 
iŶǀestigatoƌs to pƌeǀeŶt aŶd ƌeduĐe aŶd solǀe Đƌiŵe. That͛s ouƌ fuŶdaŵeŶtal puƌpose 
… We aƌe Ŷot Ŷoƌ should ǁe ďe a puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs depaƌtŵeŶt͟. ;PI.ϲͿ 
 
Consistent with the interviewees objections, only limited evidence of traditional public 
relations activities was found in the data collected. It is interesting that of the 25 teams 
interviewed, under half (44%) included identity, brand and image as part of their 
responsibilities; while the majority of these interviewees were openly dismissive of the idea of 
controlling their image with the prevalence of social media. In comparison 22 teams (88%) saw 
that their core function is to assist operational policing, and all teams said that one of their 
pƌiŶĐiple joďs is to ͚ǁaƌŶ aŶd iŶfoƌŵ͛ the puďliĐ.  OŶe fuŶdaŵental aspect which became 
apparent from the interview data was the significant shift in the culture and attitude around 
communications which many of the interviewees had witnessed in the last decade. Several of 
the interviewees drew a distinction between the ideology which underpinned traditional 
police communications and that which they thought governed their modern departments – 
which in turn had led to a change in ideological purpose if not the practical realities of how and 
what they had to communicate.  
 
The overwhelming emphasis from the interviewees was that police communications is now 
about engagement, information networking and risk communication rather than direct image 
management. This change was captured by PI.22 who said that the purpose of police 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs is to ͞pƌoǀide the puďliĐ ǁith a ǁiŶdoǁ iŶto the ǁoƌld of poliĐiŶg… theǇ Ŷeed 
to ďe aďle to see ǁhat theiƌ poliĐe foƌĐes do, ǁho ǁe aƌe, ǁhat ǁe do, ǁhat ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg foƌ 
them and they need to be able to call us to account if they think that soŵethiŶg͛s ǁƌoŶg.͟  
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The interview data reveals a clear underlying anxiety around the term and a desire to distance 
ŵodeƌŶ ͚Coƌpoƌate CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͛ fƌoŵ ǁhat ŵost iŶteƌǀieǁees ĐoŶsideƌed the ͚old 
ŵodel͛. WheŶ ŵeasuƌed agaiŶst the ĐhaŶges desĐƌiďed aďove, the popular understanding of 
puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs as ͚spiŶ͛, ͚puďliĐitǇ͛ aŶd ͚ƌeputatioŶ ŵaŶageŵeŶt͛ does iŶdeed appeaƌ to ďe a 
poor and outdated fit as a framework for modern police communications and suggests that 
public relations may no longer be relevant.  
 
As Broom and Sha (2013) remind us, however, definitions are more than just convenient 
conversational vehicles for shared communication, they also show how the definer relates to 
the concept. Change the definition and a very different answer becomes apparent.   
 
Chapter 1 discussed the historic difficulties around defining public relations. Most definitions 
are either incomplete, too vague, too narrow, tautological or impossible to apply. Indeed 
Wright (2015) suggested that trying to define public relatioŶs ǁas a ͞Ŷeǀeƌ eŶdiŶg ƋuestioŶ͟ 
due to the adaptability of the industry that means it is constantly in a state of transition. Of the 
100+ definitions considered for this thesis the only one that worked within the context of 
policing was one devised by Grunig and Hunt (1984). According to Grunig and Hunt (1984, p.4) 
puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs is ďest uŶdeƌstood as ͞the ŵaŶageŵeŶt of ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ aŶ 
oƌgaŶisatioŶ aŶd its puďliĐs͟. Foƌ GƌuŶig ;ϭϵϴϵͿ puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs is aŶ uŵďƌella fuŶĐtioŶ ŵade 
up of four basic models: Press Agency, Public Information, Two Way Asymmetrical and Two 
Way Symmetrical.  
 
The basic argument forwarded by those interviewees who said public relations was no longer 
relevant was that there is an ideological and strategic difference between new (modern) and 
old ;tƌaditioŶal P‘Ϳ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs. UsiŶg GƌuŶig aŶd HuŶt͛s ;ϭϵϴϰͿ defiŶitioŶ, hoǁeǀeƌ, 
renders this distinction irrelevant. Instead, it suggests that public relations is far from being 
redundant and has simply transitioned between models; away from the Press Agency model 
that is pƌiŵaƌilǇ ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ǁith ĐoŶtƌolliŶg iŵage aŶd ͚the stoƌǇ͛ to a ŵoƌe opeŶ oŶe like the 
Public Information model that emphasises truth and targeted communication.  
 
Seen in this light public relations still plays a fundamental role in police communications.  
While at the tiŵe of the iŶteƌǀieǁs theƌe ǁas liŵited eǀideŶĐe of GƌuŶig͛s ;ϭϵϴϵͿ thiƌd aŶd 
fourth models, there was a strong indication that police forces were increasingly 
experimenting with and adopting more dialogue based strategies and that honesty and 
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credibility are now viewed as more valuable than protecting the reputation of the force at all 
costs. As the police exist as the legitimate authority and enforcer of laws it is unlikely that 
police forces will ever be able to wholly achieve the level of openness and engagement that 
GƌuŶig͛s ;ϭϵϴϵͿ Tǁo WaǇ “ǇŵŵetƌiĐal oƌ Meƌgel͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ TƌaŶsaĐtioŶal ŵodels stipulate, ďut 
the iŶitial ĐhaŶges aƌe pƌoŵisiŶg aŶd suppoƌt the iŶteƌǀieǁees͛ asseƌtioŶ that theƌe has been 
an ideological transformation.  
 
This raises the question of why 11 of the interviewees were so opposed to public relations and 
thought it irrelevant. The answer the interview data suggests is that there are systemic 
misconceptions and misunderstandings around the definition of public relations. 15 years ago 
both the HMIC (2001) and Mawby and Worthington (2002) reported that ironically there was a 
generally poor understanding of public relations in the police, particularly within the then 
Đalled ͚PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs͛ depaƌtŵeŶts. As a ƌesult of this, puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs ǁas fƌeƋueŶtlǇ 
conflated with marketing, spin and propaganda (1.3). Understanding of public relations has not 
improved markedly in the intervening decade. PI.22, for example, said that he avoided using 
the term not because it was no longer part of his job but because of the reaction it garnered 
fƌoŵ ďoth his staff aŶd otheƌ poliĐe offiĐeƌs ǁho ͞heaƌd P‘ aŶd thought ͚spiŶ͛͟.  
 
The results show that there remains a high level of confusion around the term (3.2.3); with 
almost half of the interviewees unable to explain what public relations is. This was quite 
surprising given the number of interviewees who claimed to have a public relations 
background. PI.27, for example, said that he had over 20 years experience in corporate public 
ƌelatioŶs aŶd Ǉet ǁheŶ asked ƌeplied that he ͞ǁouldŶ͛t ƌeallǇ kŶoǁ hoǁ to defiŶe puďliĐ 
ƌelatioŶs͟. Tǁo of the iŶteƌǀieǁees thought it ǁas sǇŶoŶǇŵous ǁith ͚spiŶ͛ aŶd seǀeŶ thought 
it was the same as publicity and marketing.  
 
What was also surprising was that despite the almost endemic confusion and discomfort 
surrounding public relations, over half (52%) were keen to emphasise that public relations was 
still a relevant and important part of their function. The results show a strong association 
between the interviewees who had a more positive definition of public relations and those 
who thought it was still relevant. The converse was also consistent – with those who either 
had trouble defining public relations or viewed it negatively were significantly more likely to 
claim it was now redundant or irrelevant.  
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Yates (1989) suggested that the reason why public relations has not just survived but thrived 
despite its ͞P‘ pƌoďleŵ͟ ;Fisheƌ, ϮϬϭϮͿ is ďeĐause of its adaptaďilitǇ to become whatever is 
needed; as society changes so too does the public relations industry.  This is arguably true with 
public relations in the police. Public relations is arguably a reflection of the organisation using 
it and as the communications department has evolved to meet the requirements of a new age, 
so too has public relations practice and ideology. In doing so public relations has cemented its 
position and relevancy within policing.  
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4.3 Communication Strategies, Audience and Channels 
Questions: 1.3, 1.4, 2.2 
Results Ref: 3.1.6, 3.2.4 – 3.2.7 
 
Fuƌtheƌ eǀideŶĐe of this Ŷeǁ ͚DiƌeĐt aŶd Digital͛ peƌiod is appaƌeŶt iŶ hoǁ poliĐe foƌĐes aƌe 
communicating, the channels now being used and the strategies employed. The results show a 
clear underlying pattern in how the police are communicating; with police forces increasingly 
transitioning away from traditional methods of communication to a more direct and inclusive 
appƌoaĐh. PoliĐe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs has ŵoǀed aǁaǇ fƌoŵ the ͚pƌess offiĐe͛, oŶe ĐhaŶŶel ŵodel 
ǁheƌe theiƌ Đoƌe ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ ǁas to ŵeet the Ŷeeds of the ŵedia aŶd ͚push͛ ;Meƌgel, ϮϬϭϰͿ 
their story out, to a service provider role where the department talks directly to a plurality of 
different audience groups in the general population - only one of which is the media.  
 
The interview data suggests that there is considerable variation in strategy between 
communications teams, and across different policing environments in general. Using the 
Đategoƌies adapted fƌoŵ Meƌgel͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ tǇpologies, eǀideŶĐe was found of all four 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ stƌategǇ ŵodels ;͚Push͛, ͚Pull͛, ͚NetǁoƌkiŶg͛ aŶd ͚TƌaŶsfoƌŵatiǀe͛Ϳ iŶ ǀaƌǇiŶg 
ĐoŵďiŶatioŶs aŶd to diffeƌiŶg eǆteŶts. ͚Push͛ ;ϰϴ%Ϳ ǁas the ŵost ĐoŵŵoŶ stƌategǇ ideŶtified,  
folloǁed ďǇ ͚Pull͛ ;Ϯϱ%Ϳ ǁith a feǁ iŶteƌǀieǁees usiŶg a ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ of ͚Push͛ aŶd ͚Pull͛ ;ϭϬ%Ϳ 
oƌ ͚Push͛ aŶd ͚TƌaŶsfoƌŵatiǀe͛ ;ϭϬ%Ϳ; oŶlǇ oŶe depaƌtŵeŶt, hoǁeǀeƌ, desĐƌiďed theiƌ stƌategǇ 
as ͚TƌaŶsfoƌŵatiǀe͛ ;Ϯ.ϴ.ϱͿ.  
 
Given the historic purpose and focus of the communications department the strong emphasis 
oŶ ͚Push͛ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs is Ŷot suƌpƌisiŶg; espeĐiallǇ as soĐial ŵedia sites leŶd theŵselǀes to 
this model. This facet of social media has been utilised to great acclaim during crisis situations 
in the past (e.g. during the widespread flooding in spring 2014) and is likely to continue as an 
essential tool for police forces in the future (Connor, 2015). What was more unexpected was 
the stƌoŶg ƌeaĐtioŶ fƌoŵ the ŵajoƌitǇ of the iŶteƌǀieǁees toǁaƌds eliŵiŶatiŶg ͚Push͛ iŶ faǀouƌ 
of ͚Pull͛ oƌ ͚TƌaŶsfoƌŵatiǀe͛ stƌategies.  This ǁas ĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith the gƌoǁiŶg iŵpoƌtaŶĐe 
placed on behavioural change as the foundation for crime prevention campaigns that was 
mentioned by several of the interviewees.  
 
When asked about their current communication strategies, however, nearly two thirds of the 
interviewees expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the strategies currently in place. 
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There was considerable sense of frustration discussed with regard to the gap between how 
they thought their teams were currently communicating and how they ought to be. One of the 
difficulties which was hampering this was encapsulated by PI.28 who thought that while police 
foƌĐes ͞aspiƌe to ďe pull… I doŶ͛t thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe aĐtuallǇ ǀeƌǇ good at it… I thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe ǀeƌǇ used 
to telling people… ǁe doŶ͛t aĐtuallǇ eŶgage [the puďliĐ] iŶ the deďate aďout ǁhat ǁe͛ƌe 
doiŶg͟. PI.Ϯϴ ƌaised a ǀalid poiŶt, eŶgageŵeŶt iŶ the foƌŵ that soĐial ŵedia eŶĐouƌages is Ŷot 
only new to police forces but also often an anathema to how they have previously interacted 
with the public. In order to further grow public engagement the wider mentality around 
communications needs to change and this takes time to evolve.  
 
Such a change, however, would not have been possible before the advent of Web 2.0 and 
social media sites which allow users to generate content and interact on a virtual platform 
(Zerfass and Schramm, 2013). The interview and FOI data are consistent with the ACPO (2014) 
survey results which showed the growing importance and time devoted to social media by 
police communications teams. The data shows a pattern of accelerated up take in police forces 
post 2010/11, with forces increasingly using not just Twitter and Facebook but also 
experimenting with the potential of other sites as well.  
 
As of December 2015, all forces now have at least one Twitter account and Facebook page, 
with 34 using YouTube and over half maintaining a presence on at least one additional site. 
Twitter remains the preferred social media channel, for the time being at least, although there 
was an emerging theme in the interviews which suggested that Facebook might become the 
prioritised channel as it is considered a better tool for engagement. This is consistent with 
CoŶŶoƌ͛s ;ϮϬϭϱͿ fiŶdiŶgs ǁhiĐh suggested that CaŶadiaŶ foƌĐes ǁeƌe ŵoǀiŶg increasingly 
toǁaƌds FaĐeďook as the pƌefeƌƌed site foƌ eŶgageŵeŶt stƌategies.  GiǀeŶ MĐGƌoƌǇ͛s ;ϮϬϭϲͿ 
analysis of social media audience trends, which suggests that Twitter usage is decreasing while 
Facebook is increasing across all age ranges, encouraging a more active police, and targeted, 
presence on Facebook will likely become more important in the future.  
 
The distinction drawn between these two sites by the interviewees is particularly interesting 
and suggests a far more sophisticated and targeted grasp of social media technologies than 
that found by Crump (2011), Proctor et al (2013) or Brainard and Edlins (2015).  YouTube, 
however, continues to be an inconsistently and underused resource by many forces and while 
there are a growing number of other social media sites used these are often updated 
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lackadaisically and seldom considered as part of the integrated, official communications 
strategy.  
 
That police forces are experimenting with new sites, however, is a good indication of how the 
overall strategy and outlook of the department has changed and suggests that the direct and 
digital approach is slowly becoming more embedded. When asked about the purpose, or uses 
for, social media in a police context the interviewees emphasised three main aspects; public 
eŶgageŵeŶt, ͚ǁaƌŶ aŶd iŶfoƌŵ͛ aŶd Đƌisis ŵaŶageŵeŶt as the Đoƌe fuŶĐtioŶs/uses of soĐial 
media. In stark contrast to this, self-promotion was only included by five of the interviewees 
and was largely considered irrelevant by the remaining participants. For PI.9 and others, social 
ŵedia ǁas ǀieǁed as ͞the futuƌe of poliĐe Đoŵŵs͟ ;PI.ϵͿ, takiŶg ĐeŶtƌe plaĐe iŶ the 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs stƌategǇ. PI.Ϯϰ, foƌ eǆaŵple, desĐƌiďed iŶ detail hoǁ he iŶteŶded to ͞ĐhaŶŶel 
shift͟ audieŶĐes aǁaǇ fƌoŵ tƌaditioŶal ŵeaŶs of Đommunicating with the police (e.g. 
telephone and press) to interacting with them online. According to PI.24, the new website his 
team launched in 2013 was specifically and carefully designed to guide users into interacting 
with them online in their virtual call centre chatroom, while their social media sites all 
funnelled users back to the website.  Traditional print campaigns, the local media and daily 
press releases were considered things of the past.  
 
There was a clear pattern that emerged in the interviews between use of social media and the 
communications strategy employed. Departments which experimented with new social media 
channels were generally less concerned with risk, more open to new ideas, interested in 
promoting public engagement and described theiƌ ĐuƌƌeŶt stƌategǇ as ͚Pull͛. Theƌe ǁas also a 
clear association with the operational position of the department with the interviewees much 
ŵoƌe likelǇ to desĐƌiďe theiƌ depaƌtŵeŶts as ͚Eŵďedded͛.  
 
In forces like PI.11 and PI.18 however, where communications was seen as optional, social 
media use was significantly behind other departments with often only a corporate Twitter and 
Facebook account in use. These departments described a risk averse mentality that made 
benefiting from the opportunities created by social media difficult for the force. PI.11 
desĐƌiďed his foƌĐe as haǀiŶg a ͞pƌe-histoƌiĐ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͟ of theiƌ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs 
department. Lack of resourcing and disinterest over consecutive years had resulted in a 
depaƌtŵeŶt that ͞ǁas Ŷot fit foƌ puƌpose͟ aŶd ǁhiĐh ǁas ͞stuĐk͟ iŶ the ͞old Đoŵŵs ŵiŶd-set͟ 
ǁhiĐh saǁ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs as soŵethiŶg to ďe doŶe ďǇ a ĐeŶtƌal teaŵ ǁho ͞adǀised the ƌest 
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of the foƌĐe as aŶd ǁheŶ ƌeƋuiƌed͟ aŶd ǁas theƌe to ͞ĐleaŶ up the ŵess ǁheŶ the shit hit the 
faŶ͟ ;PI.ϮͿ. It is of Ŷote that iŶ ͚optioŶal͛ aŶd ͚ŵaƌgiŶal͛ depaƌtŵeŶts iŶteƌǀieǁees ƌaƌelǇ talked 
about the devolved communications model (4.2), instead communications was very often seen 
iŶ a siŵilaƌ light to PI.ϭϭ͛s desĐƌiptioŶ ǁith ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs ǀieǁed as ͚Ŷot poliĐe ǁoƌk͛.  
 
In parallel to the explosion of new channels, there has also been a shift in the intended 
audience. Police forces are now increasingly looking to communicate directly with the general 
public. As all of the interviewees were keen to point out, social media allows police forces for 
the first time in their history to not only control the message but to talk directly to, and engage 
with, individual members of the public on a mass scale.  
 
When asked who these audiences were, however, there was a general sense of confusion with 
nearly half of the interviewees suggesting their audience was everyone. Only four of the 
interviewees included the media as one of their principal audiences. Despite this confusion, 
however, the degree of targeting described by interviewees suggests that, on a situational 
basis at least, most teams do differentiate between audiences – ͚eǀeƌǇoŶe͛ ďeĐoŵes ͚eǀeƌǇoŶe 
ǁho fits the Đƌiteƌia͛. The iŶteƌǀieǁs shoǁed that the leǀel of sophistiĐatioŶ ǁith ƌegaƌd to 
targeting varies considerably between police forces with some forces only targeting by 
geographic location using a single, blanket channel approach (e.g. PI.14) while others used 
highly developed and detailed micro strategies for communicating messages to precisely 
defined audiences through multiple channels (e.g. PI.12).   
 
As use of social media has grown there has been a corresponding impact on police forces 
relationships with the media. In essence, as PI.24 remarked, social media means that police 
foƌĐes ͞Ŷo loŶgeƌ Ŷeed the ŵedia iŶ the saŵe ǁaǇ, aŶd jouƌŶalists kŶoǁ it͟. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to PI.ϭϮ 
aŶd otheƌs, soĐial ŵedia has ͞ƌedefiŶed͟ the poliĐe-ŵedia ƌelatioŶship leadiŶg to a ͞dƌaŵatiĐ 
shift͟ iŶ the poǁeƌ ďalaŶĐe ;PI.ϲͿ as poliĐe foƌĐes haǀe ŵoǀed fƌoŵ pƌiŵaƌilǇ usiŶg iŶdiƌeĐt 
channels to communicate to the public to a direct multi-channel approach to engagement.  
The advent and public enthusiasm for connecting with the police directly has not only allowed, 
but encouraged, police forces to provide more services and opportunities for interaction 
online. Social media sites enable the cost-effective communication of ideas, advice and direct 
engagement on a mass-scale impossible to replicate with traditional channels. This has led in 
several teams to the prioritisation of social media over traditional press-relations roles; 
particularly for campaigns and information networking.  PI.19A, for example, explained that in 
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her team the vast majority of campaigns and communications activity was now based online 
and that print and press campaigns were seldom used. Similar situations were also described 
by PI.9, PI.12, PI.22 and PI.25A.  
 
IŶ soŵe foƌĐes this ŵoǀe has led to the adoptioŶ of a ͚self-seƌǀiĐe͛ ŵodel of ŵedia ƌelatioŶs 
whereby information and resource packs for the media are posted on the force website for 
journalists to use rather than issuing a press release and answering phone enquiries. The self-
service model repositions police forces as the publishers of crime and public order information 
rather than a source that is then interpreted and published by another organisation (i.e. the 
media). At the time of the interviews almost a third (32%) of departments had adopted this 
model, with a further 12 (48%) considering it. It is indicative of the popularity of this model 
that only one team dismissed the idea outright, and that was on the grounds that journalism 
was increasing in their area and thus a more distanced relationship would be neither practical 
nor accepted by the local press.  
 
The vast majority of interviewees, however, spoke of this model as not only a practical means 
of managing the media in a fair and efficient manner but also as a way of reducing the 
sensationalism that usually attends press versions of police stories and thus controlling the 
narrative the public reads. PI.12 and PI.17, for example, no longer issue traditional press 
statements. Instead both departments place all information on their website for both the 
public and press to access with no preferential treatment offered to journalists. Both 
interviewees thought the new system worked well and reduced the level of demand placed on 
their departments from trying to manage enquires from individual journalists. It is also further 
evidence of the altering power dynamic between press and police.  
 
The ƌise of the ͚self-seƌǀiĐe͛ ŵodel, hoǁeǀeƌ, poses the ƋuestioŶ of ǁhetheƌ jouƌŶalists aƌe still 
able to play their traditional role of police watchdog, investigating and reporting police errors 
or poor behaviour in order to hold them to account (Ericson, 1991) especially in light of the 
reported decline of local journalism. It is interesting that opinion was almost equally divided 
between those who thought that journalists had ceased to provide this function and those 
ǁho thought theǇ ǁeƌe still a ͞happǇ ĐƌitiĐal fƌeŶeŵǇ͟ ;PI.13).  
 
The orthodox view is that in the old days the police and media were in a symbiotic, if 
asymmetric, relationship filled with dynamic tension where police forces needed the media to 
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talk to the public and the media held police forces to account by their oversight (Schlesinger 
and Tumber, 1993). The self-service model, however, has knocked this delicate balance and 
successfully skewed the police-media relationship further in the police favour (White, 2012). 
The difficulty with this argument is that the police have always been the primary source of 
crime news for the media and even at the height of journalism in the 1990s there was an 
observable trend towards journalists regurgitating police press statements almost verbatim 
(Chermak and Weiss, 2005; Hollins, and Bacon, 2010).  
 
IŶ this ƌespeĐt the situatioŶ has Ŷoǁ sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ alteƌed ǁith the adǀeŶt of the ͚self-seƌǀiĐe͛ 
model. What has changed, however, is that the police are becoming publishers in their own 
right, rather than simply the source; effectively removing the need for the middle-man-media 
in favour of talking directly to their audiences. The interview data shows that a growing 
number of police forces are trying to establish their own voices, separate from those of the 
news media. This transition is changing the landscape of the police-media relationship and 
redefining the traditional roles played by both parties. 
  
The ͚self-seƌǀiĐe͛ ŵodel is uŶlikelǇ oŶ its oǁŶ to haǀe a sigŶifiĐaŶt iŵpaĐt oŶ the ǁatĐhdog 
function if journalists continue to retain their criticality of the police organisation and 
independent investigations, such as the one by The Times journalist Andrew Norfolk who 
broke the Rotherham abuse scandal in 2011 (Martinson, 2014). The greater threat to the 
continuation of this function, however, is whether news outlets will have the staff or resources 
in the future to maintain it. Nearly half (48%) of those interviewed reported a discernible 
reduction in the number of local journalists. While larger news outlets like the tabloids and 
broadsheets continue to be highly critical of police forces the focus of their articles is on the 
͚ďig͛ stoƌies, aŶd usuallǇ the ďiggeƌ, ŵoƌe Ŷotoƌious foƌĐes ;e.g. “outh Yoƌkshiƌe PoliĐe aŶd the 
MPS) as those are where the big headlines and greater public interest will be. Smaller rural 
forces, in comparison, reported that they had seen a marked decline in interest from national 
papers over the last seven years and with the reduction of local journalists this was having a 
knock-on effect on the quality of reporting that departments were seeing.  
 
While the ŵajoƌitǇ ;ϲϴ%Ϳ of iŶteƌǀieǁees thought that it ͞ǁould ďe like the ďest thiŶg aĐtuallǇ 
if ǁe had Ŷo Ŷeǁspapeƌs aŶǇŵoƌe͟ ;PI.ϭϲͿ, theƌe ǁas a suƌpƌisiŶg Ŷuŵďeƌ of iŶteƌǀieǁees 
(19%) who expressed considerable concern over this eventuality.  The reasons for this concern 
were twofold; firstly, that fewer journalists meant that those that remained were increasingly 
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eǆpeĐtiŶg ͞to ďe fed͟ ;PI.ϮϱBͿ ďǇ the poliĐe - which increased the level of demand and 
expectation upon the communications team for speedy responses and the amount of 
information readily available to journalists. As PI.13 explained, at one time his team would 
issue a couple of press statements a day, more if there was a major incident. Now with the 
͚self-seƌǀiĐe͛ ŵodel, jouƌŶalists ǁeƌe eǆpeĐtiŶg ŵoƌe iŶfoƌŵatioŶ to ďe aǀailaďle ƋuiĐkeƌ. The 
second reason was the more surprising one, that the loss of an external view on the police 
could call into question the credibility of the police voice as journalists might come to be 
ǀieǁed as ŵouthpieĐes foƌ ͚poliĐe spiŶ͛. This pƌeseŶts the iŶtƌiguiŶg ƋuestioŶ of ǁhetheƌ iŶ 
addition to accountability, journalistic critique and apparent hostility acts to help legitimise the 
police voice by providing a source of independent corroboration or disaffirmation for the 
police narrative (Côté-Lussier, 2013). Whether police forces require, or should have, this 
oversight, however, is another question entirely and one that is beyond the remit of this work.  
 
The above discussioŶ shoǁs that theƌe is gƌoǁiŶg eǀideŶĐe of the ͚diƌeĐt aŶd digital͛ appƌoaĐh. 
What is evident from the interviews is that the introduction of social media has had a profound 
impact upon the way in which police forces not only communicate but also what they are 
communicating and increasingly their strategic objectives as well. Sites like Facebook and 
Twitter offer police forces the first time the ability of direct engagement and of forging large 
scale community links and networks within a virtual environment. However, uptake and 
competent use varies considerably across different policing environments with some forces 
embracing the new opportunities now available (PI.12/PI.22) and others only sluggishly 
attempting to keep pace (P.11/PI.13). Along with the unparalleled opportunities, however, 
there are an equal number of threats and challenges facing modern communications 
departments.  
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4.4 Threats and Challenges 
Questions: 1.5 
Results Ref: 3.2.9 – 3.2.11, 3.2.13 
 
Interviewees were asked to identify what they considered to be the threats and challenges for 
modern communications. The literature review had raised several issues as possible threats or 
difficulties for police communications teams; including the rise of citizen journalism, the news 
media and the muĐh talked aďout ͚Đƌisis͛ iŶ puďliĐ ĐoŶfideŶĐe ;ϭ.ϱͿ. It ǁas suƌpƌisiŶg theŶ that 
counter to expectation these were not considered threats by the interviewees. Indeed, the 
data gathered in this research suggests that in conjunction with the move away from the ͚old͛ 
police public relations philosophy there has been a corresponding change in this area as well.  
 
 
4.4.1 The Absent Problems 
It is interesting to note that of the three core problems highlighted by the literature review 
only citizen journalism was raised as a possible problem, and then by only four interviewees 
(13%). The apparent reason for the lack of concern over these traditional issues centres 
around the change in ideology discussed above. According to one of the interviewees citizen 
journalisŵ ǁas ŵeƌelǇ ͞iŶĐoŶǀeŶieŶt͟ ;PI.ϳͿ. Of ŵoƌe ĐoŶĐeƌŶ, foƌ ͞ŵodeƌŶ poliĐe Đoŵŵs͟ 
was the lack of legal knowledge frequently demonstrated by new journalists (PI.7).  
 
Perhaps the clearest example of the extent of this change is that the vast majority of 
interviewees showed limited concern about the way their force might be portrayed in the 
news media which marks a significant change from previous research (1.5). As PI.6 explained, 
the advent of social media has given the police a voice of their own which has removed many 
of the pƌessuƌes aŶd aŶǆieties aƌouŶd iŵage aŶd puďliĐ peƌĐeptioŶ that haǀe ͞histoƌiĐallǇ 
ďotheƌed poliĐe offiĐeƌs͟. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to PI.ϲ aŶd otheƌs ;PI.ϰ, PI.ϭϮ aŶd PI.ϮϮͿ, soĐial ŵedia has 
empowered police forces and this has resulted in police officers demonstrating increasing 
ĐoŶfideŶĐe aŶd a ͞laĐk of ĐoŶĐeƌŶ aďout ǁhat jouƌŶalists ŵight ďe saǇiŶg͟ ;PI.ϯͿ. It is 
important to note, however, that this view was only consistently found among the more 
technologically advanced communications teams. In the four forces where social media use 
was still in its infancy there was a much stronger emphasis placed on traditional anxieties 
around the media.   
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What was most interesting, however, was the absence of public confidence. Given the 
considerable attention this subject has received from politicians, the media and academic 
research it had been expected that the interviewees would express similar concerns and levels 
of anxiety. Far from the data supporting this view, however, over three quarters of the 
inteƌǀieǁees ;ϴϬ%Ϳ disagƌeed ǁith the idea that theƌe ǁas a ͚Đƌisis͛ of ĐoŶfideŶĐe iŶ poliĐiŶg; 
with almost half stating that if there was a crisis then it was not one felt in their county. Part of 
the reason for this disinterest appears to be due to the difficulty in accurately measuring it. 
Eight of the respondents (29%) expressed serious concerns over the current methodologies 
employed to capture confidence, and over half (58%) thought confidence was a poor, inexact 
measurement that was mostly irrelevant for police work and more of a political issue than a 
poliĐiŶg oŶe.  Faƌ fƌoŵ theƌe ďeiŶg a uŶiǀeƌsal ͚Đƌisis͛ of ĐoŶfideŶĐe iŶ ŵodeƌŶ poliĐiŶg, a 
stƌoŶg theŵe fƌoŵ the iŶteƌǀieǁ data ǁas that the appaƌeŶt ͚Đƌisis͛ ǁas ŵoƌe a ƌefleĐtioŶ of 
Machiavellian power politics (Ellison, 2000) than the actual state of public opinion. The 
majority of interviewees who still tracked confidence levels corroborated the YouGov (2013) 
findings that public confidence has actually remained remarkably steady over the last decade 
and suggested that dips in some surveys might have been caused by the systemic 
methodological problems with trying to measure confidence.  
 
That theƌe is a ͚Đƌisis͛ of ĐoŶfideŶĐe iŶ poliĐiŶg has loŶg ďeeŶ aŶ estaďlished histoƌiĐal ͚faĐt͛. 
Research and news articles over the last century have consistently reported that this is the 
case (BBC, 2014b; Bradford, 2011 Karstedt, 2009) and it has proved a popular rallying call for 
politiĐiaŶs like Daǀid Daǀis to justifǇ ĐhaŶges iŶ the ǁake of ͚sĐaŶdals͛ aŶd peƌĐeiǀed failings 
;Daǀis, ϮϬϭϯ; O͛Neill, ϮϬϭϯaͿ.   
 
While it is not possible in this thesis to discuss the perennial debate of public confidence in 
depth, the dispaƌitǇ ďetǁeeŶ the soĐial ͚faĐt͛ that theƌe is a Đƌisis aŶd the iŶteƌǀieǁ data does 
raise a number of difficult questions and potential avenues for future research. Perhaps the 
ŵost iŶteƌestiŶg ƋuestioŶ, hoǁeǀeƌ, is ǁhetheƌ the appaƌeŶt ͚Đƌisis͛ ŵight ďe ŵoƌe the ƌesult 
of a ĐǇĐliĐal sǇsteŵiĐ ͚ŵoƌal paŶiĐ͛ oǀeƌ poliĐiŶg aŶd ǁideƌ soĐial iŶseĐuƌitǇ aƌouŶd change and 
the future than actual changes in public opinion towards the police (Walklate and Mythen, 
2007). Academics and politicians alike have a long tradition of referring back to what many 
ƌefeƌ to as the ͚goldeŶ age͛ of poliĐiŶg ;‘eiŶeƌ, ϮϬϭϬͿ. The post war decade is commonly 
thought of as a halcyon era for police public relations during which the police and public were 
united and there was mutual respect and affection on both sides. This was gradually eroded in 
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the face of increased media attention, scandals and the pluralisation of society which placed 
the police and the policed on opposite sides which resulted in decreased public confidence 
levels (Clark, 1965; Holh, Stanko and Newburn, 2012).    
 
What is apparent, however, from the literature and news articles is that public confidence in 
the police has been consistently raised as an issue by politicians and the media since their 
inception in 1829 (White, 1983; Shpayer-Makov, 2010; Wood, 2011; Loader, 2014). The term 
͚ŵoƌal paŶiĐ͛ ǁas fiƌst populaƌised by Stanley Cohen during the 1970s, since then it has come 
to represent an exaggerated, and often disproportionate, social reaction to a perceived issue 
that has been incited by the activities of a person, group or organisation (Murji, 2003; Marsh 
and Melville, 2011).  
 
A popular idea among the interviewees was that politicians were using public confidence as a 
means of gaining more control over police forces. It was suggested by some that in order to 
justify a solution (e.g. police officers wearing body cameras) that there must first be a problem 
that this can be the answer to. Into this battle then came the media who reported it as a 
means of selling newspapers and thus cemented the credibility of the idea at a social level. 
Whether there is a moral panic around public confidence is beyond the scope of this chapter; 
hoǁeǀeƌ, the idea is a ĐoŵpelliŶg oŶe, espeĐiallǇ as PI.ϵ poiŶted out ͞hoǁ loŶg ĐaŶ Ǉou ďe iŶ 
͚Đƌisis͛ foƌ ďefoƌe it͛s Ŷo loŶgeƌ a Đƌisis?͟ 
 
4.4.2 Threats, Challenges and Problems 
The primary threat identified was that of budget cuts to the communications department. 
Concern around money was described as the fulcrum from which most of the other threats 
and problems facing communications departments arise.  It was raised by nearly three 
quarters of the interviewees (74%), often without prompting and was a subject frequently 
returned to during the course of the interview which is suggestive of the degree of anxiety felt 
on this issue. 
 
It is interesting to note, however, that the interviewees who did not list this as a problem were 
either from larger departments or non-communications staff (i.e. Chief Constables/PCC). Only 
one interviewee (PI.6) from a mid-sized department stated that further budget cuts were not a 
concern for her and this, she explained, was because her department had decreased so much 
iŶ the last ƌouŶd that theƌe ǁas ͞Ŷo ŵoƌe fat to tƌiŵ͟ ǁithout ƌeduĐiŶg the Ŷuŵďeƌ of staff. 
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This, PI.6 thought, was unlikely to happen as it would adversely affect the operational 
effectiveness of the depaƌtŵeŶt ǁhiĐh is Ŷot soŵethiŶg heƌ ͞Đoŵŵs-aǁaƌe Chief CoŶstaďle͟ 
would allow.  
 
The threat of further budget cuts was a problem that seemed to be particularly felt in rural 
foƌĐes aŶd iŶ those teaŵs desĐƌiďed as ͚optioŶal͛ oƌ ͚ĐoŵpliŵeŶtaƌǇ͛. IŶ ďoth of these 
scenarios the communications team was usually smaller and in forces that had placed less 
importance traditionally on communications. Conversely, those departments that described 
theŵselǀes as ͚eŵďedded͛, ǁhile still ĐoŶĐeƌŶed aďout deĐƌeased ďudgets generally expressed 
less anxiety about the future and were more positive that having restructured and made 
efficiency savings that their funding would stabilise. This suggests that to some extent the 
degree of anxiety expressed around the future of the communications department may have 
been an extension of an underlying systemic or cultural insecurity in terms of the position of 
the department within the wider police force and the value accorded to it.  
 
This certainly appears to have been the case with PI.11 and PI.18 who both described the 
senior officers in their forces as historically apathetic, if not antipathetic towards the function 
of the communication department. According to PI.11 this had led to a cultural disinterest in 
the wider force and with consecutive Chief Constables in maintaining the communication 
department and providing adequate funding to ensure that it was modernising and able to 
meet modern requirements. A similar situation was referred to by PI.18 who believed that it 
was the vieǁ of ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs as aŶ auǆiliaƌǇ ďaĐkƌooŵ fuŶĐtioŶ ǁhiĐh had ŵade it ͞aŶ easǇ 
taƌget͟ folloǁiŶg the iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ of austeƌitǇ ŵeasuƌes iŶ ϮϬϭϬ.  
 
What is of particular interest is that following initial significant reductions to these 
departments, PI.11 explained that the new Chief Constable, prompted by the PCC, had 
reinstated much of their budget after confidence levels fell over a three year period from one 
of the highest iŶ the ĐouŶtƌǇ to oŶe of the loǁest. HistoƌiĐallǇ, PI.ϭϭ͛s ĐouŶtǇ is oŶe ǁhiĐh has 
enjoyed high levels of public confidence and satisfaction with their police force. Following 
PI.ϭϭ͛s appoiŶtŵeŶt to the positioŶ of ͚Head of CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͛ he said that he ǁas aďle to 
prove to his senior officers that this sudden drop in recorded confidence levels was due 
directly to the reduction in budget. According to PI.11 this isolated that force from the public 
ďǇ ƌeŵoǀiŶg the ͞poliĐe ǀoiĐe͟ aŶd ƌeduĐed effiĐieŶĐǇ aŶd effeĐtiǀeŶess ďǇ plaĐiŶg uŶtƌaiŶed 
police staff in the department instead of employing professionals. At the time of interview, 
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PI.ϭϭ had just staƌted ǁhat he Đalled the ͞HeƌĐuleaŶ task of ďƌiŶgiŶg… Đoŵŵs iŶto the age of 
soĐial ŵedia͟. Moƌe fuŶdiŶg to pƌopeƌlǇ tƌaiŶ the staff iŶ his depaƌtŵeŶt had just ďeeŶ 
allocated and while he thought it would take considerable time and effort to retrain his staff 
and reconnect with the public the outlook was positive.  
 
The same could not be said for PI.18, who like PI.21, believed that there was an endemic 
culture of indifference to communications. Indifference from the senior management team, in 
particular, meant the situation was unlikely to change, funding would be further reduced as 
͞easǇ saǀiŶgs͟ ;PI.ϭϴͿ aŶd this ǁould ĐoŶtiŶue to iŵpaĐt oŶ the effeĐtiǀeŶess of theiƌ 
communications departments.  
 
While confidence was not included in the list of threats identified by interviewees it was raised 
by some as a potential consequence of the budget cuts. As PI.23 explained, while she thought 
that theƌe ǁas Ŷo ͚Đƌisis͛ of ĐoŶfideŶĐe iŶ poliĐiŶg, iŶ her experience public confidence was 
likely to start slipping in the absence of a visible and visibly engaged police force – two aspects 
iŶ ǁhiĐh effeĐtiǀe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs is esseŶtial. PI.Ϯϯ͛s ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ǁas that iŶ the ǁake of 
decreased budgets more forces were relying on social media as a means to increase visibility 
and the community connection in order to reduce the demand for a physical presence. Social 
media, although free to use in terms of membership fees, is highly expensive to maintain. The 
predicament is that social media is a resource that requires constant attention and one where 
success generates more work and demands more resources rather than less the longer you use 
it and the more it grows.  
 
How to manage the ever growing demand placed on communications departments was 
another frequently discussed threat and one which was ultimately the result of six separate 
but connected problems; budget, smaller teams, social media, high turnover, officer 
expectations and not being listened too. 
 
Budget and Smaller Teams:  
In order to meet the financial saving requirements, most of the departments interviewed had 
recently been through, or were going through, a restructure. This commonly resulted in a 
significant decrease in the number of staff, with most departments seeing a reduction in size 
of between 20 and 30%.  
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Social Media:  
Following the London Riots in 2011 police use and presence on social media has grown 
considerably. Most police forces now have upwards of 50 social media accounts spread over 
an ever growing number of platform. The interviewees described a pattern of accelerated 
growth on social media driven in part by a sudden uptake in public interest and involvement 
on these channels. As police forces move away from simply broadcasting to a more 
symmetrical model of communications that actively encourages engagement, more resources 
are required in order to maintain these sites to meet both the public and operational demands 
being placed on them. The difficulty, as PI.8 explained, is that the departmeŶt͛s aďilitǇ to 
͞deliǀeƌ agaiŶst that eǆpeĐtatioŶ͟ has Ŷot Ǉet Đaught up to the deŵaŶd plaĐed oŶ it. 
 
Expectations:  
Connected to the above, there was a concern that the rapid expansion and success of social 
media had resulted in police officers, and bodies such as the COP and HMIC, having 
increasingly unrealistic expectations of what communications can achieve. Engagement is a 
good example of this. As discussed earlier in 4.2, the majority of police forces (84%) said that 
they have not yet met the aspiratioŶs set out iŶ ͚EŶgage͛ ;NPIA, ϮϬϭϬͿ. The ŵost ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ 
cited reason for this was lack of time and resources in order to be meet the demand. Yet, 
despite this, interviewees also reported continued pressure from officers, the COP and HMIC 
to adopt a more dialogue based model of communications in order to replace some of the 
engagement activities police officers have traditionally performed in person.   
 
The problems caused by expectation are not only limited to pressure from governing bodies 
either. The problem of meeting demand is further exacerbated by the fact that increased 
service provision and engagement needs to be maintained once started. Chapter 1 discussed 
ChaŶdek aŶd Poƌteƌ͛s ;ϭϵϵϴͿ ͚DisĐoŶfiƌŵatioŶ theoƌǇ͛. OŶĐe audieŶĐes haǀe ďeĐoŵe 
accustomed to a leǀel of seƌǀiĐe pƌoǀisioŶ, if these eǆpeĐtatioŶs aƌe Ŷot ŵet ͚disĐoŶfiƌŵatioŶ͛ 
is likely to occur which is likely to not only affect confidence and use of those services in the 
future but also overall perception of the police organisation and the credibility of the police 
͚ǀoiĐe͛.  
 
Ignored Concerns:  
Although this was only raised by four interviewees, there was a general underlying feeling 
;paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ aŵoŶg ͚OptioŶal͛ aŶd ͚CoŵpleŵeŶtaƌǇ͛ depaƌtŵeŶtsͿ that theƌe ƌeŵaiŶed 
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difficulties with senior police officers and managers heeding the advice of communications 
staff – particularly with regard to limitations or problems with social media. PI.19B was 
particularly frustrated by the lack of care and attention he felt his senior management team 
gave to his advice and concerns. PI.19B described several recent examples where the SMT had 
decided upon a course of action against his advice only to later run into the problems he had 
cautioned would occur. Similar situations were also mentioned by PI.7, PI.9, PI.15 , PI.18, PI.21, 
PI.25A and PI.28, particularly with regard to demand and social media.  
 
Staff Turnover:  
Another, although less immediately obvious, consequence of the strain felt by communications 
departments is the impact on staff morale and wellbeing. According to PI.23, over her long 
tenure as head of communications in her force she had seen a change from slow to high 
turnover of staff. PI.25A and PI.28 agreed with this assessment and expressed a belief that the 
pressures of modern communications meant that staff were frequently overworked and felt 
underpaid and undervalued so left after gaining a few years of experience for more lucrative 
jobs. Staff retention is not just concerning as a reflection of morale, however, it is also 
potentially crippling for small departments where the cyclical loss of trained professionals 
places an additional burden on the remaining staff, both in terms of coping with increased 
demand, the loss of expertise and also training a new staff member.  
 
The above problems combine to make an unfeasible situation for communications teams who 
increasingly appear to be victims of their own success as success generates greater demand for 
more services. It also raises the question of critical mass and whether it is tenable to expect 
the level of engagement and operational support from communications if the funding and 
resources are not there to support the needs of the department. Social media appears to have 
created demand for services which, with the current resources, is difficult to meet. The more 
communications can do from an operational perspective the more is expected of them. 
Smaller teams and restricted budgets however mean that there is a limit to what can be 
achieved and if expectations are not realistic then disappointment is inevitable.  
 
One possible solution to these difficulties is collaboration. This was proposed by several of the 
interviewees as their ideal answer. HMIC (2012, 2014) suggested that collaboration between 
police forces and related public sector agencies would be an advisable and desirable means by 
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which police forces could save money and improve efficiency. HMIC (2014, p6) defined 
collaboration as: 
 ͞aŶ aƌƌaŶgeŵeŶt uŶdeƌ ǁhiĐh tǁo oƌ ŵoƌe paƌties ǁoƌk togetheƌ iŶ the iŶteƌests of 
their greater efficiency or effectiveness in order to achieve common or 
ĐoŵpleŵeŶtaƌǇ oďjeĐtiǀes͟  
 
Collaboration can involve joint enterprises between police forces or other public organisations 
(e.g. the County Council) and take the form of shared campaigns, joint research/evaluation or 
shared services, such as the joint Sussex and Surrey Major Crimes Team or the Suffolk-Norfolk 
joint Communications department. HMIC (2014, p33), however, concluded that despite their 
eaƌlieƌ ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶs ͞ĐollaďoƌatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ foƌĐes, puďliĐ aŶd private sector 
oƌgaŶisatioŶs ƌeŵaiŶs patĐhǇ, fƌagŵeŶted, oǀeƌlǇ Đoŵpleǆ aŶd too sloǁ͟.   
 
A similar situation was found when this research was conducted. Collaboration remains 
fragmented and inconsistent across the teams interviewed. While there was a generally 
positive attitude towards collaboration, with 28 interviewees (91%) seeing it as a viable means 
of meeting demand and reducing costs, only nine (36%) of those forces interviewed were 
actively working with other departments in this way. Of those nine, four forces had merged 
their communications units with another force and reported improved efficiency and 
consistency in their departments as a result of the merger. The other five forces were mostly 
collaborating on a case by case basis for specific campaigns.  
 
Lack of time to organise and manage collaborations was the most commonly given reason for 
communications teams not collaborating.  Poor communication and networking was also 
identified as a significant issue by some of the interviewees who felt that with shrinking 
budgets and growing demand collaboration provided an opportunity for joined-up, whole sale 
campaigns across the country; however they lacked the time to build relationships with other 
departments.   
 
The inefficiency in police communications was a source of considerable frustration for PI.16 
and PI.22 who both felt that there were substantial inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the way 
communications had traditionally been managed as independent and isolated units. Police 
websites were raised as a good example. Each individual force maintains and funds their own 
website and across these websites there is considerable variation in terms of design, 
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functionality and usability (Appendix 3.10. PI.22 observed that if the College of Policing had 
produced a master template or if forces had collaborated with each other on website design 
then police forces could have one well designed, affordable template that could be 
personalised by individual forces instead of 30+ variations of varying use. According to PI.22, 
even when designed in-house, websites cost thousands of pounds in terms of time and 
manpower to construct. As increased functionality and usability is of growing importance for 
poliĐe ǁeďsites, ǁhiĐh aƌe Ŷo loŶgeƌ ͞data duŵps͟ ;PI.ϮͿ ďut a strategic part of 
communications activity, collaboration would have been a sensible solution to the difficulty of 
modernising and keeping police websites up to date. Such an opportunity, however, has not 
been grasped although several forces have collaborated with another force, or their PCC, in 
order to create a joint template.   
 
A similar situation seems to exist around campaigns. In 2014, the College of Policing ran an 
initiative which sought to synchronise the major campaigns run by police forces across the 
country. The aim was to encourage consistency in campaign message and timing in order to 
improve the impact of the campaign. While this was lauded as a good idea in principle, many 
of the interviewees explained that they had later stopped participating in the scheme as it was 
placing too great a burden on them and did not fit in with their communications strategy.  
 
PI.10 was in favour of this idea, she thought that a better way of achieving the result would be 
to diary-share the campaigns across police forces so that each communications team led and 
created a campaign on a specific issue (e.g. burglary). These campaigns would then be 
disseminated to the other forces and run over an agreed period. Using this strategy, PI.10 
thought would reduce demand on communications teams, help improve consistency of 
message, improve networking between departments and share the financial burden in an 
easily managed way.   
 
When this was suggested to the other interviewees, however, there were mixed reactions. 
Some, like PI.22, PI.16 and PI.11 thought this an excellent and practical alternative to formal 
collaboration. Others, like PI.5, PI.13, PI.20A and PI.24 were very against it. The reasons given 
by this latter group varied between internal politics getting in the way, to the potential for 
brand confusion and the difference between teams making it impractical. PI.24, for example, 
thought that ͞the pƌoďleŵ is, oďǀiouslǇ, Ǉou͛ǀe got diffeƌeŶt tǇpes of ďuƌglaƌǇ [heƌe] to 
LoŶdoŶ. You͛ǀe got diffeƌeŶt ƌesideŶts, Ǉou͛ǀe got diffeƌeŶt audieŶĐes͟.  
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This was not agreed with by many of the interviewees who felt that most of the major 
campaigns were quite similar and did not differ significantly between audiences in one location 
to another. Similarly, concerns around brand were dismissed. PI.2 was particularly vocal about 
ǁhat he ĐoŶsideƌed the ͞ƌidiĐulouslǇ pƌopƌietoƌial ƌhetoƌiĐ͟ aƌouŶd ďƌaŶd. The aƌguŵeŶt put 
forwards by interviewees like PI.4 and PI.12 was that by sharing campaigns the general public 
might become confused about the brand which could affect how much attention they pay to 
the campaign because they might think it does not apply to them. PI.15, however, was quick to 
disagree with this notion on the grounds that in her experience an average member of the 
public is mostlǇ uŶaǁaƌe of poliĐe ďƌaŶdiŶg otheƌ thaŶ it has Đoŵe fƌoŵ ͚the poliĐe͛:  
͞“oŵe foƌĐes aƌe ǁoƌƌied aďout ďƌaŶd ďeĐause the poliĐe seƌǀiĐe ƌeŵaiŶs Ƌuite 
paƌoĐhial isŶ͛t it, iŶ that… it has Ŷeǀeƌ had a paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ stƌategiĐ oǀeƌǀieǁ… theǇ 
tend to be quite insular in saying this is the City of London Police or this is the 
MetƌopolitaŶ PoliĐe aŶd aĐtuallǇ people doŶ͛t ƌeallǇ Đaƌe do theǇ. TheǇ aƌe ŵoƌe 
iŶteƌested iŶ the ŵessagiŶg geŶeƌallǇ͟ ;PI.ϭϱͿ 
 
Moƌeoǀeƌ, as PI.Ϯϴ poiŶted out, ǁheŶ talkiŶg aďout the ͚poliĐe ďƌaŶd͛ aƌe ǁe ƌefeƌƌiŶg to the 
national or local one? Police identity has a long and confusing history and is the subject of 
much debate (Manning, 1997). What is increasingly apparent, however, is that there is a 
difference and frequently a disparity betǁeeŶ hoǁ people thiŶk of the ͚the poliĐe͛ as a ĐoŶĐept 
(i.e. national) and how they relate that to their local police. A YouGov poll in 2013 found 
consistently over a 10 year period that people rated their local police better than senior police 
officers
30
. This difference was also remarked on by the interviewees with regard to public 
confidence. PI.10, for example, thought that people differentiate between local police and a 
national police which sits above them and this effects how they respond to confidence 
questions. What is clear, however, is that brand is closely linked to identity, at least from the 
police perspective. Whether it does play an important part in reinforcing the police message, 
as PI.12 believes, or is completely irrelevant as PI.28 thinks, requires further research.  
 
In summary then, while there is a considerable amount of police communications work which 
must remain local, aspects where there are strong points of commonality, such as 
awareness/prevention campaigns if created and run by multiple forces will not only reduce the 
costs of running individual campaigns but promote a more unified and standardised crime 
                                           
30
 YouGov (2013) found that while the public consistently recorded lower levels of confidence in senior 
police officers, senior officers were still considered more trustworthy than politicians and journalists.  
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prevention and awareness approach than the patchwork system currently in use. Before this 
can be achieved, however, departments must first start forming better connections with their 
counterparts. In an age of instant digital connection and joint partnerships between police 
forces there is an irony that police communications seems to be content to remain in historic 
isolationism.  
 
Both the problems around brand and the generalisability of campaigns, however, pale in 
comparison to the problems caused by internal politics when it comes to collaboration. 11 of 
the interviewees expressed significant discontent and frustration with the internal politics and 
ǁhat PI.Ϯ ƌefeƌƌed to as a ͞histoƌiĐal Đultuƌe of isolatioŶ͟ ǁhiĐh theǇ felt fƌeƋueŶtlǇ haŵpeƌed 
any form of collaboration and resource sharing.  PI.16 in particular found this a consistent 
impediment to working with other departments to such an extent that her team now work 
with partner agencies rather than fellow police communications teams.  Similar experiences 
were reported by other interviewees and a common theme from these interviews is one of 
cultural isolation. One reason for this, according to PI.11 is that police communications has 
evolved independently and differently across police forces and this sense of independence is 
proving difficult to change in some teams.  
 
An additional complication with internal politics, however, has been the introduction of PCCs. 
PI.13, PI.17, PI.22 and PI.23 were all very in favour of the idea of merging communications 
teams to form larger regional teams that cover multiple forces
31
. Sir Hugh Orde, a former 
president of ACPO, has noted that since the iŶtƌoduĐtioŶ of the PCC͛s that theƌe has ďeeŶ a 
significant slowing in the number of collaborations between police forces (cited in Gilmore, 
ϮϬϭϯͿ. Oƌde͛s ;ibid) observation is consistent with the reports by the interviewees that 
proposals to merge or collaborate with other forces in more meaningful ways have been 
ĐoŶsisteŶtlǇ disŵissed ďǇ PCCs. IŶ PI.ϭϯ͛s opiŶioŶ, fuƌtheƌ ĐollaďoƌatioŶ is uŶlikelǇ as PCCs 
͞jealouslǇ guaƌd theiƌ ďailiǁiĐk͟.  
 
It is interesting to note that PCCs were identified in conjunction with another threat. The 
second problem mentioned was far more divisive with regard to opinion, with some in favour 
and some fiercely against PCCs taking operational control of the communications department.  
 
                                           
31
 Such as in the case of West Mercia communications department which covers four counties.  
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Wood (2016) argues that the introduction of the first Police and Crime Commissioners in 2012 
was positioned as the most radical change in policing since 1829. The decision to introduce 
PCCs allegedly on the grounds of democratising policing and improving public accountability 
was controversial fƌoŵ the staƌt aŶd saǁ a ͞staggeƌiŶg loǁ eleĐtoƌal tuƌŶout͟ ;Listeƌ aŶd 
Rowe, 2015, p.373; Lister, 2013) with a worryingly high level of public ignorance as to the 
function of this new post (Gilmore, 2012).  
 
In 2013 the Times reported that in three forces the PCC had taken control of the 
communications department and that this was now being considered in other forces as well 
;O͛Neill, ϮϬϭϯĐͿ; although ďǇ ϮϬϭϱ this had iŶĐƌeased to eight ;ϯ.ϭ.ϰͿ. The ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ƌaised iŶ the 
article and reiterated by over half of the interviewees (58%) was the fear that this could 
eŶdaŶgeƌ the poliĐe iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe aŶd lead to ͞politiĐisatioŶ ďǇ the ďaĐkdooƌ͟ ;PI.ϮϭͿ.  
 
Baldi and Lefrance (2012) argue PCCs represent a move from professional to political 
accountability. The general feeling expressed by the interviewees, however, was that PCC 
oversight of communications would lead to politicisation and political control rather than 
improved accountability. Underlying this fear seems to be the concern that the presence of a 
fundamentally political post would return communications departments to the past and lead 
to a ƌesuƌgeŶĐe of ͚spiŶ͛, ͚Đoǀeƌ-ups͛ aŶd ͚politiĐal ŵaŶoeuǀƌiŶgs͛, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ duƌiŶg ƌe-
election campaigns (PI.5). The hypothesis put forward by some of the interviewees was that 
this ǁould lead to the ͚poliĐe ǀoiĐe͛ losiŶg ĐƌediďilitǇ aŶd alloǁ PCCs a loop hole thƌough ǁhiĐh 
to start effecting operational policing.  
 
Lister and Rowe (2015) note that over two thirds of PCCs in the 2012 election were elected 
from political parties (Conservative, 39% and Labour, 32%), in contrast only 12 (29%) posts 
were filled by Independent candidates. How PCC control of these departments will affect their 
perceived credibility following the second election in 2016 is something only time, hindsight 
and research will show. What is interesting, however, is the divide between the interviewees 
who were in favour of or against PCC oversight. While the majority of the interviewees were 
against PCC oversight, all of the interviewees who were against this change were still managed 
by the Chief Constable and had no direct experience of the situation. Of the four (13%) who 
were in favour of it, three of them were working in departments managed by the PCC. 
Whether or not the fears around PCC control are founded, it is evidently a topic of 
considerable concern and one that needs further investigation.  
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The final significant problem mentioned by the interviewees was that of measuring what or 
whether their strategies were working. This is discussed in the next section. 
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4.5 Effectiveness 
Questions: 2.4 
Results Ref: 3.2.8, 3.2.9 
 
It has loŶg ďeeŶ thought that theƌe is a ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ͚effeĐtiǀe͛ poliĐiŶg aŶd 
communication. Allen (1947, p438), writing over sixty years ago about the English police, 
remarked that poliĐe effeĐtiǀeŶess aŶd effiĐieŶĐǇ ͞depeŶds at the ďottoŵ oŶ the ŵaiŶteŶaŶĐe 
of happǇ ƌelatioŶs ďetǁeeŶ poliĐe aŶd puďliĐ͟. This has ĐoŶtiŶued to ďe a pƌeǀaleŶt theŵe 
over the intervening decades and remains a dominant presence in official documents and 
policies today (see HMIC, 2001; ACPO, 2012; HMIC, 2014).  
 
Research into police effectiveness and how to improve it, however, only began in the 1970s 
(Hough and Clarke, 1980). Since then this topic has become a fiercely politicised issue and one 
which has been frequently cited by both politicians and the press in recent years (Elder et al, 
2004). Consecutive governments have become increasingly preoccupied with demonstrating 
continued improvements and justifying the police budget to a progressively more aware and 
vociferously demanding general public. In reflection of this there has been a proliferation of 
studies and academic interest into the nebulous concept of police effectiveness (Bottomley 
and Coleman, 1980).  It was this political and social anxiety over demonstrating effectiveness 
which arguably led to the target driven culture that became prevalent during the 1980s; 
looking to improve all areas of policing from response times to detection rates (Reiner, 2010) 
and more recently public confidence levels (Resig and Corneia, 1997; Stoutland, 2001; Fleming 
and McLaughlin, 2012).   
 
So far, however, there has been little research into how to improve the effectiveness of the 
communications department (1.5). What studies there have been have principally 
concentrated on evaluating the short term impact of specific activities using the traditional 
channels, such as newsletters (Wunsch and Holh, 2009).  An interesting change remarked on 
by the interviewees is the recent demand from senior officers (and often the PCC) to provide 
evaluation data on how well their departments are currently performing.  
 
According to five of the interviewees this marked a considerable departure from the culture of 
the ϭϵϵϬs aŶd eaƌlǇ ϮϬϬϬs ǁheƌe theǇ ǁeƌe ͞giǀeŶ a ďƌief aŶd eǆpeĐted to get oŶ ǁith it͟ ;PI.ϮͿ 
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but otherwise left alone. One interviewee (PI.19A) explained how she currently creates a 
monthly presentation for senior officers with graphs, charts and predictions around their social 
media sites to show who had been accessing these sites, levels of engagement and what the 
reaction of their campaigns had been like. PI.19A laughed as she added that five years ago her 
report would have been half a page of A4 about interest from their local journalists and 
circulation figures.   Several of the interviewees attributed this change to the growing need to 
justify expenditure and the ubiquity of analytics programmes for evaluating social media 
cheaply. The advent of these programmes meant that for the first time communications 
departments could be asked to account for the success of their activities in a cost effective way 
and without outsourcing for an independent evaluation which is what often happened with 
traditional media campaigns.  
 
The interviewees were asked whether they had an evaluation framework in place for 
traditional and social media activities and how effective they thought their current system 
was. The results from the first question were surprising. Given the level of interest in 
intelligence led policing, the concern shown by many of the interviewees towards reaching 
their audiences and the general transition away from broadcasting to behavioural change 
communications activities, it had been hypothesised that the majority, if not all, police forces 
would have some sort of framework in place. This was not the case. A significant number 
(33%) did not have a formal strategy at the time of their interview for traditional media 
campaigns and one fifth of the forces did not have one in place for social media. Furthermore, 
when asked, nearly two thirds (61%) rated their current strategies as inadequate. This raises 
the valid question of whether evaluating effectiveness is important for police communications, 
aŶd if so ǁhat does ͚effeĐtiǀeŶess͛ look like.   
 
When asked whether evaluation was important the responses were again mixed and fell into 
four broad categories. 
ϭͿ ͚EffeĐtiǀeŶess͛ is iŵpoƌtaŶt aŶd the iŶteƌǀieǁee ǁas happǇ ǁith theiƌ ĐuƌƌeŶt stƌategǇ. 
ϮͿ ͚EffeĐtiǀeŶess is iŵpoƌtaŶt ďut the ĐuƌƌeŶt sǇsteŵ is iŶadeƋuate. 
3) ͚EffeĐtiǀeŶess͛ is iŵpoƌtaŶt ďut depaƌtŵeŶt laĐked ƌesouƌĐes to ŵeasuƌe it. 
ϰͿ ͚EffeĐtiǀeŶess͛ Ŷot iŵpoƌtaŶt ďut paƌt of ďuƌeauĐƌatiĐ tiĐk ďoǆ Đultuƌe ƌeƋuiƌed ďǇ the 
senior management team.   
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The central issue, as Shaw and White (2004) point out, is that public relations is predicated on 
the assumption that communication leads to favourable behaviour or a desired outcome. This 
is the fundamental assumption which drives all communication; whether it is internal, 
external, campaign or a call for information. If no one is listening or something has no impact 
then what is the value in devoting limited resources to that activity?  Given the growing 
reliance on virtual communications to bridge gaps left by a reduced and less visible police force 
in the physical world (Salmi et al, 2000; Sindall and Sturgis, 2013) understanding what is 
working and why is of the upmost importance to police and politicians.  
 
While there was generally a positive attitude towards the need for evaluation, lack of time and 
resources was commonly cited as the reason why teams were either not measuring 
effectiveness or still using inadequate systems. This was often linked to what PI.21 referred to 
as ͞the Đultuƌal ƌoadďloĐks͟ eŶĐouƌaged ďǇ disiŶteƌest fƌoŵ seŶioƌ offiĐeƌs ǁhiĐh ŵeaŶt that 
her department rarely had the budget or the drive to think about areas for improvement. 
Issues around resources were further compounded by the endemic confusion over describing 
ǁhat ͚effeĐtiǀe͛ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs ǁould look like oƌ hoǁ to aĐtuallǇ ŵeasuƌe it. This was a 
particular problem for social media and web-based activities as the newness of these 
technologies and the wealth of data now available through them meant that communications 
staff ǁeƌe ofteŶ ͞leaƌŶiŶg oŶ the joď͟ ;PI.ϳͿ aŶd ͞fuŵďliŶg ouƌ ǁaǇ to find out what works with 
Ŷot a lot of guidaŶĐe͟ ;PI.ϮͿ.  BǇ the tiŵe of the iŶteƌǀieǁs ŵost of the teaŵs had pƌioƌitised 
social media over traditional campaigns with some like PI.19 no longer using traditional 
campaigns at all.  
 
In 2014 there were three main types of measurement used by communications teams; 
͚Output͛, ͚IŶteƌaĐtioŶ͛ aŶd ͚OutĐoŵe͛ ;Fig ϰ.ϮͿ. It is iŶteƌestiŶg to Ŷote that foƌ those teaŵs still 
eǀaluatiŶg tƌaditioŶal ĐaŵpaigŶs all teaŵs had stopped lookiŶg at ͚Output͛ iŶ faǀouƌ of 
͚OutĐoŵe͛. Foƌ soĐial ŵedia, hoǁeǀeƌ, ͚Output͛ ǁas the faǀouƌite ŵeaŶs of assessiŶg 
effeĐtiǀeŶess, although theƌe ǁas a tƌeŶd toǁaƌds adoptiŶg ͚OutĐoŵe͛ ďased ŵetƌiĐs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
291 
 
Fig 4.2                      Evaluation Models 
Model Number of 
Departments 
Measures Used 
Output 9 Reach/retweets/Followers 
Interaction 3  Likes/reposts/comments 
Outcome 5 Increase in reporting 
Information about crimes/response from public 
Specific behaviour (e.g. knifes turned in) 
 
“latteƌ ;ϮϬϬϵ, p.ϳͿ poiŶted out that ͞ǁheŶ ĐoŶsideƌiŶg effeĐtiǀeŶess… it is ƌeasoŶaďle to ask 
͚effeĐtiǀe agaiŶst ǁhat͛͟. This is a peƌeŶŶial diffiĐultǇ foƌ oƌgaŶisatioŶs, like the poliĐe, ǁheƌe 
the answer may not be either immediately apparent or easily definable. According to Engstad 
and Evans (1980) the first step is to establish what it is you are attempting to measure. The 
challenge with this is that such an assessment requires a unitary system of measurement 
which is not necessarily reflective, or capable of reflecting, inherently nebulous concepts like 
the effectiveness of communication where the results are often intangible and take time to 
become apparent (Skogan and Mears, 2004).  
 
In order to determine the effectiveness of a strategy or activity communications teams first 
need to be clear about what it is they want to measure before a suitable methodology can be 
implemented for capturing it. According to the interviewees, however, there is a historic, 
almost systemic, difficulty around evaluating communications in the police which has resulted 
in considerable confusion as to what to measure, how to capture the data and understanding 
what it then means.   
 
With the vast amounts of data readily available on social media it is all too easy to get lost 
uŶdeƌ ǁhat PI.ϰ Đalled the ͞data deluge͟. AƌguaďlǇ the pƌoďlem confronting police forces now 
is the opposite to the one that has traditionally faced them. Instead of too little data there is 
Ŷoǁ faƌ too ŵuĐh aŶd this ĐaŶ lead to ͚paƌalǇsis ďǇ aŶalǇsis͛ ;Kolakoǁski, ϮϬϭϱͿ, a situatioŶ 
ǁheƌe as PI.ϭϮ ǁaƌŶed ͞Ǉou ĐaŶ eǀaluate too ŵuĐh͟. Foƌ PI.ϭϮ, the tƌiĐk ǁas to ͞ǁoƌk out 
ǁhat Ǉou ǁaŶt to eǀaluate…ǁhat aƌe Ǉou tƌǇiŶg to geŶeƌate? WhǇ aƌe Ǉou doiŶg it? What͛s 
Ǉouƌ oďjeĐtiǀe?͟  
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The three strategies currently used offer different insights into different areas of 
commuŶiĐatioŶ ďut all aƌe also iŶheƌeŶtlǇ liŵited. ͚Output͛, oƌ ǁhat PI.ϴ ƌefeƌƌed to as ͞ǀaŶitǇ 
stats͟ aƌe the easiest Đaptuƌe ďut also the ŵost supeƌfiĐial. This data set ŵaǇ shoǁ hoǁ ŵaŶǇ 
retweets a post has had or what the reach has been but it cannot show whether the desired 
outcome has been achieved or whether, as PI.7 believes often happens, the post is merely 
ĐoŶtƌiďutiŶg to the ͞ǁhite Ŷoise effeĐt͟ that pƌoǀides a ŵoŵeŶtaƌǇ distƌaĐtioŶ ďut ŶothiŶg 
more. As PI.10 pointed out, what is the point of 50,000 people reading an appeal for 
information about a crime if there is no response?  
 
The saŵe is tƌue of ͚IŶteƌaĐtioŶ͛ ďased ŵeasuƌeŵeŶts. Theƌe is a gƌoǁiŶg ďodǇ of ƌeseaƌĐh 
which suggests that online behaviour does not necessarily correspond to how people behave 
offliŶe ;JoŶes, ϮϬϭϲͿ. ͚LikiŶg͛ oƌ ĐoŵŵeŶtiŶg oŶ a post ;tǁo of the ĐoŵŵoŶ ŵeasuƌes foƌ 
interaction) is not necessarily a reliable indicator of whether something has had an impact. A 
high proportion of people who will have read a post are silent observers on social media sites 
;BƌaiŶaƌd aŶd EdliŶs, ϮϬϭϱͿ. Foƌ eǀeƌǇ peƌsoŶ ǁho ͚eŶgages͛ ǁith that post theƌe ǁill ďe a ͚daƌk 
figuƌe͛ of those ǁho haǀe ĐhoseŶ Ŷot to eŶgage. This laĐk of eŶgageŵeŶt should Ŷot ďe takeŶ 
to mean, however, that the post has not achieved the desired result. HMIC (2014) found that it 
is only a very small minority of the public who feel comfortable or wish to engage with the 
police directly on social media and with appeals for information the audience might prefer a 
traditional means of communicating with the police either in person or by telephone.  
 
͚IŶteƌaĐtioŶ͛ ďased ŵeasuƌes ǁeƌe of ĐoŶĐeƌŶ to PI.Ϯϭ iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ as she feaƌed that ďǇ 
measuring interaction there would be an implicit pressure on teams to try to increase levels of 
interaction. This, according to PI.21, could not only prove to be a waste of resources as in her 
experience you can only engage with those that want to be engaged with, but could actually 
be counterproductive for public reassurance and encouraging a more symmetrical 
communication model. Similar concerns were raised by PI.4, PI.13 and PI.14 who all echoed 
these sentiments.  
 
The fiŶal ŵeasuƌeŵeŶt, ͚OutĐoŵe͛ ďased, is the ŵost ĐoŵpƌeheŶsiǀe of the thƌee ďut also the 
most expensive in terms of time and resources and the most difficult to accurately measure. 
This model measures impact by analysing whether a specific behaviour has changed. The 
example used by PI.9 to explain this was of a recent domestic abuse campaign her team had 
run. This had involved comparing the reporting levels for this crime category during and after 
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the campaign against the same time period for the previous three years to see if the campaign 
had had a noticeable impact on encouraging victims to come forward. There are three main 
difficulties with this metric. Firstly, it requires a relative level of stability in the recorded 
statistics in order to determine if there has been a variation. Bratton (2005) points out that 
there is a general tendency to assume that the police are responsible for crime rate 
fluctuations when there is growing evidence to suggest that this is not the case. Behaviour can 
change for a number of reasons and these campaigns are seldom run in an isolated 
environment without wider social influences but instead in a hectic social space.  As such, 
simply comparing statistics may not reveal much insight into how effective a campaign was as 
there will be multiple unknown variables also at work. As PI.21 pointed out: 
͞You ĐaŶ͛t eǀaluate the ďeŶefits of soĐial ŵedia uŶless Ǉou create a sterile environment 
aŶd Ǉou ĐaŶ attƌiďute that ďehaǀiouƌ to doiŶg that soĐial ŵedia, aŶd I doŶ͛t thiŶk ǁe 
ĐaŶ iŶ ŵost ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes͟ ;PI.ϮϭͿ 
 
Secondly, what constitutes behavioural change? A common problem with campaigns, 
according to PI.22, is that while they encourage victims to initially make contact with the police 
or to change their behaviour (e.g. locking doors) this seldom ends in a conviction as the victim 
later retracts their statements or returns to the previous behavioural pattern. Similar findings 
were reported in a BBC (2016) documentary on domestic abuse and has been found in other 
campaigns as well (Elder et al, 2004). Finally, and linked to the above, some behaviour changes 
in increments and it is only months or years later that the cultural and systemic changes can be 
clearly seen. The evaluation methods currently used for campaigns only capture the initial 
change, or absence, they cannot show how long the behavioural change continues for or 
patterns of change.  
 
As can be seen from the above, no single method offers an integrated means of assessing 
effeĐtiǀeŶess. At ďest ͚Output͛, ͚IŶteƌaĐtioŶ͛ aŶd ͚OutĐoŵe͛ offeƌ a paƌtial piĐtuƌe of the 
situation and thus make judging whether a strategy is actually effective difficult. PI.12 
suggested that the most reliable and comprehensive system for measuring effectiveness is to 
use a combination of all three models, which is the approach his team have adopted. While 
time consuming and resource intensive, PI.12 felt that as a result of using this strategy he had 
a thorough understanding of what works in his county and how to apply this in order to have 
very effective micro targeting when it came to tailoring messages for specific audiences. Such 
an approach, however, requires commitment from both the communications team and senior 
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management in order to be practical – two factors which varied considerably between police 
forces.  
 
Part of the problem with effectiveness, as PI.10 emphasised however, is that much of 
communications work is based on preventing victimisation or criminal behaviour and there is 
no reliable way of measuring that which did not happen.  
 
For PI.14 and PI.26, however, the greater concern was that the quest for demonstrating 
effectiveness could easily degenerate into target chasing. This was a particular concern for 
PI.ϭϰ ǁho felt stƌoŶglǇ that ͞ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs ĐaŶ͛t ďe taƌget dƌiǀeŶ – it ends up destroying, or 
at least iŵpediŶg, ǁhat Ǉou aƌe tƌǇiŶg to do͟. GiǀeŶ this, puƌsuiŶg the eteƌŶallǇ elusiǀe ideal of 
͚effeĐtiǀeŶess͛ thƌough ĐoŵpliĐated stƌategies ŵaǇ ďe, as PI.Ϯϲ ĐoŶĐluded, a ͞ƌed heƌƌiŶg͟ that 
encourages target chasing rather than actual improvement. 
 
The research question asked whether it is possible to measure what, or whether, police 
communication strategies are having an impact. With regard to communications the data 
ĐolleĐted iŶ this pƌojeĐt suggests that the aŶsǁeƌ is ͚possiďlǇ͛ depeŶdiŶg upoŶ the defiŶitioŶ 
used. At its heart this question is about how police forces understand and measure 
effectiveness. What is apparent is that the current strategies are used inconsistently across 
policing environments and are considered by the majority to be inadequate for the level of 
analysis thought to be necessary.  
 
Ultimately, what the data suggests is that the difference between the three interviewees who 
were satisfied with their evaluation methods and the 61% who were not is not down to the 
method used as PI.9, PI.12 and PI.19A all used different models. The key difference is that 
these interviewees had a clear rationale for what they wanted the data for and how they 
would use it. In contrast, the overriding theme from the other 19 interviewees was one of 
confusion and general bewilderment around what they wanted to achieve. For PI.9 reach was 
sufficient for her to assess how information was being shared across social media. PI.19A used 
statistics to track how campaigns were affecting reporting rates and PI.12 monitored 
everything in order to enhance the success of targeted messages.  
 
This conclusion is consistent with PI.16͛s oďseƌǀatioŶ that iŶ heƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐe the fuŶdaŵeŶtal 
problem many forces had was the absence of a clear strategy as to the purpose behind the 
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ĐaŵpaigŶs. IŶ PI.ϭϲ͛s opiŶioŶ, theƌe ǁas a ĐoŵŵoŶ ĐoŶfusioŶ aƌouŶd the diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ 
awareness and prevention campaigns which often resulted in communications staff and police 
officers thinking they were synonymous. This in turn led to confusion over what the desired 
outcomes of the project were and thus made selecting the appropriate measurement strategy 
difficult. As Hodges ;ϭϵϴϳ, p.ϭϵϬͿ, hoǁeǀeƌ, poiŶts out ͞diagŶosiŶg the ŵaladǇ is a lot easieƌ 
thaŶ fiŶdiŶg the ƌeŵedǇ͟.  
 
Demonstrating effectiveness, and perhaps more importantly cost effectiveness, is a central 
concern for police forces at the moment and one that is of growing importance for 
communications as well.  The austerity measures imposed in 2010 have resulted in a lot of 
unpopular public sector cuts and criticism levied towards police forces for continuing to 
finance what to some might mistakenly appear to be a non-essential function (Davies, 2015). 
The dilemma is that to assess effectiveness properly requires time, resources and significant 
budget – the very things the interviewees identified as the greatest threats facing police 
communications. Until the eŶdeŵiĐ ĐoŶfusioŶ aƌouŶd ͚ǁhat effeĐtiǀeŶess looks like͛ is 
resolved, however, and departments have the resources to devote to evaluation it is probable 
that ͚effeĐtiǀeŶess͛ ǁill ƌeŵaiŶ elusiǀe.  
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4.6 Chapter Summary 
 
According to Clarke (1965, p.30ϳͿ ͞PoliĐiŶg iŶ ŵost soĐieties eǆists iŶ a state of ͚dǇŶaŵiĐ 
teŶsioŶ͛ ďetǁeeŶ foƌĐes that teŶd to isolate it aŶd those that teŶd to iŶtegƌate its fuŶĐtioŶs 
ǁith otheƌ soĐial stƌuĐtuƌes͟. The poliĐe aƌe at oŶĐe a paƌt of aŶd eǆĐluded fƌoŵ soĐietǇ. The 
communications department provides an essential bridge between the police and the policed 
ǁhiĐh eŶaďles a ͞shaƌed uŶiǀeƌse of disĐouƌse͟ ;Niƌ, ϮϬϭϭ, p.ϱϬϱͿ. The puƌpose of this Đhapteƌ 
has been to address the research questions that formed foundation and direction of this 
thesis. When this project began it appeared to be a relatively straightforward area to 
investigate. What this and the preceding chapters have sought to show, however, is that it is 
anything but.  
 
Police Public Relations is a highly complex and convoluted area mired in confusion and 
misunderstanding. When one considers that this is arguably the most outward facing and 
public department in the police there is surprisingly little known about it, how it works, what it 
does or the ideology governing it. There has been a long standing belief in the press that this 
depaƌtŵeŶt eǆists to ͚spiŶ͛ ďad Ŷeǁs, ĐoŶĐeal ǁƌoŶg doiŶgs aŶd puďliĐise ͚good stoƌies͛ iŶ 
order to distract from the first two functions (Davis, 2015).  
 
What is apparent from this research is that police communications is in a state of transition. It 
is a department that has changed significantly since the 1990s as police forces have been 
required to adapt to a constantly changing communication and social landscape that is 
significantly different from that which characterised the majority of the 20
th
 Century and their 
formative development. What is also apparent from the data, however, is that in 2014 some 
police forces have adapted to these new requirements and challenges better than others and 
that for while some things have changed others have not.  
 
The advent of social media has radically redefined not only the communications landscape but 
also organisational and personal identity. Corporations and institutions are now expected to 
have and maintain a virtual identity and presence online (Zerfass and Schramm, 2013). Such a 
requirement presents a multitude of concerns and difficulties for public institutions like the 
police who as public bodies are held to higher standards of accountability, openness and 
transparency than their private sector counter parts and who must walk a fine line between in 
order to avoid allegations of spin and corruption (Motion, 2005).  
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Crump (2011) concluded from his research that police activity on social media varied 
considerably between police forces, both in terms of the degree of activity and what they were 
using these sites for. According to Crump (2011) prior to August 2011 most forces were using 
social media as an occasional channel for broadcasting news but that there was limited 
evidence of engagement, dialogue or of a consistent strategy.  The London Riots in 2011 were 
a watershed moment in police communications, following which there has been a clear 
pattern of accelerated growth as police forces have adopted these new channels as a means of 
mass communication.  
 
While the data from this research shows a similar pattern of inconsistency between police 
forces with regard to social media there have been clear improvements in the majority of the 
forces interviewed and there is compelling evidence of a new periodisation emerging in police 
public relations – that of ͚diƌeĐt aŶd digital͛. OŶe of the ŵost sigŶifiĐaŶt ĐhaŶges ideŶtified ǁas 
the channel shift many forces are currently exploring which is prioritising social media 
channels over the traditional (press) channels. This proposed channel shift represents a 
significant departure from traditional reactive police communications which was the source, 
but not the publisher, of crime information. Modern communications is increasingly proactive 
and in some forces has repositioned the police to become publishers in their own right; 
challenging the historical monopoly of the print press to break news to the public. What is 
needed is more research in the future to see how these changes are developing. The principles 
estaďlished iŶ EŶgage ;NPIA, ϮϬϭϭͿ aŶd ǁhiĐh aƌe appaƌeŶt iŶ the ďuƌgeoŶiŶg ͚DiƌeĐt aŶd 
Digital͛ appƌoaĐh haǀe set out a ǀisioŶ of a peƌsoŶal poliĐe seƌǀiĐe that eŶgages diƌeĐtlǇ ǁith 
the individual and works in partnership with a virtual network to solve crimes; such 
aspirations, however, are not necessarily attainable, particularly given the constraints on 
resources and the growing demand many departments are facing.  
 
In conjunction with the growth of social media it is perhaps not surprising that a significant 
number of the interviewees reported a corresponding change in the police – media 
ƌelatioŶship. With the ƌise of fiƌst ĐitizeŶ jouƌŶalisŵ ;Goldsŵith, ϮϬϭϬͿ aŶd Ŷoǁ the ͚self-
seƌǀiĐe͛ ŵodel of poliĐe communications, which removes the need for the media to play the 
part of intermediary between police and public, the boundaries and power dynamic has 
shifted irrevocably. Increasingly it appears that local journalists are acting merely as 
mouthpieces for the police press office, regurgitating (sometimes verbatim) the police story. 
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This change from critical watch dog function to extension of the police voice has been 
documented in other countries as well (Lee and McGovern, 2014). While this is by no means 
the situation in all areas it is indicative of possible changes police communications may 
experience in the future.  
How communications departments are going to continue changing going forwards was a 
recurrent concern through the interviews. The interviewees were apprehensive over how the 
continuing budget cuts would affect their departments going forwards. Almost all interviewees 
reported a reduction in their budgets which they said had had a detrimental effect on the 
campaigns and activities they could engage in and many felt that further reductions could only 
be achieved by reducing the number of staff. Smaller teams, smaller budgets and greater 
demand were among the most frequently cited worries and problems facing police 
communications in 2014.  
 
Given the current financial restrictions on police forces and the likelihood of these continuing 
for the foreseeable future it is more important than ever for the police to be able to justify 
their expenditure, strategies and activities. With news articles such as those by Lane (2015), 
Daǀis ;ϮϬϭϱͿ aŶd Whitehead ;ϮϬϭϭͿ aiŵed at stiƌƌiŶg puďliĐ aŶgeƌ at aŶ ͞aƌŵǇ of 
pƌopagaŶdists͟ ;Daǀis, ϮϬϭϱͿ theƌe to ͞Đoǀeƌ up… [poliĐe] iŶĐoŵpeteŶĐe͟ ;LaŶe, ϮϬϭϱͿ to the 
loss of frontline policing and services it is essential that police communications is not seen as a 
luxury, inefficient extra.  
 
Collaboration presents one possible avenue for police forces to explore. There was a strong 
sense of frustration at times during the interviews over what one interviewee called the 
͞Ŷeedless ǁaste aŶd ƌepliĐatioŶ͟ ;PI.ϭϲͿ that is a ƌeĐuƌƌeŶt issue. PI.ϮϮ ideŶtified thƌee aƌeas 
where communications teams could collaborate to save time, money and resources; 
campaigns, websites and evaluations. Such an approach however would necessitate these 
departments learning to share information, improve intra-departmental communication and 
let go of the isolationist tendencies which have historically defined police communications 
(PI.16).  
 
Time and the resources to establish these joint endeavours remain the two greatest challenges 
for police forces to overcome. However, there is compelling evidence that this might yet 
happen in the future. At the time of the interviews four forces had merged communications 
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teams and a further five of the 27 forces interviewed were involved with joint communications 
projects.  
 
A recurrent theme in the interviews was how much police communications had changed over 
the last 20 years. With the work of APCOM and social media communications is now more 
open than it has been in the past. Police forces as a whole are moving away from working in 
isolation and towards forming close working partnerships with their neighbours. With the 
success of joint teams such as the Hertfordshire, Bedfordshire and Cambridge Major Crimes 
Unit or the West Mercia and Warwickshire joint communication team, collaboration is looking 
increasingly to be a feasible answer to budgetary problems.  
 
As police forces have changed to meet the requirements and needs of society so too have the 
communications department. The interviewees all emphasised the difference between what 
theǇ ĐoŶsideƌed ͚old Đoŵŵs͛ aŶd theiƌ ǁoƌk Ŷoǁ. The ĐhaŶge iŶ depaƌtŵeŶt Ŷaŵe ǁas Đited 
as indicative of the change in ideology and culture governing these departments. Police 
communications now appears to be less about publicity and proactive reputation management 
and instead increasingly about supporting the operational needs of their police forces through 
public engagement.  
 
This distinction has led to the question of whether public relations is still relevant in modern 
communications. The interview data clearly shows that public relations remains a 
misunderstood term, with almost half of the interviewees struggling to explain or define the 
concept and nearly a quarter conflating it with publicity and marketing. Despite this confusion, 
however, over half of the interviewees agreed that public relations remains a relevant and 
important part of modern policing. The difference is that public relations is now about 
supporting the operational function of the police within society rather than acting as a barrier 
between them.  
 
The next step is for police forces to continue improving their communications activities to 
capitalise on the new social intelligence networks now available to them. A key part of this will 
require departments to have in place a robust system for assessing what is working and why to 
improve targeting and the impact of their messages. Effectiveness remains a perennial 
problem for a number of police forces. Part of the reason for this is the newness of social 
media and the mercurial nature of the present communication industry which is constantly 
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changing and evolving, often too quickly for fundamentally reactive organisations like the 
police to keep pace. These issues are further compounded by the prevalent confusion of many 
interviewees around which measurement system is best, what the data they collect means or 
how this can be applied to their activities and strategies. What is apparent, is that until this 
confusion is resolved and departments have a clear idea of both what they want to measure 
and why, effectiveness will remain mired in its current difficulties.     
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Chapter 5:                Conclusion 
 
Weďeƌ aƌgues that it is of upŵost iŵpoƌtaŶĐe to ͞ask ƋuestioŶs aďout those things which 
convention makes self-eǀideŶt͟ ;ϭϵϰϵ Đited iŶ TuƌŶeƌ, ϮϬϭϯ p.ϭϲϭͿ aŶd peƌhaps Ŷoǁheƌe is this 
ŵoƌe ŶeĐessaƌǇ thaŶ ǁith the poliĐe, aŶ iŶstitutioŶ ŵiƌed iŶ ͞ŶoŶ-kŶoǁledge͟ ;MĐGoeǇ, ϮϬϬϳ 
p.229), confusion, myth and misunderstanding (Reiner, 2010). Much has been written, said 
and thought about the British police. It has proved to be one of the most enduring and popular 
symbols, a subject on which everyone in Britain seems to have a ready opinion and a topic of 
perpetual intrinsic interest. The police are not only the law enforcers, the thin blue line, and 
the gate keepers to the criminal justice system; they are also the interpretive lens through 
which people understand crime and society (Box 2004) and society tells stories about itself 
(Loader, 1997). Such a status, however, presents a multitude of challenges in modern society 
when it comes to communication, reputation management and managing public opinion 
(Lovell, 2002; Zavattro and Sementelli, 2014).  
 
UsiŶg Weďeƌ͛s ;iďidͿ appƌoaĐh as a starting point, the aim of this study was to ask questions 
and learn about a department that is at once one of the most public facing departments of the 
police and yet in many ways the most invisible and the least understood. It is a function often 
mired iŶ allegatioŶs of ͚spiŶ͛ aŶd of ďeiŶg little ŵoƌe thaŶ a pƌopagaŶda ŵaĐhiŶe ǁhose 
pƌiŵaƌǇ fuŶĐtioŶ is to ŵaŶage ͚tƌuth͛ aŶd puďliĐ peƌĐeptioŶ iŶ oƌdeƌ to pƌoteĐt poliĐe foƌĐes 
from scandals such as Hillsborough (Geddes, 2016).   
 
This research set out to discover what public relations looks like in the modern police force; 
how it has changed with the advent of social media and whether the concept of public 
relations is still relevant in policing today. Following an extensive review of the literature, 
eighteen months of confusion and multiple discarded methodologies, three aims evolved into 
nine questions and this thesis was born.  
 
One of the early difficulties encountered while researching this area was the lack of recent, 
comprehensive research. Most studies are several years old (Mawby 2002, 2007), based in a 
foreign country (Surette, 2001; Lee and McGovern, 2014, 2015); or focus on only one aspect 
such as FOIs (Cooke and Sturgis, 2012), social media (Brainard and Edlins, 2015, Connor, 
20115; Crump, 2011) or evaluating a specific initiative (Bradford, Stanko and Jackson, 2009; 
Myhill and Bradford, 2012), rather than looking at the department in an integrated way. Such 
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an approach, however, has led to a fragmented and out dated understanding of police 
communications.    
 
The chosen methodology sought to address some of the gaps identified during the literature 
review. In investigating this area, representatives from more than two thirds (69%) of English 
police forces were interviewed in depth, covering a range of issues from the place of public 
relations in the police to their communication strategies and how these departments had 
ĐhaŶged oǀeƌ the last deĐade ;ϯ.ϮͿ.  Noǁ at the eŶd of the ͚ƌeseaƌĐh stoƌǇ͛ it is Ŷot the puƌpose 
of this final chapter to rehash the discussion in Chapter 4, but instead to summarise the key 
themes and core arguments of the thesis.   
 
5.1 Key Themes and Findings 
The central theme that emerged during this project was one of change and continuity. This 
thesis argues that while police public relations has changed considerably in form, structure and 
operational position over the last 20 years there are also strong elements of continuity - 
particularly with regard to the core functions, communication strategies used and the 
problems faced. This study found that these departments appear to be continually in a state of 
transition and tension as forces attempt to adapt to a rapidly evolving social landscape far 
removed from that of the twentieth century. Social media and the internet has radically 
redefined the what, where, when and how of communication, the traditional communication 
channels and the relationship between individuals and public institutions. In such an 
eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt, effeĐtiǀe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ has Đeased to ďe a ͚ŶiĐe-to-have optional eǆtƌa͛ aŶd 
instead become a fundamental requirement for the success of modern policing. Yet for all 
these apparent changes, there is much about these departments that has remained relatively 
unchanged from the situation described by Mawby (2002; 2007). 
 
1) A Modern Communications Department 
Prior to the 1990s, the majority of these departments were run by police officers, in small non-
centralised teams spread out across the police force as a background support function 
designed to deal with the press and adverse publicity. Following the Wolf-Olins report, 
however, police forces started modernising and professionalising their public relations 
departments (Mawby, 2002). In 2014, communications had changed significantly.  
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The interview data tells a story of how police communications departments have evolved over 
the last decade, with most moving from the position of an auxiliary backroom function not 
ĐoŶsideƌed paƌt of ͚ƌeal poliĐe ǁoƌk͛ to aŶ opeƌatioŶallǇ esseŶtial paƌt of ŵodeƌŶ poliĐiŶg. Oǀeƌ 
half (58%) of the interviewees considered their departments as fully embedded within their 
force with the remaining interviewees mostly positive in their assessments of how the 
perception and place of their departments is gradually changing.  The increasing cultural 
inclusion and acceptance that has resulted from this change is indicative of the significant shift 
in culture both internally and externally towards communications.  
 
Part of the change in perception was attributed to the decade of professionalisation. Replacing 
warranted officers with civilian experts had, according to some interviewees, transformed the 
reputation of the public relations department from a route for quick promotion, that kept the 
pƌess at aƌŵ͛s leŶgth, to a pƌofessioŶal depaƌtŵeŶt of ƌeĐogŶised experts there to aid front 
line policing.  
 
Communications departments are now wholly staffed by civilian communications professionals 
in streamlined, centralised teams embedded at the heart of the police force. While these 
teams are mostly smaller than they were following the peak of expansion in 2010 it is 
indicative of their perceived value that they are still, on average, larger than recorded by 
MaǁďǇ ;ϮϬϬϳͿ iŶ ϮϬϬϲ/ϳ; espeĐiallǇ ǁheŶ size is Đoŵpaƌed to the iŶteƌǀieǁee͛s peƌĐeptioŶs of 
their operational position. Although the delineated department structure model was still in 
use by many of the teams interviewed, some forces have adopted (or were evaluating the 
ŵeƌits ofͿ a ŵoƌe geŶeƌiĐ, ͚jaĐk of all tƌades͛, appƌoaĐh – such as the one utilised by PI.ϭϳ͛s 
team where staff were trained to be all round communications officers capable of performing 
all aspects of communications activity, rather than specialists in one area (e.g. Press Officer).  
 
2) Budget, Structure and Managing Demand 
The approach adopted iŶ PI.ϭϳ͛s teaŵ poteŶtiallǇ offeƌs a pƌaĐtiĐal solutioŶ to a gƌeat Ŷuŵďeƌ 
of issues including greater flexibility for resource allocation. In theory this model could 
sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ iŵpƌoǀe a depaƌtŵeŶt͛s adaptaďilitǇ to ŵeet deŵaŶd oŶ a daǇ to daǇ ďasis. 
Whether this new structure is adopted by more forces and lives up to expectations remains to 
be seen. However, it does provide an innovative possible solution for protecting the future 
viability of communications teams especially given the economic situation which, according to 
the interviewees, is placing considerable and increasing strain on the functionality of these 
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departments. It is indicative of the level of concern that police staff feel over this issue that the 
subject of budget cuts was brought up by 74% of those interviewed, often without prompting 
and frequently returned to during the interviews. It was also often cited as the root cause of 
other problems, such as managing the growing demand for services, smaller teams, poor staff 
retention and the sometimes sluggish adoption of new technology and channels which was 
thought to be hampering effective public engagement. 
 
The aŶǆietǇ eǆpƌessed aƌouŶd ƌesouƌĐes, staffiŶg aŶd the depaƌtŵeŶts͛ futuƌe aďilitǇ to ŵeet 
the growing demand for police services presents a serious concern, particularly as further 
budget restrictions are likely. Although police concerns around budgets and resourcing are not 
new, what the interview data does highlight is the troubling question of whether there is a 
͚ĐƌitiĐal ŵass͛ ǁith ƌegaƌd to depaƌtŵeŶt size aŶd eǆpeƌtise - below which capacity, capability 
and effectiveness is detrimentally affected. More troubling, however, is whether this point has 
already been reached in some forces as several of the interviewees feared.  
 
3) Collaboration and Information Sharing 
Collaboration over campaigns and projects is one possible way for communications teams to 
manage growing financial constraints and improve the quality, coverage and unity of message 
(HMIC, 2014). However, at present this remains fragmented, inconsistent and involving only 
small groups of forces; with only nine of the departments interviewed (36%) currently 
collaborating either with each other or with outside partner agencies.  While the vast majority 
of interviewees expressed a generally positive attitude towards collaboration as a solution 
nearly half (48%) dismissed the possibility and showed distrust of the concept. Commonly cited 
reasons were that it was either impractical, difficult to arrange, an incompatibility of 
approaches/audience or that it would be too difficult to balance the needs of multiple forces in 
a mutually beneficial relationship.  
 
These problems were further compounded by a general sense of isolation which meant that 
communications teams seldom reported a good understanding of what other teams outside of 
their immediate neighbours were doing. This was a change remarked on by a significant 
number of the interviewees who remembered a time when there was closer working between 
departments and greater knowledge sharing. Pressures on time and lack of money to finance 
closer working relationships were universally cited as the core reasons for this change. While 
some interviewees felt that there was little to be gained in closer collaboration with other 
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police forces there was a high level of frustration reported by a significant number at this lack 
of awareness as it often meant that informal resource sharing such as campaigns or 
information was rebuffed by other teams and that there was considerable variability in the 
standard and quality of work across different forces.  
 
The lack of collaboration and resource sharing means that there is a high level of duplication 
and reinvention across different police environments
32
. Given that many campaigns are not 
geogƌaphiĐallǇ speĐifiĐ aŶd aƌe oŶ topiĐs that all foƌĐes͛ pƌoduĐe ĐaŵpaigŶs foƌ this is aŶ aƌea 
which could do with improvement and further investigation. Joint campaigns between multiple 
forces have the potential to yield reduced costs for the forces involved and an improved 
standard and consistency within the campaigns – two aspects which can only benefit police 
forces in the future.  Consistency between policing environments is of growing importance 
going forward as easy travel further blurs traditional borders and areas of jurisdiction yet in 
2014 there was little evidence of an integrated approach between communications teams.  
 
ϰͿ AudieŶĐe aŶd ChaŶŶels: The EŵergeŶĐe of ͚DireĐt aŶd Digital͛  
Perhaps the most outwardly visible change however, has been in the way police forces are 
now communicating, often circumventing the traditional channels (e.g. the media) in order to 
talk to and engage with the general public directly. This change, according to the interviewees, 
is challenging and renegotiating the dynamics of the relationship between the media and 
poliĐe foƌĐes, espeĐiallǇ iŶ those foƌĐes ǁhiĐh haǀe adopted the ͚self-seƌǀiĐe͛ ŵodel. This 
approach effectively seems to side-line the news industry by making the police themselves the 
publisher and primarǇ souƌĐe of iŶfoƌŵatioŶ; the ͚Đƌediďle, tƌusted ǀoiĐe iŶ aŶǇthiŶg Đƌiŵe 
ƌelated͛ ;PI.ϰͿ, aŶd iŶ a gƌoǁiŶg Ŷuŵďeƌ of foƌĐes the ͞uŶƋuestioŶed pƌoǀideƌ͟ of iŶfoƌŵatioŶ 
which is then disseminated verbatim by over stretched local journalists. Such a change would 
not have been possible, however, without the advent of social media.  
 
HMIC ;ϮϬϭϭď, p.ϯϬͿ ĐoŶĐluded iŶ theiƌ ƌepoƌt that ͞the poliĐe haǀe ŵuĐh to leaƌŶ aďout soĐial 
ŵedia͟ aŶd that ͞ǁith soŵe Ŷotaďle eǆĐeptioŶs, the poǁeƌ of this kiŶd of ŵedia ;ďoth seŶding 
out aŶd ƌeĐeiǀiŶg iŶfoƌŵatioŶͿ is Ŷot ǁell uŶdeƌstood aŶd less ǁell ŵaŶaged͟. “iŵilaƌ fiŶdiŶgs 
have been reported consistently both with UK forces and the police in other countries (Proctor 
et al, 2013; Connor, 2015). Research over the last five years has shown a general pattern of 
                                           
32
 An example of this is the number of police forces who have designed their own websites which has 
resulted in considerable duplication and reinvention (see 3.2.13).  
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disorganisation, sporadic uptake and inconsistent use when it comes to the police on social 
media (HMIC, 2014). The data from this study suggests that after the London Riots in August 
2011 there was a period of rapid expansion when it came to police presence on these 
channels. While many police forces had a Facebook page and/or Twitter account prior to the 
2011 activity was irregular, disinterested and strategically vague in what they were trying to 
achieve. One interviewee desĐƌiďed that August as ͞a ďloodǇ ƌude ǁake-up call. Comms had 
ŵoǀed oŶ, ďut ǁe hadŶ͛t ŵoǀed ǁith it, ǁe had to plaǇ ĐatĐh-up aŶd fast͟ ;PI.ϮͿ.  
 
In his research, Mawby (2002; P.7) suggested that there were four distinct periods in the 
evolution of police public relations: Informal Image Work, Emergent Public Relations, 
Embedding Public Relations and The Professionalisation of Police Image Work. With the rapid 
growth and reliance upon social media across police forces since 2011 there is growing 
evidence of a fifth periodisation: that of Direct and Digital. This phase can be understood as 
the predominance of social media as the primary channel for communication and principal 
means of non-emergency service provision through a devolved communications model that 
encourages the deliberate development of online networks using a more dialogical approach 
to engage with members of the public and customers directly.   
 
In 2015, every police force in Britain had at least one Twitter account and Facebook page. 30 
Forces had a registered YouTube account and many were starting to experiment with other 
social media sites, like Instagram, Pinterest and Google+. At the time of the interviews Twitter 
was the preferred social media channel which was consistent with the findings of Crump 
(2011) and Brainard and Edlins (2015). However, there was also a significant number of the 
interviewees who preferred Facebook and said that they prioritised it over Twitter in their 
strategies as they considered it a more versatile tool and was more likely to encourage 
engagement from the public than Twitter which they saw as a limited broadcasting, crisis 
management channel.  
 
How and what police forces are using social media for has changed significantly since 2011. 
Police forces have increasingly come to rely upon these channels as a vital support for 
operational policing and as a means of maintaining community contact in a time of less visible 
policing. What the data also shows, however, is that there remains an inconsistency across 
those interviewed in terms of approach, use, strategy and perceived effectiveness.  There is an 
apparent association between the preferred social media cha
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strategy in use; those forces where Twitter was the main channel all stated that their 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs stƌategǇ ǁas ͚push͛ oƌ ͚ďƌoadĐastiŶg͛ ;the tƌaditioŶal poliĐe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs 
model). In contrast, those forces which prioritised Facebook, were keen to emphasise the 
iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of eŶgageŵeŶt aŶd ǁeƌe lookiŶg to eŶĐouƌage a dialogue oƌ ͚pull͛ based strategy. 
These were also generally the interviewees who were most in favour of the devolved 
communications model, promoting a more local and less centralised corporate way of 
communicating with the public.  
 
While there is evidence of a transition in communications strategy it should be noted that at 
the tiŵe of iŶteƌǀieǁ ŶeaƌlǇ half of those iŶteƌǀieǁed ǁeƌe still pƌiŵaƌilǇ usiŶg ͚push͛ as the 
dominant corporate communications strategy and there was a strong feeling reported almost 
unanimously that ͚push͛ ǁas aŶ esseŶtial ĐoŵpoŶeŶt of theiƌ ǁoƌk. Despite the laudaďle 
intentions set out in Engage (NPIA, 2011), however, this is not surprising and nor is it likely to 
change in the near future. As PI.28 explained a lot of the core police communication 
requirements are centred on the need to get information out quickly – particularly during 
emergency situations. Online dialogue and community engagement are likely to be 
increasingly important going forwards for creating and maintaining long lasting police-public 
partnerships and solving crime, it is but one though, and at present the least vital part of 
corporate police communications for many forces.  
 
Direct and Digital is still in its infancy in many forces but it is growing and embedding – as can 
be seen in the devolved communications model that is now prevalent across England. 
Individual police officers and a growing number of Corporate Communications teams are 
increasingly communicating directly with rather than simply to members of their local public 
and more social media sites, from Instagram to Snapchat, are being adopted as vehicles for 
this move. 
 
There is a concern, however, that this increased reliance upon social media as a cheap 
alternative to other forms of communication could have adverse consequences in the future. A 
common refrain from the interviews was the sense of frustration in still not being listened to 
ďǇ oǀeƌ eageƌ seŶioƌ offiĐeƌs ǁho, as PI.ϳ so adƌoitlǇ put it ͞haǀe fouŶd soĐial ŵedia aŶd thiŶk 
it will solve everything when actuallǇ it ŵakes a lot of ǁoƌk foƌ us͟. “oĐial ŵedia sites ŵaǇ ďe 
free to use in terms of membership and reach a wide, diverse audience, but they are not free 
in terms of upkeep and maintenance and can place an immense demand on the staff and time 
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resources of the department – particularly once forces start pursuing a dialogue or 
engagement based strategy with the public. The interviewees were particularly keen to labour 
the point that once their teams started replying to messages it was a slippery slope as it was 
no longer a question of simply broadcasting but meeting the demands and expectations of a 
public who are now actively seeking and expecting answers. While engagement in this way is 
thought to improve public confidence and satisfaction levels, it is also a considerable strain on 
communications teams and there is a concern as to whether dialogical engagement will 
continue to be viable if demand increased or teams are further reduced; particularly as social 
media when misused or used badly can create confusion and have lasting consequences for 
the team and the wider police force.  
 
Focusing on social media sites also runs the risk of alienating wide sections of the general 
public who either do not use their sites, or who chose not to engage with the police this way. 
Several of the interviewees reported a reduction of budget in physical marketing campaigns or 
for dealing with the media as the expectation was that social media could fill the gap far more 
cheaply and effectively. While this new allocation of resources seemed to suit some areas 
where local journalism was considered to be declining it was not the situation in all forces. 
Where local journalism was seen to be thriving social media was considered of secondary 
importance to the traditional channels. In such cases prioritising social media could have 
adverse consequences.  
  
5) Effectiveness 
CoŶĐeƌŶ oǀeƌ ͚ǁhat ǁoƌks͛, ǁhǇ it ǁoƌks aŶd hoǁ to ŵeasuƌe it ǁas a pƌeǀaleŶt theŵe fƌoŵ 
the interviewees and one which has far reaching implications for the future of police 
communications. While over half of the forces interviewed had a strategy for evaluating the 
impact of print and social media campaigns the majority of interviewees (77%) described an 
historic difficulty with measuring effectiveness; a situation at odds with the target driven 
nature of modern policing.   
 
Evaluating the effectiveness of social media activity was a particularly common concern. This 
was often exacerbated by the limited guidance and assistance interviewees reported was 
available for helping police communications teams to improve and adapt to the new demands 
being placed on them. There was also considerable confusion expressed over which metric was 
best and what could be done with the data collected. Until communications teams feel 
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confident in what information they need to capture and how to then use it, this confusion and 
concerns around how to demonstrate effectiveness is likely to persist.  
 
6) Change in Ideology: A New Public Relations? 
In conjunction with these more tangible changes, however, there also appears to have been a 
shift in the underlying ideology governing public relations in the police. Crump (2011) 
suggested that there were three typologies of social media activity that police forces routinely 
eŶgage iŶ: ͚ďƌoadĐasteƌs͛, ͚loĐal Ŷeǁs gatheƌeƌs͛ aŶd ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ faĐilitatoƌs͛. The data fƌoŵ 
the interviews however, suggests a possible further two typologies may now be in evidence – 
that of risk management and pacification. Both risk and pacification are strongly indicative of 
an adjustment to the underlying ideology as they are embedded in dialogue based discourses 
around public engagement and behavioural change. As discussed above, communications is 
now not only about broadcasting the police story but about engagement and influencing the 
behaviours of the audience the message is intended for. Over a third of those interviewed 
stated that their departments were now actively trying to alter the behaviour of their intended 
audiences.  This is a notable and important change from siŵplǇ ͞shoutiŶg stuff at aŶǇoŶe ǁho 
ǁould listeŶ͟ ǁhiĐh ǁas hoǁ oŶe iŶteƌǀieǁee ;PI.ϳͿ desĐƌiďed the poliĐe foƌĐes͛ tƌaditioŶal 
strategy for communicating.  
 
A recurrent theme expressed by the interviewees was around the distinction drawn between 
what was soŵetiŵes ƌefeƌƌed to as ͚tƌaditioŶal puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs͛, oƌ ͚old Đoŵŵs͛, aŶd ŵodeƌŶ 
communication departments. There was a strong feeling expressed by some interviewees that 
puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs ǁas sǇŶoŶǇŵous ǁith ͚spiŶ͛, iŵage ŵaŶageŵeŶt aŶd Đoǀeƌ-ups – which, it was 
emphasised, is not the purpose of modern communications. Mawby and Worthington (2002) 
found in their study that public relations was not well understood as a concept within the 
communications departments. More than a decade later this has not changed significantly. 
Almost half of those interviewed (45%) said that they either found the concept too difficult to 
define or that they did not know how to and 19% thought it was synonymous with marketing. 
 
One of the most frequent reasons cited as to the above misunderstanding was that it is no 
longer a relevant part of police communications.  It is interesting that while maintaining or 
promoting a positive public image was described as important by some it was not considered 
to be one of the core functions by the majority (80.6%). Instead, internal communications, 
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community engagement, crisis communications, reassurance and supporting operational 
policing were all considered more important (Fig. 3.35).  
 
Modern police communications, then, seems to emphasise an open agenda; one that is more 
outward and public facing than in the past and one that is looking to engage and build 
communication networks with their local communities. Communications now appears to 
prioritise risk, awareness and prevention rather than with maintaining a certain image and 
perpetuating cover ups. Such a change in ideology, however, is not incompatible with the 
precepts of public relations. In the confusion over how to define public relations arguably lies 
the root of the faulty dichotomy drawn by some of the interviewees between the old public 
relations departments of the past which prioritised image and reputation and the modern 
agenda for transparency and openness.  
 
What the interview data suggests, however, is that public relations remains a commonly 
misunderstood term in police forces and particularly among communications professionals 
soŵe of ǁhoŵ eitheƌ Đould Ŷot defiŶe puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs oƌ ĐoŶflated it ǁith ͚spiŶ͛. 
Communications departments may have moved away from public relations terminology but 
the core principles and practices remain. Like the communications department itself, public 
relations has evolved to meet the needs of society. Grunig and Hunt (1984, p.4) defined public 
ƌelatioŶs as ͞the ŵaŶageŵeŶt of ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ aŶ oƌgaŶisatioŶ aŶd its puďliĐs͟ – 
using this definition public relations appears to be more relevant than ever for police forces. 
Modern communications is all about managing communication activities effectively so that 
messages are received and then acted upon and this is wholly consistent with the observed 
change in ideology of which many of the interviewees are rightfully proud. 
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5.2 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
No research project is infallible, however, or free from methodological issues and limitations. 
While these issues were addressed in Chapter 2 there are four main limitations to this study 
which need to be acknowledged here: namely scope, credibility, applicability and 
generalisability.  
 
Scope 
One of the key problems with our understanding of police public relations has been the 
fragmented research that has often been limited in scope. There are many reasons for 
previous research to have focused in this way, not least because of the time, money and the 
practicalities involved in large scale research projects. There is also a lingering concern that 
ƌeseaƌĐh that tƌies to ďe the ͚jaĐk of all tƌades͛, is ͚ŵasteƌ of ŶoŶe͛. BǇ foĐusiŶg oŶ the ŵaĐƌo, 
the micro is hidden within the bigger picture, and in focussing on the micro one can lose 
perspective and understanding of how the individual components fit together. In an ideal 
world, managing both macro and micro elements in one research project would be achievable 
as well as desirable – but this is not that world. All research is conducted through what Hughes 
;ϮϬϬϬ, pϮϰϭͿ Đalls ͞ƌeseaƌĐh ďaƌgaiŶs͟; the Đoŵpƌoŵise ďetǁeeŶ ǁhat is ŶeĐessaƌǇ, aĐhieǀaďle 
and ideal. With an institution like the police, where access has to be carefully negotiated, this 
often means limiting the focus so that the end result is something practical and of value to the 
organisation.  
 
In the early stages of this project I was faced with a similar choice; I could either elect to focus 
on evaluating one aspect (such as output or confidence) or concentrate on investigating what 
‘itĐhie aŶd “peŶĐeƌ ;ϭϵϵϰ, p.ϭϴϮͿ desĐƌiďe as ͚the ĐoŶteǆtual͛ – i.e. estaďlishiŶg the ͞foƌŵ aŶd 
Ŷatuƌe of ǁhat eǆists͟. GiǀeŶ ŵǇ ƌeseaƌĐh iŶteƌests aŶd hoǁ ŵuĐh these depaƌtŵeŶts 
appeaƌed to haǀe ĐhaŶged fƌoŵ MaǁďǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϮͿ ƌeseaƌĐh I opted for the latter.  
 
In choosing this approach, however, it was by necessity self-limiting in terms of scope and the 
immediate practical value that evaluative studies can offer. While a number of themes have 
suggested themselves, the data and conclusions have been left as interpretive in recognition of 
these limitations.   
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Credibility 
Theƌe is a peƌeŶŶial diffiĐultǇ ǁith askiŶg foƌ people͛s suďjeĐtiǀe assessŵeŶt of ĐoŶteŶtious 
issues. The extent to which the interviewees were correct in their assessments and professed 
opinions is an important question to ask and a very difficult one to answer. The interviewees 
were asked questions designed to explore the inner workings of their departments. While 
͚ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͛ ŵight seeŵ like a ƌelatiǀelǇ uŶĐoŵpliĐated aŶd uncontroversial subject area 
(and therefore one on which people would speak freely) it was evident from the interviews 
that many of the participants felt it to be an ideological, political and practical minefield; 
particularly when topics around effectiveŶess, opeƌatioŶal positioŶ aŶd ͚puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs͛ ǁeƌe 
introduced.  
 
There were occasions when over the course of the interviews participants changed their 
answers. Whether this was because their opinion changed, the question was asked in a slightly 
different way or they wished to give a different answer for their own reasons, it is impossible 
to determine. What this does call into question, however, is the credibility of the responses.  
 
Wolcott (1995) argues that qualitative interviews are better understood as interpretative or 
surreal performances during which the interview subject and interviewer are constantly 
negotiating the communicative space (2.4). There is a double misfortune here in that rightly or 
wrongly, professionals involved in this area have a ƌeputatioŶ foƌ ͚ŵaŶagiŶg͛ these 
performances to give the results they desire. That is not to say that this is what occurred 
during the interviews, only that it is a possibility which must be kept in mind particularly given 
the limitations associated with the sampling method used.  
 
It was evident early on that voluntary sampling would be the only avenue possible with the 
proposed sample group. This does mean, however, that there are questions around the impact 
of participant self-selection on the intervieǁ data as the paƌtiĐipaŶts all had to ͚opt iŶ͛, aŶd 
therefore must have had a reason for doing so. In some cases this agenda was made explicitly 
clear by the participants, but this was by no means universal (2.4). Reasons given ranged 
between curiosity (1), a professed desire to assist with academic research (3), a means of 
encouraging change with the Senior Management Team (3), best practice (5) and interest in 
the results (15).     
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Mergel (2014) suggests that one way of ascertaining the credibility of the interview data is to 
compare organisational activity and stated intent against actual output and officially recorded 
intent (e.g. policies). The original plan had been to investigate this area in an integrated way 
using a triangulated approach (Fig 5) comparing the ideology/stated aims of the 
communications department (interviews) against police communications activities (content 
analysis of online output) and effect/impact (public opinion surveys)
33
. In doing this the 
iŶteŶtioŶ had ďeeŶ to Đoǀeƌ the ͚life ĐǇĐle͛ of poliĐe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs iŶ oƌdeƌ to fill oŶe of the 
more significant gaps in current literature where research often concentrates on one, possibly 
two, of those three areas but rarely covers all three.   
 
 
Communications Life Cycle 
Fig 5  
 
For a number of reasons this plan was not feasible, and so the content analysis and public 
opinion surveys were dropped in favour of concentrating on the interviews (2.9). This lack of 
comparison though means that it is very difficult to determine how accurate a portrayal the 
interview data is of the actual situation and therefore raises valid questions about the 
credibility.  
 
 
                                           
33
 see Appendix 2.2 
Stated Aims 
(Interviews) 
Communications 
Activity 
(Content Analysis) 
Effect 
(Public Opinion 
Suveys) 
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Applicability 
The interview data shows how rapidly police communications is changing. The speed and 
depth of these changes varied considerably across participating forces but all those 
interviewed described their departments as in a state of continual transition. The third 
limitation with this research is one suffered by most studies in that interview data provides a 
picture of a moment in time. In such a fast paced industry as this there is always the issue of 
the data being out of date almost as soon as it has been collected (Lee and McLaughlin, 2014).  
 
This was a concern raised by six interviewees who felt that by the time this research was 
available to them their department would have moved on to pastures new. There is little that 
can mitigate this limitation in the forces where this has occurred. What was the case in 2014 
when the interviews were conducted may no longer be the situation in 2016. 
 
Generalisability 
The final significant limitation with this project is generalisability. While the sample achieved in 
this study was far more successful than initially hoped for at nearly 70% of the target forces, 
there remains the question of the stone left unturned. In an ideal world of unlimited time, 
resources and open access it would have been preferable to interview a more representative 
sample from all 39 police forces in England; including the head, managers and non-
management staff. It would also have been useful to interview a sample of those police 
officers who are now managing their own police social media accounts to see how the 
devolved communications model has been accepted and used by those who are now key 
players in its continued and future success. For a number of reasons this was not possible to 
implement in this study. 
 
This raises the valid question of to what extent and how the findings from this study might be 
applied to other police forces. What is needed now is research that examines the whole life 
cycle of police communications activity in order to determine what action has been taken, 
why, and the outcome/effect it has had on its intended audience (Fig 5). In doing so 
assumptions can be tested and the question of how to use communications effectively in a 
police context may be properly addressed.  
 
An example of one such assumption is one that much of current police work is premised upon; 
that police visibility, whether virtual or physical, provides a level of reassurance to the public 
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and strengthens their relationship with those same people (Salmi et al, 2000, 2005). An 
argument which was put forwards on multiple occasions during the interviews was that this 
might not be the case and in attempting to force contact and engagement police forces could 
actually be alienating sections of the populous and achieving the reverse of what they are 
attempting to do by encouraging fear and anxiety. Understanding the impact of 
communication activities is of upmost importance - especially given the increasing reliance 
upon communication as a means of maintaining and managing the police-public relationship, 
the drive to continue growing online audiences and the mounting pressure to demonstrate 
engagement.  
 
Another potential avenue for future research would be to investigate further how the trend 
towards devolved, decentralised communications is progressing within police forces. Previous 
studies eǆaŵiŶiŶg soĐial ŵedia haǀe foĐused oŶ the ͚Đoƌpoƌate͛ aĐĐouŶts ŵaŶaged ďǇ the 
communications team, they have also only looked at online activity from an output 
perspective. Research is needed to examine how local accounts differ from the main corporate 
accounts across different policing environments. This research concluded that there had been 
an ideological shift in these departments away from overt image management and towards a 
more risk-based information network. Whether this change holds true with the local accounts 
was beyond the scope of this study, but it does suggest an intriguing area for future 
exploration, especially given the continued trend towards devolution, the growing reliance on 
soĐial ŵedia aŶd the staƌtliŶg degƌee of ǀaƌiatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ poliĐe foƌĐes͛ aĐtiǀities aŶd 
strategies.   
 
Further research is also needed into understanding the operational position of 
communications within the police, particularly with regard to those forces where the PCC has 
assumed oversight or control of the communications department. This research found a trend 
suggesting that the communications department in those forces where the PCC had control 
ǁeƌe ŵoƌe ofteŶ ĐoŶsideƌed ͚optioŶal͛ oƌ ͚ĐoŵpleŵeŶtaƌǇ͛ aŶd less likelǇ to ďe pƌopeƌlǇ 
embedded within the wider force.  
 
In May 2016 the second generation of PCCs was elected (or re-elected) and with this possible 
change in regime there are a number of concerns raised by some of the interviewees which 
would benefit from further evaluation. Two of the more significant concerns expressed were 
over politicisation of police communications through the election process and the possible 
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ramifications of PCC oversight on police transparency and communications effectiveness. 
Given the above, it is increasingly important to understand the impact the PCC has had on 
communications and to test the hypotheses that their involvement will a) politicise (or be seen 
to politicise) the police, and b) affect the transparency and effectiveness of the department.     
 
A final area for future investigation is the impact of social media on traditional media 
relationships from the journalistic perspective. A recurrent theme that emerged from the data 
was how social media, and the emergence of a more dialogical communications strategy, had 
significantly changed the police – media relationship. The majority considered that this was a 
positive change as social media allowed police forces to communicate in more ways, to put 
͚theiƌ stoƌǇ͛ out iŶ theiƌ oǁŶ ǁoƌds aŶd to ƌeduĐe the poǁeƌ of the pƌess ŵoŶopolǇ oŶ puďliĐ 
engagement – which had been a historic problem for many forces. Such a view, however, is of 
necessity rather biased and one sided. Chibnall (1977) described the police-press relationship 
as asǇŵŵetƌiĐal iŶ the poliĐe faǀouƌ as theǇ ǁeƌe the oŶes ǁho ͚ĐoŶtƌolled͛ the aĐĐess to 
crime related news. This study found, as others have before it (1.3), that this is not a view 
shared by many of the interviewees who, counter to Chibnall (1981), felt that police forces 
haǀe ďeeŶ ͚ǀiĐtiŵs͛ of this ƌelatioŶship foƌ ŵaŶǇ Ǉeaƌs. A useful, aŶd aƌguaďlǇ esseŶtial, 
companion piece to this research would be to discover how journalists (both national and 
local) perceive this relationship in the age of Direct and Digital police communications and how 
that compares to the police view.  
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5.3 Final Thoughts  
 
One of the primary influences that has driven this research has been the desire to understand 
the function and activity of public relations in modern policing. What is evident from the data 
is that the more things change, the more they stay the same. While there has been a 
considerable cultural change within these departments, and within police forces in general 
towards communication, the core strategies and functions have remained relatively 
uŶĐhaŶged siŶĐe MaǁďǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϮ; ϮϬϬϳͿ ƌeseaƌĐh.  
 
The social sphere is now a fiercely competitive environment where the police are but one of 
many voices and with the unprecedented opportunities created by social media there are an 
equal number of unprecedented threats and problems. Alongside these practical changes 
however, is an arguably greater ideological change which has seen police communications in a 
growing number of forces moving away from reactive, defensive communication to a 
proactive, inclusive model which actively seeks to build networks and relationships with 
outside communities.  
 
Sites like Facebook and Twitter have forced the police into an omnipresent spotlight on a 
national, and sometimes international, stage in which there is little chance for control, evasion 
or avoiding difficult issues and the constant calls for accountability. Police forces now have to 
have a voice in the public sphere, one that is not just broadcasting information but engaging 
with the ever growing public networks forming online. In such an environment transparency, 
openness and dialogue have become essential tools for the continued success of policing.  As 
the data demonstrates, however, the type, extent and effectiveness of communication 
activities differs significantly between different policing environments . Just over half of the 
forces interviewed had a measurement system in place to assess the impact and effectiveness 
of print campaigns and 76% had an evaluation strategy for social media. Of significant concern 
however, is the effectiveness of these strategies as 61% of the interviewees expressed 
considerable dissatisfaction over their current methods; with many feeling confused and lost 
as to what data they should be collecting, what the data showed or how they could action it to 
improve their activities.  
 
In the current economic climate now more than ever it is important for police forces to 
understand what works and why when it comes to something as vital for their continued 
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success as communication. To understand effectiveness properly requires understanding the 
life cycle of the communications project – a task that is often difficult for police forces to 
accomplish. If this is not understood then how can police forces be confident that their 
activities and strategies are having a positive, or indeed any, impact on their intended 
audiences? The age of Direct and Digital communications may have arrived but adoption and 
competency varies considerably between police forces. What is required now is more 
research, more discussion and greater collaboration between police forces and other agencies 
in order to help police forces capitalise on the unprecedented opportunities for information 
networks and partnerships within their communities and to avoid unnecessary reinvention. 
 
Police forces have made considerable improvements with regard to how they are using social 
media since the reports produced by Crump (2011) and the HMIC (2011a). Communications 
does appear on the whole to be less defensive and more inclusive, to be more about talking 
and engagement than about protective silence and information management. All bar one 
interviewee reported an improvement in the perceived approachability, transparency and 
openness of their force and the level of public engagement since 2011. In the era of social 
media, by releasing information, even if the majority ignore it, the police appear to be 
presenting a more open and approachable image; arguably pacifying an increasingly 
disillusioned public and creating the potential for a more integrated police force within the 
wider community.  
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APPENDIX 1.1       Definitions 
 
Table 1: Outcome Based Definitions 
1 Chartered Institute of 
Public Relations (CIPR, 
2015) 
͞the disĐipliŶe ǁhiĐh looks after reputatioŶ, ǁith the aiŵ 
of earning understanding and support and influencing 
opinion and behaviour. It is the planned and sustained 
effort to establish and maintain goodwill and mutual 
uŶderstaŶdiŶg ďetǁeeŶ aŶ orgaŶisatioŶ aŶd its puďliĐs͟. 
2 Collins Online Dictionary 
(2015) 
͞the praĐtiĐe of ĐreatiŶg, proŵotiŶg, or ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg 
goodwill and a favourable image among the public 
toǁards aŶ iŶstitutioŶ, puďliĐ ďody͟ 
3 Entrepreneur (2015): a 
popular business 
magazine 
͞UsiŶg the Ŷeǁs or ďusiŶess press to Đarry positiǀe stories 
about your company or your products; cultivating a good 
relationship with local press represeŶtatiǀes͟. 
4 First World Assembly of 
Public Relations 
Associations (1978 cited 
in Morris and 
Goldsworthy, 2012 p4) 
͞PuďliĐ relatioŶs is the art aŶd soĐial sĐieŶĐe of aŶalysiŶg 
trends, predicting their consequences, counselling 
organisation leaders and implementing planned 
programmes of action which will serve both 
orgaŶisatioŶ’s aŶd puďliĐ iŶterest͟.  
5 Oxford Online 
Dictionary (2014) 
͞the professioŶal ŵaiŶteŶaŶĐe of a faǀouraďle puďliĐ 
image by a company or other organisation or a famous 
persoŶ.͟ 
6 PRCA (2015): One of the 
largest Public Relations 
association in Europe 
PuďliĐ relatioŶs is ͞all aďout reputatioŶ. It’s the result of 
what you do, what you say, and what others say about 
you. It is used to gain trust and understanding between 
an organisation and its various publics – ǁhether that’s 
employees, customers, investors, the local community – 
or all those groups͟. 
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Table 2: Ideology Based Definitions 
1 Bolger, J. (1983, p36) ͞The purpose of puďliĐ relatioŶs is to iŶflueŶĐe the 
puďliĐ’s respect, confidence, and approval for the 
ageŶĐy’s aĐtioŶs aŶd efforts͟ 
2 Cutlip (1994, p761) PuďliĐ relatioŶs is there to ͞ŵoŶitor the puďliĐ opiŶioŶ 
environment so that institutions can steer a safe and 
steady course through the wings and storms of the public 
Đliŵate͟. 
3 Cutlip, Center and 
Broom (2000, cited in 
Broom and Sha, 2013, 
4p29). 
͞The ŵaŶageŵeŶt fuŶĐtioŶ that estaďlishes aŶd 
maintains mutually beneficial relationships between an 
organisation and the publics on whom its success or 
failure depeŶds.͟ 
4 Morris and Goldsworthy 
(2012, p6) 
͞PuďliĐ relatioŶs is the plaŶŶed persuasioŶ of people to 
ďehaǀe iŶ ǁays ǁhiĐh further its spoŶsor’s oďjeĐtiǀes. It 
works primarily through the use of media relations and 
other forms of third-party eŶdorseŵeŶt͟. 
5 Motion (2000, p1) PuďliĐ relatioŶs is the adǀisory role of ͞ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ 
ĐouŶselliŶg aŶd relatioŶship ďuildiŶg͟. 
6 Public Relations Society 
of America (PRSA, 2012) 
͞PuďliĐ relatioŶs is a strategiĐ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ proĐess 
that builds mutually beneficial relationships between 
orgaŶisatioŶs aŶd their puďliĐs͟. 
7 The Canadian Public 
Relations Society (CPRS, 
2008) 
͞PuďliĐ relatioŶs is the strategiĐ ŵaŶageŵeŶt of 
relationships between an organisation and its diverse 
publics, through the use of communication, to achieve 
mutual understanding, realize organizational goals and 
serǀe the puďliĐ iŶterest.͟ 
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Table 3: Combination Definitions 
1 Harlow (1976, p36) ͞PuďliĐ relatioŶs is the distiŶĐtiǀe ŵaŶageŵeŶt fuŶĐtioŶ 
which helps establish and maintain mutual lines of 
communications, understanding, acceptance and co-
operation between an organisation and its publics; 
involves the management of problems and issues; helps 
management to keep informed on and responsive to 
public opinion; defines and emphasizes the responsibility 
of management to serve the public interest; helps 
management keep abreast of and effectively utilize 
change, serving as an early warning system to help 
anticipate trends; and uses research and sound and 
ethiĐal ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ as its priŶĐiple tools.͟ 
2 Grunig and Hunt (1984, 
p4) 
PuďliĐ relatioŶs ͞is the ŵaŶageŵeŶt of ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ 
ďetǁeeŶ aŶ orgaŶisatioŶ aŶd its puďliĐs͟.  
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APPENDIX 1.2  Peel͛s NiŶe PriŶĐiples 
 
 
1) The basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder. 
 
2) The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of 
police actions. 
 
3) Police must secure the willing cooperation of the public in voluntary observance of the 
law to be able to secure and maintain the respect of the public. 
 
4) The degree of cooperation of the public that can be secured diminishes 
proportionately to the necessity of the use of physical force. 
 
5) Police seek and preserve public favour not by catering to public opinion but by 
constantly demonstrating absolute impartial service to the law. 
 
6) Police use of physical force should only be to the extent necessary to secure or 
maintain order and only of persuasion advice and warnings have failed. 
 
7) Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to 
the historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police; the 
police being the only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to 
duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and 
existence. 
 
8) Police should always direct their action strictly towards their functions and never 
appear to usurp the powers of the judiciary. 
 
9) The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible 
evidence of police action dealing with it.  
 
 
Available at:  
Reith, C. (1948) A Short History of the British Police, London: Oxford University Press.  
http://www.crimefree.org.za/Role-players/Government/Police/peels.htm  
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APPENDIX 2.1:       Letter to Chief Constables 
 
 Ms Victoria McIntee 
81 Cobbold Road 
Felixstowe 
Suffolk 
IP11 7QS 
 
14 January 2014 
Deaƌ… 
I am a PhD student at Canterbury Christ Church University studying Criminology; I am writing 
to enquire into the possibility of talking to your Head of Communications as part of this 
research.  
MǇ thesis topiĐ is ͚PoliĐe PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs aŶd PuďliĐ CoŶfideŶĐe iŶ the Age of “oĐial Media͛. 
The aim of my research is to: 
1) Explore both the official and unofficial roles and use of the public relations department 
within the constabulary; 
2) To understand how public relations is being used by police forces – particularly within the 
context of increasing and managing public confidence and satisfaction; 
3) To investigate how the police evaluate the effectiveness of these initiatives and schemes; 
4)  To understand the use and impact of social media on police communication and interaction 
with their public; 
5)  To explore whether public relations strategies, particularly those involving social media have 
had a discernible impact upon public confidence and satisfaction with the police in that 
area.  
6) Has PR only become an issue during late modernity? 
 
Superintendent Alexander Murray from the West Midlands police service commented in the 
British Journal of Sociology that collaborative work between academics and police forces in 
this area could potentially be very useful, especially in the current climate.  
I am currently working with twenty police forces across the UK including GMP, West Midlands, 
and Avon and Somerset: however I would ideally like to talk to as many police forces as 
possible as I understand that corporate communications departments differ considerably 
around the country. I hope that by comparing the methods, successes and problems faced by 
different police forces that a composite picture can be formed of how public relations and 
communication could proceed more efficiently and effectively for policing in the future 
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particularly in relation to the growing importance of procedural justice theory in policing and 
the increasing reliance upon social media as a vehicle for public dialogue.  
I hope that the topic of my PhD is interesting and that it will bring useful information and 
insight to the police constabularies in general and those I work with in particular. An 
anonymised copy of my research findings and conclusions will be available for any 
participating police force.  
I look forward to hearing from you soon. 
If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me or my academic supervisors 
whose contact details I have included below.  
 
Best Wishes,  
 
 
Victoria McIntee  
PHD Researcher 
Department of Law and Criminal Justice Studies 
Canterbury Christ Church University 
BA/BCS (Hons), MA (Hons) 
v.e.mcintee98@canterbury.ac.uk  
 
Academic Supervisors 
Dr Tom Cockcroft, B.Sc. (Hons), M.Sc. (Econ.), 
FHEA 
Senior Lecturer 
Department of Law and Criminal Justice Studies, 
Canterbury Christ Church University 
 
Email: tom.cockcroft@canterbury.ac.uk  
Tel. (01227) 782171 
Professor Robin Bryant 
Director of Criminal Justice Practice 
Department of Law and Criminal Justice Studies, 
Canterbury Christ Church University 
Email: robin.bryant@canterbury.ac.uk 
Tel: 01227 782316   
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APPENDIX 2.2: University Ethics Compliance 
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APPENDIX 2.3:    Consent Form 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Project: Police Public Relations in the Age of Social Media 
 
Name of Researcher: Victoria McIntee 
Contact details:   
Address:  81 Cobbold Road 
  Felixstowe 
  Suffolk 
IP11 7QS 
   
Tel:  01394 671838 / 07843000965 
   
Email:  v.e.mcintee98@canterbury.ac.uk  
 
  Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the 
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason. 
 
3. I understand and consent to this interview being recorded. 
 
4. I understand that any personal information that I provide to the 
researchers will be kept strictly confidential and in accordance with the 
Data Protection Act (1998). 
 
5. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
________________________ ________________            ____________________ 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
 
 
 
___________________________ ________________             ____________________ 
Researcher Date Signature 
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APPENDIX 2.4A: Original Interviewee Information Sheet 
 
 
PhD Research into  
͚PoliĐe PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs aŶd PuďliĐ CoŶfideŶĐe iŶ the Age of SoĐial Media͛. 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
A research study is being conducted at Canterbury Christ Church University (CCCU) by Victoria 
McIntee.   
Background 
The police have become increasingly image conscious in recent years allocating a substantial 
amount of resources to PR campaigns and image management through both their use of the 
media and their operational strategies. This raises the question of how effective such 
strategies are in a society which, academics claim, is beset by fear and anxiety.  There is very 
little research, however, into police public relations and whether it a) has an effect on public 
opinion; b) whether it can be considered an effective strategy for intended police outcomes; 
and c) what these intended outcomes actually are. 
 
This studǇ is paƌt of ŵǇ PhD ƌeseaƌĐh iŶto ͚PoliĐe PuďliĐ ‘elations and Public Confidence in the 
Age of “oĐial Media͛. 
 
The aims of my research are the following: 
1)  To explore both the official and unofficial roles and use of the public relations/ 
communications department within the constabulary; 
2) To understand how public relations is being used by police forces across different 
policing environments; 
3) To investigate how, or whether, the effectiveness of police communication can be 
measured or assessed;   
4)  To understand the use and impact of social media on police communication and 
interaction with their public; 
5)  To examine whether police public relations has only become an issue during late 
modernity. 
 
 
 
What will you be required to do? 
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Participants in this study will be required to take part in a recorded interview and complete 
and questionnaire about their experience and knowledge of public relations in their police 
force.  
Procedures 
You will be asked to participate in an interview and to complete a questionnaire.  
 
Feedback 
An anonymised copy of the findings from this study will be available to all police forces who 
take part upon request.   
 
Confidentiality 
All data and personal information will be stored securely within CCCU premises in accordance 
ǁith the Data PƌoteĐtioŶ AĐt ϭϵϵϴ aŶd the UŶiǀeƌsitǇ͛s own data protection requirements.  
Data can only be accessed by the primary researcher, Victoria McIntee. After completion of 
the study, all data will be made anonymous (i.e. all personal information associated with the 
data will be removed). 
 
Deciding whether to participate 
If you have any questions or concerns about the nature, procedures or requirements for 
participation do not hesitate to contact me.  Should you decide to participate, you will be free 
to withdraw at any time without having to give a reason. 
 
Any questions? 
Please contact me by email: v.e.mcintee98@canterbury.ac.uk  
or by post: Victoria McIntee, Department of Law and Criminal Justice Studies, Priory Cottages, 
University of Canterbury Christ Church, CT1 1QU.  
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APPENDIX 2.4B:  Revised Interviewee Information  
 
PhD Research into  
͚PoliĐe PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs aŶd PuďliĐ CoŶfideŶĐe iŶ the Age of SoĐial Media͛. 
INTERVIEW INFORMATION SHEET 
 
A research study is being conducted at Canterbury Christ Church University (CCCU) by Victoria 
McIntee.   
Background 
The last few years have seen a number of immense and profound changes in how we as a 
society, and as individuals, communicate. We live in a hyper-mediated world where 
communication is not only virtually free but also instantaneous and further reaching than has 
ever been possible before. The London riots in August 2011 demonstrated the power and 
social importance of the aptly named social media; particularly the influence and significance 
of Twitter and Facebook. The riots also highlighted the need for understanding and adapting to 
this new technology and its social implications.  
 
Since 2009 Britain's police forces have become increasingly active on these sites; at present 
every force in the UK have at least one Twitter and Facebook account with many forces 
maintaining and operating dozens of local-based accounts as well. There is very little research, 
however, into how and why social media is being used by the police; how it fits into the 
broader communication strategies; and how this is changing the long held foundations of 
public relations. 
 
This studǇ is paƌt of ŵǇ PhD ƌeseaƌĐh iŶto ͚PoliĐe PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs aŶd PuďliĐ CoŶfideŶĐe iŶ the 
Age of “oĐial Media͛. 
 
The aims of my research are the following: 
1)  To explore both the official and unofficial roles and use of the public relations/ 
communications department within the constabulary; 
2) To understand how public relations is being used by police forces across different 
policing environments; 
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3) To investigate how, or whether, the effectiveness of police communication can be 
measured or assessed;   
4)  To understand the use and impact of social media on police communication and 
interaction with their public; 
5)  To examine whether police public relations has only become an issue during late 
modernity. 
What will you be required to do? 
Participants in this study will be required to take part in a recorded interview about their 
experience and knowledge of public relations in their police force.  
 
Feedback 
An anonymised copy of the findings from this study will be available to all police forces who 
take part upon request.   
 
Confidentiality 
All data and personal information will be stored securely within CCCU premises in accordance 
with the Data ProtectioŶ AĐt ϭϵϵϴ aŶd the UŶiǀeƌsitǇ͛s oǁŶ data pƌoteĐtioŶ ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts.  
Data can only be accessed by the primary researcher, Victoria McIntee. After completion of 
the study, all data will be made anonymous (i.e. all personal information associated with the 
data will be removed). 
 
Deciding whether to participate 
If you have any questions or concerns about the nature, procedures or requirements for 
participation do not hesitate to contact me.  Should you decide to participate, you will be free 
to withdraw at any time without having to give a reason. 
 
Any questions? 
Please contact me by email: v.e.mcintee98@canterbury.ac.uk  
or by Telephone:     07843000965  
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APPENDIX 2.5a:    Interview Questions/Prompt List 
 
Questions have been grouped thematically as the order in which they were asked varied 
depending upon the interview.  
1) What is the iŶteƌǀieǁee͛s ďaĐkgƌouŶd iŶ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs? 
 
2) Overview of Department:- 
a. Size and structure of department 
b. Operational position within police force:  
i. Embedded, 
ii. Complementary, or 
iii. Optional 
c. How has the communications department changed during your tenure? 
d. Serving policing officers in comms and professionalization. 
 
3) Public Relations: 
a. Role and purpose of the department 
b. Most important aspect of modern communications 
c. Definition of PR 
d. Is PR still relevant to modern police comms teams? 
e. Many police forces have renamed their communications department 
͞Coƌpoƌate CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͟, oƌ soŵe ǀaƌiaŶt theƌeof, dƌoppiŶg the ͞PuďliĐ 
‘elatioŶs͟ eleŵeŶt fƌoŵ their department name. Why do you think this is? 
 
4) What does the interviewee consider their biggest successes regarding police public 
relations/communications to date? 
 
5) What threats does the interviewee think are facing police communications at present, 
and which ones are the most concerning? (e.g. social media, citizen journalism, media, 
public confidence etc.) 
 
6) Successful campaigns: 
a. Which campaigns does the communications department routinely run? 
b. Most successful campaigns? 
c. Some police forces have started doing special campaigns around Christmas. Is 
this the Đase iŶ the iŶteƌǀieǁee͛s foƌĐe? 
d. If so: 
i. Whose idea was it? 
ii. What was the purpose/objective behind the idea? 
iii. Was it successful?  
iv. Would they do it again? 
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7) How does the interviewee measure or assess the success/effectiveness of: 
a. Campaigns 
b. Other communications activity (e.g. media, social media) 
 
8) How aware is the interviewee of what the other police communications departments 
are doing? 
 
9) APCOMM: 
a. Is the interviewee a member? 
b. Do they consider their membership useful? 
c. Do they attend the annual conference? 
 
10) Communications Strategy: 
a. Openness and transparency agenda. Public Relations is usually seen as spin. 
How does the interviewee deal with this balance? 
b. What does the interview consider the aim of police communications: push, 
pull or transformative? 
c. What should the communications strategy be? 
d. Is there a different strategy for traditional media and social/digital media? 
 
11) Social Media: 
a. Place in strategy? 
b. How has the introduction of digital media changed things? 
c. What are the main uses/purpose of social/digital media? 
d. Is there a preferred platform? If so, why? 
e. How is the effectiveness measured? 
f. Does the interviewee collect/analyse demographic usage? 
g. What are people using social/digital media for? 
h. College of PoliĐiŶg͛s Engage document states that Twitter and Facebook 
should be used by the police to engage in dialogue with their publics. Does the 
interviewee think they have achieved a dialogue on these mediums? 
i. Where does the interview think social media use will go in the future in terms 
of police communications? 
j. What analytical software do they use? 
 
12) Website: 
a. What is the police website used for? 
b. Traffic? 
c. What are people looking at? 
 
13) Journalists and Traditional Media: 
a. How has the relationship with journalists and traditional media changed with 
the evolution of social media and citizen journalists? 
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b. Hoǁ ǁould the iŶteƌǀieǁee ĐhaƌaĐteƌise theiƌ depaƌtŵeŶt͛s ƌelatioŶship ǁith 
their local journalists? 
c. Does the interviewee feel that local journalism is still providing an 
independent watchdog function? 
d. “oŵe poliĐe foƌĐes aƌe ŵoǀiŶg toǁaƌds a ͞self-seƌǀiĐe͟ ŵodel of dealiŶg ǁith 
journalists and news outlets. Does the interviewee think this is: 
i. A viable option? 
ii. Something they are either already doing or considering adopting? 
iii. How this will affect the impartiality of the news? 
e. Audience: 
i. Who does the interviewee consider their audience?  
ii. Does this change depending on the type of message? (e.g. targeted 
communications) 
iii. Does the department use targeted communications? 
iv. How successful does the interviewee think their department is at 
communicating with their audiences? 
 
14) Public Confidence: Under New Labour, confidence became the single national target 
for police forces. There has been a great deal of research dedicated to evaluating the 
success of specific schemes in trying to improve public confidence in the police. This 
target was later scrapped by Theresa May in 2010.  
a. Does the interviewee think that confidence is still important? 
b. Does the iŶteƌǀieǁee͛s foƌĐe still ŵeasuƌe puďliĐ ĐoŶfideŶĐe? 
c. Does the interviewee think that there is a crisis of confidence? 
d. What alternatives are there instead of confidence as a measure of public 
opinion? 
 
15) PCC aŶd PoliĐe CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs. At least fiǀe PCC͛s haǀe takeŶ oǀeƌ ĐoŶtƌol of the 
police communications department from the chief constable since their election in 
2012.  
a. Is this the case in this police force? 
b. If not, is the PCC likely to take over the communications team? 
c. What is the iŶteƌǀieǁee͛s opiŶioŶ of this situatioŶ? 
d. How does the interviewee see this sort of situation working? (e.g. tensions 
between PCC as the official police watchdog but also in control of the 
image/relationship management department). 
 
16) Where does the interviewee think police communications is likely to go in the future? 
(e.g. mergers, collaborative communications) 
 
17) What research does the interviewee think needs to be done / would be helpful to the 
police in terms of police communications? 
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APPENDIX 2.5b:   Interview Transcript Data 
This appendix contains excerpts from several of the interviews conducted. Some sections of 
these excerpts have been redacted as they contain information which could be used to identify 
the interviewees or their employers. Where this has occurred a substitution in [] has been 
added where appropriate to aid clarity. For example, interviewees frequently referred to 
forces or councils they were in partnership with by name. As this can be used to identify which 
force the interviewee is working for the names have been redacted and if necessary 
substituted with a generalisation – e.g. [the county council] or [our partner force].   
 
The six excerpts included in this appendix were chosen as examples of the five different 
interview conditions discussed in Chapter 2  ; Conversational, Direct Questions and Participant 
Directed, one three way interview and one of the telephone interview transcripts have also 
been included as the structure and means of recording information were quite different. Two 
examples have been included of Participant Directed transcripts as there was a difference 
ďetǁeeŶ those ǁheƌe the iŶteƌǀieǁee͛s eŶthusiasŵ doŵiŶated the diƌeĐtioŶ the iŶteƌǀieǁ 
took (PI.14 and PI.22) and those where the interviewee deliberately tried to direct and control 
the interview (PI.13, PI.20, PI.25 and PI.27)  
 
For the quotes used iŶ the ƌesults Đhapteƌ … is used to shoǁ ǁheƌe a seĐtioŶ has ďeeŶ 
removed. This occurred numerous times for different reasons. Most frequently it was either 
because the interviewee got distracted by a tangent and spent time talking about a side issue 
or there was an interjection either from the interviewer or another interviewee. In order to 
keep continuity in the quotes and make them as easily intelligible as possible these 
sections/interruptions were removed.  
 
Interview 
Ref Code 
Gender Type of 
Interview 
Structure of Interview 
PI.6 Female In Person Direct Questions 
Very good interview. Good level of rapport and 
willingness to talk on the part of PI.6. Good level of 
engagement through the interview and PI.6 was candid 
about the problems her team were facing.  
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Interview started off quite stilted as PI.6 seemed to be 
waiting for me to ask specific questions. The more 
direct and specific the question the more information 
PI.6 gave in her answers.  
PI.8 Female In Person Conversational. 
 Very good interview. Excellent level of rapport, follow 
up offered by PI.8. Good level of engagement and 
candour when answering questions.  
PI.22 Male In Person Participant Directed. Good interview and one of the 
longest at over two hours. PI.22 very keen to talk but it 
was difficult at times to direct the interview as PI.22 
once started on a topic would talk for quite some time. 
Unlike PI.13 and PI.27 this interview was interviewee 
directed more because of the overriding enthusiasm 
shown by the interviewee than because he was overtly 
trying to manage the direction of the questions.  
PI.25 Female 
and 
Male 
In Person Three Way Interview:  
PI.25A Participant Directed, PI.25B Conversational.  
PI.25A sought to direct the interview, he was often the 
first to speak and while he would accept PI.25Bs 
corrections he was the dominant speaker.  
 
PI.25B responded better to conversation based style. 
After PI.25A left part through the interview, PI.25B 
became more comfortable speaking and answering 
questions fully rather than just offering the odd 
sentence.  
PI.26 Female Phone Direct Questions. 
Difficult interview as rapport was noticeably lacking. 
Interviewee often evasive in answering conversational 
prompts and required direct questions. Question 
pƌefaĐed ǁith ͞ǁould Ǉou agƌee ǁith?͟ type remarks 
gained the clearest answers as PI.26 liked to disagree 
with such statements.   
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PI.27 Male In Person Participant Directed.  
Difficult interview – right from the start PI.27 decided 
how the interview was going to be structured and 
where it was going to go. Made asking the questions I 
had difficult unless they happened to coincide with the 
aspects PI.27 wished to discuss.  
 
 
PI.06              Page 1 – 6 of 23 
Interviewer: “o aƌe Ǉou ƌeadǇ to staƌt? EǆĐelleŶt. I͛ll staƌt ǁith aŶ easǇ oŶe theŶ. “ize of 
department.  
 
Interviewee: OkaǇ, so ǁe͛ǀe got a ĐuƌƌeŶt estaďlishŵeŶt of thiƌtǇ tǁo, I ďelieǀe, FTE͛s 
now and that is a mixture of so, a press bureau, which looks after all of our 
reactive media calls. Four local communication officers that support the 
loĐal poliĐe aƌeas, ďut aƌe still esseŶtial ƌesouƌĐe… At the ŵoŵeŶt ǁe͛ǀe got 
oŶe digital ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs offiĐeƌ, although ǁe͛ƌe lookiŶg to stƌeŶgtheŶ 
that in that area in the next couple of months, potentially with another two 
by sort of reusing diffeƌeŶt ƌoles ǁithiŶ this depaƌtŵeŶt aŶd theŶ ǁe͛ǀe got 
a central team which looks after all of our internal and change coms and PR 
campaigns if you like. And also aligned to us is the, a graphic designer, a 
photographer, two web developers. We have two corporate events 
managers, officers in our team that look after all the kind of commendation 
ceremonies and the success stories if you like. And then we have at the 
moment four communication assistants which are kind of a cross between, 
kind of an admin/coms support as opposed to a pure coms PR person if you 
like. TheǇ haǀeŶ͛t got ďaĐkgƌouŶd oƌ ƋualifiĐatioŶ iŶ Đoŵs as suĐh, ďut agaiŶ 
ǁe͛ƌe ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ uŶdeƌgoiŶg poteŶtiallǇ a ŵiŶi ƌestƌuĐtuƌe ǁithiŶ the 
depaƌtŵeŶt, ďut ǁe͛ƌe ǁaitiŶg foƌ that to ďe sigŶed off so I ĐaŶ͛t go iŶto 
details of that at the ŵoŵeŶt. It͛s ƌeallǇ aďout ŵoǀiŶg foƌǁaƌds, foĐussiŶg 
oŶ eǆaĐtlǇ, the digital aŶd pƌoduĐiŶg ŵoƌe digital ĐoŶteŶt. BeĐause ǁe͛ǀe 
got the channels now, all we need now is the actual content to fill those 
channels.  
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Interviewer: So are you, is your department primarily staffed with civilian staff then? Or 
do you have serving officers? 
 
Interviewee: We have no serving officers in our department at all.  
 
Interviewer: Is that ďǇ ĐhoiĐe oƌ…  
 
Interviewee: Well ǁe͛ƌe a Đoŵs department and so therefore I would not expect 
ŶeĐessaƌilǇ to haǀe people iŶ ŵǇ depaƌtŵeŶt that aƌeŶ͛t Đoŵs. Thames 
Valley Police [MǇ foƌĐe] haǀeŶ͛t ďeeŶ oŶe foƌ that, ǁhiĐh I kŶoǁ soŵe of the 
forces do use police officers. We have very strong links into the operational 
side of the ďusiŶess. We aƌe effeĐtiǀelǇ aŶ opeƌatioŶal depaƌtŵeŶt. Theƌe͛s 
quite a rub, I think, between us and the home office. Around home office 
calling, including coms, in what you would call back office support. Well 
ǁe͛ƌe Ŷot. We aƌe aŶ opeƌatioŶal teaŵ, ǁe͚ƌe deploǇaďle. WheŶeǀeƌ theƌe͛s 
soŵethiŶg happeŶiŶg, ǁe͛ƌe paƌt of that ƌesouƌĐiŶg; ǁe͛ƌe paƌt of the 
opeƌatioŶ. “o theƌe aƌe ďits of it that aƌeŶ͛t opeƌatioŶal, ďut pƌiŵaƌilǇ ǁe aƌe 
there to support the investigation team, to support front line policing and to 
help get the intelligence and the witness appeals and information back to 
help progress investigations. 
 
Interviewer: That͛s ǀeƌǇ iŶteƌestiŶg ďeĐause West MidlaŶds has ƌeŵoǀed all poliĐe staff 
from its corporate coms unit, whereas several other police forces again, like 
Suffolk and Norfolk and North Yorkshire still have serving police officers in 
those depaƌtŵeŶts. “o it͛s iŶteƌestiŶg lookiŶg at the ĐhaŶge iŶ ideas. 
 
Interviewee: Yeah, ǁell I͛ǀe ďeeŶ ǁith Thames Valley [this force] since 2008. Not in this 
ƌole, ďut iŶ a ƌole out oŶ aƌea. IŶ all that tiŵe ǁe͛ǀe Ŷeǀeƌ had poliĐe offiĐeƌs 
working within corporate communications. I think it might have been in the 
past that there were but again, that was when we were out on areas, not in 
my memory have we had that. 
 
Interviewer: That͛s ǀeƌǇ iŶteƌestiŶg. “o ǁhat aďout ďudget aŶd the ĐhaŶge iŶ ďudget? I 
kŶoǁ that theƌe͛s ďeeŶ a huge shƌiŶkiŶg of ďudgets all oǀeƌ the plaĐe.  I ǁas 
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wondering how it affected the corporate communications department here? 
 
Interviewee: We had a quite significant restructure along with the force as a whole in 
2011 and we took a thirty percent cut off our budget. Bearing in mind our 
ďudget is laƌgelǇ salaƌǇ aŶǇǁaǇ. It͛s Ŷeǀeƌ ďeeŶ ďig, it͛s a ďit sŵalleƌ thaŶ it 
was, ďut it͛s Ŷeǀeƌ had a ďig P‘ ŵaƌketiŶg pƌojeĐt if Ǉou like. PoliĐe foƌĐes 
tended not to have massive budgets in area, it was mainly head camp. So 
that was when we had structures where we had area based communications 
teams in our five basic command units as they were called. So you would 
have had a coms manager, plus one or two coms officers and we had a 
central bit here at HQ where the internal coms sat and where this team, the 
graphic design, etc. sat. So in order to reduce costs and to take that budget 
hit they centralised the service, so we took all of the area people, brought 
them in house. Got rid of that whole middle level of managers, if you like, 
the middle layers of managers. Put a couple more seniors in and then kind of 
levelled everyone out. We lost, trying to think how many head count we lost 
in the end, it was kind of being done to me at the time if that makes sense. 
So we lost I think five, full time equivalents of. Most were redeployed so 
ƌeduŶdaŶĐies ǁeƌe kept to a ŵiŶiŵuŵ, ďut it͛s just that the actual salary 
level dropped because we were no longer paying so many [unclear: 0:07:20] 
if Ǉou like, theǇ ǁeƌe all people, those that ǁeƌeŶ͛t suĐĐessful iŶ the seŶioƌ 
management post were then effectively I suppose, demoted back to a coms 
officer or a press officer level. 
 
Interviewer: ThaŶk Ǉou ǀeƌǇ ŵuĐh. “o ǁhat, this oŶe͛s alǁaǇs a tƌiĐkǇ oŶe to ask, ďut 
what do you think the purpose of the coms department is? And how do you 
thiŶk it͛s ĐhaŶged? 
 
Interviewee: I see the purpose of the coms department to work with frontline police 
offiĐeƌs aŶd iŶǀestigatoƌs to pƌeǀeŶt aŶd ƌeduĐe aŶd solǀe Đƌiŵe. That͛s ouƌ 
fuŶdaŵeŶtal as faƌ as I͛ŵ ĐoŶĐeƌŶed. That is ouƌ fuŶdaŵeŶtal puƌpose heƌe. 
As paƌt of that though theƌe͛ll ďe thiŶgs like ƌeputatioŶ ŵaŶageŵeŶts, crisis 
management, etc. But that all kind of forms part of that. The actual key thing 
is aƌouŶd ǁoƌkiŶg ǁith offiĐeƌs aŶd… puďliĐ ĐoŶfideŶĐe iŶ the poliĐe. It͛s 
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about engaging with the public, getting them to want to work with the 
police, so that when something happens, they feel that will be able to come 
to the police with information and get involved in help solving things. We 
are not nor should we be a public relations department or a marketing 
department. We want to promote the successes of the police, absolutely, 
ďut ouƌ fuŶdaŵeŶtal ƌeasoŶ foƌ ďeiŶg is that ǁe͛ƌe aŶ opeƌatioŶal 
department putting operational police officers on the ground and on the 
frontline.  
 
Interviewer: And do you think this is changed? Or has that core fundamental remained 
the same? 
 
Interviewee: I thiŶk it͛s alǁaǇs, siŶĐe I͛ǀe ďeeŶ iŶ aŶd agaiŶ I go ďaĐk, I͛ǀe oŶlǇ ďeeŶ iŶ 
since 2008. That was always our fundamental purpose. Probably even more 
so when you were out on area because you were really, you kind of really 
had a kind of territorial thing going on with the area you looked after and 
you really were embedded within kind of the CID world and working with 
the officers. You knew all the officers, they were popping in all the time to 
tell you things. So even more so then, you were probably front line focussed. 
PoteŶtiallǇ Ǉou͛ǀe lost a ďit of that ĐeŶtƌalisiŶg ďeĐause a lot of people iŶ 
heƌe haǀe Ŷeǀeƌ ǁoƌked oŶ aŶ aƌea, so theǇ doŶ͛t haǀe that saŵe 
understanding of the frontline officers. So we try really hard to get our guys 
to go out on patrol, get them to go out with rota policing, get them to go 
and spend some time in the control room, so they can actually remember 
ǁhǇ ǁe͛ƌe heƌe. AŶd ǁe͛ƌe heƌe to seƌǀe the puďliĐ aŶd to help ouƌ offiĐeƌs. 
As part of that we have to serve the pƌess, ďut that shouldŶ͛t ďe ouƌ sole 
foĐus. Ouƌ ƌeasoŶ foƌ doiŶg it is that ǁe͛ƌe theƌe to suppoƌt poliĐiŶg 
purpose. 
 
Interviewer: Do you think then, would you say that your audience has changed? Your 
primary audience? Because ten years ago, before social media and the 
internet really took off, I imagine the journalists were your primary way of 
getting information out to the public. So there was a certain amount of 
enlightened self-interest in having very good press relations. But I imagine 
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now with social media, the power balance might have shifted slightly. 
 
Interviewee: Power balance has shifted dramatically I would say. Even from when I 
started in the policing, it was everything that you did and everything that 
was around an incident or operation, it was all focussed on media 
management., press management. So how are we gonna give them the 
information? And you completely almost lost sight of the fact that actually 
even though it was still press, the idea was still because you needed to get 
messages out to the public, but the shift with the digital channels now, the 
kiŶd of leǀels of audieŶĐe that ǁe͛ǀe got ǁho aƌe aĐtiǀelǇ ǁaŶtiŶg to eŶgage 
ǁith us aŶd theǇ͛ǀe ĐhoseŶ to sigŶ up aŶd to folloǁ us oŶ tǁitteƌ. TheǇ 
choose to be Facebook friends or likes of ours. They choose to sign up to our 
ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ ŵessagiŶg. TheǇ͛ƌe aŶ aĐtiǀe audieŶĐe that has said ǁe ǁaŶt to 
engage with you. That is far more powerful, potentially, than what we do 
necessarily through the newspapers and the more traditional press. 
Obviously ǁe still ǁoƌk ǁith theŵ aŶd ĐleaƌlǇ theǇ͛ƌe iŵpoƌtaŶt. PaƌtiĐulaƌlǇ 
ǁheŶ Ǉou͛ǀe got ďig thiŶgs goiŶg oŶ ǁheƌe Ǉou Ŷeed to get ŵessages out to 
a wide audience quickly, missing people, etc. But the power balance has 
shifted dramatically and you see it even with the chief officers now. Once 
upoŶ a tiŵe a Ŷegatiǀe stoƌǇ iŶ ouƌ loĐal Ŷeǁspapeƌ… ǁould seŶd theŵ iŶto 
disaƌƌaǇ. TheǇ͛d ďe ǁaŶtiŶg to kŶoǁ hoǁ that happeŶed. But Ŷoǁ, it͛s kiŶd 
of like, Ǉeah theǇ͛ǀe ǁƌitteŶ a Ŷegatiǀe stoƌǇ, theǇ kiŶd of do that, ďut what 
we can now do is we can put our side out through our channels or we can 
put soŵe good Ŷeǁs out to ĐouŶteƌ ďalaŶĐe it. “o theƌe͛s a ƌeal shift theƌe. 
TheǇ͛ƌe still ƌeallǇ iŵpoƌtaŶt aŶd theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot goŶŶa go aǁaǇ aŶd ǁe still 
have to service that part of it, but they are just another channel in order for 
us to engage and inform the public.  
 
Interviewer: That͛s ǀeƌǇ iŶteƌestiŶg ďeĐause oŶe of the ĐoŵŵeŶts that aŶotheƌ 
interviewee made to me when I talked to him about this, was that he 
thought that the day of the journalist was over. This is why he shifted out of 
journalism into police communications and he spent a long time telling me 
aďout ǁhǇ Ŷeǁspapeƌs aƌe a dǇiŶg ďƌeed, so it͛s ǀeƌǇ iŶteƌestiŶg fƌoŵ ŵǇ 
perspective looking at how powerful the media have always been 
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ĐoŶsideƌed aŶd theŶ Ǉou͛ƌe saǇiŶg theǇ͛ƌe oŶe ĐhaŶŶel, ďut theǇ͛ƌe still ǀeƌǇ 
iŵpoƌtaŶt. “o do Ǉou thiŶk theǇ͛ƌe goiŶg to ĐoŶtiŶue ďeiŶg ǀeƌǇ iŵpoƌtaŶt 
oƌ… 
 
Interviewee: I ĐaŶ͛t see it goiŶg aǁaǇ. I͛ ďe suƌpƌised. TheǇ͛ƌe less iŵpoƌtaŶt thaŶ they 
were, but they still have a role to play. I mean you see it now with the kind 
of big stories around some of the nastier side of policing, the Plebgate and 
that kiŶd of thiŶg. TheǇ still haǀe a ďig ƌole to plaǇ. That͛s [uŶĐleaƌ: Ϭ:ϭϮ:ϱϭ] 
you see it everywhere, so you know, to say probably newspapers more so, 
dǇiŶg ďƌeed. LoĐal Ŷeǁspapeƌs. “o ǁe͛ǀe oŶlǇ got oŶe dailǇ Ŷoǁ, ǁhiĐh is 
the Oǆfoƌd Mail iŶ the ǁhole of the Thaŵes ValleǇ patĐh. That͛s ouƌ oŶlǇ 
daily newspaper.  
 
Interviewer: That͛s aŶ astoŶishiŶg reduction. 
 
Interviewee: AŶd theǇ͛ƌe kiŶd of Ǉou kŶoǁ, Ǉou͛ƌe ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ heaƌiŶg ƌuŵouƌs aďout the 
faĐt that theǇ͛ƌe oŶ the ďƌiŶk of like Ŷot poteŶtiallǇ ďeiŶg dailǇ aŶǇŵoƌe, 
goiŶg to oŶliŶe oƌ a feǁ daǇs a ǁeek. “o theƌe͛s a ƌeal, that͛s sigŶifiĐaŶt foƌ 
us aŶd theǇ aƌe a hugelǇ deŵaŶdiŶg Ŷeǁspapeƌ. Theƌe͛s Ŷo ǁaǇ theǇ͛ƌe 
quiet. I mean up to fifty percent of our time is probably spent servicing that 
daily. So their kind of appetite is still there, the bit where we now get the 
rub is, because out appetite isŶ͛t ŶeĐessaƌilǇ theƌe to keep seƌǀiĐe oŶ 
eǀeƌǇthiŶg that theǇ ǁaŶt oŶ little stoƌies that doŶ͛t haǀe aŶǇ poliĐiŶg 
purpose or add value to confidence. Why are we going to waste our time 
aŶd ƌesouƌĐes doiŶg that? That doesŶ͛t suppoƌt ouƌ offiĐeƌs telliŶg someone 
that a ďlue Đaƌ hit a ƌed Đaƌ aŶd theƌe ǁeƌe Ŷo iŶjuƌies. AŶd that͛s the kiŶd of 
thing that is causing, I guess, a few issues with some of the locals, because 
theǇ ĐaŶ͛t get used to that aŶd theǇ stƌuggle to uŶdeƌstaŶd that ǁe doŶ͛t 
need to do that anymore to keep them happy, to keep that relationship 
happy. Even though of course we want to work with them. But the 
ďƌoadĐast side of ďusiŶess, Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t disĐouŶt people like “kǇ aŶd the BBC 
and their twenty-four hour demand. You know, when we have a significant 
iŶĐideŶt ƌuŶŶiŶg, theǇ aƌe all oǀeƌ it aŶd ǁe aďsolutelǇ ĐaŶ͛t igŶoƌe theŵ 
because we absolutely have to try and manage them otherwise they 
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become a real problem and can cause real issues in your investigation. 
  
Interviewer: Could you explain a bit about how they cause these problems? Because I can 
imagine that they get in the way and they go and interview people on their 
own, but are there any other problems that they can cause? 
 
Interviewee: It can be things, well funnily enough we were talking, I was at a conference 
this morning and they were talking about the April Jones investigation and 
they were talking around the searching and the fact that the media really 
ramped up asking people to come in and help search and we were hearing 
from the key guy who was the search lead and he was saying the amount of 
issues and difficulties, it actually hampered them being able to do proper 
searching because they had to focus on dealing with the two thousand 
people that had turned up because the media had said come down and 
search. So it had a massive impact on how the investigation worked. It can 
have an impact on things like, obviously scene management can be difficult 
soŵetiŵes if Ǉou͛ǀe got the ŵedia ĐƌaǁliŶg all oǀeƌ it. AŶd kiŶd of it͛s 
changed the way senior investigating officers work as well, because they can 
Ŷo loŶgeƌ just go, kiŶd of shut it doǁŶ aŶd saǇ ǁell ǁe doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to giǀe 
them any of this. They now understand that they need to work with us as 
the coms attack advisor if you like, to try and give some access to the media 
for things like photos and scene images etc. So that we can keep a handle on 
that, so that we can preserve the crime scene and make their job easier. So 
actually the more you can work with them and the more you can give them 
as we did on the Jayden Parkinson murder in Oxford. We made sure that we 
facilitated things like access to them, interviews regularly to the senior 
officers.  Because if you do that, it actually makes it easier for you to get on 
with the investigation and they͛ƌe less likelǇ to staƌt tƌǇiŶg to Đliŵď oǀeƌ the 
back gardens of the neighbours and then trampling all over your crime scene 
and so you know, it pays to help them get some access. 
 
                             And now because of our digital content as well and our digital channels, we 
ĐaŶ giǀe theŵ paĐkages ǁhiĐh is ŵoƌe the ǁaǇ ǁe͛ƌe ǁoƌkiŶg Ŷoǁ, is that 
ǁe go aŶd ǁe take a photo aŶd ǁe͛ll filŵ the seŶioƌ offiĐeƌ, if he hasŶ͛t got 
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time to access the media at that point. We can do all of that for them and 
theŶ giǀe theŵ the paĐkage uŶtil ǁe ĐaŶ get theŵ aĐĐess, so it͛s aďout doiŶg 
soŵe of that joď foƌ theŵ as ǁell. AŶd paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ the loĐal papeƌs, theǇ͛ǀe 
got such limited staff now. They literally are crying out for anything that you 
can give them to help.    
 
Interviewer: What would you consider the biggest threats to corporate communications 
at the moment? Smooth running of it? 
 
Interviewee: I doŶ͛t thiŶk theƌe aƌe, I thiŶk iŶ the poliĐiŶg ǁoƌld ďeĐause of the, I thiŶk 
most of the corporate coms teams have been cut back quite significantly in 
the… iŶ the last ƌouŶd of Đuts so I doŶ͛t thiŶk theƌe͛s a ŵassiǀe issue ǁith 
cutting. I guess a couple of threats are obviously, some have got issues with 
the police and crime commissioners who have stolen some of the corporate 
communications teams.  
 
Interviewer: I͛ŵ Ŷot suƌe hoǁ that ǁoƌks. 
 
Interviewee: Well it doesŶ͛t aŶd that͛s the pƌoďleŵ. I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ if Ǉou͛ǀe spokeŶ to 
theŵ, ďut if Ǉou of aŶd speak to NoƌthaŵptoŶ… 
 
Interviewer: mmmmmm 
 
Interviewee: If you actually speak to the officers, they are just completely at a loss, 
ďeĐause all of Đoƌpoƌate Đoŵs Ŷoǁ sits uŶdeƌ the PCC. TheǇ͛ǀe lost the 
operational support. They have nothing and so they are sat there going, how 
do I get a ǁitŶess appeal? BeĐause it͛s all oǀeƌ heƌe aŶd theǇ ĐaŶ͛t diƌeĐt 
opeƌatioŶal ďeĐause theǇ͛ƌe PCC͛s, so it just doesŶ͛t ǁoƌk. “o that͛s a ďig 
thƌeat. FoƌtuŶatelǇ heƌe it͛s Ŷot a thƌeat ďeĐause ǁe͛ǀe all goŶe ďaĐk oǀeƌ to 
the Đhief ĐoŶstaďle, ďut that͛s defiŶitelǇ aŶ issue. OďǀiouslǇ Đollaďoration, 
Ŷot ŶeĐessaƌilǇ a thƌeat ďut it͛s aŶ oppoƌtuŶitǇ as ǁell. “o Ǉou pƌoďaďlǇ 
ŵight see ŵoƌe foƌĐes ŵoǀiŶg foƌǁaƌds, Ŷot so ŵuĐh I doŶ͛t thiŶk, 
collaborating a full coms team. But there will be bits of collaboration that 
take place. And we already do some of that with some of our South East 
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partners. You know working together. 
 
PI.08                    Pages 1 – 6 of 36 
Facilitator: All right, are you ready to get started?  
 
Interviewee: Yeah. 
 
Facilitator: I suppose, the first thing is how did you get involved in corporate 
communications with the police because it's something that's an unusual 
job, isn't it, I'd have thought. 
 
Interviewee: Yeah. I started out as a journalist, trained as a journalist and went for my 
first job as a journalist and discovered how well they paid you. And at the 
time, I was leaving university and needed a job and ended up working in PR, 
worked for a PR agency for a while, moved on, worked in the private sector 
and then got a job as a press officer here back in 2003.  
 
 I spent four years as a press officer, loved it, absolutely loved it, but knew I 
needed to keep moving on. So I did just under four years here the first time 
around, [I said 00:01:50] first time around, went off, worked in private 
industry, worked for charity, worked for public sector organisations, came 
back, but worked for ACPO nationally on domestic extremism and which is 
of the UK side of counterterrorism, did two years down in London, working 
for them.  
 
 The job was moving, as ACPO started to change and was moving to the Met, 
and, at the time, I was doing part time down there and part time up here. So 
it was quite a nice change. I didn't want to go down to London and 
commute fulltime again, because I'd done it once and it was horrible. And 
ended up coming back here, initially as marketing manager and then got 
head of department about this time last year. I've been in post here a year.  
 
Facilitator: Congratulations. How have you found it, your first year? 
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Interviewee: Interesting. We've had a massive restructure. We've cut by a third. 
 
Facilitator: The problem all over, isn't it. 
 
Interviewee: But, yeah, it's been good because I've had a lot of ideas and there was a lot 
of things as marketing manager, I wanted to influence that I didn't have the 
influence over, which I've been able to do and we continue to just develop 
and change. April 1st was our sort of goal for the new structure and we're 
just finding our feet a little bit now. And it feels like it's settled down a little 
bit. 
 
Facilitator: Well, that's really, really good. So are you finding that the new structure's 
working for you? 
 
Interviewee: It seems to be. We were previously split marketing, internal comms and 
press office, and we're now flat structure. So it's comms officer, who do a 
little bit of everything, but we're still split proactive and reactive. So we have 
the long-term planned campaigns, which are managed by three of the team 
and the reactive firefighting, whatever comes in today, we'll deal with...  
 
Facilitator: Crisis communication. 
 
Interviewee: ...is dealt with by the reactive team.  
 
Facilitator: So that's really interesting. You've got a background in marketing. So I was 
going to ask how marketing actually really fits in with police corporate 
communications because it's not something that you see as a natural 
bedfellow for the police and yet, of course, they've got to sell their image in 
today's world.  
 
Interviewee: Yeah. For me, the brand is probably the most important thing and whether 
that's what our external communication looks like in terms of print format 
or whether that's what people look like when they're out on the street 
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talking to people, it's all about the brand. And I think that's one of the things 
we lacked. We lacked that consistency. We lacked that co-operation, 
almost.  
 
 And there was a bigger restructure around the organisation, which sort of 
split out the areas. And it was all around the same time, so it gave us an 
opportunity to say well, actually, we're going to implement this brand. We 
have our own theme. We have what I like to think as our Tesco brand, so we 
don't deviate from that. We've got quite strict brand guidelines, which has 
taken people a long time to get used to. But it means that there's a 
consistency in all of our communications, whether that's online, offline, 
things that we don't use, photographs.  
 
 The budget restraints have helped or hindered, depending on your 
viewpoint, but we don't use photographs because we found that we were 
having to replace them constantly. They were dated quite quickly. People 
left, people died, people were sacked. So it was a constant battle to keep on 
top, so we said, you know, scrap it. We don't need photographs now. We 
just use word cloud imagery, which saves us a fortune in time and effort. 
 
Facilitator: How did you go about constructing a brand image because the police are so 
iconic anyway and people see them as quite a homogenous entity, I think? 
So it must be quite a challenge to create a regional identity when you've got 
competition with the national one I'd have thought or possibly not. 
 
Interviewee: No, it's local, so it's not regional. It's just purely Cambridgeshire [this 
county]. And the brand was built around a crime prevention campaign. So 
we took all of our analysis, all of our strategic assessment, identified what 
the force's priorities were and used that information to say, well, if this is 
what the force's priorities are, then that's what our proactive priorities 
should be and built a campaign around that.  
 
 And previously, we'd have gone to several designers and we'd have gone to 
different people. So all of our imagery would have looked different, all of 
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our crime prevention materials would have looked different. We just 
needed to bring it all in line so that people know that, if they see something 
that looks like that, they know it's come from the police, rather than it being 
a, oh, is that from council, is that from fire service, is that from...  
 
 So we developed these brand guidelines to give us that it didn't matter 
where you saw it, you knew if it looked like that, in the same you know if 
you see something that's from Tesco's or from Boots, you know it's a Boots 
product, you know it's a Tesco product, that it was a police message and 
that people should pay attention to it. It was the theory behind it and we've 
been rolling out the brand for nearly three years now. In fact, it will be three 
years where everything we do is on brand. 
 
Facilitator: Do you find that it's having much of an impact from a reputational point of 
view? People are saying, we're clearly recognising the police now. When 
communication's from them, we recognise the logo. 
 
Interviewee: A lot of that analysis hasn't been as in depth as I would have liked it to have 
been, but we know that, in terms of identifying what is a police message or 
what is a council message, has become stronger. But what we've also found 
is councils, other partners, fire services, have wanted to use our brand as 
well to get their messages across. And it was designed with that ability, so it 
was flexible enough.  
 
 I think part of the theory, in terms of implementation, was around we knew 
we were cutting. We knew that our visibility was going to shrink. So it was 
about making us visible. If it's not a police officer on the street, we still need 
to make our presence visible. And we brought on a whole range of tactics. 
We had a couple of marked-up cars and trailers and things that were, if we 
couldn't be there, we would put something out there in an area where we 
had a hotspot.  
 
 For example, we had a vehicle crime hotspot in a car park in Peterborough 
and we did it through patrols and it reduced, but it moved to somewhere 
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else in the city. So what we did was the officers put the car in one car park 
and patrolled the other and just kept swapping them around. So they did 
the patrols in one and the car crime went down. And they think it's because 
people thought there were cameras in the vehicle we were putting... 
 
Facilitator: It's the speed camera principle on the road, isn't it. You never know whether 
it's going to have film in, so you slow down.  
 
Interviewee: And a lot of it was to save the policemen. It's something that's there. When 
we can't be there, it's something that's there to deter and, as a crime 
prevention tool, it certainly seemed to work. 
 
Facilitator: And probably reassure as well, if people are recognising it as an official 
police presence and they'll have quite a reassurance aspect. I imagine social 
media's been quite important with the visible reduction because it's an easy 
and very far-reaching way of getting to a lot of people. 
 
Interviewee: Yeah, massively, massively. We started off in 2010 with our social media. 
And that was predominantly around an EDL march and we learned a lot of 
lessons from that account we set up. It was the first Twitter account and it 
was initially set up in an individual's name. And, after six months, he then 
moved on to another job, which is what happens. A lot of people move 
around quite a bit.  
 
 So we discovered at that point that actually it wasn't a good idea to have an 
individual name on an account because the people who were following him 
were people from Peterborough. He then moved to Cambridge and people 
in Cambridge didn't care what was happening in [long pause]. 
 
 So we said, right, we don't do that. We have a corporate account. So we 
now have a formal corporate account, which we own. And then we have 
localised accounts, which are run by the local teams, reactive teams, who 
work updating.  
 We don't use Facebook and Twitter at the moment, but we're just about to 
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launch an Instagram account. We have a YouTube account. We've started to 
move away from what I call the vanity stats. So we're not measuring how 
many followers we've got. We're measuring the engagement that we're 
having and actually making what we're doing on those channels more 
meaningful than what we necessarily previously were. 
 
Facilitator: How would you measure the engagement, if you're not basing it on the 
number of followers? 
 
Interviewee: Just because something appears in a paper, it doesn't mean you read it. So 
because something appears in your Facebook feed, it doesn't mean you 
read it. If you like it, you comment on it. If you put it as a favourite... 
Facilitator: So it's proactive, yeah. 
 
Interviewee: ...it suggests that you've done some sort of interaction with it and we would 
class that as an engagement. We're also doing a lot through Google 
Analytics and measuring and campaign tracking things that we're putting 
out, so we can measure, okay, we're putting an appeal out and we're 
directing people back to our website. We can measure how many people 
come in from those channels. So if they'd read it and engaged with it, they'll 
click the link and that's an engagement. 
Facilitator: Yes, and they'll go look at the big story. 
 
Interviewee: Yeah, and that's an engagement stat for us. And we're looking at developing 
our website, so we'll have the opportunity to be able to report online do 
various things and book appointments, that kind of thing, online. And once 
that's on, we can actually say, if we're doing a witness appeal, we put it on 
Facebook. They came from Facebook to our website. We asked them to give 
us information. They clicked on the box to submit some information. We 
can tell they've submitted the form and we know it's gone off to our 
intelligence guys. So we should be able to eventually... 
 
Facilitator: Joined up. 
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Interviewee: ...track the entire process from what we've done to what's actually come in 
because, at the moment, put out witness appeals daily and I would argue, 
probably 90% don't get anything back. And as a reduced team, what's the 
point? What are we gaining from doing that or what's the organisation 
gaining from doing that? So part of the review is about being a bit smarter 
around how we do it and what we do and making sure we're targeting 
people as opposed to just blanketing everybody.  
 
PI.22              Page 24 – 30 of 57 
Interviewee: If you just had one [unclear 00:51:34] yeah and, you know, we are to a 
ĐeƌtaiŶ degƌee, ǁe͛ƌe lookiŶg at this iŶ ĐollaďoƌatioŶ ǁith otheƌ poliĐe 
forces.  We collaborate with South Yorks, so we share IT and we share HR 
aŶd, Ǉou kŶoǁ, as a ƌesult ǁe͛ƌe ǁoƌkiŶg Ƌuite ĐloselǇ, so if ǁe͛ƌe lookiŶg at 
a solutioŶ ǁe look at it togetheƌ, ǁe ŵaǇ still ƌule it out ďeĐause it͛s Ŷot fit 
for purpose for them but it is foƌ us, ďut oŶ the ǁhole ǁe͛ƌe gettiŶg a lot 
smarter at looking at where we can pool the different types of technology 
we use in the future, examples being the mobile data rollout, which has 
given officers across Humberside and South Yorks tablets rather than them 
haǀiŶg to ĐoŵpletelǇ dƌop eǀeƌǇthiŶg theǇ͛ƌe doiŶg to Đoŵe ďaĐk to a 
station to upload all the information about crime, they can do it on the 
move now, so they can update their Twitter feed or their Facebook feed or 
they can access crime systems, they can do crime reports, they can do 
ĐheĐks oŶ people ǁhile theǇ͛ƌe out aŶd aďout oŶ the ŵoǀe usiŶg this 
teĐhŶologǇ, Ǉou kŶoǁ, it͛s a ďig leap foƌǁaƌd foƌ us, ďut if Ǉou look iŶ the 
grand scheme of themes cops in America have had that for 20 or 30 years 
built into their police cars.  So, you know, everything comes in big circles, 
ǁe͛ƌe fiŶallǇ gettiŶg oŶ ďoaƌd ǁith this, ďeĐause ǁe͛ǀe ƌealised that, Ǉou 
kŶoǁ, theƌe aƌe ďetteƌ ǁaǇs of doiŶg thiŶgs aŶd the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s 
innovation funding massively helps that process, because we were able to 
secure a big deal of funding for the first two phases of that.  We used to be 
in a position where the Home Office had a lot of crime prevention material, 
but as money started getting tighter and tighter, you know, the Home Office 
ĐouldŶ͛t affoƌd to keep pƌoǀidiŶg that tǇpe of ŵateƌial, liteƌallǇ Ǉou ƌaŶg up 
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and said can I have ten boxes of this and they sent you it for free, so 
obviously that bubble was going to burst at some stage, so yeah, you know, 
we do now find ourselves in a position where lots of forces are trying to be 
that first force, that secured support from others to create everything and 
foƌ us all to paǇ theŵ to supplǇ us ǁith it.  Hoǁ loŶg that͛s goiŶg to take to 
do, how far spread will it ultimately be, will the College of Policing or ACPO 
or anyone ultimately come out and say no this is what a force website needs 
to look like iŶ the futuƌe, geŶuiŶelǇ doŶ͛t kŶoǁ.  All I do kŶoǁ is that 
compared to some forces, yeah you mentioned one force earlier looking at a 
Ŷeǁ ǁeďsite aŶd Ǉou͛ƌe talkiŶg £ϭϬϬk plus, ǁell ouƌs is liteƌallǇ goiŶg to 
Đoŵe iŶ at a Ƌuaƌteƌ of that, ǁhiĐh is still ŵoƌe thaŶ ǁe͛d ǁaŶt to seŶd, ďut 
ǁe͛ƌe tƌǇiŶg to eŶgiŶeeƌ iŶ the ŵost siŵplistiĐ of thiŶgs so that ǁe ĐaŶ theŶ 
maintain it in-house so ǁe doŶ͛t haǀe to keep goiŶg ďaĐk to supplieƌs to get 
them to make fundamental changes to templates or upload things, so we 
can cater for a lot more in-house as we move forward.   
Facilitator: BeĐause theƌe͛s Ƌuite a lot of talk aƌouŶd ĐollaďoƌatioŶ at the ŵoŵeŶt isŶ͛t 
there with the HMIC saying you need to collaborate more and one area 
which, you know, struck me a while ago as being sort of a, obvious on the 
face of it, collaboration is with the campaigns, because as you said basically 
Ǉou͛ǀe got ĐeƌtaiŶ campaigns [unclear 00:54:44] rolled out across the 
country. 
Interviewee: Yes, it͛s Ŷot ƌoĐket sĐieŶĐe stuff is it?  Yeah. 
Facilitator: So I do find a little perplexing when I go and talk to police forces and they 
might say well yeah we talk to our neighbouƌs, ďut ǁe doŶ͛t kŶoǁ that Avon 
and Somerset just did a really fantastic campaign about domestic violence. 
Interviewee: No. 
Facilitator: You know, round the football World Cup and I do find that really quite odd. 
Interviewee: Yeah, you would think I mean and, you know, there are many ways that you 
Đould poteŶtiallǇ Đaptuƌe all of this ƌaŶgiŶg fƌoŵ as a poliĐe foƌĐe ǁe͛ƌe 
happǇ foƌ people to ďoƌƌoǁ ǁhateǀeƌ theǇ ǁaŶt to ďoƌƌoǁ, ǁe͛ƌe all iŶ the 
same business, so could it all be uploaded into one repository of information 
aŶd people just piĐk out ǁhat theǇ Ŷeed safe iŶ the kŶoǁledge that if it͛s 
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been uploaded there in the first place the force who has designed it are 
happǇ foƌ Ǉou to use it, so, Ǉou kŶoǁ, theƌe͛s that as oŶe appƌoaĐh, theƌe͛s 
an interim approach I suppose, the other side of it is yeah could we be in a 
positioŶ ǁithiŶ a Ǉeaƌ oƌ tǁo͛s tiŵe to just haǀe this foƌĐe appƌoǀed list of 
stuff that you can draw down as and when you need it.  The Association of 
Chief Police Officers attempted last year into this year to do national weeks 
of aĐtioŶ to foĐus foƌĐes͛ atteŶtioŶ oŶ ĐeƌtaiŶ suďjeĐts all at the saŵe tiŵe, 
it Đaused a feǁ issues, Ǉou kŶoǁ, that it ǁasŶ͛t ǀeƌǇ ǁell thought out, so a 
lot of forces opted out after the first few, but it shows that, you know, 
policing in general is trying to get its act together for want of even worse 
ǁaǇ of phƌasiŶg it, ďut it͛s a ǁaǇ off. The good Ŷeǁs is ďeĐause ǁe aƌe all iŶ 
the saŵe ďoat Ǉou͛d piĐk up the phoŶe to aŶǇ head of Đoŵŵs oƌ aŶǇ, Ǉou 
know, section manager within a corporate comms team and gone are the 
daǇs ǁheƌe ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ iŶ teƌŵs of aŶǇoŶe I͛ǀe spokeŶ to ƌeĐeŶtlǇ ǁheƌe theǇ 
saǇ Ǉeah, ďut theƌe͛ll ďe a Đost attaĐhed to it aŶd that, Ǉou kŶoǁ, up to a 
couple of years ago that was the case if you wanted to use soŵeoŶe else͛s 
aƌtǁoƌk, ďeĐause theǇ͛d iŶǀested so ŵuĐh tiŵe aŶd effoƌt aŶd iŶ soŵe 
seŶses it ǁas ŵaǇďe aŶ ageŶĐǇ Đƌeated pieĐe of ǁoƌk Ǉeah, ďut it͛ll Đost Ǉou. 
Facilitator: That͛s ƌeallǇ iŶteƌestiŶg, ďeĐause I kŶoǁ ǁell tǁo foƌĐes aƌe ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ 
looking at diaƌǇ shaƌiŶg ǁith theiƌ ĐaŵpaigŶs, so theǇ͛ǀe got the list of, Ǉou 
kŶoǁ, the ĐaŵpaigŶs theǇ Ŷeed to do aŶd theǇ͛ǀe split theŵ up, so that 
they can switch between the two of them. 
Interviewee: ‘ight, it͛s iŶteƌestiŶg, so shaƌiŶg the ǁoƌkload ďetǁeeŶ ďetǁeeŶ͛eŵ. 
Facilitator: AŶd also the fuŶdiŶg, so theǇ͛ƌe oŶlǇ paǇiŶg foƌ half the ĐaŵpaigŶs eaĐh aŶd 
struck me when I was talking to them as being really, you know, potentially 
a very good way of doing it.  
Interviewee: Yeah, Ŷoǁ that͛s a ƌeallǇ good idea.  I ŵeaŶ ǁe͛ƌe Ŷot Ƌuite to that eǆteŶt, 
ďut ǁe͛ƌe eaƌlǇ stages of that tǇpe of ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ ǁith South Yorks.  We͛ƌe 
opeŶiŶg ouƌ list of stuff, theǇ͛ƌe opeŶiŶg up theiƌs so ǁe͛ǀe got this ďiggeƌ 
pool of information that we can ultimately get out of people.  The next 
logical step is alright well what can we do in conjunction in some senses, 
ďeĐause Ǉou͛ƌe also talkiŶg aďout the Đƌoss ďoƌdeƌ eleŵeŶt of ouƌ ďuƌglaƌs 
go there and vice versa, rural crime exactly the same thing.  So that, you 
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know, certainly the four Yorkshire forces, us, South, North and West Yorks 
[ŶeighďouƌiŶg foƌĐes] aƌe all iŶ oŶe ďig Đollaďoƌatiǀe pot, ǁe doŶ͛t ǁoƌk 
together for everything, but if you look at areas of policing at the minute like 
underwater search, our underwater search team is the Yorkshire and 
Huŵďeƌ uŶdeƌǁateƌ seaƌĐh teaŵ, aiƌ opeƌatioŶs, if ouƌ heliĐopteƌ͛s offliŶe 
or any of the others are we collaborate with other forces and they give us a 
certain amount of air coverage off the back of it all.  Comms is another area, 
you know, there have been moves in the past for I think it was West Yorks 
were looking at being the provider of literature, provider of campaign 
material to the other three Yorkshire foƌĐes, ďut it just ǁasŶ͛t Ƌuite the ƌight 
time for us to look at it for various different reasons, so that, you know, 
there are moves afoot to try and do that, I think certainly within the next 6 
to 12 months will be like that with South Yorks team and we will be sharing 
a hell of a lot more, we will be meeting a lot more regularly and hopefully 
forward planning.  
Facilitator: Do Ǉou thiŶk that ǁe͛ƌe goiŶg to see ŵoƌe ŵeƌgeƌs ĐoŵiŶg out iŶ the futuƌe, 
ďeĐause West MeƌĐia͛s a ďit of a suĐĐess stoƌǇ at the ŵoŵeŶt aƌeŶ͛t theǇ 
ǁith hoǁ theǇ͛ǀe iŶĐoƌpoƌated is it WaƌǁiĐkshiƌe, WoƌĐesteƌshire, 
Herefordshire and one other county that I always forget? 
Interviewee: Yeah. 
Facilitator: But theǇ͛ǀe doŶe a ƌeallǇ good joď.  WheŶ I talked to Kate Quilley there, she 
ǁas suggestiŶg that she aĐtuallǇ thiŶks that it͛s goiŶg to happeŶ ƌegioŶallǇ 
round the ĐouŶtƌǇ aŶd ǁe͛ƌe goiŶg to staƌt seeiŶg foƌĐes ŵoǀiŶg aǁaǇ fƌoŵ 
collaboration and into mergers. 
Interviewee: Yeah, well look at Police Force Scotland, you know, ultimately as an example 
it͛s just oŶe giaŶt poliĐe foƌĐe Ŷoǁ isŶ͛t it aŶd, Ǉou kŶoǁ, eǀeƌyone looked 
at that with a hell of a lot of cynicism and trepidation when it all came 
togetheƌ, hoǁ ǁell͛s that aĐtuallǇ goiŶg to ǁoƌk?  The ƌealitǇ of it is ǁe all 
work to one set of laws, we all work to one set of practice directions for 
obvious reasons.  Yeah, ǁe͛ƌe goiŶg to haǀe to Đoŵe to a poiŶt if soŵethiŶg 
doesŶ͛t giǀe fiŶaŶĐiallǇ ǁheƌe the Ŷeǆt stage is lookiŶg at all ƌight so ǁhat 
can was just do together, now where can we either merge police forces, 
become one big giant police force, provide one set of governance or one set 
383 
 
of ŵateƌial that͛ll ďe used, Ǉou kŶoǁ, Ǉou ĐaŶ guaƌaŶtee Ŷot oŶlǇ the 
marketing material or probably even down to the stock check forms or the 
penalty notices or the speeding fine tickets, you know, all of these sorts of 
things probably look different force to force, but the information on them 
ǁill haǀe to ďe eǆaĐtlǇ the saŵe.  “o, Ǉou kŶoǁ, it pƌoďaďlǇ isŶ͛t too faƌ 
away at all if things stay the way that they are and forces are still having to 
make some drastic cuts. 
Facilitator: BeĐause theƌe͛s Ƌuite a fieƌĐe ƌeseŶtŵeŶt toǁaƌds the idea of ŵeƌgeƌs 
aƌeŶ͛t theƌe aŵoŶg the puďliĐ?  
Interviewee: Yeah. 
Facilitator: I kŶoǁ iŶ “uffolk aŶd Noƌfolk theǇ͛ƌe ĐollaďoƌatiŶg oŶ a lot of thiŶgs Ŷoǁ, 
but there was a huge outpouring of resentment when there were 
discussions this year about them moving the control room from Suffolk to 
Norfolk and logistically it made perfect sense, but opinion wise people, you 
kŶoǁ, theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot haǀiŶg it.  “o I iŵagiŶe it Đould aĐtuallǇ Đause Ƌuite a 
branding reputation problem to merge. 
Interviewee: Yeah, ǁe͛ǀe got it to a ĐeƌtaiŶ eǆteŶt Ŷoǁ ǁith the ŵodel, ouƌ ĐuƌƌeŶt poliĐe 
force model sees us having three policing divisions, policing four local 
authority areas.  The new force model will see us have one giant division, 
ďut oďǀiouslǇ still poliĐiŶg foƌ loĐal authoƌitǇ aƌeas.  “o Ǉou͛ll still haǀe 
community policing within those four local authority areas, but the rest of 
the specialist teams, the response teams, those types of facilities will all be 
on a demand ďasis.  “o ǁe͛ll haǀe the aďilitǇ to ďe aďle to plot ǁheƌe ǁe 
Ŷeed offiĐeƌs ďased oŶ ǁhat͛s goiŶg oŶ iŶ that loĐatioŶ at aŶǇ giǀeŶ tiŵe, if 
that problem then desists and we have it somewhere else clearly you just 
move your resources to where you need them, that͛s Ŷot to saǇ that soŵe 
aƌeas ǁoŶ͛t get aŶǇ Đoǀeƌage, ďut, Ǉou kŶoǁ, Ǉouƌ aŶalogǇ aďout liǀiŶg iŶ aŶ 
aƌea ǁheƌe it͛s ƌeallǇ loǁ Đƌiŵe so Ǉou doŶ͛t see offiĐeƌs ǀeƌǇ ofteŶ, ǁell 
ĐleaƌlǇ that͛s ƌight, Ǉou kŶoǁ, if ǁe͛ǀe got a fiŶite Ŷuŵďeƌ of ƌesouƌĐes we 
Ŷeed to ŵake the ŵost of theŵ ǁheƌe theǇ͛ƌe Ŷeeded at that poiŶt iŶ tiŵe 
and have the flexibility of putting them where they need to be and that 
iŶĐludes the statioŶ ǁe͛ƌe iŶ Ŷoǁ, Hessle has got the northern command 
centre, which is one giant telephone eǆĐhaŶge aŶd theŶ ǁe͛ǀe got the 
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southern command centre in Grimsby, which is the other part of the jigsaw.  
The reality of it is if you ring 101 or 999 either site could answer, regardless 
of ǁhetheƌ Ǉou͛ƌe iŶ Hull, Grimsby, Scunthorpe, somewhere in [unclear 
01:02:41] either site could answer, it just trips through to the next available 
caller, but the suggestion at the moment of closing down the southern 
command centre and centralising everything here, because our processes 
will be more efficient has caused oŶe of the ŶatioŶal poliĐiŶg ŵiŶisteƌs͛ 
team members to come up and question our senior management teams 
aƌouŶd ǁhǇ ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg it oŶ the gƌouŶds of ǁell that ǁill haǀe a Ŷegatiǀe 
iŵpaĐt oŶ ƌesouƌĐiŶg to a Đƌiŵe.  Well ǁhǇ ǁill it?  It͛s suggestiŶg that it͛ll 
take longer for a phone call to go from Grimsby to, you know, is it as simple 
as that?  I think what it has shown, I think all of this change stuff has shown 
that the puďliĐ just doŶ͛t uŶdeƌstaŶd hoǁ ǁe aĐtuallǇ poliĐe.  If I stuĐk a 
traffic copper in front of you with a response bobby next to him, a firearms 
offiĐeƌ, a dog offiĐeƌ, theƌe͛s goiŶg to ďe soŵe faiƌlǇ oďǀious diffeƌeŶĐes 
when you look at a guy with a gun, a guy with a dog, take all that away from 
them, just leave them there in uniform, theǇ͛ƌe all eǆaĐtlǇ the saŵe aŶd I 
thiŶk, Ǉou kŶoǁ, people just doŶ͛t ƌealise hoǁ ǁe poliĐe aŶd Ŷoǁ that ǁe͛ƌe 
talkiŶg aďout takiŶg thiŶgs aǁaǇ oƌ doiŶg thiŶgs diffeƌeŶtlǇ theƌe͛s this feaƌ 
of god that Đƌiŵe͛s goiŶg to go ŵad aŶd it ǁoŶ͛t, ďeĐause aĐtuallǇ ǁe͛ƌe just 
gettiŶg sŵaƌteƌ at deliǀeƌiŶg these seƌǀiĐes, ďest eǆaŵple ďeiŶg ǁe doŶ͛t 
have a system at the moment that shows you the nearest resource to a 
paƌtiĐulaƌ iŶĐideŶĐe, ǁe ǁill haǀe iŶ the ǀeƌǇ, ǀeƌǇ Ŷeaƌ futuƌe, it͛s ďeiŶg 
ǁoƌked oŶ Ŷoǁ, it͛s aŶ off the shelf product, it works in conjunction with 
Ǉouƌ ƌadio, it͛s GP“ ďased, so ǁe get a Đall iŶ aďout a ŵajoƌ ĐollisioŶ ƌight oŶ 
the border between what would be at the moment East Yorkshire and Hull, 
at the ŵoŵeŶt it ǁould ďe the ƌesouƌĐe that͛s Ŷeaƌest from their division 
that will go and deal with it.  So you could end up with this ludicrous 
situatioŶ ǁheƌe Ǉou͛ǀe got a tƌaffiĐ Đoppeƌ fƌoŵ Hull two minutes from the 
joď, ďut it͛s Ŷot his aƌea, Ǉou͛ǀe got a tƌaffiĐ Đoppeƌ fƌoŵ East Riding 25 
minutes away having to do this mad across the city dash to try and get 
there, all of that goes when we get rid of divisions, all of that goes when you 
get this new software and it means that science will tell us, history will tell 
us where we need to put our resources and then the nearest resource will 
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atteŵpt the saŵe thiŶg.  We͛ǀe alƌeadǇ got ďluƌƌiŶg of ďouŶdaƌies ďetǁeeŶ 
ouƌ ŶeighďouƌiŶg foƌĐes ǁheƌe paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ ǁith tƌaffiĐ, Ǉou kŶoǁ, if theƌe͛s 
an incident on the border with North Yorks aŶd it͛s just iŶto theiƌ patch and 
ǁe͛ƌe Đloseƌ [uŶĐleaƌ Ϭϭ:Ϭϱ:ϯϰ] aŶd theǇ ĐaŶ get theƌe ǁheŶ theǇ get theƌe, 
so, Ǉou kŶoǁ, that soƌt of thiŶg͛s alƌeadǇ happeŶiŶg.  We do a lot of Đƌoss 
border operations nowadays which is absolutely brilliant in terms of tackling 
people that just go ǁheƌeǀeƌ, ĐƌiŵiŶals doŶ͛t giǀe a shit do theǇ, theǇ͛ll go 
ǁheƌeǀeƌ theǇ ǁaŶt to.  “o ǁe Ŷeed to ďe the saŵe aŶd that soƌt of stuff͛s 
happeŶiŶg Ŷoǁ, it͛s just that, Ǉou kŶoǁ, the ƌealitǇ of it is a lot of people 
think they know more than they actually know, so when you start talking 
about doing things massively different and having to get rid of all of these 
staff Ǉou ĐaŶ uŶdeƌstaŶd ǁhǇ theƌe͛s a ƌeal leǀel of feaƌ aƌouŶd haǀiŶg to do 
it. 
Facilitator: Oh yes, but how would you deal with the rebranding issue, because I 
iŵagiŶe selliŶg it͛s goiŶg to ďe paƌt of the Đoŵŵs ƌespoŶsiďilities foƌ 
[unclear 01:06:21]. 
Interviewee: Yeah, the fiƌst paƌt of it͛s the siŵple ego thiŶg aŶd Ǉou kŶoǁ full ǁell that 
Ǉou͛ƌe iŶ a positioŶ ǁheƌeďǇ, Ǉou kŶoǁ, if Ǉou͛ƌe ŵaiŶtaiŶing your 
Humberside [XX] Police and South Yorkshire [YY] PoliĐe ŵaŶtƌas aŶd theǇ͛ƌe 
going into this one big pot, is it the South Yorkshire [YY] and Humber [XX] 
Police Force or is it the Humber [XX] and South Yorkshire [YY] Police Force?  
“o Ǉou͛ǀe got all of that to get aƌouŶd iŶ the fiƌst plaĐe, it͛d ďe easǇ if ǁe 
went in as one big Yorkshire [ƌegioŶal] foƌĐe, ďeĐause Ǉou͛d ďe Yorkshire 
and Humber Police Force. 
Facilitator: Yeah, Yorkshire. 
Interviewee: That͛ll ďe fiŶe.  “o Ǉou͛ǀe got that to get oǀeƌ iŶ the first place and believe 
ŵe it ǁould happeŶ, ďeĐause ǁe had it ǁith the shaƌed seƌǀiĐes ǁe͛ǀe got 
Ŷoǁ, ǁell ǁe͛d like to ďe the South Yorkshire [YY] and Humberside [XX] 
shared services - Ŷo, so, Ǉou kŶoǁ, Ǉou͛ǀe got that to get oǀeƌ, ďut I thiŶk 
the realitǇ of it is it͛s aďout opeŶiŶg ouƌselǀes ƌight up as foƌĐes aŶd selliŶg 
all of the things that are going to benefit people, why are we doing it, you 
kŶoǁ, helpiŶg theŵ thƌough this ĐhaŶge pƌoĐess, so ǁe͛ƌe saǇiŶg this is 
ultiŵatelǇ ǁhat ǁe͛ƌe goiŶg to do, this is ǁhǇ ǁe͛ƌe goiŶg to do it aŶd this is 
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what the net result is going to be, so some real tangible as it stands if we 
had an incident here that force would have to come and deal with it, but 
under the new model we know where all of our resources are across the 
two border areas and we send the nearest resource to the job, so attending 
iŶĐideŶts ďeĐoŵes so ŵuĐh ƋuiĐkeƌ it͛s uŶďelieǀaďle, highlightiŶg ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ 
in areas like public protection, protecting vulnerable people, CSE, those 
soƌts of thiŶgs Ǉou͛d probably double the size of the unit that would be able 
to ǁoƌk oŶ it aĐƌoss ďoth aƌeas aŶd it ǁouldŶ͛t ŶeĐessaƌilǇ Ŷeed to ďe aƌea 
specific, you could make sure the right people were dealing with the right 
job, so that, you know, there would be a lot of areas that you could clearly 
demonstrate some [pause] some real advantages, but the key would be are 
we open enough to do that in the first place? 
Facilitator: That͛s iŶteƌestiŶg, I ŵeaŶ…   
Interviewee: People, Ǉou kŶoǁ, theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot stupid, theǇ Ŷeed to kŶow why, they need to 
kŶoǁ ǁhat the ďeŶefits aƌe aŶd theǇ Ŷeed to kŶoǁ theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot ďeiŶg 
diddled out of ŵoŶeǇ that theǇ͛ƌe paǇiŶg thƌough theiƌ ĐouŶĐil taǆ, Ǉou 
know, there are clear benefits to ultimately going down that route. 
Facilitator: And I think that͛s a ƌeallǇ iŶteƌestiŶg ǁoƌd Ǉou used theƌe opeŶ, ďeĐause 
tƌaditioŶallǇ it͛s Ƌuite diffiĐult foƌ the poliĐe to ďe opeŶ aŶd this ǁhole idea 
aďout tƌaŶspaƌeŶĐǇ͛s Ƌuite a sĐaƌǇ ĐoŶĐept to aŶ iŶstitutioŶ that͛s, Ǉou 
know, premised on security and information management. 
Interviewee: Yeah.  No, I agƌee.  We͛ƌe the poliĐe, Ǉeah. 
Facilitator: Which normally meant information retention and not giving it out. 
Interviewee: Yeah, ǁe͛ll tell Ǉou ǁhat Ǉou Ŷeed to kŶoǁ ǁheŶ Ǉou Ŷeed to kŶoǁ it. 
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Facilitator: You have quite a high population in Sussex, haven't you, because if you 
think of it, traditionally, as being quite a rural county and yet, it's also got 
quite a strong metropolitan transient population now, going into London, I 
would have thought.  
Interviewee 2: Well, we've got this collaboration with Surrey [a neighbouring force] as well 
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and their comms department is where we're working together, efficiently, 
etĐ. But theǇ'ƌe half the size ǁe aƌe aŶd I thiŶk… Aƌe theǇ aďout the same 
size? 
Interviewee: Their comms department is about the same size as ours, but they're half the 
size of the population. 
Interviewee 2: So we've got Brighton, ǁhiĐh is… 
Interviewee: And Gatwick. 
Interviewee 2: And we've got Gatwick as well, which is in the [unclear 00:06:36] really keep 
us busy. 
Interviewee: And something I forgot to mention is that in each district for the 
neighbourhood policing team, you have a public engagement officer and 
their job is kind of like my job at a much lower level. They deal with ensuring 
that the neighbourhood policing teams are engaging with the public and 
making the best use out of not just social media, but making the best use of 
any other communications that we can gather in terms of leaflets if they 
need something. They'll look at, do we need that for a campaign.  
 They'll come to me, ask me for it. I will brief it into the production team and 
they'll deliver it, if I think that they need it as well. And they're quite good at 
getting the local comms right and they're involved a lot in the social media 
stuff, but they're also often all other forms of communication. So that's our 
link. Although they're not our department, it's maybe the policing 
department, they're our link as opposed to local teams.  
Interviewee 2: So they'll link in with accounts as well as media relations [crosstalk 00:07:44 
interviewee 2 interrupted by interviewee 1] just constant flow of 
information. 
Facilitator: What would you say the role and purpose is of corporate communications in 
the police? 
Interviewee: It's a difficult one. Well, to support operational policing and to increase 
public confidence in policing. That's the big role, I think. 
Interviewee 2: I think certainly media relations is support operational policing and it's 
reassurance, advice and it's a general communications. I mean, I was just 
388 
 
doing the HMIC report about crime, integrity. It's a whole range of things 
that we try to communicate internally, externally and with our partners as 
well. So it's really working all together to help [pause] cut crime. 
Interviewee: It's to pƌoteĐt ǀulŶeƌaďle… 
Interviewee 2: Protect vulnerable people and it's about professionalism as well. 
Interviewee: And catching the criminals. 
Interviewee 2: Yeah, and professionalizing the service. And then, of course, we've got the 
cuts as well. So it's working differently and trying to get those messages out 
and understood and people work with us. So it's bringing everyone on 
board.  
Facilitator: Professionalization of the police is an interesting one, isn't it, because the 
last time research was done in this area, it was about 1998, from an 
academic point of view. And Rob Mawby, the guy who did it, he found that 
most comms teams were staffed by police officers. And when I came to 
study them in 2009, there was a fair whack of police officers still in post. 
And now having come back to it in 2012, it's like they've all gone. It's a huge 
culture shift away from having police officers doing the comms job to having 
professionals, which I think is very interesting. 
Interviewee: I think we need a good knowledge of policing, or most of us have got quite a 
good knowledge of policing because we've been in for a while and we've 
worked within operational teams or we've worked with operational teams 
for a long time. But I think there was a time when it was police officers who 
perhaps didn't know comms and didn't think about channels and didn't 
think about who their audience were really. 
Interviewee 2: The training and the knowledge and so on and the way it's changed over the 
years. I mean, I know there are some forces who have still police officers, 
but certainly now, people in their department have the PR skills, the 
journalism and so on to basically draw out the best messages, etc. and 
channels. 
Interviewee: A big part of having us have portfolios in our divisions is that I work directly 
with the East Sussex command team and I'm based with them in 
Eastbourne. I'm here a lot of the time. I'm all over in East Sussex, but a big 
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part of me working with the command team and working with public 
engagement officers is that I understand policing as well.  
 A big part of internal comms is ensuring that we know who the audience are 
and that we know how to talk to them basically and how to get the message 
across and the public engagement officers and the local team know how to 
get the message across to their local people that are part of their 
community. So I think that really works well, having us based with that 
command team to have that knowledge for us. But at the time, we've got 
professional knowledge that they can use too. 
Interviewee 2: They have confidence in us as well. We do surveys and I think there's one 
recently about our own department and how we were perceived and so on. 
The feedback generally, was that it's a professional service. I can feel 
confident that they know what they're doing. And we have a good 
reputation I think, in the divisions and departments, but also I think 
externally as well with partners and with media as well. And in the HMIC 
report being publicised today, it's about partnership that [unclear 00:12:12] 
confident and constructive relationships with partners. 
Facilitator: So HMIC is putting out lots of reports at the moment. There's a value for 
your money that I slogged through during the summer and I thought that 
was fascinating, looking at the comparisons they were doing between the 
different police forces, particularly the collaboration aspects. I understand 
that you're collaborating very closely with Surrey these days.  
 When I talked to Ruth, she was kind enough to explain how that works 
across boarders because I know some forces with comms, they're finding it 
a real struggle to actually manage the cross-boarder aspect. So Suffolk and 
Norfolk, for example, there's quite a lot of local resentment that we're 
sharing a comms team now in the public. And I think part of that is because 
they're struggling to put the messages out in Suffolk in a way that doesn't 
feel like it's benefiting Norfolk because they're based in Norfolk. 
Interviewee 2: Right. So local people want local news, yeah. 
Facilitator: But where do you see the collaboration going with Surrey? Do you think it's 
likely to have a similar situation with Suffolk and Norfolk where they 
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combined their comms teams? 
Interviewee 2: It's a possibility that we will ŵeƌge. TheǇ'ƌe saǇiŶg theǇ'll kŶoǁ iŶ the Ŷeǆt… 
There's a model being created at the moment. We'll know in January, 
February time, but in the meantime, we're collaborating on certain 
campaigns, drink drive, domestic abuse, [crosstalk 00:13:40 interviewee 2 
interrupted by interviewee 1]. 
Interviewee: There's a regional burglary campaign at the moment that we're 
collaborating with [three other police forces] [crosstalk 00:13:46 
interviewee 1 interrupted by interviewee 2]. 
Interviewee 2: Thames Valley, there's four forces there, so somebody's doing the internal 
and we're doing the press releases and there's the posters and so on, so 
that we're being efficient, I think.  
Interviewee: Yeah. And I think we all kind of work well together. There are differences in 
every comms team, which there would be, but we work quite well together. 
Interviewee 2: We're certainly feeding things to Surrey and they're supporting us as well, 
but in the long term, I think we can imagine a smaller comms department, a 
joined up one probably. And I think that's happened elsewhere, hasn't it? 
Facilitator: Yeah, West Mercia, they've merged with Warwick. They've got a joint 
comms team now, the same as Suffolk and Norfolk, but it seems to be 
working a lot better there. But I do find this concept of collaboration 
fascinating because when I was talking to the northern police forces, they're 
quite keen to have almost like a regional command centre up in the north, 
so that they all collaborate very closely. But they're finding it difficult to 
actually enter into negotiations, even though they're all willing.  
 So finding out that other police forces are managing to collaborate 
effectively, it's good signposting for them saying, look, you can do it this way 
and this is how this is working in other places. 
Interviewee 2: And we're going to learn from each other, aren't we. But I think we've 
already had some changes where we looked at collaborating some specialist 
roles and then decided, no, we won't. So it's all being picked through at the 
moment for the model.  
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Facilitator: So it's a watch this space and see what happens as of next year and it's only 
a couple of months away now, isn't it? Scary thought. With collaboration, do 
Ǉou thiŶk the… OďǀiouslǇ, ǁe'ƌe goiŶg to see ŵoƌe of it iŶ the futuƌe, ďut 
particularly, in terms of regional communications collaboration. So Devon 
and Cornwall and Dorset were talking about diary sharing through the year, 
so they didn't replicate campaigns because that seems to be one of the big 
things where each of the forces does its own campaign, or used to, and 
you'd have 43 replicated campaigns across the country, each a bit different. 
Interviewee 2:  Well, that's what we're doing with Surrey [another force] at the moment. 
We're picking the main ones that we could work on and they aren't the 
most substantial ones. So say, for example, in Sussex [this county] for drink 
drive, we don't name and shame, but we name those that have been 
charged and that will go out publicly and so on. And now Surrey [the other 
force] is looking at doing that and that's starting next week, I think. 
Interviewee: Yeah, but actually, I've had another force get hold of me and ask me if they 
can do it as well. So other forces are starting to look at what other forces are 
doing and trying to replicate it. But I know the College of Policing and ACPO 
send out campaigns that they're doing and something I suppose they need 
to do at a national level, is work out which campaigns can we help on. 
Which ones can we tell forces here's your package. Here's the campaign 
materials. Here's what you've got to do.  
 The problem there is probably funding in that they might not have enough 
to create a campaign for the whole country. But if there were something 
where the forces all threw in some money for specific campaigns and we 
looked at a national theme, then that might work.  
 The problem is, obviously, you've got different types of burglary in Sussex 
[here] to London. You've got different residents, you've got different 
audiences. And so our regional burglary campaign was fairly simple to look 
at, but still our messaging is slightly different in Sussex [this county] and 
Surrey [our partner force] than it might be in Kent because they'll have a 
different type of offence happening there. Or it will be happening maybe at 
a slightly different time of the year. So it's difficult to collaborate on things 
like that.  
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Interviewee 2: We have a domestic abuse one coming up that's focused on youngsters and 
Surrey is taking that on. So we meet with them regularly. Sarah does a 
particular [unclear 00:18:10] we all do [crosstalk 00:18:12 interviewee 2 
interrupted by interviewee 1]. 
Interviewee: Well, with the domestic one, we've got our Talk to Us, We Can Help 
campaign and Surrey are taking that on. But some of the messaging again, 
they've changed slightly, I'm guessing to fit their audience or perhaps it's 
because they don't particularly like our messaging. I don't know. I'm not 
really involved in it.  
 But that's where you find the problem, is that yes, we can create materials 
and we can create something around a campaign and we'll have all this 
insight and research, but if it gets too generic, then it's worthless and it's not 
going to work. So that's where each force does need to think about who 
they're targeting and who their main victims are.  
Facilitator: The question of audience is another very interesting point, isn't it, because 
some police forces I've talked to have said that their audience is everyone 
and they don't target and they're not strategic in how they communicate 
because they consider everybody to be their audience. They want to get 
everybody. 
 Then others say, no, we're very targeted, so we'll do certain things for 
youth. We'll do certain things for people who are older. We'll look at Mosaic 
data, we'll look at survey data and really target down to individual street 
level to work out where we need to and how we need to communicate with 
that audience, should we need to. So it's quite interesting looking at how 
different forces think about audiences. 
Interviewee: Yeah, there are different campaigns where we will be quite generic because 
ǁe doŶ't Ŷeed… I ŵeaŶ, the dƌiŶk dƌiǀe ĐaŵpaigŶ is ǀeƌǇ geŶeƌiĐ. We'ƌe Ŷot 
specifically targeting anyone with that. We're targeting everyone and telling 
everyone don't drink and drink or drive.  
Interviewee 2: But we use Mosaic, don't we.  
Interviewee: But we do use Mosaic if we're looking to get a little bit deeper. So again, say 
a burglary at a local level, the engagement officers will look at Mosaic after 
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burglaries in a certain road, they'll look at Mosaic. They'll find out what type 
of people are being targeted, how those people prefer to be communicated 
with and they work on how they're going to communicate to them from 
that. So it's a balance of both really.  
 But I think probably forces that say, we're just targeting everyone, we don't 
target specific groups, probably don't have a very good knowledge of 
marketing and don't perhaps don't understand how important it is to get 
the message right for those audiences, whereas I think we tend to get it 
right most of the time.  
Facilitator: And marketing is not something that you traditionally associate with a 
police force, would you, and yet, it's a really essential function.  
Interviewee: Yeah, perhaps it's the wrong word, because we're not marketing a product. 
We're marketing a service and we're marketing crime prevention. 
Interviewee 2: But aren't the account managers doing marketing training? 
Interviewee: Yes, a couple of us are doing a professional diploma in marketing through 
the Institute of Marketing. And we went with marketing instead of the CIPR 
because marketing I think it probably made a little bit more sense. PR is 
public relations, but marketing will help us, I suppose, target again a little bit 
more focus.   
Facilitator: Well, public relations is quite diffuse, isn't it, because it still doesn't really 
have a set definition. I know the CIPR has come up with a definition, but for 
every definition you find, there's another 10 that will contradict it and will 
be slightly different. 
Interviewee: Actually, it's similar to marketing as well, yeah. They all have different 
definitions. 
Facilitator: How would you define them though, because you said they're similar, but 
they obviously have differences? What do you think those differences are? 
Interviewee: For me, marketing is about that targeted marketing into segments of your 
level of communities. And I think PR has become a little bit of a dirty word 
really, hasn't it? It feels like it's erm [pause] spin and if you say public 
relations, people think ͚spiŶ͛.  
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Interviewee 2: But I think they use of it of everything [crosstalk 00:22:38 interviewee 2 
interrupted by interviewee 1]. 
Interviewee: I think they use a bit of everything. But I suppose there's not too much of a 
diffeƌeŶĐe, ďut… 
Interviewee 2: But certainly, the department has changed to be more focused 
communication and for a particular campaign to work.  
Interviewee: And there's more focus on the victim. We're thinking about victims much 
more than we ever have, which is a brilliant thing, which is definitely what 
we need to be doing. I think the marketing side of things helps that. And the 
ŵedia ƌelatioŶs side of it is peƌhaps ŵaǇďe ŵoƌe geŶeƌiĐ thaŶ…  
Interviewee 2: Yes. It is very much. 
Interviewee: But it links in extremely well with our campaigns and we get the message 
[unclear 00:23:20] hopefully we'll be seeing the results. 
Facilitator: That's interesting what you were saying about PR being something of a dirty 
word now because, when I started in 2009, there were quite a few 
departments, which were communications and public relations or media 
and public relations and then they've all had a name change. And I think 
there's only two or three now that I found who have kept the PR element or 
the media element. And the rest of them have gone for things like 
communications department or corporate communications. 
Interviewee: I think corporate communications can be a problem for some [pause] for 
some frontline officers as well because they will say, oh, I'm being 
corporate. And it's not in a positive way a lot of the time. It's in quite a 
negative way quite a lot of the time. I'm just being corporate, and I think 
that can be a problem sometimes. If somebody doesn't really get what 
corporate communications does, which there are plenty of people out there 
that probably don't. And they just see posters and think, why are we 
spending money on posters and that stuff. 
Interviewee 2: But mostly, they're really supportive [laughs]. 
Interviewee: Yes, they are. 
Interviewee 2: Posters and campaigns, that's all it was. So it has developed massively and 
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we're developing it further. For example, I think Surrey [our partner force] is 
ahead of us in social media. We're trying to develop that collaboration.  
Interviewee: Yeah, and I think we used to be ahead of Surrey really, when we had 
somebody at the helm of just looking at digital communications, which is 
why we're introducing that again.  
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Question Answer 
What format would the 
interviewee like the 
results in? Full PhD or 
results section only? 
 PI.26 would like a copy of the full PhD. 
What is the 
iŶteƌǀieǁee͛s 
background in police 
communications? 
 PI.26 has an extensive background in communications. 
Her previous jobs include: 
Communications various positions in public and private 
sector corporate communications specialising in media 
relations.  
  She has been in post as the head of Northumbria Police 
Strategic Corporate Communications since 2007.  
 
Overview of that police 
foƌĐe͛s ĐoŵŵuŶiĐations 
department. 
1) Size and 
structure 
2) Role and 
purpose 
3) Operational 
position 
1) Size and structure: 
o The department has changed names several 
times. The current name is Strategic Corporate 
Communications.  
 
o 24 full time staff. 
 
o The department serves both PCC and CC. 
 
o The department comprises of a traditional press 
office, E-comms team, Marketing team and the 
Campaign team.  
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o The press office team manage the more 
traditional functions associated with police 
communications. They handle media enquiries, 
monitoring the media and liaising with journalists. 
The service is provided seven days a week: 7am – 
6pm Monday to Friday and only during the 
mornings of Saturday and Sunday. There is always 
someone on call in case of emergencies. 
 
o  The E-Comms team handles the web content, 
social media and the intranet. 
 
o The Marketing team deals with campaigns and 
events 
 
o The Campaign team is in control of creating audio 
and visual content. 
 
o The comms team used to also include a Public 
Insight function between 2006 and 2013. This was 
for surveying the public for their opinions.   This has now been moved to Corporate 
Development as it is more of a 
performance issue than communications.  Northumbria was the only force who had 
their Public Insight sitting in corporate 
communications in 2007.  Theƌe is Ƌuite a lot of ͞sǇŶeƌgǇ aŶd joiŶed 
up ǁoƌkiŶg͟ ďetǁeeŶ Đoŵŵs aŶd 
corporate development. 
 
o No warranted officer working in the department. 
Department a little unusual as it has always been 
run by civilians as far as PI.26 is aware.  
 
o PI.26 aware that "civilian control of comms has 
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led to police officers in the past refusing to 
cooperate or talk to us as we aren't 'proper 
police'". 
 
2) Role and Purpose: 
o The purpose of communications at Northumbria 
police is to "support the prevention and detection 
of criŵe aŶd ƌaise ĐoŶfideŶĐe͟.  
 
o PI.Ϯϲ said the depaƌtŵeŶt ǁas ͞ĐleaƌlǇ aligŶed to 
opeƌatioŶal poliĐiŶg, Ŷot theƌe to spiŶ͟.  
 
o PI.26 was very concerned that her department 
should not be seen/understood in terms of 
spinning or trying to cover things up.  
 
o One of the main responsibilities of the 
department is reputation management. The 
department is there to be the outward facing 
interface to facilitate communication within the 
police force and between police and public.  
 
o PI.26 told me that the so called 
professionalization of police comms has led to 
business terms creeping into common usage 
which can sometimes do more harm than good. 
͞‘eputatioŶ ŵaŶageŵeŶt͟, ͞ďƌaŶd iŵage͟ aŶd 
͞ŵaƌketiŶg͟ aƌe pƌiŵe eǆaŵples of this. These 
terms came from people with marketing and PR 
backgrounds and makes it sound like the 
department is there to obfuscate and lie to 
protect the police force.  
 
o Really, marketing is about telling people what the 
police force is doing. The police are not a private 
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ĐoŵpaŶǇ ǁho haǀe the aďilitǇ to saǇ ͞no 
ĐoŵŵeŶt͟. ModeƌŶ poliĐe foƌĐes haǀe to ďe opeŶ 
and accountable and part of this is talking to the 
public and explaining what they are doing.  
 
o The confusion caused by these terms is why PI.26 
does not like terming what they do as PR in 
conjunction with the police. People rightly or 
wrongly associate PR with spin and politicians. PR 
itself is all about open communication but the 
negative connotations are why Northumbria has 
gone for Communications as the department 
name and not Public Relations. 
 
3) PI.26 thinks that Communications is operationally 
embedded.  
o This was not always the case – a lot depends on 
the tone set by the Chief Constable. 
 
o Back in the 90s PI.26 was a press officer at 
Northumbria police. "Back in the 90s, the 
communications office was mostly left out of 
operational policing. Police officers had preferred 
journalists and it was very common that the first 
thing the press office would hear of a situation 
would be from the newspaper the next day." 
 
o This was not a workable situation. 
Communications needs to know what is going on 
in order to properly manage situations and keep 
informed the people who need to know.   Modern communications requires joined 
up thinking.  Internal communications is as important, 
if not more, than keeping the public 
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informed. For a police force to be 
effective all officers must be on message 
and singing from the same hymn sheet. In 
a large organisation internal 
communications is the only way to 
manage this.  
 
o The old school view held by most police officers 
was that the comms department was to be     
avoided as it was manned by police staff. They 
would only talk to / trust other police officers.  
 
o “oŵe offiĐeƌs still doŶ͛t like / aƌe Ŷot keeŶ oŶ the 
communications departments. 
 
o Northumbria police comms function has always 
been run by civilian staff. They might have the 
occasional police officer on secondment to the 
department but that is all.  
 
o The new chief constable is very keen on 
communications and so the department is fully 
included in all planning meetings, Gold command 
and the daily briefings. 
 
How has police 
communications 
changed? 
 Police communications has changed a lot over the years 
that PI.26 has been working at Northumbria police. 
1. Information / communications is now all about 
two way dialogue. Before it was about 
broadcasting and push comms. Now it is about 
the conversation and getting people involved in 
it. 
 
2. 24/7 media has meant that the old style of 
deadlines are a thing of the past. Everything is in 
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ƌeal tiŵe so Đoŵŵs ͞Ŷo loŶgeƌ haǀe tiŵe to Đƌaft 
aŶsǁeƌs͟. Communications used to be a craft, 
now it is a catch-up race.  
 
3. Social media: the advent of SM means that 
everything happens much, much faster and to a 
much bigger audience. The flow of 
misinformation and information is now much 
greater and harder to control. Police forces need 
to start thinking about how to manage the flow of 
information.  
 
4. With social media and 24/7 media coverage there 
is nowhere to hide if mistakes are made. 
Openness and accountability are key to surviving 
in a mediated virtual democracy.  
 
5. There has been a comms function at Northumbria 
police for over 25 years. In the 90s it was a Press 
Office dealing with press related matters and had 
a staff of 4 people. The head of department 
would have weekly meetings with the CC or DCC. 
Now the department has control/responsibility 
over a wide range of activities from the press to 
campaigns, to web presence and are embedded 
at all levels of policing. The department now has 
24 full time staff and PI.26 meets with the CC 
every morning.  
 
What does the 
interviewee think are 
the biggest successes of 
the department? 
 The ďiggest aĐhieǀeŵeŶt iŶ PI.Ϯϲ͛s ǀieǁ is leǀel of joiŶed 
up work she and her team do with operational policing. 
Through her oversight communications has become fully 
integrated at Northumbria police and PI.26 is incredibly 
pƌoud of this aĐhieǀeŵeŶt. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to PI.Ϯϲ ͞eǀeƌǇthiŶg 
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this department does is linked to operational policing 
oďjeĐtiǀes, if it isŶ͛t, theŶ ǁe doŶ͛t do it͟.  
 
What does the 
interviewee think are 
the biggest 
threats/problems 
facing their 
department? 
1) Funding: funding is probably the biggest threat facing 
Northumbria police comms at the moment. They have 
already seen significant cuts and there are likely to be 
more to come. The problem is that further cuts will 
probably come from reducing the number of staff on her 
teaŵ. PI.Ϯϲ is ǁoƌƌied that ͞people ofteŶ thiŶk Đoŵŵs is 
a non-essential service until the shit hits the fan and then 
it is a ĐƌitiĐal fuŶĐtioŶ͟. The diffiĐultǇ is that if the Đuts aƌe 
made and the team reduced when the shit does hit the 
faŶ the teaŵ ǁill Ŷot ďe aďle to ͞deal ǁith it effeĐtiǀelǇ͟. 
PI.26 thinks that comms at the moment is in danger of 
ďeiŶg ƌeduĐed to ͞just fiƌefightiŶg͟ ďut as eǀeƌǇoŶe kŶoǁ, 
prevention is much more important/useful in the long run 
than just relying on the bucket brigade. The current Chief 
Constable is very pro communications and so the team 
and level of resources are relatively safe but if he retires 
or moves on and they get a new Chief Constable all bets 
are off and they could see significant reductions in the 
future. 
  
2) Police Culture: the culture towards communications from 
senior staff makes a huge difference. PI.26 has worked 
under seven different Chief Constables and has found 
through experience that the tone set by the senior 
management team is vital to comms being accepted, 
integrated and used properly by the rest of the force. The 
current chief has placed comms at the centre of all 
discussions and planning sessions, but PI.26 is concerned 
that this will change if/when there is a change of 
management.  
 
3) PCCs: the political aspect of the PCC is a serious concern 
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and potential threat for police forces at the moment. The 
biggest danger comes from being caught in the middle if 
there is a problem between the PCC and CC and in the 
political aspirations / election side of the PCC role. They 
might have been intended to be apolitical but most of 
them are openly political in the sense that they were 
elected as conservation, liberal or labour candidate. PI.26 
isŶ͛t suƌe ǁhat ǀalue the PCC has brought to policing 
other than being another aspect of modern policing that 
the common public just do not understand.  
 
Christmas campaigns  No Christmas campaign as such although they do ramp up 
certain campaigns around this time of year.  
o Domestic abuse, drink driving and night time 
economy for example. 
 
o But these campaigns run all year round.  
 
o Tactic used is intelligence led campaigns; so 
working out where the peaks are for certain 
crimes and launching campaigns to coincide. E.g. 
around the world cup domestic abuse increases 
so most forces based a DA campaign around this.  
 
o Saturation is an important thing to consider – too 
many simultaneous campaigns and people stop 
paying attention. 
 
How does the 
interviewee 
measure/assess 
success? 
 Success is a tricky concept to measure. Is it reach? 
Number of followers? Number of retweets/reposts? 
Likes? CoŵŵeŶts? CoŶǀeƌsatioŶs? PI.Ϯϲ isŶ͛t suƌe. 
TƌaditioŶal ŵethods of assessiŶg suĐĐess aƌeŶ͛t Ǉet 
suitable for using on social media. 
  PI.26 uses street surveys to assess the impact of 
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traditional campaigns. These surveys use police officers 
stopping people randomly on the street and asking 
whether they have seen something and what they 
understand by it.  
  “oĐial ŵedia shouldŶ͛t ďe aďout Ŷuŵďeƌs of folloǁeƌs. 
Reach and interaction are sort of measured but again 
means little. What matters is how many people have 
understood the message and how many have then acted 
on it. Traditional crime prevention / awareness 
campaigns are easier to assess in terms of how successful 
they are. You can look at whether reported crimes of that 
type go up during a campaign. 
  Behavioural change is key. 
  Social media campaigns / appeals are not yet formerly 
assessed. So far they are just repeating what seems to 
work. E.g. witness appeals gain a lot of interest on 
Facebook and seem to gather a lot of intelligence.  
 
How aware is the 
interviewee of what 
other communications 
departments are doing? 
 PI.26 feels they are pretty aware of what other police 
forces are doing.  
  PI.26 said that they used to be a lot more aware of what 
other forces were doing – she͛s slipped iŶ the last feǁ 
years as the departments have become increasingly busy 
and there is little time for extra non-essential research 
projects.  PI.26 used to be "a lot more aware but I've 
slipped in the last couple of years - we're all just so busy". 
  PI.26 thinks comms departments are probably most 
aware of those forces they share a boarder with as these 
will be the ones they have the closest operational ties 
with. 
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 PI.26 thinks that police foƌĐes aƌe usuallǇ Ƌuite good ͞at 
ďloǁiŶg theiƌ oǁŶ tƌuŵpets ǁheŶ theǇ haǀe a suĐĐess͟ 
and that is how she keeps aware of what other police 
forces are doing well.  
o Problem with this is that it depends upon police 
forces self-publicising. 
  PI.26 is quite happy to with letting other forces borrow 
her campaign material for a small fee. She thinks the level 
of dupliĐatioŶ ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ ďeiŶg doŶe is ͞ŶoŶseŶsiĐal͟.  
 
How would the 
interviewee describe 
their communications 
strategy? Push, pull or 
transformative? 
 Their current strategy is aimed at dialogue – but PI.26 
admits that there are always going to be strong elements 
of ͚push͛ iŶ hoǁ theǇ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate siŵplǇ ďeĐause of 
their communication needs.  
  Northumbria currently respond to most tweets and 
Facebook posts unless they are extreme in which case 
they are blocked.  
  PI.26 thinks that behavioural change is increasingly 
important and where they want to be. Communication 
isŶ͛t just aďout ͚pushiŶg͛ the iŵpoƌtaŶt iŶfoƌŵatioŶ at 
people but about showing them why they need to take 
note and then convincing them to change their 
behaviour. In changing their behaviour they can reduce 
the opportunity for crime, protect themselves etc. and 
thus help the police do their jobs. 
  ͞PoliĐiŶg is Ŷot doŶe iŶ isolatioŶ – it needs all of the 
puďliĐ ďeĐause it is paƌt of the puďliĐ͟. “oĐial ŵedia helps 
with this as it increased the public participating in a 
police/public partnership and opens up a new audience 
ǁho doŶ͛t look at the Ŷeǁs ;e.g. ǇouŶg peopleͿ.  
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What is police Public 
Relations? 
 PR is just one small part of modern police 
communications and not particularly well understood. In 
principle it is there "to facilitate cooperation between the 
public and the police and within the police force itself; 
but people tend to get it confused with 'spin'." 
  Lots of negative connotations about spin and lying.  
  "I doŶ't like to use the teƌŵ P‘… people ƌightlǇ oƌ ǁƌoŶglǇ 
associate PR with spin and politicians. PR itself is all about 
open communication but the negative connotations is 
why we use Communications for a name and not Public 
Relations". 
Are there any serving 
police officers in the 
department at the 
moment? 
 No and there have never been as far as PI.26 is aware 
although they sometimes have police officers seconded 
to their department. 
 
What is the most 
important aspect of 
communication in a 
modern police force? 
 ͞OpeŶ aŶd tƌaŶspaƌeŶt aŶd keep it siŵple͟  Internal comms - Internal communications is just, if not 
more important, than keeping the public informed. For "a 
police force to be effective all officers must be on 
message and singing from the same hymn sheet." In a 
large organisation, internal communications is the only 
way to manage this. 
 
Where do you think 
police communications 
will go in the future? 
 PoliĐe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs is ͞uŶder attack from budget 
ƌestƌiĐtioŶs͟. It is pƌoďaďle that teaŵs ǁill get sŵalleƌ aŶd 
smaller and cease to be as effective. 
  Social media is likely to become more important to the 
detriment of traditional methods due to these budgetary 
restrictions.  
  This is probably not going to be a good thing as social 
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media should not be allowed to dominate as not 
everyone uses it. 
 
Police website: 
1) Traffic 
2) What are people 
looking at 
3) Uses 
4) Demographics 
1) Traffic 
o They have no idea. Demographic data collection 
and analysis is still in an embryonic state. 
 
2) What are people looking at 
o Crime prevention 
o Operational incidences / crime 
o Recruitment 
o Police animals 
 
3) Uses 
o Northumbria police website is the "essential hub, 
or library for virtual information interaction" 
o Social media is meant to drive people to the 
website for more information and services 
o They are currently designing a website app and a 
crime prevention app 
 
4) Demographics 
o Not sure as they have not yet started to collect 
this data.  
 
Website is here to stay! Although it may need a redesign to keep 
up with changing needs and requirements.  
Journalists 
1) How has the 
relationship 
changed? 
2) Are they 
moving 
towards self-
service? 
1) How has the relationship changed? 
o Traditionally journalists hate press officers "as 
they see us as a block to the police officers who 
ǁill giǀe theŵ ŵoƌe aŶd ďetteƌ stoƌies… Noǁ ǁe 
are a necessary evil as local journalists no longer 
have time to go investigating on their own and 
post Leveson has placed restrictions of these 
relationships".  
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3) Local 
journalism? 
2) Are they moving towards self-service? 
o Just starting to move a little towards self-service 
model but they are not there yet. Journalists still 
want to do most things are their own (e.g. 
audio/visual coverage of events, interviews etc.) 
 
o "Most journalists no longer have time to go out 
and find stories on their own now, so they 
basically regurgitate and rewrite press 
statements"  
 
3) Local journalism? 
o There are fewer journalists and daily papers. 
 
o Fewer reporters who ring up and ask now and far 
fewer exclusives. With social media it is highly 
likely that stories will be broadcast online by 
civilian journalists long before reporters and 
police know about the issue. 
Audience: 
1) Who are their 
audiences? 
2) How are they 
reaching them? 
3) How successful 
are they in 
reaching them? 
1) Who are their audiences? 
o Strictly speaking everyone but really it depends on 
the campaign or crime they need information on. 
2) How are they reaching them? 
o PI.26 is still working out how to target specific 
audiences. They are currently using the same 
approach for social media as they use for 
traditional campaigns – they post things on 
sites/place most likely to be used by the target 
demographic. Facebook targeting is something 
they are only just starting to explore.  
 
3) How successful are they in reaching them? 
o PI.26 is not sure as analysis and evaluation is still 
something they are considering and trying to work 
out how to do. The method they usually use is 
408 
 
street surveys. These surveys stop people on the 
street and ask them if they have seen something 
(e.g. a campaign, witness appeal etc.) and what 
they understand by it. 
o Social media is not assessed at all at the moment. 
PI.26 wants to develop a way of analysing this. 
 
Social media: 
1) Place in strategy 
2) Use/purpose 
3) Effectiveness 
4) Demographics 
5) What are people 
using it for? 
6) Dialogue or push 
7) Where will it go 
in the future? 
8) Preferred 
channel? 
1) Social media is only one of several strategies PI.26 
employs to talk to the public. It is an important element 
but not THE most important. The local media, website 
and traditional campaigns are all equally important for 
getting different messages out to different people at 
different times. The medium used for a specific message 
depends on who they are trying to contact and what 
format the message needs to take. Some campaigns 
woŶ͛t ƌeaĐh the ƌight people oŶ soŵe ŵediuŵs; e.g. little 
point in putting advice for ethnic minorities on sites 
geared towards the white majority.  
 
2) Publicity, communicating with the public, keeping internal 
and external audiences informed of developments and 
things they need to know. Social media is a force 
connecting everyone – ͞it alloǁs tƌulǇ deŵoĐƌatiĐ 
conversation at all levels and the police need to be a part 
of these ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶs. TheǇ ĐaŶ͛t just ͚push͛ ǁhat 
information they want to give out to the public, they 
need to go find out where people want to communicate, 
ǁheƌe theǇ aƌe haǀiŶg ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶs aŶd theŶ juŵp iŶ͟.   
 
3) Very difficult to discern whether social media is effective 
or not; PI.26 does not have the analytical infrastructure in 
place in order to determine this with any accuracy. Reach 
is measured as are the number of followers but PI.26 
doesŶ͛t thiŶk these aƌe aĐĐuƌate estiŵates of iŵpaĐt oƌ 
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effectiveness. This is an area she thinks would benefit 
from more research but the police do not have time to do 
it. "success is a tricky concept to measure. Is it reach? The 
number of followers? The Number of retweets/reposts? 
Likes? Comments? - I don't know! The traditional 
methods of assessing success aren't yet suitable for using 
on social media". 
 
Reach, tweets and engagement considered but ultimately 
deemed a "time consuming red herring". Behaviour 
change is what matters - but as yet there is no reliable 
way of assessing this. 
 
4) No demographic data collected at the moment. Is the 
next phase for this force as they need to know who is 
using what channels, what is reaching them and what 
impact it is having. They are currently developing 
analytical software for this but it will not be ready for a 
while yet and in the meantime they are operating on 
public survey data and guess work. PI.26 is quite 
frustrated by the lack of knowledge around this but the 
big constraint is time – the team is at stretching point 
already which makes introducing a research element into 
it very difficult.  
 
5) People are mostly looking at recruitment, police puppies 
and firearms licences.  
 
6) The traditional strategy for police comms was pushing 
information out to the public. PI.26 is very proud that 
under her direction the comms department has moved 
away from this and into using dialogue. They now try to 
answer all questions posted on their social media sites in 
order to encourage discussion and conversation. They are 
also starting to join other discussions on these sites 
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where questions have not been asked in order to have a 
voice in these conversations.  
 
7) “oĐial ŵedia is gƌoǁiŶg all the tiŵe. Like PaŶdoƌa ͛s Boǆ, 
or a genie, now it has arrived there is no going back. PI.26 
thinks that it is going to continue to grow and become 
more important as it becomes more normalised in all age 
demographics. We are likely to see new channels 
appearing, some old ones disappearing as people move 
oŶ to the ͞Ŷeǆt ďest thiŶg͟; the tƌiĐk ǁill ďe pƌediĐtiŶg 
which ones are going to last. "Like the genie, social media 
is out of the bottle and now that is has arrived there is no 
going back". Likely to dominate traditional forms of 
communications to the detriment of non-online 
audiences 
 
8) Twitter is the preferred channel. Pinterest, Fickr and 
Instagram have only seen a little bit of take up from the 
public. Instagram and Flickr are only useful for photos. 
Facebook is useful but Northumbria are still coming to 
grips with how to use it.  
 
9) "Policing is not done in isolation - it needs all of the public 
because it is part of the public. Social media helps with 
this as it encourages public participation and opens up a 
new audience who don't look at the news - young 
people". 
 
 
 
 
 
PI.27           Page 2 – 8 of 19 
INTERVIEWEE: This is quite a useful aid memoir to go through all the things that we 
ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ do, I͛ll eǆpand on it a little bit. So this is a strategy document for this year. The 
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objectives at the top are the MET's corporate vision around safest global city. Being the best 
crime fighters, trust and confidence of the community, etc. etc. And broadly speaking my 
team is split into four chunks at the moment. Media, Internal coms, marketing and external 
relations; which is stake holder relations, public affairs, you'd call it in some other 
organisations. So not dealing with the media, but dealing with stake holders. Those are the 
sort of four chunks and the objectives we've set out here broadly correspond to those four 
areas.  
 
So managing risk, building reputation and cutting crime are really the ways in which we 
focus our news activity or our media activity. Managing risk is about trying to manage 
investigations and the risk around those investigations. It might be a risk to reputation; it 
might be a risk to the investigation itself. For example, yesterday we did a big briefing about 
the paedophile ring or allegations of the pedophile ring in London, we let all the news 
outlets know, we put an appeal out for information, obviously that is helping to detect 
crime, but we also had a word with the journalist in the nicest possible way about trying to 
make sure their activity doesn't cut across or jeopardize the investigation. It's a very unusual 
situation where so much of the material is in the public domain, which isn't usually the case 
with police investigations. The risk there is that journalists start to interview people 
themselves and can if they're not careful [long pause] corrupt the investigation itself. 
Corrupts the wrong word [pause] they can compromise would be a better word. So that's 
about managing the risk to the investigation, as well as managing reputational risk as well. 
It's perfectly possible that we get absolutely nowhere with that whatsoever. And people 
then say either, you're useless detectives or you were never serious, you're part of the cover 
up, and then your reputation takes a hit. So, I'll just go through the strategies column if you 
like, the activities say what we do to support that strategy, the measures, how do we know 
we've done it and done it well? So this approach, objectives, strategies, activities and 
measures, is quite a well-known approach.  I think it's actually Proctor and Gamble or 
somebody who devised this four column approach if you like. So you can say, what are your 
goals or objectives? What are your strategies for achieving those? What do you do 
underneath that strategy and how do you know when you've done it? 
 
FACILITATOR: Yes, my dad uses something similar in his business mentoring. 
 
INTERVIEWEE: Ok, so there you go. So very, very simple and it's just as applicable to coms as 
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it is to any other activity. So strategies, high quality, twenty four seven content. It's fairly 
obvious, but reflecting the MET [our] messaging framework, we have our own set of 
corporate messages, I'll make a list because that'll be useful for you as well. We have our 
own set of sort of corporate messages which we update every quarter and we distribute to 
leaders for use in all their sort of public engagements if they wish and that's effectively at 
any one point, what are the key messages as an organisation we're trying to put out there. 
Again, businesses would do that and political parties would do that as well. So it's really 
saying, we need to be twenty four seven [pause] we need to constantly try to make sure our 
messages reflect the story that we're trying to tell to the world. High quality service to 
journalists, responsive, accurate, transparent, supported by a stronger digital production 
ĐapaďilitǇ. You kŶoǁ, jouƌŶalists aƌe ouƌ Đustoŵeƌs. Uŵŵŵŵ…We ǁaŶt theŵ to ďelieǀe ǁe 
give them a good service because we think that will increase their respect for the 
organisation. The reference to digital production capability recognizes that there are 
increasing audiences for digital content on the web and that we have had a largely analogue 
print media focused operation, used to dealing with tabloid and broad sheet journalists, not 
an operation geared towards producing content for websites, be it our website or a 
newspaper website. So, we're in the process of transitioning to get, create more video, more 
stills, more information graphics. Not just classic press releases. Stop me at any point that 
you want to. 
 
FACILITATOR: How do you feel that your relationship with journalists has changed recently? 
There's been a, there must have been a big shift, over the last couple of decades from the 
way that is normally thought of police sitting in pubs with their journalist friends to much 
more professionalized relationship and of course with Leveson and then social media... 
 
INTERVIEWEE: Yeah, it's changed dramatically and really since probably 2011-12. So 
Elizabeth Fillkin did her report into how the MET communicated with journalists in 2012, 
have you read that? 
 
FACILITATOR: No, I haven't. 
 
INTERVIEWEE: It͛s ǁoƌth diggiŶg out. “o she ǁas aŶ iŶdepeŶdeŶt QC, ǁho ǁas 
commissioned by the previous commissioner after all the phone hacking stuff had broken, 
he said, they knew they had a problem, come and pick apart this problem. We wouldn't and 
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even I wouldn't necessarily agree with all of her conclusions, I think she [pause] but, she was 
right to identify the relationship as too cosy and too cosy with particular tabloid 
newspapers. She was the one that made references to, who really pushed on the don't drink 
alcohol with journalists, because they flirt with you. That was the most memorable line, is 
that journalists flirting with police and officers. May well have had a point but I think she 
kind of blew it completely out of all proportion [laughs]. But since then the me  [police 
forces] have got a much more open, transparent relationship. We do little or no off the 
record back ground briefing. We try and do, pretty much everything on the record. Like the 
soƌt of ǁhole of ǇesteƌdaǇ͛s ďƌiefiŶg ǁas all oŶ the ƌeĐoƌd. In the past the organisation 
would probably have done a back ground briefing and dribbled out a few tit bits, but now 
it's all on the record. Ummm [pause] For the most part anyway. There are occasions where 
we need to do background briefing. Journalists don't particularly like that, they like to be fed 
little tit bits just to them, but again the other aspect of this is on the record and everybody 
gets the same. You know, we don't say, journalist x tell you what, we'll give them that story, 
etc. It doesn't work like that. So it has changed an awful lot and journalists don't particularly 
like that. 
 
FACILITATOR: Have you seen reduction in the number of local journalists? 
 
INTERVIEWEE: I͛d like to Ǉes. Well Ŷot I'd like to saǇ Ǉes, I ďelieǀe the aŶsǁeƌ is pƌoďaďlǇ 
yes, [long pause] but we still have a massive number of customers and since we have 
started aggregating all the demand we get from journalists, because there was a time when 
every borough in London had his own police press officer, so it was impossible to tell how 
much demand you were getting, now they all work for this team, so we can see what we're 
getting. Not seeing any drop off. So fewer journalists doesn't necessarily mean less demand. 
Actually it can mean more demand because they want you to do more of the work for them. 
You know, so they don't send photographers along to events because they don't employ 
photographers anymore, therefore they're expecting you to take photographs for them and 
provide more of the content because they're not there. So... 
 
FACILITATOR: So moving almost to a self-service sort of idea?  
 
INTERVIEWEE: Yes, theƌe͛s a ďit ŵoƌe of that Ŷoǁ, particularly at a local level.  
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FACILITATOR: Because that's where, some of the other police forces I've talked to, they're 
trying to position themselves now, so it's very much... 
 
INTERVIEWEE: Yes absolutely. And I know they're trying to do it deliberately in some, aren't 
they? So you know, London is still a big city. I don't know how many local newspapers there 
are in total, but we have our team that are based here that deals with all the national and 
international stuff and is staffed twenty four seven. We have four other teams across 
London serving news media in the different bits of London and we've got about four people 
in each of those teams. They would generally get sixty to seventy calls or emails every day 
from local journalists, bloggers, websites, etc. So there may be fewer traditional journalists, 
but also there's now citizen journalists or bloggers or community activists who've sprung up. 
The barrier between what's a journalist and what's somebody who's just interested in what 
you're up to is very grey. We've got former MP Louise Mensch, she writes a blog now. She 
comes in and expects a service that a traditional journalist would get and it's quite hard to 
say we're not gonna answer your questions, but we will answer somebody from the Daily 
Mails, doesn't really make a great lot of sense.  
 
FACILITATOR: Everything's in transition at the moment isn't it. We're redefining all the 
traditional boundaries that have been in place since print press came in in the sixteenth 
century. 
 
INTERVIEWEE: Yes absolutely and it leads on to the next bit actually. You say we talk about 
building leadership, external leadership communications capability. That's about media 
training and getting our leaders to be more effective at communicating with their 
newspapers or broadcasters. In part recognising that we've got fewer people than we have 
even, having a smaller team in the future and so we need senior leaders and coppers at all 
levels to be able to have confidence in speaking to the media. So we're doing a lot of 
trainiŶg to suppoƌt that at the ŵoŵeŶt… [huŵs] Deǀelop keǇ eǆteƌŶal ŵessagiŶg ĐhaŶŶels, 
that's about developing social media primarily, but not just social media. 
 
FACILITATOR: Do you ever prefer platform to social media? 
 
INTERVIEWEE: Well theƌe… [long pause] have you heard of Martin Sorrell?  
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FACILITATOR: Yes. 
 
INTERVIEWEE: So Martin Sorrell sums it up in a really good way, albeit a couple of years ago, 
so it's a ďit, little ďit out of date. But he said FaĐeďook͛s foƌ Ǉouƌ ďƌaŶd, Tǁitteƌ's foƌ puďliĐ 
relations. I think that's quite a good way to put it. So we use, we have forty odd thousand 
followers on Facebook. We tend to do kind of brand based stories, we got a really, really 
successful story today with an officer who was called to a house where a four pound weight 
baby had just gone into unconsciousness, so, ran with the baby to the nearest hospital, he 
didn't wanna wait for an ambulance. Baby was resuscitated, baby now fine. Fantastic 
picture, that's reached, well it had fifteen thousand five hundred likes by lunchtime. That 
gives you a reach, we reckon, probably, well that'll be over a million people that will have 
reached by now. And yes, of course it's news and information, but that's more about kind of 
brand and reputation. Twitter is much better for kind of, hyperlocal [hmmm] niche news 
and information. Partly for journalists but also other people are generally interested. So we 
have more than two hundred twitter accounts now across [the force] the MPS We've 
encouraged our neighbour teams who might be covering one ward or a cluster of wards to 
develop them and only talk about the news in their little bit of London and engage with 
people around that. You know, we had a couple of burglaries last night in such and such 
street, you might want to take care and make sure your house is locked tonight kind of stuff. 
Not encouraged to talk about the policing settlement from the home office or should we or 
should we not have water cannon or whatever, it's supposed to be about what's happening 
in your area. And Twitter's brilliant for that and Twitter's also good, it's a bit grey, of course 
you can do brand building stuff on Twitter as well, but it is a very good service for niche 
news and information. So that's how we sort of see those two at the moment. We do use 
YouTube a bit as well, but as a video distribution channel, probably not something where at 
the moment we would say there's particular audience in its own right. And probably those 
are the top three channels that we're using at the moment. 
 
FACILITATOR: Do you find there are any stories that get particular attention? Some other 
police forces have found that if they stick anything to do with animals up, police animals... 
 
INTERVIEWEE: Facebook yeah, well children, animals, pictures, yeah will do very well. But 
not necessarily with traditional media. Journalists might not find that quite so interesting. 
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FACILITATOR: It's an interesting idea though, using it to drive people to the website. 
Because it seems to be something which grabs some people. But then you've got to wonder 
if it's sending out the right message, because you might then have more people going onto 
these sites, but are they actually taking anything away from it other than, oh look there's a 
lovely litter of puppies. 
 
INTERVIEWEE: Yeah, so animal stories, a bit so-what. Stories about police officers behaving 
in a courageous or compassionate fashion and demonstrating our values, yeah that does 
have real importance to us.  
 
FACILITATOR: A lot of clouds. And do you find that, because lots of police forces are now 
moving in to using social media for witness appeals aren't they and appealing for 
information. That seems to get a lot of, an increasing number of people getting very 
involved in it. 
 
INTERVIEWEE: Yes and for us, I think the biggest area where that's relevant is missing 
persons appeals. We get phenomenal number of missing persons in London. I think we did 
thirty two thousand investigations into missing persons last year. Which is a staggering 
number. Now we don't put out an appeal for all of them and I haven't counted how many 
appeals we've done, but generally I'd say across the MPS [short pause] we're probably doing 
at least one a day, probably ten a week or something like that. The more important ones will 
go out on our main MET twitter account which has got two hundred and forty thousand 
followers. Other ones we may just decide to publicize at a Borough level, from a Borough 
account. But it's a remarkably powerful tool for helping spread the word about missing 
persons. Not to say we don't use it for other appeals as well, but it is particularly good at 
that because, you will tend to find a network of friends who will then circulate the image if 
they haven't started already and it has that viral impact and obviously you've got images as 
well there and images do better on twitter in particular and also Facebook as well so it 
gathers momentum. 
 
  
APPENDIX 2.6:            Methodology Comparison Table 
Version No. 
and Date 
Research Questions Methodology 
Version 1: 
PhD Proposal 
May 2012 
1) Do the British Police have a media/public 
relations strategy? If so, to what extent do PR 
strategies differ between policing 
environments? 
2) Are these strategies effective and, if so, how is 
effectiveness measured/assessed? 
3) Has PR only become an issue during late 
modernity? 
4) Does police PR have a discernible impact upon 
public opinion of crime and the police? 
 Triangulated methodology using a combination of a comprehensive 
literature review, three case studies and quantitative analysis of 
officially recorded statistics from police recorded public opinion polls 
and confidence surveys.  
  Case studies to be undertaken in three police forces (one rural, one 
urban and one metropolitan). The case studies would use ethnographic 
oďseƌǀatioŶ of these foƌĐes͛ P‘ depaƌtŵeŶts aŶd a seƌies of qualitative 
semi-structured interviews with several PR department staff. The case 
studies were aimed at answering questions 1, 2 and 3.  
  The quantitative analysis of officially recorded statistics would have 
examined data from local public opinion polls and surveys of public 
trust in the police and fear of crime levels. This data would then have 
been used to determine trends and patterns through regression 
analysis using media reporting over this period as a control in order to 
answer question 4.   
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Version 2: 
November 
2012 
 
1) Who are the police trying to communicate with, 
or to?  
a) Who are the audience(s)? 
b) Does their audience change depending on 
geographical location/social strata? 
c) Is there a preferred/targeted audience? (E.g. 
white middle class, old ladies, young ethnic 
minorities). 
d) Are there elements/groups in society with 
whom local police PR is not attempting to 
communicate with/to?  
2) How are different police forces communicating 
ǁith ͚the puďliĐ͛?  
a) What media are the police using to 
communicate?  
b) Do these methods/strategies differ between 
police forces and environments? 
 Triangulated methodology using a combination of literature review, 
interview based case studies with up to nine police forces and an online 
public opinion survey.   The case studies in up to nine police forces: three rural, three urban 
and three metropolitan. They would have involved ethnographic 
observation of these forces PR departments and a series of qualitative 
semi-structured interviews with several PR department staff.  
  The online survey would be run through the Facebook and Twitter 
pages of participating police forces, if the police agreed, and if not then 
through an online survey tool such as Survey Monkey or Bristol Online 
Survey. 
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c) Do methods and strategies differ between 
audiences?  
d) Are different methods/strategies chosen to 
target specific audiences? 
e) Are people aware of police public relations 
strategies? 
3) Do the British Police have an official 
media/public relations strategy or outcomes?  
a) If so, to what extent do PR strategies differ 
between policing environments and why?  
4) To what extent do PR and communication 
strategies affect perceptions and assessments of 
effectiveness/satisfaction/confidence in the 
police?  
5) Are these strategies considered effective and, if 
so, how is effectiveness measured/assessed? 
6) Has PR only become an issue during late 
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modernity? 
7) How does PR relate to police self-identity?  
a) Does how the police portray themselves to 
the public play an important part in 
informing/maintaining their own self-images?   
b) If so, how does this circular image construction 
fit in with some of the more neo-liberal 
interpretations of police communications and 
image work?  
 
Version 3: 
January 2013 
 
Version 
submitted for 
First Review 
after contact 
with Pilot 
Constabulary 
1) Hoǁ aƌe ͚the poliĐe͛ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatiŶg ǁith ͚the 
puďliĐ͛ aŶd does this diffeƌ ďetǁeeŶ poliĐe 
jurisdiction, geographical area and demographic 
group/audience? 
2) WhǇ is ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ͚the poliĐe͛ aŶd 
͚the puďliĐ͛ iŵpoƌtaŶt? 
3) What aƌe ͚the poliĐe͛ tƌǇiŶg to aĐhieǀe aŶd hoǁ 
do they measure/assess the success or failure of 
 Multi-strategy approach using a combination of case studies and three 
surveys.  
  Case studies in up to nine constabularies  involving three separate 
elements: semi-structured interviews with members of the 
ĐoŶstaďulaƌies͛ puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs depaƌtŵeŶt, seŶioƌ poliĐe offiĐeƌs aŶd a 
selection of serving police officers who do not work in the public relations 
depaƌtŵeŶt; oďseƌǀatioŶ of the ĐoŶstaďulaƌies͛ puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs 
department by shadowing members of the PR department for a 
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these attempts? 
4) What do people expect from their police? And 
how does this impact on their 
relationship/interaction with police officers?  
5) What influences how people think/feel about 
͚the poliĐe͛? IŶ paƌtiĐular, what 
factors/influences make a person feel confident 
in the police?  
 
 
negotiated period of time; and an analysis of official documents, posters 
and magazines produced by the police for both their internal and 
external audiences. 
  Survey 1: survey of police public relations departments sent to every 
police force in England. The survey would have looked at the number of 
staff, staff training, name of the department and place within the 
organisational hierarchy, current strategies, strategic aims, roles and 
responsibilities, and about budget cuts and how this had affected them in 
terms of resource allocation and distribution. 
    Survey 2: survey of householders. The survey would have been posted to 
a randomly selected sample of houses from each ward within the 
jurisdiction of the police forces involved in the case studies. The 
recipients would have been randomly selected from the electoral 
register. The sample size would have depended in part on how many 
wards there were in total in each jurisdiction and how many police forces 
agreed to the case study. The aim of the questionnaire was to explore 
͚puďliĐ͛ opiŶioŶ aďout the poliĐe, ǁhat people eǆpeĐted fƌoŵ theiƌ poliĐe 
service, their awareness of various police activities and public relations 
and to ask people what they think would help improve public confidence 
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and satisfaction levels with the police. 
  Survey 3:  web survey of businesses and other online internet groups 
suĐh as the poliĐe ǁeďsite, Tǁitteƌ aŶd FaĐeďook pages usiŶg ͚“ŵaƌt 
“uƌǀeǇ͛.  It ǁould also haǀe ďeeŶ seŶt to ďusiŶesses through FSB and 
Chamber of Commerce publicity channels. It was intended that the 
survey would have run for six months with interim analyses at two and 
four months; this should have improved the probability of a decent 
response rate while remaining within manageable parameters.  
  The questions and format of the householder survey and the online 
survey would have been identical and would have provided a longitudinal 
comparison and contrast to the cross sectional house holder survey. The 
difference between the householder survey and the online survey was 
the target group and method of delivery. The householder survey would 
have collected data from a random sample of the population who may 
have been a) unaware of the police web presence, b) unable to access 
these resources or c) uninterested in these resources, whereas the online 
survey would have been deliberately canvassing the opinions of people 
who had demonstrated an interest in the police public relations.  
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Version 4: 
May 2013 
 
Post First 
Review – 
Version Sent to 
and rejected by 
Pilot 
Constabulary 
July 2013 
1) What methods and strategies are the police 
usiŶg to ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate to, oƌ iŶteƌaĐt ǁith, ͚the 
puďliĐ͛ aŶd does this diffeƌ ďetǁeeŶ poliĐe 
jurisdictions, geographical areas and 
demographic groups?  
2) What are the police trying to achieve with these 
methods and strategies?  How is the success or 
failure of these schemes measured? 
3) Why do the police think that communication 
between the police and the public is important, 
and has public relations only become an issue 
for the police during late modernity? 
4) What influence/role has the question of public 
confidence played in the development of police-
public communications? 
5) How has the increasing use of social media in 
police forces affected the way that the police 
and public interact? 
 
 Multi-strategy approach using a combination of case studies and two 
surveys.  
  Case studies conducted in three or more constabularies and would have 
involved three separate elements: semi-structured interviews; 
observation of the constabulaƌies͛ puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs depaƌtŵeŶt; aŶd aŶ 
analysis of official documents, social media sites, posters and magazines 
produced by the police for both their internal and external audiences. 
  The semi-structured interviews using a purposive sample would have 
iŶǀolǀed iŶteƌǀieǁiŶg ŵeŵďeƌs of the ĐoŶstaďulaƌies͛ puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs 
departments, senior police officers and a selection of serving police 
officers who do not work in the public relations departments. The 
observation element would have involved shadowing members of the 
public relations departments over a specified time which would have 
been negotiated with each Constabulary.  The documentary analysis 
would have involved an examination of the material produced by the 
public relations departments of themes, trends and content in order to 
compare the intended content, received content and internal meanings 
agaiŶst the ͚offiĐial͛ stƌategies aŶd iŶteŶtioŶs of the puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs 
departments. It would also have involved an analysis of how the police 
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were using social and electronic media to communicate with the public 
and whether this had affected interaction between police and public.  
  Survey 1: survey of police public relations departments; looking at 
number of staff, staff training, name of the department and place within 
the organisational hierarchy, current strategies, strategic aims, roles and 
responsibilities, and about budget cuts and how this had affected them in 
terms of resource allocation and distribution. 
  Survey 2: web survey of police website, Twitter and Facebook pages. The 
second survey would have been an online questionnaire. It would have 
been advertised on the websites, Facebook and Twitter pages of each 
poliĐe foƌĐe paƌtiĐipatiŶg iŶ the Đase studies usiŶg ͚“ŵaƌt “uƌǀeǇ͛. The 
aim of the questioŶŶaiƌe ǁas to eǆploƌe ͚puďliĐ͛ opiŶioŶ aďout the poliĐe, 
how often they used police run social media resources, why they used 
them, what services people expected from their police, and their 
awareness of various police activities and public relations initiatives.  
 
Version 5: 
September 2013 
 
Post Pilot 
1) To explore the official and unofficial use of the 
public relations department within the 
Constabulary. 
 Multi-strategy approach using a combination of case studies and survey 
analysis in nine police forces. 
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Constabulary  
Consultation 
2) To understand how public relations is being used 
by the police force – particularly within the 
context of increasing, and managing, public 
confidence and satisfaction. 
3) To investigate how the police evaluate the 
effectiveness of these initiatives and schemes. 
4) To determine how integrated the public 
relations department is and how important their 
work is considered by different people within 
the police organisation.  
5) To understand the use and impact of social 
media on police communication and interaction 
with their publics.  
 The case studies involved semi-structured interviews with the heads of 
police communication departments and the Chief Constables of 
participating forces. An analysis of official documents, social media sites, 
posters and magazines produced by the police for both their internal and 
external audiences would then have been compared against officially 
recorded levels of public confidence and satisfaction with the police. The 
documentary analysis would have involved an examination of the 
material produced by the public relations departments of themes, trends 
and content in order to compare the intended content, received content 
aŶd iŶteƌŶal ŵeaŶiŶgs agaiŶst the ͚offiĐial͛ stƌategies aŶd iŶteŶtioŶs of 
the public relations departments. It would also have involved an analysis 
of how the police were using social and electronic media to communicate 
with the public and whether this had affected interaction between police 
and public. 
  The survey would have explored the number of staff, staff training, name 
of the department and place within the organisational hierarchy, current 
strategies, strategic aims, roles and responsibilities, and about budget 
cuts and how this had affected them in terms of resource allocation and 
distribution.   
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Version 6: 
November 2013 
1) To explore the official and unofficial use of the 
public relations department within the 
Constabulary. 
2) To understand how public relations is being used 
by different police forces – particularly within 
the context of increasing, and managing, public 
confidence and satisfaction. 
3) To investigate how the police evaluate the 
effectiveness of public relations strategies.  
4) To understand the use and impact of social 
media on police communication and interaction 
with their publics. 
5) To investigate the extent to which the 
introduction of social media has changed 
͚tƌaditioŶal͛ poliĐe P‘ ǁoƌk.  
 
 Triangulated methodology using a combination of case studies, a survey 
of police PR departments and an analysis of online activity (e.g. use of 
social media).  
  The case studies would have involved in-depth 60 minute interviews 
with as many of the heads of Corporate Communications Departments 
who agreed to take part in the study and follow up in-depth qualitative 
based questionnaires or email interviews with both the heads of 
department and several members of staff working in the departments. 
The number of staff and identity and position of the email recipients 
will be negotiated with the heads of department but will have been be 
between 2 and 6 depending on the size of department.  
  Survey of all non-participating police forces to ascertain number of 
staff, staff training levels, rank of staff members, budgets etc.  
Version 7: 
July 2014 
Primary Questions 
1) What is the purpose of police communication? 
2)  What are police forces trying to communicate? 
3) How are the police communicating? 
 Combination of case studies and Freedom of Information requests (FOI) 
  The case studies would involve in-depth interviews with all the heads of 
Corporate Communications Departments (or their nominated 
representative) who agree to participate and gathering data about the 
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4) With whom are the police trying to 
communicate? 
5) What are the threats and challenges facing police 
communications? 
 
Secondary Questions 
1) Is the concept of public relations still relevant in 
the modern police force? 
2) To what extent do public relations strategies 
differ between policing environments? 
3) What position does communications hold within 
the operational side of policing? 
4)  Is it possible to measure what, or whether, police 
communication strategies are having an impact? 
online presence and behaviour, socio-historic and demographic 
information about their jurisdiction, department size, budget, staff 
training and any relevant policies and procedures.  
  Information about the department and policies/procedures would be 
gathered through FOI requests. 
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APPENDIX 3.1: FOI Reference Tables 
All FOIs submitted and answers given are available in the disclosure logs on the individual 
police forces websites under the reference numbers given in the tables below.  
FOI Request 1         (Submitted February 2015) 
Questions: 
1)      How many people are there currently employed in the department which handles 
communications/media relations? 
2)      What are their posts/job titles and pay grade. 
3)      How many people were employed in this department in 2010? 
4)      Is this number expected to increase or decrease over the next three years? 
5)      Are there any warranted police officers currently working in the communications/media 
relations department? 
a.     If yes, how many and what are their job titles 
b.     If not, when was the last time a warranted officer was employed/worked in  
communications/media relations. 
6)      Has the position of head of the communications/media relations department ever been 
held by a warranted police officer? If so, when was this? 
7)      What is the budget for the communications/media relations department for 2013/2014 
and 2015/2016? 
8)      Is the budget expected to increase or decrease over the next three years? 
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Police Force Response 
Received 
FOI Reference  Date Received 
Avon and Somerset Police YES 487-15 On-time 
March 2015 
Bedfordshire Police YES 
2015-00519 
On-time 
March 2015 
Cambridge Police YES 
0197/2015 
On-time 
March 2015 
Cheshire Police YES 
6292 
On-time 
March 2015 
City of London Police YES 
COL/15/193 
On-time 
March 2015 
Cleveland Police YES 
2015/6263 
On-time 
March 2015 
Cumbria Police YES 
187/15 
On-time 
March 2015 
Derbyshire Police YES 
FOI/603.15 
On-time 
March 2015 
Devon and Cornwall Police YES 
1187/15 
On-time 
March 2015 
Dorset Police NO REPLY 
 
follow up email and 
no response 
 
Durham Police YES 
SS/DC/FOI/171/15 
On-time 
March 2015 
Essex Police YES 
7093 
On-time 
March 2015 
Gloucestershire Police NO  REPLY follow up email and 
no response 
 
Greater Manchester Police YES 
GSA598 
On-time 
March 2015 
Hampshire Police YES 
HC/00547/15 
On-time 
March 2015 
Hertfordshire Police YES 
FOI183/15 
On-time 
March 2015 
Humberside Police YES 
2015-264 
On-time 
March 2015 
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Kent Police YES 15/02/239 On-time 
March 2015 
Lancashire Police NO  REPLY follow up email and 
no response 
 
Leicestershire Police YES 
1296-15 
On-time 
March 2015 
Lincolnshire Police YES 
000823/15 
On-time 
March 2015 
Merseyside Police YES 
SM67/15 
Late reply – 
received April 2015 
Metropolitan Police Service YES 
2015020002057 
On-time 
March 2015 
Norfolk Police YES 2015-00643  On-time 
March 2015 
North Yorkshire Police YES 
987.2014-15 
Late reply – 
received April 2015 
Northamptonshire Police YES 
000867/15 
On-time 
March 2015 
Northumbria Police YES 215/15 On-time 
March 2015 
Nottinghamshire Police YES 
001350/15 
On-time 
March 2015 
South Yorkshire Police YES 
20150052 
On-time 
March 2015 
Staffordshire Police YES 
5645 
Late reply – 
received May 2015 
Suffolk Police YES 
FOI 865/14/15 
On-time 
March 2015 
Surrey Police YES 
165-15-205 
On-time 
March 2015 
Sussex Police YES 
FOI 186 /15 
On-time 
March 2015 
Thames Valley Police YES 
HQ/PA/000555/15 
On-time 
March 2015 
Warwickshire Police YES 
2015-00155 
On-time 
March 2015 
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West Midlands Police YES 
RFI 6066/15 
Late reply – 
received April 2015 
West Mercia Police YES 
000662/15 
On-time 
March 2015 
West Yorkshire Police YES 
000173/15 
On-time 
March 2015 
Wiltshire Police YES 
2015/159 
On-time 
March 2015 
 
 
FOI Request 2         (Submitted March 2015) 
Questions: 
1)    What is the name of the department which deals with communication/media in your 
police force? Has it had any previous names? If so, when was the name changed?  
2)    How much did your force spend on external communications in 2009, 
2010,2011,2012,2013 and 2014? 
a.  A break down by type e.g. marketing, advertising, campaigns, witness appeals and 
social media would be helpful.  
b.  What percentage of the communications department budget it this?  
3)     How much did your force spend on internal communications in 2009,2010,2011, 
2012,2013 and 2014?  
4)     How much did your force spend on staff for the communications/media department in 
2009,2010,2011,2012,2013 and 2014?  
a.  What percentage of the overall budget for the communications/media department 
was this?  
5)     When was your current website designed/launched  
6)     How much did it cost to develop this website?  
7)     Was the website designed in collaboration with any other police forces?  
8)     Does your force have a social media policy? If so, could you please attach a copy.  
9)     Does your force have a media policy? If so, could you please attach a copy.  
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Police Force Response Received FOI Reference  Date 
Received 
Avon and Somerset Police NO REPLY – Information 
available from alternative 
source 
469/14  
Bedfordshire Police YES F-2015-00790 On-time 
April 2015 
Cambridge Police NO REPLY – Information 
available from alternative 
source 
0354/2014  
Cheshire Police NO REPLY – Information 
available from alternative 
source 
5460  
City of London Police NO REPLY – Information 
available from alternative 
source 
COL/14/363  
Cleveland Police NO REPLY – Information 
available from alternative 
source 
2014/5535  
Cumbria Police YES 289/15  Late reply 
May 2015 
Derbyshire Police YES 000923/15 On-time 
April 2015 
Devon and Cornwall Police NO REPLY – Information 
available from alternative 
source 
2652/14  
Dorset Police NO REPLY – Information 
available from alternative 
source 
2014-351  
Durham Police YES 263/15 On-time 
April 2015 
Essex Police YES 7214 On-time 
April 2015 
Gloucestershire Police YES 2015.267 
2014.5441 
On-time 
April 2015 
Greater Manchester Police NO REPLY – Information 
available from alternative 
source 
1282/14  
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Hampshire Police YES HC/000835/15 On-time 
April 2015 
Hertfordshire Police YES FOI/313/15 On-time 
April 2015 
Humberside Police NO REPLY Follow up email   
Kent Police YES 15/03/362 On-time 
April 2015 
Lancashire Police YES 6604/15 Late reply 
June 2015 
Leicestershire Police YES 002034/15 Late reply 
May 2015 
Lincolnshire Police YES 33/14 On-time 
April 2015 
Merseyside Police NO REPLY – Information 
available from alternative 
source 
DJ 129/14  
Metropolitan Police Service YES 2015040000124 On-time 
April 2015 
Norfolk Police YES FOI 958/14/15 On-time 
March 2015 
North Yorkshire Police YES 1094.2014-15 Late reply 
August 2015 
Northamptonshire Police YES 001308/15 On-time 
April 2015 
Northumbria Police YES 334/15  On-time 
April 2015 
Nottinghamshire Police YES 002243/15  Late reply 
June 2015 
South Yorkshire Police YES 20150320 On-time 
April 2015 
Staffordshire Police YES 5759 On-time 
April 2015 
Suffolk Police YES F-2015-01013 On-time 
March 2015 
Surrey Police YES 165-15-317 Late reply 
May 2015 
Sussex Police YES 313/15 On-time 
April 2015 
Thames Valley Police YES HQ/PA/000872/15 On-time 
April 2015 
Warwickshire Police NO REPLY – Information RFI 5233  
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available from alternative 
source 
West Midlands Police YES RFI 6165  On-time 
April 2015 
West Mercia Police YES 001026/15 On-time 
April 2015 
West Yorkshire Police NO REPLY – Information 
available from alternative 
source 
2014-303  
Wiltshire Police NO REPLY   
 
FOI Request 3         (Submitted July 2015) 
Questions: 
1) Does your force have a written document that sets out long term objectives for 
communication, media and public relations activity? (e.g. a communications strategy) 
a. If yes, since when? 
b. Please attach a copy of the most recent version.  
 
2) Do you have: 
a.  a force structure chart showing where the communications department sites 
within the organisation? 
b. A department structure chart? 
 
3) In which year was the communications department first established? 
 
4) In which year was the communications department established in its current 
restructure? 
 
5) Who does the head of the communications department report to? (e.g. Chief 
Constable, Deputy Chief Constable, Superintendent). 
 
6) Does the head of the communications department sit on the force 
executive/command team? 
a. If yes, is this as a voting member or in an advisory capacity? 
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7) How long has the current head of communications held their position as head of 
department? 
 
Police Force Response 
Received 
FOI Reference  Date Received 
Avon and Somerset Police YES 1046/15 On-time 
July 2015 
Bedfordshire Police YES F-2015-01436  On-time 
July 2015 
Cambridge Police YES 0570/15 On-time 
July 2015 
Cheshire Police YES 6663 Late reply 
November 2015 
City of London Police Refused under 
Section 14 (2) 
Similar requests   
Cleveland Police YES 2015/6574 On-time 
August 2015 
Cumbria Police YES FOI 529/15 On-time 
August 2015 
Derbyshire Police YES 001789/15 On-time 
July 2015 
Devon and Cornwall Police YES 3594/15 On-time 
July 2015 
Dorset Police YES 2015-557 On-time 
August 2015 
Durham Police YES 493/15 On-time 
July 2015 
Essex Police NO  REPLY Request not answered  
Gloucestershire Police YES 2015.501 On-time 
August 2015 
Greater Manchester Police YES 001710/15 On-time 
July 2015 
Hampshire Police YES HC/001627/15 On-time 
July 2015 
Hertfordshire Police YES FOI/616/15 On-time 
July 2015 
Humberside Police YES F-2015-00811 On-time 
August 2015 
Kent Police YES 15/07/672 On-time 
July 2015 
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Lancashire Police YES 6881/15 Late reply 
November 2015 
Leicestershire Police YES 003971/15 On-time 
July 2015 
Lincolnshire Police YES 11/15 On-time 
July 2015 
Merseyside Police YES SM191/15   Late reply 
November 2015 
Metropolitan Police Service Yes FOI 2015070000415 On-time  
July 2015 
Norfolk Police YES F-2015-01883 On-time 
July 2015 
North Yorkshire Police NO  REPLY Request not answered  
Northamptonshire Police YES 002512/15 On-time 
July 2015 
Northumbria Police YES 639/15  On-time 
July 2015 
Nottinghamshire Police YES 004505/15  On-time 
July 2015 
South Yorkshire Police YES 20150673 On-time 
August 2015 
Staffordshire Police YES 6005 Late reply 
End August 2015 
Suffolk Police YES F-2015-01883 On-time 
July 2015 
Surrey Police YES 165-15-587 On-time 
August 2015 
Sussex Police YES FOI    589/15 On-time 
August 2015 
Thames Valley Police YES HQ/PA/001830/15 On-time 
July 2015 
Warwickshire Police NO  REPLY Request not answered  
West Midlands Police NO  REPLY Request not answered  
West Mercia Police YES 002513/15 On-time 
July 2015 
West Yorkshire Police YES 00728/15 On-time 
August 2015 
Wiltshire Police YES FOI 2015-459 On-time 
August 2015 
 
APPENDIX 3.2:      FOI Data 
 
FOI Quick Reference Colour Key  
FOI request not answered but alternative 
FOI data found 
FOI Request Not Answered Information Not Known,  Not 
Given or Not Applicable 
Question Answer 
 
FOI 1: February 2015 (Part 1) 
 FOI 
Reference 
How many people 
are employed in 
the public relations 
department 
Job titles and Pay Grade How many 
people were 
employed in the 
communication
s department in 
2010? 
Is this 
number 
expected to 
increase/ 
decrease 
over the 
next three 
years? 
Avon and 
Somerset 
Police 
487-15 20 full time posts 
including two job 
share posts and one 
part time post 
1 x Head of Corporate Communications 
1 x Office Manager/PA to Head of Comms 
1 x Internal Communications Officer 
15 x Communications Officers (this includes the press team (4 
members), geographically located communications officers who 
work locally to support neighbourhood and community policing (3 
full time + 1 part time and 1 job share) and the campaign and 
marketing team (2 posts; one on external campaigns and the other 
(job share) supports significant change programmes and projects). 
1 x Communications Business Manager 
1 x Deputy Head of Corporate Communications 
2 x Marketing and Campaigns Officer 
1 x Digital Communications Officer 
32 Not Known 
439 
 
Bedfordshire 
Police 
2015-
00519 
15 full time posts 
but only 9.5 posts 
are currently filled  
1 x Head of Communications 
1 x Channels and Content Manager 
4 x Channels and Content Officer 
1 x Strategic Communications Manager 
1 x Media and Communications Manager 
3 x Media and Communications Officers 
1 x Insight and Evaluation Officer 
18 Increase to 
fill vacant 
posts but 
not to 
increase 
overall size 
of 
department.  
Cambridgeshir
e Police 
0197/201
5 
8 full time posts  8 Not Known 
Cheshire 
Police 
6292 13 1 x Communications Manager 
2 x Communications Manager 
1 x Graphic designer 
2 x Media Officer 
5 x Media Officer 
1 x Communications Analyst 
1 x Temporary Digital Media Co-ordinator (Sergeant) 
14 Not Known 
City of London 
Police 
COL/15/1
93 
12 1 x Communications Director 
1 x Head of Media 
1 x Digital and Social Media Manager 
1 x Internal Communications Manager 
1 x Communications and Digital Manager 
1 x Senior Communications Officer 
1 x PR Manager 
1 x Digital and Social Media Officer 
4 x Media and Comms Officers 
Not Known Increase 
Cleveland 
Police 
2015/626
3 
8, with 1 vacancy 2 x Corporate Communications Manager (full time)            2 x 
Corporate Communications Manager (part time)           1 x Assistant 
Corporate Communications Manager (part time)                                          
1 x Assistant Corporate Communications Manager (currently 
vacant)                                                                                1 x Digital 
7, five full time 
and 2 job share 
plus 2 
temporary staff 
on fixed term 
Not Known 
440 
 
Communications Manager (full time)                  2 x Freedom of 
Information Officers - scale 6 –SOI 
 
contract. 
Cumbria Police 187/15 6 Marketing and Communications Manager 
1 x E-Communications Manager 
3 x Communications Officers 
1 x E-Communications Officer 
9 No plans to 
change 
Derbyshire 
Police 
FOI/603.1
5 
7.8 full time 
positions 
1 x Head of Corporate Communications 
1 x Web Manager 
1 x Web Administrator 
1 x Media and PR Manager 
1 x Media and PR Officer 
1 x Neighbourhood and Communications Officer 
1 x Partnership Communications Manager 
? X Community Messaging Officers 
1 x Engagement Officer 
1 x Awards and events Coordinator 
1 x Print Manager 
? x Graphic Designers 
1 x Facilities Officer 
17 Decrease 
Devon and 
Cornwall 
Police 
1187/15 31.29 full time 
positions 
Communications Officer 
Community Messaging Officer 
Copy Bureau Operator/Receptionist 
External Communications Manager 
External Communications Support Officer 
Force Media Manager 
Forms Design and Publication Officer 
Graphic Assistant 
Head of Corporate Communications 
Internal Communications Manager 
Internal Communications Support Officer 
53 Not Known 
441 
 
Mapping/Geographic Information Systems and Digitisation 
Administrator 
Media Services Officer 
Museum Curator 
PR and Campaigns Officer 
Scanning Op/Bureau Supervisor 
Senior Scanning/Mapping Assistant 
Technical Web Developer 
Web Design and Digital Media Officer 
Web Designer 
Dorset Police 2014-351 11   Expected to 
stay the 
same 
Durham Police SS/DC/FOI
/171/15 
7 people in 5.6 full 
time posts 
1 x Media and Communications Manager 
6 x Media and Marketing Officers 
6 people in 5 full 
time roles 
1 x Manager 
1 x Corporate 
Communication
s Officer 
0.5 x Press and 
PR Office 
Assistant 
05. Press and 
Public Relations 
Manager 
2 x Press and 
Public Relations 
Officer 
 
No, it is 
expected to 
stay the 
same 
Essex Police 7093 17.5 full time posts Head of Media 
Internet Manager 
29.5 full time 
posts 
Not Known 
442 
 
Intranet Assistant 
Intranet Manager 
Marketing and PR Officer 
Museum Curator 
New Media Manager 
Press and PR Officer 
Senior Graphic Designer 
Social and Digital Engagement Officer 
Press Officer Manager 
 
Gloucestershir
e Police 
2014.5441 12 for Chief 
Constable and 1 for 
PCC 
   
Greater 
Manchester 
Police 
GSA598 35 Senior Manager, 
Senior PR Officer, 
Senior Internal Comms Officer 
Press Officer 
PR Officer 
Internal Comms Officer, 
Web Officer, 
Web Editor, 
Web Developer, 
Admin Coordinator, 
Awards Coordinator 
Admin Assistant 
Admin Assistant 
51 Not Known 
Hampshire 
Police 
HC/00547
/15 
26 (head count) Media Relations Manager 
Northern Area Communications Officer 
Western Area Communications Officer 
Western Area Communications Manager 
Media Prod Technical Supervisor 
 Not Known 
443 
 
Northern Area Communications Manager 
Brand and Publications Manager 
Eastern Area Communications Officer 
graphic Designer 
Media Relations Officer 
Media Production Technician 
Communications Officer 
E-Business Officer 
Force Photographer 
Director of Communications 
E-business Manager 
Force Policy and Procedure Manager 
Hertfordshire 
Police 
FOI183/15 16 1 x Head of Department 
1 x Media and Communications Manager 
1 x PR Manager 
1 x Business Support Administrator 
1 x Media Desk Leader 
6 x Senior Press and PR Officers 
2 x Press and PR Officers 
1 x Digital Communications Officer 
1 x Analyst for Web Services 
1 x Media Relations Apprentice 
 
22 Not Known 
Humberside 
Police 
2015-264 8 1 x Head of Corporate Communications 
1 x External Comms Manager (covers engagement, marketing and 
media relations) 
1 x Internal Comms, Digital and Graphic Design Manager 
(responsible for managing the external graphic design content) 
4 x Media Officers 
1 x Internal Marketing Officers 
1 x E-Comms Officer 
12 Not Known 
444 
 
 
Kent Police 15/02/239 29 full time posts, 1 
casual member of 
staff and 1 
volunteer 
1 x Head of Communications and Community Engagement 
1 x Deputy Head of Corporate Communications 
1 x PCC Communications Manager 
1 x Head of Press Office 
2 x Press Officer 
2 x Internal Communications Officer 
2 x Marketing Officer 
1 x Press Officer 
12 x press Officer 
2 x Web Editor 
1 x Digital Communications Officer 
1 x Graphic Designer 
1 x Press Officer 
1 x Social Media and Communications Assistant 
1 x Video Programme Manager 
1 x Museum Curator 
1 x PCC Communications Assistant 
1 x Press Officer 
1 x Volunteer 
 
10 x police staff 
in Marketing 
and Internal 
Communication
s; 
25 x police staff 
employees in 
Media Services 
1 x casual 
member of staff 
in Media Service 
 
Total = 36 
Not Known 
Lancashire 
Police 
5672/14 14   probably 
decrease 
Leicestershire 
Police 
1296-15 On the 9th of 
February a new 
Corporate 
Communications 
department was 
formed.  
 
There are 18 FTEs 
1 x Director of Strategic Communications and Engagement 
4 x Communications and Campaigns Officers 
3 x Community Engagement Officer 
2 x Digital Media Officers 
1 x Head of Digital Media Services 
3 x Media Relations Officers 
2 x Press Officers 
1 x Stakeholder Engagement Officer 
New 
Department so 
refused an 
answer 
Not Known 
445 
 
Lincolnshire 
Police 
000823/1
5 
11 Full time posts 1 x Corporate Communications Manager 
1 x Design and Publications Officer 
1 x HQ Press Office Operations Officer 
1 x Web/Intranet and social media Operations Officer 
1 x Corporate Communications Officer 
1 x Design and Publications Operator 
1 x Web and Digital Communications 
1 x Area Operations Communications Officer 
1 x TV and Events Production Officer 
1 x TV AV Operations Officer 
1 x Engagement and Campaigns Officer 
 
8 Not Known 
Merseyside 
Police 
SM67/15 12 Full time posts 
6 in corporate 
communications 
6 in media office 
1 x Corporate Communications Manager 
3 x Digital Media Officers 
2 x Corporate Communications Officers 
1 x Media Manager 
5 x Media Officers 
16 May 
decrease 
following 
further 
budget cuts 
but won't 
increase 
Metropolitan 
Police Service 
(MPS) 
20150200
02057 
98 full time posts 30 x press officer 
? x social media 
? X internal communications 
? X stakeholder communications 
? X publicity and marketing 
20 x borough communications based locally whose role includes 
work with local media as well as internal, community and 
stakeholder communication on a local level 
145 Not Known 
Norfolk Police 
(joint with 
Suffolk) 
2015-
00643  
Total in Joint 
department - 26.8 
 
Suffolk - 14.4 
1 x Joint Head of Corporate Communications (until 23/05/2015) 
1 x Corporate Communications Manager 
1 x Senior News Officer 
1.4 x Corporate News Officer 
Suffolk - 19 
posts 
Norfolk - 22 
posts 
Not Known 
446 
 
 
Norfolk - 12.4 
1 x Temporary Corporate News Officer (internal) 
2 x Local News Officers 
1 x Corporate Communications Co-ordinator 
1 x Secretary 
1 x Digital Media Lead 
2 x Digital Media Officer 
North 
Yorkshire 
Police 
987.2014-
15 
9 1 x Head of Communications                                                                 
6 x Corporate Communications Manager                                                         
1 x Communications Delivery officer                                                 1 x 
Project and Delivery Officer 
13 Not Known 
Northamptons
hire Police 
000867/1
5 
17 Head of News and Communication,  
6 x News Producer 
Digital media Producer 
News Coordinator 
Web developer 
Intranet Developer 
20.8 full time 
posts 
Not Known 
Northumbria 
Police 
215/15 24 1 x Director of Strategic Corporate Communications 
1 x Head of Strategic Communications 
1 x Graphic Designer 
1 x Audio Visual Designer 
1 x E-comms (student placement) 
1 x Media and Communications Manager 
1 x Marketing and Events Lead Practitioner 
1 x Creative Services Lead Practitioner 
1 x E-Comms lead Practitioner 
1 x E-comms assistant 
1 x Marketing and Events (student placement) 
1 x senior graphic designer 
1 x E-comms assistant 
1 x corporate communications assistant 
9 x Corporate communications advisors 
46 No plans to 
change this 
number 
447 
 
1 x Senior Printer 
Nottinghamshi
re Police 
001350/1
5 
14 Temporary Head of Corporate Communications 
Media Services Manager 
Public Engagement Manager  
Media Relations Officer 
Social and Digital Engagement Officer 
Public Engagement Officer 
Events Coordinator  
Online Content Coordinator 
19 Currently in 
consultation 
but likely to 
decrease 
South 
Yorkshire 
Police 
20150052 16 people for 14 full 
time posts 
1 x Head of Corporate Communications 
1 x Engagement Manager 
1 x Senior Internal Engagement Officer 
1 x Online Content Coordinator 
1 x Senior Public Engagement Officer 
1.8 x Social and Digital Content Officers 
1 x Digital and Campaigns Officer 
.8 x Media Service Manager 
1 x Senior Media Relations Officer 
3.5 x Media Relations Officers 
Not Known Not Known 
Staffordshire 
Police 
5645 13.1 full time 
equivalent 
Head of Corporate Communications - Grade J -  vacant              
Media Relations Manager                      - Grade H - 1                    
Corporate Comms Manager                  - Grade H - 0.9                
Campaigns Officer                                   - Grade F - 2.6                    
Campaigns Assistant                               - Grade E - 1.6                    
 Media Relations Officer                         - Grade F - 2.6                           
Media Relations Assistant                      - Grade E - 1.0              
Web Development Officer                     - Grade F - 1.0         
Web Admin Assistant                              - Grade D - 0.6             
Freedom of Information Officers          - Grade E - 1.8 
Not Known No plans at 
this stage to 
increase or 
decrease 
Suffolk Police 
(Joint with 
FOI 
865/14/15 
Total in Joint 
department - 26.8 
Suffolk 
1 x Corporate Communications Manager 
Suffolk - 19 
posts 
Not Known 
448 
 
Norfolk)  
Suffolk - 14.4 
 
Norfolk - 12.4 
1 x Senior News Officer 
1.6 x Corporate news Officers 
1 x Temporary Corporate News Officer Internal (until 30/06/15) 
3 x Local News Officer 
1 x Digital Developer 
1 x Digital Designer 
2.81 x Police Connect Operator 
1 x Printer (print services and staff are being moved from Comms 
to Procurement department this 2015/16) 
1 x Print Room Assistant 
Norfolk - 22 
posts 
Surrey Police 165-15-
205 
28 full time posts Corporate Communication Team: 
1 x Head of Department 
1x Office Manager 
 
Media Relations Team: 
1 x Manager 
2 x Lead Media Relations Officers 
6 x Media Relations Officers 
 
Projects and Campaigns: 
2 x Lead Account Managers 
6 x Account Managers 
 
Online and Productions: 
1 x Manager 
1 x Project Support Officer 
3 x Channel Developers 
3 x Communications Assistants 
35 No Current 
Plans to 
change the 
number 
Sussex Police FOI 186 
/15 
26 Media Relations Assistant 
Customer Service Coordinator 
Multimedia Producer 
27 Decrease 
449 
 
Change Communications Project Manager 
Department Communication Manager 
Divisional Communication Manager 
Media Relations Officer 
Senior Creative Designer 
Senior Communications Manager 
Senior Media Relations Officer 
Communications Team Manager 
Media Team Manager 
Thames Valley 
Police 
HQ/PA/00
0555/15 
21 1 x Apprentice Comms Support 
1 x Museum Curator 
1 x Communications Support Assistant 
7 x Communications Officer 
7 x Media Officer 
2 x Photographer 
3 x Digital Communications Officer 
1 x Corporate Events Officer 
2 x Web Developer 
1 x Graphic Designer 
1 x Digital Engagement Manager 
1 x Communication Support Services 
1 x Media Manager 
2 x Communications Manager 
1 x Head of Corporate Communications 
8 Not Known 
Warwickshire 
Police (joint 
with West 
Mercia) 
2015-
00155 
24 1 x Head of Corporate Communications 
3 x Managers 
4 x Operational Communications Officers 
1 x Communications Officer Specials 
1 x Communications Officer StraDA 
4 x Organisational Communications Officer 
1 x Graphic Designer 
Not Known Not Known 
450 
 
1 x Reprographics Officer 
4 x Operational Communications Assistant 
3 x Organisational Communications Assistant 
1 x Reprographics Assistant 
West Mercia 
Police (joint 
with 
Warwickshire) 
RFI 
6066/15 
21 1 - head of comms 
3 - Managers 
12 - officers 
8 - Assistants 
Not Known Not Known 
West Midlands 
Police 
000662/1
5 
36.65 full time 
equivalent 
1.0 x Head of Corporate Comms                                                  
 0.90 x Head of PR                                                                                  
 1.0 x Head of News                                                                                      
1.0 x Website Programmer                                                             
1.0 x Assistant Website Designer                                                       
1.0 x Photographer                                                                               
1.0 x Business Support Manager                                                      
4.56 x Disclosure Officer                                                                      
3.46 x Operational Comms Manager                                                
4.88 x Organisational Territorial Comms Manager                   
1.0 x Senior Website Designer                                                         
1.0 x Organisational Comms Officer                                               
9.03 x Comms Officer                                                                                
4.0 x Operational Comms Officer                                                   
1.0 x Awards & Secretarial Coordinator                                       
0.82 x Business Support Assistant 
42 Not Known 
West 
Yorkshire 
Police 
000173/1
5 
20 full time posts Not Known 30 between Jan 
-Aug 
29 from Sep - 
Dec 
Not Known 
Wiltshire 
Police 
2015/159 19 full time posts 9 x Communications Officers 
1 x Media Officer 
1 x Strategic Support 
15 Intention is 
to retain the 
same 
451 
 
1 x Head of Communications 
1 x Visual Communications Officer 
1 x E Comms Developer Officer 
1 x Head of Media Service 
4 x Media Officers 
number of 
staff 
 
  
452 
 
FOI 1: February 2015 (Part 2) 
 FOI 
Reference 
Are there any 
warranted 
police 
officers 
currently 
working in 
the 
communicati
ons relations 
department? 
If yes, how 
many and 
what are 
their job 
titles 
 If not, when was the 
last time a warranted 
officer was employed in 
the communications 
department 
Has the position 
of head of the 
communications 
department ever 
been held by a 
warranted police 
officer? If so, 
when was this? 
What is the 
budget for the 
communications 
department for 
2013/2014 and 
2015/2016? 
Is the budget 
expected to increase 
or decrease over the 
next three years? 
Avon and 
Somerset 
Police 
487-15 No N/A There was temporary 
cover from a warranted 
officer from March to 
November 2012. This 
was to support the Head 
of Communications 
whilst a team 
restructure took place. 
No 2013/14 - 
£701,6000 
2015/16 - 
£763,000 
There are currently no 
planned changes to 
the budget beyond 
inflation. However 
future budget cuts 
may mean that the 
budget for 
communications may 
be decreased.  
Bedfordshire 
Police 
2015-
00519 
No N/A No warranted officers 
have worked in comms 
as far as their records 
show 
No  2013/14 - 
£459,600 
2014/15 - 
£491,800 
Not yet set 
Cambridgeshir
e Police 
0197/201
5 
No N/A No warranted officers 
have worked in comms 
as far as their records 
show 
No 2013/14 - 
£500,000 
Not Known as 
controlled by PCC but 
will probably decrease 
453 
 
Cheshire 
Police 
6292 Yes Sergeant 
working as a 
Temporary 
Digital 
Media Co-
ordinator 
N/A 1996 2013/14 - pay = 
£569,149 
2013/14 - non pay 
= £204,499 
2015/16 - pay = 
647,932 
2015/16 - non pay 
= £157,051 
Not Known 
City of London 
Police 
COL/15/1
93 
Yes 1 - Special 
Constable 
Not known Yes - Special 
Constable in 
2013/14 
Not known Budget is expected to 
remain the same 
Cleveland 
Police 
2015/626
3 
No N/A From November 2012 – 
May 2013, a Police 
Officer was temporarily 
seconded to Media 
The last Police 
Officer to hold 
position of head of 
the 
communications/
media relations 
department was a 
Police Inspector 
and he left the 
post in 
approximately 
1985. 
2013/14 
£11,965.00                     
2014/15 Part of 
overall Tasking 
Coordination and 
Planning budget, 
no specific budget 
for Corporate 
Comms. 
Not known 
Cumbria Police 187/15 No N/A To cover maternity leave 
September 2011 - Jan 
2012 
Not Answered 2013/14 - £78,492 
2014/15 - £75,148 
2015/16 - not yet 
confirmed 
Not expected to 
increase 
454 
 
Derbyshire 
Police 
FOI/603.1
5 
No N/A 2003 No 2013/14 - 
£570,000 
2014/15 - not 
known 
Decrease 
Devon and 
Cornwall 
Police 
1187/15 No N/A 2008 Not according to 
their records; 
however, their 
records only go 
back to 2005 
2013/14 - 
£241,000 
2014/15 - 
£261,000 
2015/16 - 
£233,000 
Broadly the same. 
Dorset Police Request 
not 
answered 
      
Durham Police SS/DC/FOI
/171/15 
No N/A N/A No this post has 
never been held 
by a police officer 
2013/14 - 
£236,735 
2015/16 - 
£219,713 
The budget is not 
expected to increase 
over the next three 
years except to take 
into account pay rise.  
Essex Police 7093 No N/A Not Known Not that they are 
aware of and 
certainly not for 
the last 10 years 
2013/14 - £64,041 
(not including staff 
costs) 
Not known but will 
probably decrease 
Gloucestershir
e Police 
Request 
not 
answered 
      
Greater 
Manchester 
Police 
GSA598 No N/A N/A No 2013/14 - 
£1,312,653 
2015/16 - 
The budget is 
expected to decrease 
over the next 12 
455 
 
£1,308,623 months. Beyond that 
there is no 
information at this 
stage.  
Hampshire 
Police 
HC/00547
/15 
No N/A 2012 Yes, in 2012 2013/14 - 
£1,029,800 
2014/15 - 
£979,300 
2015/16 - 
£1,204,300 
Not yet known 
Hertfordshire 
Police 
FOI183/15 No N/A Not Known No 2013/14 - 
£751,544 
2014/15 - 
£814,271 
(projected 
outcome budget is 
£740,355) 
Projected budget for 
2015/16 - £731,827 
(decrease) 
Humberside 
Police 
2015-264 No N/A 2007/2008 and 
Inspector was working in 
the department 
In 2005 an 
inspector was the 
head of the Press 
Office function 
(press office 
predated 
Corporate 
Communications 
function) 
2011/12 - 
£304,590 
2012/13 - 
£314,120 
2013/14 - 
£331,050 
2014/15 - 
£372,540 
Not Known 
Kent Police 15/02/239 No N/A Not within the last 15 Not within the last 2013/14 - Likely to decrease 
456 
 
years 15 years £1,115,700 
2015/16 - 
£1,160,600 
Lancashire 
Police 
Request 
not 
answered 
      
Leicestershire 
Police 
1296-15 No N/A an Inspector was 
available as a liaison 
point of contact for the 
department but they 
carried out other duties 
than a media related 
role 
No Not yet finalised Not Known 
Lincolnshire 
Police 
000823/1
5 
No N/A 2005 No 2013/14 - 
£488,000 
2014/15 - 
£549,000 
2015/16 - 
£500,000 
(provisional 
allocation) 
Budget is expected to 
increase over the next 
two years.  
Merseyside 
Police 
SM67/15 No N/A 2004 Not since 2000 Corporate 
Communications 
2015/16     
£302,342 
 
Marketing 
Likely to decrease 
457 
 
2015/16     
£385,894 
Metropolitan 
Police Service 
(MPS) 
20150200
02057 
No N/A Chief Superintendent 
who was Assistant 
Director of Internal 
Communications until 
2006/07 
No 2013/14 - 
£9,600,000 
2014/15 - 
£9,320,000 
Most likely decrease 
Norfolk Police 2015-
00643  
No N/A 2014 (left October 2014) Was held by a 
warranted officer 
up until 31 
October 2014 
2013/14 - Joint 
Budget - £996,220 
                 - Norfolk         
- £1,801 
 2015/16 - Joint 
Budget - 
£1,069,242 
                  - Norfolk        
-£1,801 
Not known 
North 
Yorkshire 
Police 
987.2014-
15 
No N/A 2014 2014 2015/16 - £63,950 Decrease 
Northamptons
hire Police 
000867/1
5 
No N/A Warranted officers have 
worked in Corporate 
Communications as part 
of their development 
but there are no records 
of their postings 
Yes 2013/14 - 
£685,000 
Not yet set 
Northumbria 
Police 
215/15 No N/A No warranted officer has 
worked in 
No warranted 
officer has held 
2011/12 - 
£1,229,349 
Not known 
458 
 
communications the position of 
head of strategic 
Corporate 
Communications 
2012/13 - 
£1,200,408 
2013/14 0 
£1,173,754 
2014/15 - 
£1,054,628 
Nottinghamshi
re Police 
001350/1
5 
No N/A 2009/2010 
Superintendent was 
head of Comms 
Yes 9/10 126,005  
2010/11 42,295  
2011/12 12,306  
2012/13 42,827  
2013/14 44,366 
 2014/15 32,300* 
Budget for 2015/16 
has not yet been set 
but is likely to be 
lower 
South 
Yorkshire 
Police 
20150052 Not 
Answered 
Not 
Answered 
Not Answered Not Answered 2013/14 - 
£686,012 
2014/15 - 
£700,861 
Not Answered 
Staffordshire 
Police 
5645 No N/A Not given Prior to 2006 2013/14 
£739,449.00                   
2015/16 
£526,470.00 
No plans at this stage 
to increase or 
decrease 
Suffolk Police FOI 
865/14/15 
No N/A  2014 (left October 2014) Was held by a 
warranted officer 
up until 31 
October 2014 
2013/14 - Joint 
Budget - £996,22  
 
 2015/16 - Joint 
Budget - 
£1,069,242 
 
Not known 
459 
 
Surrey Police 165-15-
205 
No N/A 2013 Warranted officer 
as Temporary 
head between 
October 2012 and 
April 2013 
2013/14 - 
£1,519,000 
2015/16 - not yet 
finalised 
No current plans 
Sussex Police FOI 186 
/15 
No N/A Never had a warranted 
officer working in 
Comms 
No 2013/2014 budget 
£1,160,308, 
2015/20016 
budget £1,148,521 
Decrease 
Thames Valley 
Police 
HQ/PA/00
0555/15 
No N/A Not Known No 2013/14 – 
£1,169,199 
2015/16 - 
£1,144,000 
Not Known 
Warwickshire 
Police 
2015-
00155 
Not 
Answered 
Not 
Answered 
Not Answered Not Answered 2013/14 – 
£275,795 
 2014/15 – 
£341,139  
2015/16 – 
£227,197 
Not Known 
West Mercia 
Police 
RFI 
6066/15 
No N/A Not Known No 2013/14 - 613,866 
2014/15 - 759,309 
2015/16 - 505,697 
Not Known 
West Midlands 
Police 
000662/1
5 
No N/A July 2012 Various Police 
officers have held 
the position of 
head of Press and 
Public Relations 
2013/14 
£100,800.00                   
2014/15 
£101,200.00                   
2015/16 
Spend across the 
force is currently 
under review. 
460 
 
until July 2012 
when the post was 
civilianised. 
£160,500.00 
West 
Yorkshire 
Police 
000173/1
5 
No N/A Not Known Not known The 
Communications/
media relations 
department forms 
part of the Force 
Performance 
Improvement Unit 
and has no budget 
of its own. 
Not Known 
Wiltshire 
Police 
2015/159 No N/A Not Known Last time held by a 
warranted officer 
in 2003 
2013/14 - 
£609,403 
2015/16 - 
£600,000  
Remain the same  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
461 
 
FOI 2: March 2015 (Part 1) 
 FOI 
Reference 
What is the name of 
the department that 
deals with the media, 
communications and 
public relations? 
Are there any 
previous names 
for this 
department? 
When 
was the 
current 
website 
launche
d? 
How much did the website 
cost? 
Was the 
website 
designed in 
collaborati
on with 
any other 
police 
forces? 
Does 
your 
force 
have a 
social 
media 
policy? 
Does 
your 
force 
have a 
media 
policy? 
Avon and 
Somerset 
Police 
469/14 Corporate 
Communications 
Not Known    Yes No – 
CAG 
guideline
s only 
Bedfordshire 
Police 
F-2015-
00790 
Communications and 
Engagement 
Media Office; 
Media & 
Ecomms; 
Internal Comms 
Oct-09 Not Answered Yes, 
Hertfordshi
re 
Constabula
ry 
Yes Yes 
Cambridgeshi
re Police 
0354/201
4 
Corporate 
Communications 
Not Known    No No – 
ACPO 
guideline
s only 
Cheshire 
Police 
5460 Corporate 
Communications 
Department (last 
changed over 10 
years ago) 
Press Office May-10 Information available from web 
link:                          
https://www.blpd.gov.uk/foi/foi.
aspx 
Estimated £68,980 including set 
up cost and three years support 
No Yes Yes 
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+ maintenance.  
City of 
London 
Police 
Request 
not 
answered 
*interview data name 
of department is 
Corporate 
Communications 
      
Cleveland 
Police 
2014/553
5 
Corporate 
Communications 
    Yes Yes 
Cumbria 
Police 
289/15  Marketing and 
Communications 
(since 2007) 
Not given Sep-09 £24,380 No Not 
given 
Not 
given 
Derbyshire 
Police 
000923/1
5 
Corporate 
Communications 
(since 2002) 
Not given Feb-11 £53,825.00 No  Yes Yes  
Devon and 
Cornwall 
Police 
2652/14 Corporate 
Communications 
    Yes Yes 
Dorset Police 2014-351 Media and Corporate 
Communications 
Press and Media 
Department 
   No 
official 
policy 
Yes 
Durham 
Police 
263/15 Media and Marketing 
(since 2010) 
Press and Public 
relations; 
Corporate 
Communications 
2013 £55,000 No Yes Yes 
Essex Police 7214 Media Department Not Known Jan-10 £80,000 No Not a 
policy as 
such, 
only a 
Yes 
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procedu
re 
relating 
to 
private 
use of 
Social 
Media 
Website
s  
Gloucestershi
re Police 
2015.267 
2014.5441 
Communications and 
Engagement (since 
Apr 2014) 
Corporate 
Communications 
15th 
April 
2015 
No information held - project 
not yet complete. 
No, 
designed 
in-house. 
Yes Yes 
Greater 
Manchester 
Police 
1282/14  Corporate 
Communications 
(name changed in 
2003) 
Press and Public 
Relations 
Branch  
 Not 
Answere
d 
 Not Answered  Not 
Answered 
Yes Yes 
Hampshire 
Police 
HC/00083
5/15 
Corporate 
Communications 
Not Known 2012 £327,134 (excluding Vat) (need 
to ask who the contractors were 
or if it was done in house?) 
No Yes Yes 
Hertfordshire 
Police 
FOI/313/1
5 
Corporate 
Communication (for 
over 15 years) 
Not Known 2011  Not Answered Yes, 
Bedfordshir
e Police 
No No 
Humberside 
Police 
Request 
not 
answered 
*interview data – 
name of department 
Corporate 
Communications 
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Kent Police 15/03/362 Corporate 
Communications 
(name changed in 
2012) 
Information and 
Media Services 
2006 Content management system 
costs them £7000 per year 
No Yes Yes 
Lancashire 
Police 
6604/15 Media and 
Engagement Dept. 
(since April 2015) 
Previously 
known as 
Corporate 
Communications 
(2007), Media 
and Marketing 
and prior to that 
Information 
Unit. 
2011 £67,994 No Yes - 
currently 
under 
review 
Yes 
Leicestershir
e Police 
002034/1
5 
Communications and 
Public Engagement 
Department (Name 
changed 1st April 
2015) 
Corporate 
Communications  
2012 Between £35 & £40k to develop No Yes Yes 
Lincolnshire 
Police 
33/14 Communications and 
Public Affairs (since 
April 2014) 
Corporate 
Communications
; Media Services. 
2009/10  Not Answered No Yes Not 
given 
Merseyside 
Police 
DJ 129/14 Communications and 
Public Relations 
activities shared 
between two 
departments: 
Corporate Support 
Communication 
and Marketing 
Department 
   Yes Yes 
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and Development and 
the Community 
Engagement 
Department 
Metropolitan 
Police 
Service 
(MPS) 
20150400
00124 
Directorate of Media 
and Communication 
(since 2013) 
Directorate of 
Public Affairs 
Launche
d 2010 
Total development cost: 
£968,000 
No Yes Yes 
Norfolk 
Police 
FOI 
958/14/15 
The Joint Corporate 
Communications 
Department 
Communications 
and Public 
Affairs; The 
Press Office 
 Not 
Answere
d 
 Not Answered  Not 
Answered 
Awaiting 
sign 0ff 
No 
North 
Yorkshire 
Police 
1094.2014
-15 
 Corporate 
Communications 
Press Office        Yes  Yes 
Northampto
nshire Police 
001308/1
5 
News and Publishing 
(since 2014) 
Not Known Dec-13 Developed in house No Yes Yes 
Northumbria 
Police 
334/15   The Strategic 
Corporate 
Communications 
Department 
Media Services 
(changed 2008) 
      Yes Yes 
Nottinghams
hire Police 
002243/1
5  
Corporate 
Communication 
Not Known Jul-13 Total cost £11,936 No Yes Yes 
South 
Yorkshire 
Police 
20150320 Corporate 
Communications 
(since 2013) 
Press Office and 
Press and Public 
Relations 
Department and 
Media and 
2012   Not Answered No  No – in 
the 
process 
of 
drafting 
  No – in 
the 
process 
of 
drafting 
466 
 
Marketing it it 
Staffordshire 
Police 
5759 Corporate 
Communications 
Not Known 2010/11 Developed in House so no listed 
cost 
No Yes Yes 
Suffolk Police F-2015-
01013 
The Joint Corporate 
Communications 
Department 
Corporate 
Communications 
 Not 
Answere
d 
  Not Answered   Not 
Answered 
Awaiting 
sign 0ff 
No 
Surrey Police 165-15-
317 
Corporate 
Communications 
Not Known 2012 £85,000 approximately No Yes Yes 
Sussex Police 313/15 Corporate 
Communications & 
Public Engagement 
Department (since 
2011) 
Corporate 
Communications 
2011 Done in-house No  Yes Not 
Answere
d  
Thames 
Valley Police 
HQ/PA/00
0872/15 
Corporate 
Communications 
Not Known Designe
d 2008, 
launched 
January 
2009 
£70,000 for ICT costs re hosting, 
servers, licences, software etc. 
however, other costs incurred 
have not been specifically 
recorded. 
No Yes Yes 
Warwickshir
e Police 
RFI 5233 Corporate 
Communications 
(since Feb 2013 when 
it became one 
function delivering 
services for both 
Warwickshire and 
West Mercia Police 
forces) 
Not Answered    Yes Yes 
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West Mercia 
Police 
RFI 6165  Corporate 
Communications  
(since Feb 2013 when 
it became one 
function delivering 
services for both 
Warwickshire and 
West Mercia Police 
forces) 
Not Known March 
2015 
£75, 110 (created jointly for 
West Mercia and Warwickshire) 
Warwickshi
re  
Yes Yes 
West 
Midlands 
Police 
001026/1
5 
Corporate 
Communications 
(since 2012) 
Press and PR 2014 Not given No Yes Yes 
West 
Yorkshire 
Police 
2014-303 Corporate 
Communications 
Press 
Department 
   Yes Yes 
Wiltshire 
Police 
Request 
not 
answered 
*website shows name 
of department is 
Corporate 
Communications 
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FOI 2: March 2015 (Part 2) 
 FOI 
Reference 
Amount spent on 
external 
communications in 
the years 2009 - 2014 
Break down by 
type 
Percentage of 
the 
Communicatio
ns department 
budget 
Amount Spent on 
Internal 
Communications in 
the years 2009 - 2014 
Amount Spent on 
Staff in 
Communications 
department 
Percentage of 
Communication
s Budget 
Avon and 
Somerset 
Police 
Request 
not 
answered 
      
Bedfordshire 
Police 
F-2015-
00790 
Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered 2009/10 £622,800                
2010/11 £690,000                
2011/12 £704,700                
2012/13 £485,800                
2013/14 £ 459,600             
2014/15 £ 491,800 
Not Answered Not Answered 
Cambridgesh
ire Police 
Request 
not 
answered 
      
Cheshire 
Police 
5460 Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered 2009        
£335,840                        
2010        
£425,946                        
2011        
£521,893                        
2012        
£501,893                        
2013        
£549,699                        
67%                              
56%                              
56%                              
56%                              
52%                              
57% 
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2014        
£522,521 
City of 
London 
Police 
Request 
not 
answered 
      
Cleveland 
Police 
Request 
not 
answered 
      
Cumbria 
Police 
289/15  2009/10   £63,067              
2010/11   £38,665              
2011/12   £53,826              
2012/13   £66,240              
2013/14   £33,228              
2014/15   £53,423 
Not Answered 13%                            
8%                              
12%                            
21%                            
11%                            
16% 
Not Answered 2009/10  
£250,749                        
2010/11  
£253,515                        
2011/12  £248054        
2012/13  
£229,432                        
2013/14  
£220,925                        
2014/15 £225,532 
50%                              
56%                              
54%                              
74%                              
70%                              
67% 
Derbyshire 
Police 
000923/15 2009    £93,084.90              
2010    £47,141.14              
2011    £84,108.90              
2012    £52,277.95              
2013    £49,449.20              
2014    £50,520.67              
Marketing, 
campaigns and 
advertising 
contact numbers.          
2009 £41,750.53            
2010 £13,426.65            
2011 £4,161.46              
2012 £4,142.44              
2013 £3,026.62              
2014 £0.119.26 
Not Answered Not Answered 2009   
£462,223.55                   
2010   
£487,960.88                   
2011   
£611,294.28                   
2012   
£633,945.56                   
2013   
£667,903.22                   
22.07%                       
24.36%                       
29.48%                       
30.17%                       
27.27%                       
25.83%                       
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2014   
£613,435.06                   
Devon and 
Cornwall 
Police 
Request 
not 
answered 
      
Dorset Police Request 
not 
answered 
      
Durham 
Police 
263/15 Total Media                         
2009   £186,911                  
2010   £258,030                  
2011   £216,547                  
2012   £248,644                  
2013   £236,735                  
2014   £230,375 
Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered Total budget                   
2009   
£119,414,000                
2010   
£122,930,000                
2011   
£121,350,000                
2012   
£116,085,000                
2013   
£118,695,000                
2014   
£115,892,000                
0.16%                           
0.21%                           
0.18%                           
0.21%                           
0.20%                           
0.20%                           
Essex Police 7214 Total budget                        
2009/10 £106,355.00         
2010/11 £103,638.00         
2011/12 £75,307.60           
2012/13 £60,861.00           
2013/14 £64,041.00           
Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered 2009/10 
£1,036,772.                    
2010/11 
£1,090,732                    
2011/12 
£1,108,193                    
2012/13 
Not Answered 
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£881,783.00                   
2013/14 
£718,103.78 
Gloucestersh
ire Police 
2015.267 
2014.5441 
Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered 2008/9   £477,909         
2009/10  
£530,839                        
2010/11  
£478,645                        
2011/12  
£389,517                        
2012/13  
£412,971                        
2013/14  
£502,143 
82.69 %                      
83.49%                       
84.80%                       
88.70%                       
86.56%                       
80.61% 
Greater 
Manchester 
Police 
Request 
not 
answered 
            
Hampshire 
Police 
HC/00083
5/15 
2009/10    £127,156 
2010/11    £31,590 
2011/12    £14,099 
2012/13    £29,304 
2013/14    £2,259 
2014/15    £10,759 
Not Answered 19.46% 
5.29% 
2.13% 
3.20% 
0.26% 
1.35% 
Only information is on 
cost of Frontline - 
their magazine 
2009/10    £8,966 
2010/11    £27,827 
2011/12    £12,205 
2012/13    £12,490 
2013/14    £13,814 
2014/15    £3,267 
2009/10    
£446,661 
2010/11    
£498,301 
2011/12    
£577,859 
2012/13    
£760,213 
2013/14    
£781,840 
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2014/15    
£717,311 
Hertfordshire 
Police 
FOI/313/1
5 
Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered 2011          
£735,365                        
2012          
£734,800                        
2013          
£758,259                        
2014          
£726156 
85%                              
91%                              
93%                              
97% 
Humberside 
Police 
Request 
not 
answered 
      
Kent Police 15/03/362 Between £5000 and 
£20000 
Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered 2009/10    
£1,071,389 
2010/11    
£1,334,537 
2011/12    
£999,920 
2012/13    
£942,156 
2013/14    
£1,007,452 
2014/15    
£1,062,988 
77% 
85% 
98% 
82% 
90% 
87% 
Lancashire 
Police 
6604/15 2009/10 £39,784.00           
2010/11 £76,901.74           
Not Answered Not Answered 2012/13 Beyond 
Expectations and 
2009/10 £619,431         
2010/11 £636,186         
88%                              
89%                              
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2011/12 £16,026.37           
2012/13 £30,850.75           
2013/14 £18,668.57           
2014/15 £18,545.33           
Special Constabulary 
Campaign: £3533.50           
2013/14 Buzz 
Campaign ICT 
Platform: £4615.42             
2013/14  Buzz 
Campaign -  
Maintenance of ICT 
Platform: £600 
2011/12 £752,242         
2012/13 £701,596         
2013/14 £700,366         
2014/15 £461,906 
95%                              
91%                              
91%                              
87% 
Leicestershir
e Police 
002034/15 Not Answered Printing and 
Publicity 
2009/10   
£98,449% 
2010/11   £27,954 
2011/12   £23,240 
2012/13   £43,035 
2013/14   £43,703 
2014/15   £36,416 
 
Website and 
Social Media 
2009/10   £4,372 
2010/11   £14,997 
2011/12   £35,194 
2012/13   £21,336 
2013/14   £19,012 
2014/15   £11,073 
Not Answered Not Answered 2009/10    
£541,603 
2010/11    
£607,744 
2011/12    
£512,231 
2012/13    
£566,945 
2013/14    
£471,832 
2014/15    
£471,832 
80% 
89% 
86% 
82% 
81% 
79% 
474 
 
Lincolnshire 
Police 
33/14 Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered 2008/09 £214,000         
2009/10 £213,000         
2010/11 £248,000         
2011/12 £334,000         
2012/13 £426,000         
2013/14 £431,000 
62%                              
60%                              
80%                              
87%                              
89%                              
88% 
Merseyside 
Police 
Request 
not 
answered 
      
Metropolitan 
Police 
Service 
(MPS) 
201504000
0124 
2009/10                               
Budget: £6,695,943            
Spend: £6,357,650              
2010/11                               
Budget: £7,550,642            
Spend: £6,871,606              
2011/12                               
Budget: £ 6,946.861          
Spend: £ 6,538,213             
2012/13                               
Budget: £6,981,308            
Spend: £ 4,884,414             
2013/14                               
Budget: £9,555,516            
Spend: £ 7,630,754             
Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered 2009/10                          
Pay budget: 
3,871,500                       
Overtime budget: 
£126,083                   
Pay spend: 
£3,727,948                    
Overtime spend:£ 
87,474                         
2010/11                          
Pay budget: £ 
3,810,842                      
Overtime budget: 
£ £101,095                     
Pay spend: 
£387,731                        
Overtime spend: £ 
74,577                             
Not Answered 
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2011/12                          
Pay budget: £ 
3,767,020                       
Overtime budget: 
£101,000                        
Pay spend: £ 
3,355,138                       
Overtime spend: £ 
98,990                             
2012/13                          
Pay budget: 
£3,865,180                    
Overtime budget: 
£ 106,520     
                                         
Pay spend: 
£3,355,138                    
Overtime spend: 
£70,931                          
2013/14                          
Pay budget: 
£5,514,469                    
Overtime budget: 
£ 119,551                       
Pay spend: £ 
4,463,220                       
Overtime spend: 
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376,879                          
Norfolk 
Police 
FOI 
958/14/15 
Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered 2011/12 £973,541         
2112/13 £892,465         
2013/14 £918,053         
2014/15 £950,480         
Norfolk & Suffolk 
combined 
84.62%                       
90.41%                       
94.15%                       
99.53%                       
Norfolk & 
Suffolk 
combined 
North 
Yorkshire 
Police 
Request 
not 
answered 
            
Northampto
nshire Police 
001308/15 2010/11 and 2011/12       
Strategic Marketing 
budget £50,000 per 
annum                                   
2012/13                               
Budget for 3 months 
before cessation of 
Dept.: £12,500                     
2014/15                              
Budget £81,195 
Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered 2009/10 £641,000         
2010/11 £699,000         
2011/12 £668,000         
2012/13 £589,000         
2013/14 £149,000 
(3mths) 
Total budget              
2009/10 
£672,000                    
2010/11 
£793,000                    
2011/12 
£797,000                    
2012/13 
£674,000                    
2013/14 
£174,000 
(3mths) 
Northumbria 
Police 
Request 
not 
answered 
            
Nottinghams
hire Police 
002243/15  2009/10 £134,808              
2010/11 £55,317                
Not Answered 30.59%                       
10.35%                       
Not Answered 2009/10 £586,829         
2010/11 £546,217         
83.91%                       
79.57%                       
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2011/12 £12,306                
2012/13 £42,827                
2013/14 £44,366                
2014/15 15,511 
2.67%                         
9.16%                         
6.97%                         
2.91% 
2011/12 £519,839         
2012/13 £ 
565,971                          
2013/14 £623,614         
2014/15 £569,731 
98.50%                       
97.57%                       
81.27%                       
93.17%  
South 
Yorkshire 
Police 
Request 
not 
answered 
            
Staffordshire 
Police 
5759 Only information is 
for marketing: 
2009/10    £6,915 
2010/11    £14,505 
2011/12    £41,301 
2012/13    £43,222 
2013/14    £35,152 
2014/15    £35,152 
Not given 1.44% 
2.48% 
5.83% 
6.60% 
5.32% 
5.32% 
Not Answered 2009/10    
£450,580 
2010/11    
£524,383 
2011/12    
£555,804 
2012/13    
£577,669 
2013/14    
£587,022 
2014/15    
£462,154 
93.68% 
89.79% 
78.49% 
88.18% 
85.36% 
69.98% 
Suffolk Police F-2015-
01013 
Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered 2011/12 £973,541         
2112/13 £892,465         
2013/14 £918,053         
2014/15 £950,480        
Norfolk & Suffolk 
combined 
84.62%                       
90.41%                       
94.15%                       
99.53%                       
Norfolk & 
Suffolk 
combined 
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Surrey Police 165-15-
317 
2009/10    £237,723 
2010/11    £447,791 
2011/12    £331,487 
2012/13    £271,767 
2013/14    £285,915 
2014/15    £251,780 
Publicity and 
Marketing 
2009/10    
£186,901 
2010/11    
£192,379 
2011/12    
£194,202 
2012/13    £89,617 
2013/14    
£140,111  
2014/15    £66,560 
 
Publicity and A/C 
Publications 
2009/10   £30,245 
2010/11   
£192,379 
2011/12   
£105,168 
2012/13   
£150,243 
2013/14   
£135,020 
2014/15   
£176,587 
 
12.26% 
21.34% 
19.75% 
16.85% 
18.82% 
17.47% 
Not Answered 2009/10   
£1,328,081 
2010/11   
£1,331,855 
2011/12   
£1,029,286 
2012/13   
£1,024,755 
2013/14   
£952,074 
2014/15   
£1,010,076 
Not Answered 
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Market Research 
2009/10   £20,577 
2010/11   £32,054 
2011/12   £32,117 
2012/13   £31,907 
2013/14   £10,784 
2014/15   £8,633 
Sussex Police 313/15 Non-employee costs           
2010/11 £270,660.01         
2011/12 £111,042.80         
2012/13 £177,964.89         
2013/14 £132,994.55         
2014/15 £103,616.00         
Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered Employee costs              
2010/11 
£922,537.30                   
2011/12 
£923,329.38                   
2012/13 
£1,023,287.68                
2013/14 
£1,014,100.34                
2014/15 
£1,003,746.62                
77.32%                       
89.26%                       
85.19%                       
88.41%                       
90.64% 
Thames 
Valley Police 
HQ/PA/00
0872/15 
Total budget                        
2009/10 
£1,628,594.91                     
2010/11 
£1,584,648.01                     
2011/12 
£1,230,599.36                     
2012/13 
£1,151,049.79                     
Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered 2009/10 
£1,422,890.00                
2010/11 
£1,456,036.00                
2011/12 
£1,083,361.00                
2012/13 
£1081,557.00                 
2013/14 
Not Answered 
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2013/14 
£1,301,714.46                     
2014/15 
£1,280,606.08 
£1,096,720.00                
2014/15 
£1,089,944.00 
Warwickshir
e Police 
Request 
not 
answered 
      
West Mercia 
Police 
RFI 6165  No split between 
external and internal 
comms, also 
marketing spend is 
included from 
2013/14. Figures 
after the Strategic 
Alliance of 
Warwickshire and 
West Mercia are a 
split of 69% of the 
overall spend of the 2 
forces.                           
2009/10 £110,460.00         
2010/11 £32,004.00           
2011/12 £23,490.00           
2012/13 £25,576.00           
2013/14 £71,562.00           
2014/15 £127,784.00 
Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered Changes to coding 
structure have 
impacted on 
information 
available                         
2009/10 
£176,449.00                   
2010/11 
£165,242.00                   
2011/12 
£470,762.00                   
2012/13 
£418,461.00                   
2013/14 
£542,304.00                   
2014/15 
£583,738.00 
Not Answered 
West 
Midlands 
001026/15 2009/10 Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered Not Answered 
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Police £1024,010.88                      
2010/11 
£1332,902.67                      
2011/12 
£1027,191.29                      
2012/13 
£1046,354.49                      
2013/14 £ 1179,656           
2014/15 £1123,377      
West 
Yorkshire 
Police 
Request 
not 
answered 
      
Wiltshire 
Police 
Request 
not 
answered 
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FOI 3: July 2015 (Part 1) 
 FOI 
Reference 
In which year 
was the 
communications 
department first 
established? 
In which year was 
the 
communications 
department 
established in its 
current structure? 
 Who does the 
head of the 
communications 
department 
report to? (E.g. 
Chief Constable, 
Deputy Chief 
Constable, 
Superintendent)
. 
 Does the head 
of the 
communications 
department sit 
on the force 
executive/comm
and team? 
If yes, is this as a 
voting member or 
in an advisory 
capacity? 
How long has the 
current head of 
communications 
held their position 
as head of 
department? 
Avon and 
Somerset 
Police 
1046/15 2000/2001 2014 DCC Yes Voting 6 years 
Bedfordshire 
Police 
F-2015-
01436  
2010 August 2014 CC and PCC Yes Not Answered 1 year 
Cambridgeshir
e Police 
0570/15 Not known Apr-14 Chief Constable Yes All heads of 
departments are 
members. 
August 2013 
Cheshire 
Police 
6663 Not known 2015 DCC Yes Advisory Currently operating 
with an interim Head 
of Dept. under new 
structure 
City of London 
Police 
Refused on 
the grounds 
of Similar 
requests / 
Information 
available 
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Cleveland 
Police 
2015/6574 c1987 2015 Chief 
Superintendent 
Not as a member Advisory Temporary post 
holder since Nov 
2014 
Cumbria Police FOI 529/15 2005 Dec 2012 Superintendent  Not Answered Not Answered Dec 2012 
Derbyshire 
Police 
001789/15 1960s 2003 Superintendent, 
Deputy Head of 
Corporate 
Services 
No Not Answered Since 2003 
Devon and 
Cornwall 
Police 
3594/15 Not known 2014 Director of Legal 
Services 
No Not Answered Since August 2007 
Dorset Police 2015-557 2004 July 2015 DCC Yes Advisory February 2014 
Durham Police 493/15 1991 2010 Head of 
Performance and 
Analysis 
No Not Answered 9 months 
Essex Police Request not 
answered 
      
Gloucestershir
e Police 
2015.501 Mid 1980s No information 
held 
No information 
held 
Yes Advisory 2 years 
Greater 
Manchester 
Police 
001710/15 Not certain. 
Possibly since 
1970s, perhaps 
earlier. 
2010 with slight 
changes 2013 
DCC Yes Both advisory and 
decision making 
Since 2008 
Hampshire 
Police 
HC/001627/
15 
Not known 2015 No information 
held 
Yes Full member 17th April 2013 
Hertfordshire 
Police 
FOI/616/15 mid 1990s 2013 DCC Yes Advisory August 2001 
Humberside 
Police 
F-2015-
00811 
2006 Mid 2014 DCC Yes They are there in 
their capacity as 
head of Corporate 
Comms 
Approx. 2 weeks 
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Kent Police 15/07/672 1990 2004 with 
modifications in 
2007 
DCC Yes Not Answered 2010 
Lancashire 
Police 
6881/15 Media & 
Marketing Dept. 
created 1998 
 
April 2015 Chief 
Superintendent 
of HQ 
Operations 
No Not Answered Since April 2014 
Leicestershire 
Police 
003971/15 Always existed in 
some form 
2014 DCC The Director of 
the Directorate 
attends weekly 
meetings of both 
the PCC Senior 
Management 
Team, and 
meetings 
between the 
PCC's SMT and 
the Chief Office 
Team.  
He has voting 
rights on the 
former, but not 
the second. He sits 
on the Force 
Executive Board 
and has voting 
rights. 
On 30 June 2014 the 
current incumbent 
was appointed the 
Interim Director as a 
consultant. Since 
May 1 he has been 
the substantive 
Director as a 
permanent member 
of Force employed 
staff. 
Lincolnshire 
Police 
11/15 More than 40 
years 
April 2014 Deputy Chief 
Executive to PCC  
 
No Not Answered Since 1980 
Merseyside 
Police 
SM191/15   1999 2014 There is no Head 
of 
Communications 
for the Force.  
There is a 
Corporate 
Communications 
Manager and a 
Media Manager.  
As stated above 
there is no Head 
of 
Communications 
– both the 
Corporate 
Communications 
Manager and the 
Media Manager 
Advisory As stated above 
there is no Head of 
Communications.  
The Corporate 
Communications 
Manager and the 
Media Manager 
have held their 
positions since the 
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The Corporate 
Communications 
Manager reports 
to the Chief 
Superintendent 
Community 
Engagement and 
Corporate 
Communications 
and the Media 
Manager reports 
to the Head of 
Corporate 
Support 
 
sit on their 
relevant 
departments 
Command Team 
restructure in 2014 
Metropolitan 
Police Service 
(MPS) 
FOI 
2015070000
415 
DPA responsible 
until 2012/3 
2013 Deputy 
Commissioner 
Yes Advisory August 2012 
Norfolk Police F-2015-
01883 
No exact details 
held; early 90s 
2012 Both DCCs Yes Advisory November 2014 
North 
Yorkshire 
Police 
Request not 
answered 
      
Northamptons
hire Police 
002512/15 c 1985 July 2014 Assistant Chief 
Executive to PCC 
No Not Answered Sept 2013 
Northumbria 
Police 
639/15  2009 2014 Deputy Chief 
Constable 
No Not Answered Post currently vacant 
Nottinghamshi
re Police 
004505/15  Not known 2015 DCC Yes Advisory 20th April 2015 
South 
Yorkshire 
20150673 2013 2013 DCC No Not Answered March 2014 
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Police 
Staffordshire 
Police 
6005 Over 20 years 
ago 
2014 DCC No Not Answered June 2015 
Suffolk Police F-2015-
01883 
No exact details 
held; early 90s 
2012 Both DCCs Yes Advisory November 2014 
Surrey Police 165-15-587 Not known 2012, minor 
changes 2015 
DCC Yes Voting 30th April 2013 
Sussex Police FOI    
589/15 
Not known 2015 Chief 
Superintendent 
Yes Advisory Acting since April 
2014, confirmed in 
post Jan 2015 
Thames Valley 
Police 
HQ/PA/001
830/15 
Since 1968 Sept 2014 DCC Yes Advisory Since Sept 2011 
Warwickshire 
Police 
Request not 
answered 
      
West Mercia 
Police 
Request not 
answered 
      
West Midlands 
Police 
002513/15 2012 2012 DCC Yes Advisory  June 2012 
West 
Yorkshire 
Police 
00728/15 c1970s 2012 Chief 
Superintendent 
No  Not Answered 2012 
Wiltshire 
Police 
FOI 2015-
459 
1990 or earlier 2014 Assistant Chief 
Officer: Business 
and people 
development 
No but attends 
Senior Command 
Team meetings  
when required 
and is a member 
of the Force 
Senior 
Leadership Team 
Advisory for both 
teams 
2 and a half years 
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FOI 3: July 2015 (Part 2) 
 FOI Reference Does your force have a 
written document that 
sets out long term 
objectives for 
communication, media 
and public relations 
activity? (e.g. a 
communications strategy) 
If yes, since when? Force Organisation 
Chart 
Communications 
Department Structure 
Chart 
Avon and Somerset 
Police 
1046/15 No Not Applicable No Yes 
Bedfordshire Police F-2015-01436  No, only in early draft Not Applicable No Yes 
Cambridgeshire 
Police 
0570/15 Yes Always, most recent 
this year 
Yes On website 
Cheshire Police 6663 Yes No information Yes Yes 
City of London 
Police 
Similar requests / 
Information available 
    
Cleveland Police 2015/6574 No Not Applicable Yes No 
Cumbria Police FOI 529/15 No Not Applicable Yes Yes 
Derbyshire Police 001789/15 No information held Not Applicable Yes Yes 
Devon and Cornwall 
Police 
3594/15 No  Not Applicable No Yes, although this is 
now out of date and a 
current version is being 
worked on. 
Dorset Police 2015-557 Yes 2011 No Yes 
Durham Police 493/15 Yes January 2015 No No 
Essex Police Request not answered     
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Gloucestershire 
Police 
2015.501 Yes 2013 No information No 
Greater Manchester 
Police 
001710/15 Yes Approx. 10 years No Yes 
Hampshire Police HC/001627/15 Under development Not Applicable No Yes 
Hertfordshire Police FOI/616/15 No. Follows NPCC (ACPO) 
guidelines 
Not Applicable Yes Yes 
Humberside Police F-2015-00811 No Not Applicable No Yes 
Kent Police 15/07/672 No information Not Applicable Corporate Comms 
department lies 
directly within DCC's 
portfolio 
Yes 
Lancashire Police 6881/15 Yes Since June 2014 No Yes 
Leicestershire Police 003971/15 No Not Applicable Yes Yes 
Lincolnshire Police 11/15 Yes Not Answered Yes Yes 
Merseyside Police SM191/15   Not long term. Plan only 
covers 6 months 
 
Completed every 6 
months 
Yes No 
Metropolitan Police 
Service (MPS) 
FOI 2015070000415 FOI Comms stat Not Answered FOI DMC- structure 
chart 
FOI executive structure 
Norfolk Police F-2015-01883 No N/A Yes No 
North Yorkshire 
Police 
Request not answered     
Northamptonshire 
Police 
002512/15 No N/A Yes Yes 
Northumbria Police 639/15  Yes. Police and Crime Plan 
2013/2018    
 
2013 Not Answered Not Answered 
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Nottinghamshire 
Police 
004505/15  Yes  Not Answered No Yes 
South Yorkshire 
Police 
20150673  Not Answered Not Answered No Yes 
Staffordshire Police 6005 A draft strategy is awaiting 
sign-off 
N/A Yes Yes 
Suffolk Police F-2015-01883 No N/A Yes No 
Surrey Police 165-15-587 Yes 2013 Yes Yes 
Sussex Police FOI    589/15 Draft plan For this financial year No Yes 
Thames Valley 
Police 
HQ/PA/001830/15 Yes  Not Answered Yes Yes 
Warwickshire Police Request not answered     
West Mercia Police Request not answered     
West Midlands 
Police 
002513/15 No Not Applicable Yes Yes 
West Yorkshire 
Police 
00728/15 Corporate Communications 
Events calendar 
Not Answered No specific structure 
chart 
Yes 
Wiltshire Police FOI 2015-459 No Not Applicable Yes Yes 
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The following FOI data comes from the disclosure logs available on police websites which houses previous FOI requests fulfilled by those police forces.  
 
FOI Data from Disclosure Log (Part 1)  
 FOI Reference  Does your force have 
a dedicated or Shared 
Communications 
Department? 
What is the 
Name of this 
Department? 
Previous 
Department 
Names 
Date 
department 
established 
Who has 
operational 
control of 
department? 
Any plan to 
change who 
has control? 
Avon and 
Somerset Police 
469/14 Dedicated Corporate 
Communications 
Not Known 11+ years ago Chief Constable No 
Bedfordshire 
Police 
2014-00828  Dedicated but also 
seem to do stuff for 
other forces - need to 
ask for clarification on 
this 
Media Office 
Social media is 
shared with E-
Communications 
dep. 
Not Known early 90s Chief Constable Yes: over the 
next year 
control will be 
shared by CC 
and PCC 
Cambridgeshire 
Police 
0354/2014 Yes Corporate 
Communications 
Not Known Not Known Chief Constable No 
Cheshire Police 5460 Dedicated Corporate 
Communications 
Press and Public 
Relations and 
before that Press 
Office 
Pre-dates 1985 Chief Constable No 
City of London 
Police 
No Similar Information Found  
Cleveland Police 2014/5535 Yes Corporate 
Communications 
Press Office and 
before that 
Media and 
Marketing 
Not Known but 
20+ years 
Chief Constable Not Known 
Cumbria Police No similar information found 
Derbyshire Police 001154/14 Dedicated Corporate No other names 2003 Chief Constable No 
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Communications 
Devon and 
Cornwall Police 
2652/14  Dedicated Corporate 
Communications 
Department 
which has two 
sub-
departments: 
Press and Events 
Unit and the 
Media Services 
Unit 
Not Known Not Known Chief Constable No 
Dorset Police 2014-351 Dedicated Media and 
Corporate 
Communications 
Department 
Press and Media 
Department 
1996 (name 
change in 2003) 
Deputy Chief 
Constable 
No 
Durham Police 306/14. Dedicated Media and 
Marketing Team 
Corporate 
Communications 
and before that 
Press Office 
Media and 
Marketing 
established in 
2010 
Chief Constable No 
Essex Police 6120 Dedicated Media 
department  
Not Known Not Known Chief Constable No 
Gloucestershire 
Police 
2014.5441 Dedicated Communications 
and Engagement 
Corporate 
Communications 
 Chief 
Constable. 
However, Head 
of Public Affairs 
(head of dep) 
also answers to 
PCC 
 
Greater 
Manchester Police 
1282/14 Dedicated Corporate 
Communications 
Name changed in 
2003 from Press 
and Public 
1959 Chief Constable No 
492 
 
Relations Branch 
Hampshire Police No similar information found 
Hertfordshire 
Police 
FOI/369/14 Dedicated Corporate 
Communications 
Media Office 1998 Chief Constable Not Stated 
Humberside 
Police 
No similar information found 
Kent Police No similar information found 
Lancashire Police 5672/14 Dedicated Corporate 
Communications 
Media and 
Marketing, and 
Press Office 
Lancashire have 
had a comms 
department for 
over 20 years. 
Name was 
changed to 
Corporate 
Comms in 2008, 
before that it 
was known as 
Media and 
Marketing 
Chief Constable No 
Leicestershire 
Police 
003750/14 Dedicated Corporate 
Communications 
Press Office 20+ years Chief Constable Currently 
under 
revisement - 
may change to 
PCC 
Lincolnshire Police 001598/14 Shared between 
police and PCC 
Corporate 
Communications 
and Public 
Affairs 
Corporate 
Communications, 
Media Services, 
Public Relations 
and Press Office 
New shared 
department 
established 
1/04/2014, 
original Press 
Office dates 
back to the 70s. 
Operational 
control is the 
responsibility of 
the Chief 
Constable. 
However, line 
management is 
No 
493 
 
the 
responsibility of 
the PCC's office 
Merseyside Police DJ 129/14 Yes Two 
departments:  
Corporate 
Support and 
Development 
and the 
Community 
Engagement 
Department 
Communication 
and Marketing 
Department 
changes came 
into effect April 
2014 but there 
has been a press 
office since 1976 
Chief Constable No 
Metropolitan 
Police Service 
(MPS) 
201450000601 Dedicated Directorate of 
Media and 
Communications 
(DMC) 
Directorate of 
Public Affairs 
2012 but there 
has been a press 
office function 
since the 1960s 
Commissioner 
of the MPS 
 
No 
Norfolk Police FOI 68/14/15 
& 69/14/15 
Shared with Suffolk Corporate 
Communications 
Communications 
and Public 
Affairs, and the 
Press Office 
Joint 
Communications 
team created in 
2011. Not 
known when 
first press office 
was established 
in Norfolk as this 
has traditionally 
been staffed by 
police officers 
Chief 
Constables of 
Suffolk and 
Norfolk have 
joint control 
No 
North Yorkshire 
Police 
84.2014-15 Shared with PCC Corporate 
Communications 
Press Office Corporate 
Communications 
created in 2010 
but existed as 
PCC No 
494 
 
press office 
before this. 
Northamptonshire 
Police 
002150/14 Shared between 
Police and PCC 
News and Public 
Involvement 
Team 
Corporate 
Communications 
Team and 
Research Team 
01/07/2014 Peter Heaton – 
Assistant 
Commissioner 
Public 
Involvement  
Works in the 
PCC's office 
No 
Northumbria 
Police 
326/14 Shared between 
Police and PCC 
The Strategic 
Corporate 
Communications 
Department 
Media Services 
(changed 2008) 
Not Known: 10+ 
years 
Chief Constable No 
Nottinghamshire 
Police 
003016/14  Dedicated Corporate 
Communications 
Media 
Department' and 
'Public Relations' 
Department 
approximately 
1994 
Chief Constable No 
South Yorkshire 
Police 
20140402 Dedicated Corporate 
Communications 
Team (name 
change in 2014) 
Press Office and 
Press and Public 
Relations 
Department and 
Media and 
Marketing 
Press officer for 
at least 25 years 
Chief Constable 
has operational 
control but the 
department is 
seconded from 
the PCC's office 
16 full time + 1 
temporary 
Staffordshire 
Police 
FOI 4851 Dedicated Corporate 
Communications 
Press Office and 
Media and 
Marketing 
15 years in 
current form, 
but there has 
been a press 
office function 
since the 70s 
Corporate 
Communications 
Chief Constable No 
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was reorganised 
into it's own 
department in 
2010/11 
Suffolk Police F-2014-01255 
& F-2014-
01256 
Shared with Norfolk 
Police 
Corporate 
Communications 
Corporate 
Communications 
Collaborated 
unit established 
2011 but there 
has been a Press 
Office in Suffolk 
from early 90s 
Chief 
Constables of 
Suffolk and 
Norfolk 
No 
Surrey Police 165-14-379 Yes Corporate 
Communications 
(consists of 
Media relations 
team, projects 
and campaigns 
team and online 
and production 
team) 
Not Known Not Known Deputy Chief 
Constable 
No 
Sussex Police No similar information found 
Thames Valley 
Police 
HQ/PA/001360/14 Dedicated Corporate 
Communications 
Corporate 
Information 
Not Known Chief Constable No 
Warwickshire 
Police 
RFI 5233 Shared with 
Wiltshire 
Corporate 
Communications 
Several but not 
stated in reply 
Not Known Chief 
Constables of 
both forces 
No 
West Mercia 
Police 
5006 Yes Corporate 
Communications 
Press Office and 
Public Relations 
2012 as 
Corporate 
Communications 
Chief Constable Not known 
West Midlands 
Police 
2014127/2552 Yes Corporate 
Communications 
Press and PR name changed 
in 2012 
Chief Constable Not known 
West Yorkshire 2014-303 Dedicated Corporate Press Corporate Staff are Fixed for the 
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Police although PCC 
communication 
officers sit within 
this department 
Communications 
(made up of 
four hubs: 
PR/Marketing, E 
Comms and 
Graphic Design, 
PCC 
Communications 
and Media 
Services) 
Department Communications 
established in 
2006 but Press 
Office has been 
around for over 
25 years 
employed by 
PCC but 
operational 
control remains 
with the Chief 
Constable 
next two years 
Wiltshire Police No similar information found 
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FOI Data from Disclosure Log (Part 2)  
 FOI Reference No. No. of people 
working in 
department 
now 
No, of People 
working in 
Department 
in 2004 
No, of People 
working in 
Department 
in 1994 
Department Budgets 
2000 - 2014 
List of Social 
Media Sites 
used by Police 
force 
Number of Sites 
Avon and 
Somerset Police 
469/14 19 11 No 
information 
available 
2014/15       £735,000 
2013/14       £701,600 
2012/13       £694,650 
2011/12       £800,300 
2010/11       £838,300 
2009/10       £760,100 
2008/09       £553,400 
2007/08       £602,300 
2006/07       £504,900 
2005/06       £421,200 
2004/05       £287,000 
2003/04       £312,300 
2002/03       £274,700 
2001/02       £273,300 
2000/01       £224,400 
Twitter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facebook 
 
 
 
 
 
Flickr 
YouTube 
Google+ 
LinkedIn 
59 (1 main, 35 
local 
neighbourhood 
accounts, 17 
individual 
officers and 6 
special interest 
accounts 
 
8 (1 main, 3 
local 
neighbourhood 
and 4 special 
interest 
accounts 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Bedfordshire 
Police 
2014-00828  5 full time staff 
in media office 
and 2 in E-
Communications 
5 2 2013/14        £355,000 Twitter, 
Facebook, 
Audioboo, 
8 
1 
1 
Cambridgeshire 
Police 
0354/2014 8 full time and 2 
people job 
8 full time No 
information 
approximately 
£500,000 for all years 
Twitter,  
Facebook,  
12, 
13, 
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sharing available YouTube,  
Word Press. 
1, 
1, 
Cheshire Police 5460 15 permanent 
staff and 2 
temporary 
11 2 2014/15       £920,459 
2013/14    £1,058,521 
2012/13        £889,311 
2011/12        £926,405 
Twitter 
Facebook 
Hootsuite 
26 
5 
1 
City of London 
Police 
No information available 
Cleveland Police 2014/5535 7 6 No 
information 
available 
2013/14        £207,510 
2012/13        £201,370 
2011/12        £220,508 
2010/11        £199,584 
2009/10        £172,759 
2008/09        £167,500 
2007/08        £167,500 
2006/07        £206,323 
2005/06        £206,323 
2004/05        £203,274 
 
Twitter, 
Facebook, 
Flickr, 
YouTube, 
31 
14 
1 
1 
Cumbria Police No information available 
Derbyshire Police 001154/14 7.8 full time 
equivalents 
4 1 2013              £570,000 
2012              £578,200 
2011              £578,600 
2010              £493,800 
2009              £494,100 
2008              £177,735 
2007              £138,808 
2006              £128,300 
2005                 £0 
2004                 
£11,400 
Twitter 
Facebook 
1 
1 
499 
 
2003                 £0 
 
Devon and 
Cornwall Police 
2652/14  30 No 
information 
available 
No 
information 
available 
2014/15        £247,000 
2013/14          £11,000 
2012/13          £60,000 
2011/12          £46,000 
2010/11        £266,000 
2009/10        £265,000 
2008/09        £259,000 
2007/08        £133,000 
2006/07        £122,000 
2005/06          £98,000 
Twitter 
Facebook 
YouTube 
Flickr 
Pinterest 
Audioboo 
84 
36 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Dorset Police 2014-351 11 13 No 
information 
available 
2013/14        £422,700 
2012/13        £480,700 
2011/12        £345,400 
2010/11        £402,900 
2009/10        £445,500 
2008/09        £420,000 
2007/08        £444,600 
2006/07        £422,500 
2005/06        £397,200 
2004/05        £364,100 
2003/04        £249,400 
2002/03        £372,400 
2001/02        £476,400 
2000/01          £90,100 
 
Twitter, 
Facebook, 
YouTube, 
Flickr 
No information 
on the number 
of sites. 
Durham Police 306/14. 7 4 4 2014/15        £229,775 
2013/14         
£236,735 
2012/13         
Twitter, 
Facebook, 
Vine, 
Vimeo, 
75 
15 
1 
1 
500 
 
£248,644 
2011/12         
£216,547 
2010/11         
£235,165 
YouTube, 
Instagram 
1 
1 
Essex Police 6120 16 full time No 
information 
available 
No 
information 
available 
No information 
available 
Twitter 
Facebook 
Audioboo 
Flickr 
Storify 
Bambuster 
YouTube 
60+ 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Gloucestershire 
Police 
2014.5441 12 for CC 
1 for PCC 
20 2 No information 
available 
Facebook 
Twitter, 
Pinterest 
19 Twitter 
2 Facebook 
1 Pinterest 
Greater 
Manchester Police 
1282/14 34 32 No 
information 
available 
2013/14     £1,312,653 
2012/13     £1,335,504 
2011/12     £1,520,551 
2010/11     £1,766,355 
2009/10     £1,840,479 
2008/09     £1,673,744 
2007/08     £1,660,923 
2006/07     £1,600,699 
2005/06     £1,446,553 
 
Facebook, 
Twitter, 
Flickr, 
YouTube, 
Pinterest, 
Google+ 
40 
64 
 
 
Hampshire Police No information available 
Hertfordshire 
Police 
FOI/369/14 14 full time 14 No 
information 
available 
2013/14           
£816,911 
2012/13           
£876,675 
2011/12           
Twitter 
Facebook 
52 
1 
501 
 
£874,347 
Humberside 
Police 
No information available 
Kent Police No information available 
Lancashire Police 5672/14 14 full time posts 15 No 
information 
available 
2013/14        £772,121 
2012/13        £776,813 
2011/12        £782,493 
2010/11        £798,915 
2009/10        £739,688 
2008/09        £820,138 
 
Twitter 
Facebook 
YouTube 
33 
39 
1 
Leicestershire 
Police 
003750/14 16 9 No 
information 
available 
No information 
available 
Facebook 
Twitter 
YouTube 
Pinterest 
EBay 
19 
96 
1 
1 
1 
Lincolnshire Police 001598/14 10 full time posts No 
information 
available 
No 
information 
available 
2014/15        £549,000 Facebook 
Twitter 
YouTube 
Flickr 
24 
41 
Merseyside Police DJ 129/14 12 (6 in each 
department) 
18 No 
information 
available 
2013/14        £768,623 
2012/13        £883,820 
2011/12     £1,223,058 
2010/11     £1,384,824 
2009/10     £1,467,119 
2008/09     £1,334,509 
2007/08     £1,246,705 
2006/07     £1,179,424 
 
Twitter 
YouTube 
1 
1 
Metropolitan 
Police Service 
201450000601 98 145 No 
information 
2013/14     £9,600,000 
2012/13     £7,000,000 
Twitter 
Facebook 
120 
1 
502 
 
(MPS) available YouTube 
Instagram 
Flipboard 
Flickr 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Norfolk Police FOI 68/14/15 & 
69/14/15 
12 people in 10 
jobs.  
Total in joint 
department = 25 
Not Known No 
information 
available 
2014/15     £1,066,786 
2013/14        £996,220 
2012/13     £1,025,420 
2011/12        £494,929 
2010/11     £1,075,401 
2009/10     £1,136,562 
2008/09     £1,116,644 
 
Twitter 
Facebook 
Google+ 
YouTube 
Audioboo 
7 
2 
1 
1 
1 
North Yorkshire 
Police 
84.2014-15 13 4 3 No information 
available 
Twitter 
Facebook 
78 
3 
Northamptonshire 
Police 
002150/14 18 Information 
not held 
but has 
provided 
staff levels 
for last 5 
years: 
hovers 
around 17- 
20 
No 
information 
available 
2013/14        £685,000 
2012/13        £589,000 
2011/12        £668,000 
2010/11        £699,000 
2009/10        £596,000 
Facebook 
Twitter 
1 
83 
 
Northumbria 
Police 
326/14 24 full time posts 
(currently under 
review) 
No 
information 
available 
No 
information 
available 
2014/15     £1,054,628 
2013/14     £1,173,754 
2012/13     £1,200,408 
2011/12     £1,229,349 
2010/11     £1,580,294 
2009/10     £1,428,536 
2008/09        £901,547 
Twitter,  
Facebook, 
YouTube, 
Flickr, 
Pinterest, 
Audioboo 
11 
9 
1 
1 
1 
1 
503 
 
 
Nottinghamshire 
Police 
003016/14  16 full time posts 8 full time 
posts 
No 
information 
available 
2010/2011    £686,490  
2011/12        £529,150 
2012/13        £675,101 
2013/14        £671,360 
 
Facebook, 
Twitter, 
YouTube 
1 
40+ 
1 
South Yorkshire 
Police 
20140402 No information 
available 
No 
information 
available 
No 
information 
available 
No information 
available 
Twitter, 
Facebook, 
Google+ 
YouTube 
Audioboo 
FourSquare 
214  
14 
1 
1 
2 
1 
Staffordshire 
Police 
FOI 4851 13 full time posts No 
information 
available 
No 
information 
available 
2014/15        £527,000 
2013/14        £559,000 
2012/13        £649,000 
2011/12        £487,000 
 
Facebook 
Twitter 
YouTube 
Flickr 
7 
45 
1 
1 
Suffolk Police F-2014-01255 & F-
2014-01256 
13 people sharing 
11 posts 
No 
information 
available 
No 
information 
available 
2014/15     £1,066,786 
2013/14         
£996,220 
2012/13     £1,025,420 
2011/12         
£494,929 
2010/11         
£631,226 
2009/10         
£572,209 
2008/09         
£501,190 
 
Twitter, 
Facebook, 
Google+ 
YouTube 
7 + 3 personal 
senior officer 
accounts 
1 
1 
1 
Surrey Police 165-14-379 28 Not Known No 2014/15     £1,459,332 Twitter 15 
504 
 
although 
there were 
32 people 
in 2010 
information 
available 
2013/14     £1,519,433 
2012/13     £1,612,506 
2011/12     £1,678,591 
2010/11     £2,098,266 
Facebook 
YouTube 
Storify 
Audioboo 
Flickr 
Pinterest 
16 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Sussex Police No information available 
Thames Valley 
Police 
HQ/PA/001360/14 30 
of which 7 are 
dedicated Press 
Officers 
No 
information 
available 
No 
information 
available 
2013/14     £1,169,199 
2012/13     £1,131,753 
2011/12     £1,133,199 
2010/11     £1,643,240 
2009/10     £1,677,060 
2008/09     £1,626,853 
2007/08     £1,511,298 
2006/07     £1,467,981 
2005/06     £1,382,951 
2004/05     £1,414,839 
2003/04     £1,366,438 
2002/03     £1,182,239 
2001/02     £1,051,480 
2000/01     £1,039,798 
 
Twitter 
Facebook 
YouTube 
32 
1 
1 
Warwickshire 
Police 
RFI 5233 18 Full time posts 
and 2 temporary 
posts 
8 No 
information 
available 
2014/15    £1,082,448 
2013/14        £895,190 
2012/13        £602,126 
2011/12        £663,132 
2010/11        £519,920 
2009/10        £629,319 
2008/09        £485,634 
2007/08        £456,179 
2006/07        £380,267 
Twitter,  
Facebook, 
Flickr, 
YouTube, 
Cover it Live, 
Audioboo, 
Four Square, 
Word Press/ 
Blogger Blogs 
69, 
3, 
1, 
1, 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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2005/06        £374,510 
2004/05        £352,549 
 
West Mercia 
Police 
5006 37 No 
information 
available 
No 
information 
available 
2014           £1,400,000 Twitter 
Facebook 
YouTube 
Flickr 
Instagram 
Stormcloud 
220 
8 
 
 
West Midlands 
Police 
2014127/2552 37 full time 
positions 
No 
information 
available 
No 
information 
available 
No information 
available 
Twitter,  
Facebook 
Stormcloud 
Instagram 
Flickr 
YouTube 
220+ Twitter  
8 x Facebook 
West Yorkshire 
Police 
2014-303 14 - including 2 
managers and 2 
part time posts 
10 civilian 
staff 
1 2014/15        £603,628 
2013/14        £609,404 
2012/13        £599,595 
2011/12        £606,498 
2010/11        £712,320 
2009/10        £696,558 
2008/09        £569,831 
 
Facebook 
Twitter 
YouTube 
1 
45 
1 
Wiltshire Police No similar information found 
 
 
  
APPENDIX 3.3: Communications Department Staff Levels 
 
Size of Department (number of full time equivalent posts) 
Police Force Number 
of Staff 
2004 
Number 
of Staff 
2010 
Number 
of Staff 
2014 / 
2015 
Percentage 
Decrease 
Between 
2010 - 2015 
Is this Number 
Expected to Increase or 
Decrease? 
Avon and 
Somerset Police 
11  32  20  12.74% Not Known 
Bedfordshire 
Police 
5  18  15  31.03% Only 9.5 posts currently 
filled. Plan is to increase 
to fill vacant posts but 
not to increase overall 
size of department.  
Cambridgeshire 
Police 
8  8  8  0% Not Known 
Cheshire Police 
 
11  14  13  7.14% Not Known 
City of London 
Police 
Not 
Known 
Not 
Known 
12   Increase 
Cleveland Police 
 
6  10 8 20.00% Not Known 
Cumbria Police Not 
Known 
9  6  33.33% No plans to change 
Derbyshire Police 
 
4  17  7.8  54.12% Decrease 
Devon and 
Cornwall Police 
Not 
Known 
53  31.29  40.96% Not Known 
Dorset Police 13  Not 
Known 
11   Expected to stay the 
same 
Durham Police 4  5  5.6  Increased No, it is expected to 
stay the same 
Essex Police Not 
Known 
29.5  17.5  40.68% Not Known 
Gloucestershire 
Police 
20 full 
time 
posts 
Not 
Known 
13  Not Known 
Greater 
Manchester Police 
32  51  35  31.37% Not Known 
Hampshire Police Not 
Known 
Not 
Known 
26    Not Known 
Hertfordshire 14  22  16  27.27% Not Known 
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Police  
Humberside Police Not 
Known 
12  8  33.33% Not Known 
Kent Police Not 
Known 
36  29  19.44% Not Known 
Lancashire Police 15  Not 
Known 
14   probably decrease 
Leicestershire 
Police 
9  Not 
Known 
18  Not Known 
Lincolnshire Police Not 
Known 
8  11  Increased Not Known 
Merseyside Police 18  16  12  
 
25.00% May decrease following 
further budget cuts but 
won't increase 
Metropolitan 
Police Service 
(MPS) 
145  145  98  32.41% Not Known 
Norfolk Police Not 
Known 
22 12.4 43.64% Not Known 
North Yorkshire 
Police 
4  13  9  30.77% Not Known 
Northamptonshire 
Police 
17 20.8  17  18.27% Not Known 
Northumbria 
Police 
Not 
Known 
46  24  47.83% No plans to change this 
number 
Nottinghamshire 
Police 
8  19  14  26.32% Currently in 
consultation but likely 
to decrease 
South Yorkshire 
Police 
Not 
Known 
Not 
Known 
14  Not Known 
Staffordshire 
Police 
Not 
Known 
Not 
Known 
13.1   No plans at this stage to 
increase or decrease 
Suffolk Police Not 
Known 
19 14.4 24.21% Not Known 
Surrey Police Not 
Known 
35  28  20.00% No Current Plans to 
change the number 
Sussex Police Not 
Known 
27  26  3.70% Decrease 
Thames Valley 
Police 
Not 
Known 
8  21   Not Known 
Warwickshire 
Police 
8  Not 
Known 
24   Not Known 
 
 
West Mercia Not Not 21   Not Known 
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Police Known Known 
 
West Midlands 
Police 
Not 
Known 
42  36.65  12.74% Not Known 
West Yorkshire 
Police 
10  29 20  31.03% Not Known 
Wiltshire Police Not 
Known 
15  19  Increased Intention is to retain 
the same number of 
staff 
 
APPENDIX 3.4:         Social Media Policies 
 
Table 1               Police Force Social Media Policy Comparison Summary Table 
 Yes No Did Not Answer / No 
Policy 
Stated Aim of Document 22 5 12 
Twitter 8 19 12 
Facebook 7 20 12 
Other Social Media Sites 5 22 12 
Blogs 4 23 12 
Friends / Following 11 16 12 
Acceptable Posts / What Not To Post 21 6 12 
Legal Information on social media use 17 10 12 
What to do if something goes wrong 7 20 12 
Dangers / Risks of Social Media use 15 12 12 
Writing for your audience 13 14 12 
Public Trust and Confidence 20 7 12 
Force Reputation 18 9 12 
Covert Policing 7 20 12 
Confidentiality 16 11 12 
Rules for Personal Use 17 10 12 
Rules for Professional Use 18 9 12 
Privacy Settings 10 17 12 
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TABLE 2 Guidance On (Part 1) 
Police Force Length of 
Document 
Twitte
r 
Faceboo
k 
Other 
Social 
Media 
Sites 
Blogs Friends/ 
Followin
g 
Acceptabl
e Post 
Material / 
what not 
to post 
Legal info 
on social 
media 
use for 
police 
What to 
do if 
somethin
g goes 
wrong 
Dangers/ 
Risks of 
Social 
Media 
Use 
Writing for 
your 
Audience 
Avon and Somerset 
Police 
2 No No No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bedfordshire Police 4 No No No No No No Yes Yes No No 
Cambridgeshire Police  No Policy  
Cheshire Police 5 No No No No No Yes Yes No Yes No 
City of London Police Did Not Reply   
Cleveland Police 10 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Cumbria Police  Did Not Answer Question  
Derbyshire Police 12 No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Devon and Cornwall 
Police 
8 No No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Dorset Police 4 No No No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Durham Police 30 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Essex Police  No Policy  
Gloucestershire Police  They do have a policy but did not provide one  
Greater Manchester 
Police 
7 No No No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Hampshire Police  They do have a policy but did not provide one 
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Hertfordshire Police 3 Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Humberside Police  Did not reply  
Kent Police  They do have a policy but did not provide one   
Lancashire Police 3 Yes Yes No No No Yes No No No No 
Leicestershire Police 3 No No No No No No Yes No No No 
Lincolnshire Police 6 No No No No No Yes Yes No No No 
Merseyside Police  They do have a policy but did not provide one  
Metropolitan Police 
Service (MPS) 
18 No No No No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Norfolk Police (joint 
with Suffolk) 
26 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
North Yorkshire Police 8 Yes Yes No No No Yes No Yes Yes No 
Northamptonshire 
Police 
 They do have a policy but did not provide one  
Northumbria Police 1 No No No No No No No No No No 
Nottinghamshire 
Police 
12 No No No No No No Yes No No No 
South Yorkshire Police  No – in process of drafting it  
Staffordshire Police 6 No No No No No Yes Yes No Yes No 
Suffolk Police (Joint 
with Norfolk) 
26 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Surrey Police 5 NO NO NO NO NO Yes No No Yes No 
Sussex Police 4 No No No No No Yes No No No No 
Thames Valley Police 15 No No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Warwickshire Police 
(joint with West 
12 No No No No No No Yes No No Yes 
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Mercia) 
West Mercia Police 
(joint with 
Warwickshire) 
12 No No No No No No Yes No No Yes 
West Midlands Police 12 No No No No No Yes Yes No Yes No 
West Yorkshire Police  They do have a policy but did not provide one  
Wiltshire Police 27 (Split 
over 2 
document
s 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Table 3 Guidance On (Part 2) 
Police Force Aims of 
Document 
Public Trust 
and 
Confidence 
Force 
Reputation 
Covert 
Policing 
Information 
Confidentiality 
Rules for 
Personal 
Use 
Rules for 
Professional 
Use 
Privacy Settings 
Avon and Somerset 
Police 
No No No No No No No No 
Bedfordshire Police Yes No Yes No No No Yes No 
Cambridgeshire Police No Policy  
Cheshire Police Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No 
City of London Police Did Not Reply  
Cleveland Police No No No No Yes No No No 
Cumbria Police Did Not Answer Question  
Derbyshire Police Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Devon and Cornwall 
Police 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dorset Police Yes No No No Yes Yes No Yes 
Durham Police Yes No No No Yes No Yes Yes 
Essex Police No Policy  
Gloucestershire Police They Have a Policy But Did Not Send One  
Greater Manchester 
Police 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
Hampshire Police They Have a Policy But Did Not Send One  
Hertfordshire Police No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Humberside Police Did Not Reply  
Kent Police They Have a Policy But Did Not Send One  
Lancashire Police Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Leicestershire Police Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 
Lincolnshire Police Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No 
Merseyside Police They Have a Policy But Did Not Send One  
Metropolitan Police 
Service (MPS) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Norfolk Police (joint 
with Suffolk) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
North Yorkshire Police Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Northamptonshire 
Police 
They Have a Policy But Did Not Send One  
Northumbria Police Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 
Nottinghamshire Police Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No 
South Yorkshire Police No – in process of drafting it  
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Staffordshire Police Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Suffolk Police (Joint 
with Norfolk) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Surrey Police No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sussex Police Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No 
Thames Valley Police Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No 
Warwickshire Police 
(joint with West 
Mercia) 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 
West Mercia Police 
(joint with 
Warwickshire) 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 
West Midlands Police Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
West Yorkshire Police They Have a Policy But Did Not Send One  
Wiltshire Police No Yes Yes No Yes No No No 
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APPENDIX 3.5:      Social Media Sites 
 
 
 
Twitter Facebook Google+ YouTube Personal 
Blog 
Official 
Blog 
Pinterest Flickr Instagram Soundcloud Storyfy AudioBoom 
Avon and 
Somerset Police 
YES YES YES YES NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Bedfordshire 
Police 
YES YES NO YES NO Yes NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Cambridgeshire 
Police 
YES YES NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Cheshire Police YES YES NO YES NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO 
City of London 
Police 
YES YES NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Cleveland Police YES YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Cumbria Police YES YES NO YES NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES 
Derbyshire Police YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Devon and 
Cornwall Police 
YES YES NO YES NO YES YES YES NO NO NO YES 
Dorset Police YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Durham Police YES YES NO YES NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Essex Police YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Gloucestershire 
Police 
YES YES NO YES NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Greater 
Manchester Police 
YES YES NO YES NO YES YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Hampshire Police YES YES NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Hertfordshire 
Police 
YES YES NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Humberside YES YES NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO 
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Police 
Kent Police YES YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Lancashire Police YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Leicestershire 
Police 
YES YES NO YES NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Lincolnshire Police YES YES NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Merseyside Police YES YES NO YES NO NO NO Yes NO NO NO NO 
Metropolitan 
Police Service 
(MPS) 
YES YES NO YES NO NO NO Yes NO NO NO NO 
Norfolk Police YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
North Yorkshire 
Police 
YES YES NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO Yes NO 
Northamptonshire 
Police 
YES YES NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Northumbria 
Police 
YES YES NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Nottinghamshire 
Police 
YES YES NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
South Yorkshire 
Police 
YES YES NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Staffordshire 
Police 
YES YES YES YES NO NO NO Yes NO NO NO NO 
Suffolk Police YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Surrey Police YES YES NO YES NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Sussex Police YES YES YES YES NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Thames Valley 
Police 
YES YES NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Warwickshire 
Police 
YES YES YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO NO YES 
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West Mercia 
Police 
YES YES NO YES NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO 
West Midlands 
Police 
YES YES NO YES YES NO NO YES YES YES NO NO 
West Yorkshire 
Police 
YES YES NO YES NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Wiltshire Police YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
 
APPENDIX 3.7:    Supplementary Interview Data 
 
Table 3.7a        Interviewee Background Information and Training 
Interview 
Ref. 
Gender Training / Experience Number of 
Years in 
Current Post 
Staff or 
Warranted 
Officer 
PI.1 Male N/A 5 Officer 
PI.2 Male 10+ years working in the 
communications department - 
but no formal training. 
10+ Officer 
PI.3 Male University education in comms 
+ experience working in 
corporate PR before moving to 
the public service sector 
(police) for a challenge. 
11 months Staff 
PI.4 Male Trained as a journalist and 
worked in a newspaper for over 
20 years 
2 years Staff 
PI.5 Male N/A 18 months Staff 
PI.6 Female 10 + Corporate PR background 7 years Staff 
PI.7 Female Professional training and CIPR 
accredited 
 
Has worked in another comms 
unit in another police force 
Less than a 
year 
Staff 
PI.8 Female Trained as a journalist, then 
moved into corporate PR. 
Joined the Police as a press 
officer and then worked her 
way up to head of comms. 
2.5 years Staff 
PI.9 Female Trained in Corporate PR in 
private sector  
3 years Staff 
PI.10 Female Background is in 
communications in various 
public services. 
7 years Staff 
PI.11 Male Degree in communications and 
10+ years working in two other 
police comms teams 
2 years Staff 
PI.12 Male Joined the police 15 years ago 
as a divisional press officer. No 
official comms qualifications. 
Later studied for his CIPR and is 
1 year Staff 
519 
 
now an accredited comms 
professional. 
PI.13 Male Work experience only 30+ years  Staff 
PI.14 Male Variety of private and public 
industries in communications 
roles. 
11+ years Staff 
PI.15 Female Trained as a journalist before 
moving into police comms 15 
years ago. 
Less than 1 
year 
Staff 
PI.16 Female Trained as a journalist 5 years Staff 
PI.17 Female Worked in corporate 
PR/comms for 10+ years 
4+ years Staff 
PI.18 Male trained as a journalist for the 
broadsheet press before 
moving into police 
communications. 
10+ years Staff 
PI.19A Female University degree in comms. 5 years Staff 
PI.19B Male University degree in computing, 
joined department straight out 
of uni 
8 years Staff 
PI.20A Female Worked in private sector 
corporate comms. Joined 
department 11 years ago 
4 years Staff 
PI.20B Male Trained as a journalist and then 
worked on a newspaper for 5+ 
years 
Less than a 
year 
Staff 
PI.21 Female 10+ years working in corporate 
comms but no formal 
qualifications 
1 year Officer 
PI.22 Male Advertising specialist for a 
newspaper. Joined police 
comms about 5 years ago. 
5 years Staff 
PI.23 Female Background working in comms 
for various public sector 
agencies, including another 
police force before joining her 
current force as head of 
department. 
CIPR registered 
14 years Staff 
PI.24 Male N/A Less than a 
year 
Officer 
PI.25A Male background training is in 
Marketing and PR  
7 years Staff 
PI.25B Female Background in police comms 28 years Staff 
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but no formal qualifications 
PI.26 Female 14 years working in private and 
public sector comms 
8+ years Staff 
PI.27 Male Journalism background, worked 
in TV News 
1 year Staff 
PI.28 Female Trained as a journalist and 
worked on several newspapers 
before moving into public 
sector communications work 
17 years Staff 
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3.7b           Communications Strategy 
Interview 
Ref. 
Current Comms Strategy What Should The Comms Strategy 
Be/Ideal 
PI.1 N/A N/A 
PI.2 Push. "Police communications is still 
basically about broadcasting. We 
might talk about increasing 
engagement but at the moment we 
just don't have the capacity to 
actually manage it". 
Pull 
PI.3 Push Pull 
PI.4 Pull Transformative 
PI.5 Push. Comms not being used 
intelligently due to "poor 
leadership"; has a long way to go 
before it catches up with other 
departments 
N/A 
PI.6 Pull Pull 
PI.7 Mixture of Push and Pull Mixture of Push and Pull 
PI.8 Push 
Should be pull and transformative - 
but so much of police comms has to 
be about 'push' that dialogue can get 
a little lost at times. 
Pull and Transformative 
PI.9 Pull  Transformative 
PI.10 Push Pull 
PI.11 Push Transformative  
"I want the majority of the activity to 
be focused on – to be around at the 
least, engagement, ideally actual 
behaviour change, so I hope it makes 
them, – that will happily stop them 
being a victim, happily made them take 
preventative actions.  Those are the 
kind of outcomes I want to see.  A lot of 
police officers still see effective coms as 
delivering that awareness, just the 
understanding.  " 
PI.12 Push and Pull Pull and Transformative 
PI.13 Push Push 
PI.14 Pull Pull 
PI.15 Push Pull 
PI.16 Push Transformative 
PI.17 Pull Transformative 
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PI.18 Push Pull 
PI.19A Push Transformative 
PI.19B Push and Transformative Transformative through push 
" I would say,  we  do practising 
behaviours that why we do these 
campaigns to say lock your house, lock 
it or lose it, all of these kind of 
ŵessages, if Ǉou͛ƌe goiŶg out after 
dark, so I would say that bit is trying to 
change behaviours.  In terms of the 
Push and Pull, it is more along the lines 
of Ǉeah, heƌe is the ŵessages, heƌe͛s 
ǁhat͛s goiŶg oŶ, aŶd  ǁe do, ǁe leaǀe it 
opeŶ foƌ diƌeĐtioŶ ďut ǁe͛ƌe a sŵall 
team, so the more interaction you get, 
the ŵoƌe Ǉou͛ǀe got to ŵaŶage that so 
ǁe do get iŶteƌaĐtioŶ… " 
PI.20A Push Pull 
PI.20B Push Pull and Transformative 
PI.21 Push unless it is there is an appeal, 
then it is pull 
Transformative 
PI.22 Push and Transformative Push and Transformative 
PI.23 Pull Transformative 
PI.24 Transformative Transformative 
PI.25A Pull Pull 
PI.25B Pull Transformative 
PI.26 Pull but certain amount push is 
inevitable with police comms 
Pull 
PI.27 Push Pull 
PI.28 Push and Transformative "yes push and transformative and again 
it͛s a peƌsoŶal ǀieǁ, ďut I thiŶk ǁe 
aspiƌe to ďe pull, ďut I doŶ͛t thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe 
aĐtuallǇ ǀeƌǇ good at it… I thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe 
very used to telling people, I think it 
Đoŵes fƌoŵ a ĐoŵŵaŶd ethos that͛s iŶ 
the poliĐe, Ǉou kŶoǁ, ǁe͛ll tell you 
ǁhat ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg, ǁe doŶ͛t aĐtuallǇ 
engage you in the debate about what 
ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg.  " 
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APPENDIX 3.8:     Interview Data 
 
3.2.1  Interviewee Information 
Staff 
͞ǁheŶ I aƌƌiǀed heƌe, I had the diffeƌeŶt ĐoŵpoŶeŶts of ŵǇ teaŵ ǁeƌe all iŶ diffeƌent, 
those houses aƌe ďasiĐallǇ like houses, aŶd theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot like a ďuildiŶg Ǉou ǁould ǁoƌk 
iŶ. “o soŵeoŶe͛s got this liǀiŶg ƌooŵ aŶd diffeƌeŶt paƌts of the teaŵ ǁeƌe iŶ diffeƌeŶt 
ďits of the house. “o theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot aĐtuallǇ a teaŵ, kiŶd of like iŶtegƌated together and 
that͛s aŶ iŶteƌestiŶg set up as ǁell aŶd I thiŶk that͛s aďout the Đoŵs Ŷot ŶeĐessaƌilǇ 
ďeiŶg iŶ liŶe. “o Ǉou͛ƌe iŶteƌŶal ďit, Ǉouƌ ŵedia ďit aŶd Ǉouƌ otheƌ ďit Ŷeed to ďe 
iŶtegƌated togetheƌ so that, iŶ siŵple teƌŵs, if Ǉou͛ƌe aŶŶouŶĐiŶg a ďig thing about 
Ǉouƌ oƌgaŶisatioŶ, Ǉou ǁaŶt Ǉouƌ people to kŶoǁ fiƌst. You doŶ͛t ǁaŶt theŵ to piĐk 
up the kind of, Daily Echo or whatever papers we have here and say, oh I just read 
this ŵoƌŶiŶg that ŵǇ joďs kiŶd of, oŶ the liŶe. AŶd I thiŶk people doŶ͛t alǁaǇs get 
that right in big organisations that are complicated geographically spread. You have 
to haǀe that ĐoŶtƌol esseŶtiallǇ so that Ǉou ĐaŶ aǀoid that͟. ;PI.ϯͿ 
 
͞ǁe had stƌuĐtuƌes ǁheƌe ǁe had aƌea ďased ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs teaŵs iŶ ouƌ fiǀe ďasiĐ 
command units as they were called. So you would have had a coms manager, plus 
one or two coms officers and we had a central bit here at HQ where the internal 
coms sat and where this team, the graphic design, etc. sat. So in order to reduce costs 
and to take that budget hit they centralised the service, so we took all of the area 
people, brought them in house. Got rid of that whole middle level of managers, if you 
like, the middle layers of managers. Put a couple more seniors in and then kind of 
levelled everyone out... So we lost I think five, full time equivalents of. Most were 
ƌedeploǇed so ƌeduŶdaŶĐies ǁeƌe kept to a ŵiŶiŵuŵ͟. ;PI.ϲͿ 
 
͞I thiŶk at the ŵoŵeŶt that ǁe aƌe iŶ that plaĐe ǁheƌe eǀeƌǇďodǇ does haǀe a 
dediĐated joď, soŵeoŶe saǇiŶg ǁell I do this aŶd that͛s the ǁeď so that͛s Ŷot iŶ ŵǇ 
ƌole… I thiŶk theiƌ ƌoles Đould alŵost ďeĐoŵe a siŵilaƌ oŶe, Đould ďe oŶe teaŵ that 
do all that stuff togetheƌ ƌeallǇ.͟ ;PI.ϭϴͿ 
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͞BƌeakiŶg doǁŶ ďouŶdaƌies - so much of social media use now is cross department 
work. Service provision through S.M. isn't strictly comms work, it's operational as 
well. Same with intelligence gathering - we get a lot of information through social 
media which is then passed onto the investigating teams - so yeah, roles are less 
defiŶed͟. ;PI.ϮϯͿ 
 
͞ǁe'ƌe looking at pushing out our Twitter account to our control room for a lot of the 
reactive stuff. So things like road closures, destruction, burglaries, where you need an 
instant response. The guys in the control room are dealing with that and pushing stuff 
out straight away, rather than it then coming to us as a press release and sent off 
ďaĐk foƌ appƌoǀal fƌoŵ the offiĐeƌ… “o it's ŵoǀiŶg ŵoƌe iŶto a Đustoŵeƌ seƌǀiĐe 
fuŶĐtioŶ, as opposed to a Đoŵŵs fuŶĐtioŶ iŶ its tƌaditioŶal seŶse… Theƌe isŶ't a 
choice. You caŶ't haǀe it ďoth ǁaǇs… Foƌ ŵe peƌsoŶallǇ, it's aďout the iŶtegƌated 
comms. It's about them seeing the bigger picture and thinking outside of those silos, 
ďƌeakiŶg those silos doǁŶ͟. ;PI.ϴͿ 
 
Training and Experience 
"I think it's great when we do shake up the business by bringing people in from 
outside.  But, I think there's benefit in someone who knows the job of policing.  I say 
to people, I've said to my bosses here when I came down, yes, I'll be your head of 
corp coms but I've also got 12 years of policing experience so I know the business of 
policing. I know how things stick together politically, I get the culture of the place, I 
get what you're operationally trying to do.  So, you know, I have seen kind of peers 
come in from outside the industry and find quite a learning curve but at the same 
time, as long as they shake things up and bring in new ideas as well and it's healthy, 
haǀe a ŵiǆtuƌe… I doŶ't thiŶk ďƌiŶgiŶg iŶ people ǁith stƌoŶg jouƌŶalisŵ ďaĐkgƌouŶd is 
right for this kind of role.  Sometimes people will be brought in because they've got a 
strong journalistic background, actually they haven't worked in the wider 
communications and engagement so, that for me is a concern.  Less of a concern if 
they are people from a different sector moving with comms experience." (PI.11) 
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The Association of Police Communicators (APComm) 
Usefulness and Attendance: 
͞Ǉeah aŶd it͛s good, I still get iŶteƌest aŶd a kiĐk out of heaƌiŶg hoǁ otheƌ people 
haǀe Đoped ǁith Đƌisis ŵaŶageŵeŶt, that͛s oŶe of the ŵost diffiĐult things, you know, 
aŶd it͛s ǀeƌǇ easǇ to sit oŶ the side liŶes saǇ ǁhǇ oŶ eaƌth did Ǉou do that, ǁhǇ didŶ͛t 
you do that and then when you actually hear what goes on behind the scenes yeah 
ǀeƌǇ iŶteƌestiŶg.͟ ;PI.ϮϴͿ 
 
͞It͛s ǀiƌtuallǇ aĐƌoss all foƌĐes Ŷoǁ I think we had one or two outstanding non payers 
ďut the ǀast ŵajoƌitǇ aƌe Ŷoǁ ŵeŵďeƌs, ŵeŵďeƌship is a pittaŶĐe … aŶd fƌoŵ that 
you get subsidised training that we do, media law training we did this year and we 
put a conference on for next to nothing so theƌe͛s ŵuĐh ďetteƌ liŶks Ŷoǁ, ŵoƌe 
ĐoŶtaĐts aŶd eŵails foƌ people so Ǉou get iŶfoƌŵatioŶ out to theŵ, theƌe͛s still loads 
of work to do but it is improving and we did the first conference for a few years last 
year and were thinking we could get away with not having to do one until 2015 but 
everybody wanted it, because people in a world where training budgets are virtually 
non-existent and given the opportunity to network is increasingly reduced because 
Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t get out the offiĐe, to ďe aďle to do it at least one point during the year, cling 
to it.͟ ;PI.ϮϯͿ 
 
͞Yes, I ŵeaŶ like all ĐoŶfeƌeŶĐes it depeŶds oŶ the suďjeĐt ŵatteƌ, ǁhetheƌ it͛s 
iŶteƌestiŶg, Ǉou kŶoǁ, I ŵeaŶ I haǀeŶ͛t ďeeŶ to oŶe foƌ seǀeƌal Ǉeaƌs, ďeĐause ǁe 
tend to share it round, so the same people doŶ͛t go eǀeƌǇ Ǉeaƌ aŶd I ŵeaŶ ǁheŶ I͛ǀe 
goŶe I fouŶd it useful, I fouŶd the Đhat… pƌoďaďlǇ ŵoƌe useful thaŶ the aĐtual 
pƌeseŶtatioŶs theŵselǀes.͟ ;PI.ϮϴͿ  
 
3.2.2 Overview of Department  
Staff: 
͞ǁe had stƌuĐtuƌes ǁheƌe ǁe had aƌea ďased ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs teams in our five basic 
command units as they were called. So you would have had a comms manager, plus 
one or two comms officers and we had a central bit here at HQ where the internal 
comms sat and where this team, the graphic design, etc. sat. So in order to reduce 
costs and to take that budget hit they centralised the service, so we took all of the 
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aƌea people, ďƌought theŵ iŶ house. Got ƌid of that ǁhole ŵiddle leǀel of ŵaŶageƌs… 
Put a couple more seniors in and then kind of levelled everyone out... So we lost I 
think five, full time equivalents. Most were redeployed so redundancies were kept to 
a ŵiŶiŵuŵ͟. ;PI.ϲͿ 
 
͞ǁe'ǀe got aŶ assistaŶt pool of people, theǇ pƌoǀide ǁhat ǁe Đall ouƌ Ŷeǁs huď aŶd 
they are central, everything coming in. So requests from officers for press releases, 
media inquiries, responding to social media, so they do our social media monitoring, 
responding to inquiries, everything that we do on a day-to-day base comes in there. 
Then, we've got an operational side of the business and an orgaŶisatioŶal side… The 
operational officers take on those proactive campaigns and the major incidents, so 
your murders, serious sexual offences, those inquiries and your organisational take 
on your change projects. So all of those officers have priority projects, and they are 
split by the organisational operational need as opposed to you're a press officer, 
Ǉou'ƌe a ǁeď ĐoŶteŶt, Ǉou'ƌe a ŵaƌketeƌ.͟ ;PI.ϭϳͿ 
 
Professionalisation: 
 ͞But fƌoŵ ǁhat I͛ǀe seeŶ I ǁould aƌgue it͛s ďetteƌ to haǀe pƌofessioŶal people 
running departments to kind of make decisions based on their knowledge about how 
Ǉou ĐaŶ use ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͟. ;PI.ϯͿ 
 
͞I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ǁhǇ ǁe haǀe poliĐeŵaŶ iŶ Đhaƌge of Đoŵŵs oƌ ǁoƌkiŶg iŶ these 
departments; they are not qualified, they don't know what they are talking about, 
aŶd that's ǁhǇ it's a ŵess… All ďaĐkƌooŵ fuŶĐtioŶs should ďe ƌuŶ ďǇ pƌofessioŶals 
who know what they are doing - we don't have untrained civilians policing the 
streets, so why should we have untrained police officers running the business side of 
thiŶgs?͟  (PI.5) 
 
͞ǁheŶ I staƌted, the pƌess offiĐe, foƌ eǆaŵple, ǁas ƌuŶ ďǇ a, he ǁas ďǇ theŶ, aŶ eǆ-
Chief Inspector but he started in the role as a Chief Inspector and then retired into 
the role.  It had a Sargent in it and a PC and it also employed a couple of ex-officers as 
well and I think the thing was that Corporate Communications was, kind of, seen as 
mainly press and they thought as long as you had people who are used to dealing 
ǁith the ŵedia aŶd haǀiŶg aŶ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of laǁ, theŶ that͛s ok, and yeah, over 
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the years, that has really changed, ok, I mean, I followed a Chief Super Intendant who 
used to do this role, the problem, one of the problems that I see with having Police 
Officers in the role is that they tend to come in particularly at my level, they tend to 
come in, change things and move on for promotion, so there is very much a culture 
that if you want to get promoted you have to appeared to have changed things, so 
they would tinker with the way that communications was done, which meant there 
was no stability, there was no understanding throughout the organisation of the way 
that communications should be dealt with, so yes, I think there has been a real move 
toǁaƌds pƌofessioŶalisatioŶ of it.͟ ;PI.ϭϬͿ 
 
͞It͛s ĐhaŶged ǀeƌǇ ŵuĐh fƌoŵ then to now, so this is the other change in comms, 
where you will employ a professional head of service, not expect a police officer to be 
able to run it. The department here previously had a professional head of 
communications, but you should be really careful about what skills and what type of 
department you wanted to be.  Because my understanding is, when they first had a 
professional head of comms seven or eight years ago, the advert created a post 
where somebody was a bit of a media personality, as opposed to running a 
professional corporate comms department. So despite them wanting a head of 
Đoƌpoƌate Đoŵŵs to ďe a pƌofessioŶal ƌole, theǇ didŶ͛t get oŶe seǀeŶ Ǉeaƌs ago, it 
was somebody who was more interested in media spin, if you like, than running a 
coƌpoƌate Đoŵŵs depaƌtŵeŶt.  “o that͛s hoǁ ǁe eŶded up goiŶg ďaĐk to a poliĐe 
offiĐeƌ ƌuŶŶiŶg it.͟ ;PI.ϮϭͿ 
 
 ͞I͛ŵ the fiƌst pƌofessioŶal head as faƌ as ǁe kŶoǁ, iŶ foƌtǇ Ǉeaƌs. Theƌe ǁas a Đhief 
inspector or a superintendent to do this job. And you might think, why would you 
make a chief inspector head of coms? What do they know about coms? Well yeah. 
But what do they know about learning development? What do they know about HR? 
Well now all these jobs are covered by staff coz warranted officers are given jobs 
where you have to be a trained, warranted officer to do it. And you might say well, 
that souŶds pƌettǇ oďǀious doesŶ͛t it? But theƌe ǁas Ŷeǀeƌ aŶǇ Ŷeed foƌ the poliĐe to 
thiŶk diffeƌeŶtlǇ till the ŵoŶeǇ staƌted dƌǇiŶg out.͟ ;PI.ϰͿ 
 
͞I thiŶk pƌoďaďlǇ ǁhat happened, in a sense, that public relations has been a sort of 
eǀolǀiŶg skill hasŶ͛t it aŶd as it͛s eǀolǀed it͛s ďeĐoŵe ŵoƌe sophistiĐated aŶd as it͛s 
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ďeĐoŵe ŵoƌe sophistiĐated it͛s ďeeŶ oďǀious Ǉou Ŷeed speĐialised people to do it.  
Whereas I think when it was in its infancy there was this assumption that anybody 
could take it on.  That would be the same probably for public relations in any 
organisation because I used to work in television publicity for example and all we 
really did there was literally write pƌess ƌeleases.  We didŶ͛t ƌiŶg up the ŵedia get the 
ŵedia to Đoŵe oŶ loĐatioŶ theƌe ǁouldŶ͛t ďe aŶǇ otheƌ sides of it like theƌe ǁould 
these days, like doing internal communications or public relations, it was all very 
ŵuĐh opeƌatioŶs.͟ (PI.15) 
 
͞All ƌight fiƌst ƋuestioŶ Ŷo, ǁe doŶ͛t haǀe aŶǇ poliĐe offiĐeƌs oƌ eǆ-police officers in 
the uŶit aŶǇŵoƌe… pƌioƌ to that it ǁas also a seŶioƌ offiĐeƌ at the eŶd of theiƌ teŶuƌe 
just riding out the clock ever so slightly.  So I think there is a level of recognition 
aƌouŶd the faĐt that this is a ǀeƌǇ speĐialist seƌǀiĐe that͛s ďeiŶg pƌoǀided aŶd Ǉou 
either invest in it properly, you either get the right staff to do it and you employ the 
right tactics, the right methods, the right science to fully understand what you need 
to do aŶd the diffeƌeŶĐe Ǉou͛ƌe ŵakiŶg aŶd doiŶg it oƌ Ǉou doŶ͛t do it at all. I thiŶk, 
Ǉou kŶoǁ, that͛s the ƌealitǇ of it fƌoŵ a poliĐiŶg poiŶt of ǀieǁ aŶd I saǇ that ďeĐause 
Ǉou go ďaĐk to pƌoďaďlǇ ϭϬ, ϭϱ Ǉeaƌs ago… Ǉou pƌoďaďlǇ Đould aƌgue that a comms 
function within a police force was maybe a bit of a luxury, because there were 
processes in place there where crime reporters and local area reporters went straight 
to the local sergeant or inspector or they sat down once a week with a detective chief 
inspector and, you know, in some senses they were just looking through the logbook 
and they were picking out jobs directly from the logbook and they were talking to the 
sergeant about it, getting some detail and that prompted their stories.  So a lot of the 
stuff, although it was quite slow in getting out, they were getting it directly from the 
hoƌse͛s ŵouth aŶd I thiŶk Đoŵŵs teaŵs ǁeƌe pƌoďaďlǇ seeŶ as a ďit of a delaǇ taĐtiĐ 
ƌatheƌ thaŶ soŵethiŶg of aĐtual use iŶ seƌǀiŶg the pƌess.͟ (PI.22). 
 
Operational Position: 
 ͞ǁheŶ I fiƌst Đaŵe heƌe, Đoŵŵs ǁas optioŶal… it ǁas a diffeƌeŶt ǁoƌld theŶ to ďe 
fair in lots of respects. Back 10 years ago we had a different Chief Constable, focused 
on media so we started to get a bit more about people being bothered where 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ sits aŶd that͛s just gƌoǁŶ aŶd gƌoǁŶ aŶd soŵetiŵes it fƌustƌates 
ďeĐause Đoŵŵs is the last oŶ the ageŶda!͟ ;PI.ϮϯͿ 
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͞BaĐk iŶ the ϵϬs, the ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs offiĐe ǁas ŵostlǇ left out of opeƌatioŶal 
policing. Police officers had preferred journalists and it was very common that the 
first thing the press office would hear of a situation would be from the newspaper 
the Ŷeǆt daǇ… “oŵe offiĐeƌs still doŶ't like the ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs depaƌtŵeŶt, ďut theǇ 
kŶoǁ theǇ haǀe to talk to us Ŷoǁ͟. ;PI.ϮϲͿ 
 
͞I think it is absolutely seen as part of what we do, I think people absolutely 
understand the importance of it and part of that is because people understand the 
importance of it because it helps, so they understand you can put out witness 
appeals and do things like that, so that actually it can help them with solving some 
issues ďut also theǇ͛ǀe seeŶ a lot of Đases ǁheƌe it goes ǁƌoŶg aŶd ƌeputatioŶ gets, 
you know, damaged, irreparably. So, yeah, so my team for example, the press office 
are always involved in things very early, we have regular meetings with PSD around 
misconduct type cases, so we are aware of those. I sit at every single COG meeting, 
our Chief Officer Group meeting; I report into the Deputy Chief Constable, so as 
before, it was a Chief Super InteŶdaŶt  aŶd it ǁasŶ͛t seeŶ as… it ǁas paƌt of 
soŵethiŶg else, it͛s Ŷoǁ seeŶ … as aŶ iŶĐƌediďlǇ iŵpoƌtaŶt iŶtegƌal paƌt of thiŶgs aŶd 
I thiŶk that͛s, soƌt of, ĐhaŶged ƌight aĐƌoss the ĐouŶtƌǇ. Although iŶteƌestiŶglǇ, the 
cuts have meant in some areas it has gone back to where it was before and I think 
that theǇ ǁill, Ƌuite hoŶestlǇ, liǀe to ƌegƌet that ďeĐause I just doŶ͛t thiŶk that it͛s a 
sustaiŶaďle ǁaǇ of dealiŶg ǁith thiŶgs ƌeallǇ͟. ;PI.ϭϬͿ 
 
͞We haǀe ǀeƌǇ stƌoŶg liŶks iŶto the opeƌatioŶal side of the ďusiness. We are 
effeĐtiǀelǇ aŶ opeƌatioŶal depaƌtŵeŶt. Theƌe͛s Ƌuite a ƌuď, I thiŶk, ďetǁeeŶ us aŶd 
the home office - around the home office including coms in what you would call back 
offiĐe suppoƌt. Well ǁe͛ƌe Ŷot. We aƌe aŶ opeƌatioŶal teaŵ, ǁe ͚ƌe deploǇable. 
WheŶeǀeƌ theƌe͛s soŵethiŶg happeŶiŶg, ǁe͛ƌe paƌt of that ƌesouƌĐiŶg, ǁe͛ƌe paƌt of 
the opeƌatioŶ. “o theƌe aƌe ďits of it that aƌeŶ͛t opeƌatioŶal, ďut pƌiŵaƌilǇ ǁe aƌe 
there to support the investigation team, to support front line policing and to help get 
the intelligence and the witness appeals and information back to help progress 
iŶǀestigatioŶs͟. (PI.6) 
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͚Eŵďedded͛: 
͞It's ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ eŵďedded… I see the Đhief ĐoŶstaďle eǀeƌǇ MoŶdaǇ ŵoƌŶiŶg foƌ half aŶ 
hour and take all the senior officers through what public relations and comms activity 
we've got planned for the next eight days every Monday morning. So we are a key 
part of what we do and during our response, absolutely, we are part of the big 
responsible, even more and more now, the part of how do we deliver the service, sit 
closer to the training. When does training become internal communication and when 
does internal comms become a training issue. And we're working through those at 
the moment because that's absolutely critical to deliver the service pƌopeƌlǇ.͟ ;PI.ϭϮͿ  
 
͞The ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs teaŵ is iŶǀolǀed at all leǀels of opeƌatioŶ, Đultuƌe ĐhaŶge, 
improvements and changes. We're not just broadcasting message for police officers 
we're part of crafting them, setting the communications strategy and fully involved in 
all aspeĐts of poliĐiŶg͟. ;PI.ϭϰͿ 
 
͞I thiŶk ǁe'ƌe eŵďedded, ďeĐause ǁe'ƌe Đƌoss-operations and organisational, and 
both of those are just as important, because actually organisational risk, a lot of it is 
managed through your communications… I thiŶk that ǁe aƌe ǀeƌǇ foƌtuŶate... 
because we are respected and just as an officer would call a tactical fire arms officer 
to give them professional advice, we are seen as those professional advisors. There's 
still more to embed that, but absolutely, we're at the heart of reputation 
management and operational success. So I think from that position, I'd say that we 
aƌe aŶ eŶaďliŶg seƌǀiĐe to the ƌest of the oƌgaŶisatioŶ.͟ ;PI.ϭϳͿ 
 
͚CoŵpleŵeŶtaƌǇ͛: 
͞the good thiŶg is that the poliĐe offiĐeƌs aƌe ŵoƌe aǁare of communications these 
daǇs aŶd it͛s Ŷot just doŶe ďǇ the poliĐe.  TheǇ͛ƌe ŵoƌe likelǇ to Đall the 
communications team and particularly for media now that may of course have 
something to do with all the bad publicity about officers being arrested for tipping off 
the ŵedia ǁith iŶfoƌŵatioŶ etĐ͟. ;PI.ϭϱͿ 
 
͚OptioŶal͛: 
͞I thiŶk Ƌuite ofteŶ - I think too often to be honest – it͛s a ďit of aŶ add oŶ. “o 
something that is kind of pulled out of the box when they need it.  A lot of activity 
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that goes on in the force we quite often get brought into too late in the day really. So 
tǇpiĐallǇ ǁe͛d ďe asked ĐaŶ Ǉou do this ƌatheƌ thaŶ should ǁe do this, if that ŵakes 
seŶse.  “o ǁe͛ǀe ďeeŶ ďƌought iŶ at the ďaĐk eŶd of the pƌoĐess ǁheƌeas if ǁe ǁeƌe 
at the start we would be saying actually there is a real comms opportunity here 
ďeĐause ǁe thiŶk ǁe should ďe doiŶg this, this…  You ĐaŶ see it iŶ eǀeƌǇ ŵeetiŶg ǁe 
go to on the agenda is like media is on the end of the spiel - doŶ͛t take it peƌsoŶallǇ. 
Even the whole sort of re-structure that we had, previously my role would be 
reporting direct into some of my Chief Officer teams probably the Chief Constable 
whereas now my role sits below a Super Intendant who reports to a Chief Super up to 
Chief Officer team.  So that symbolically pushes comms a bit down the agenda I 
thiŶk͟. ;PI.ϭϴͿ 
 
In Transition: 
͞It ǁas seeŶ as soŵethiŶg optioŶal aŶd additioŶal.  CeƌtaiŶlǇ that ĐoƌŶeƌ has ďeeŶ 
turned.  The review they did a year ago before I came in, realigned corporate 
communications back to the deputy chief constable's portfolio which I think is the 
most common model for most other forces.  It recommended getting rid of 
temporary police officers overseeing it and bringing it back in as subject specialist in 
department – which is where I caŵe iŶ.͟  ;PI.ϭϭͿ 
 
͞I thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe Ŷot igŶoƌed, ǁe͛ƌe ǀeƌǇ ŵuĐh a paƌt of the plaŶŶiŶg that goes iŶ to aŶǇ 
operation for instance.  Media is an essential part on the operation order that they 
pƌoduĐe.  “o ǁe͛ƌe iŶ theƌe fƌoŵ the staƌt.  I thiŶk ŵaǇďe that͛s on sort of the big 
operations, I think maybe on the smaller things that happen I think just very 
oĐĐasioŶallǇ aŶ offiĐeƌ ǁill ďe goiŶg thƌough theiƌ ĐheĐklist aŶd thiŶk ǁell I haǀeŶ͛t 
told the ŵedia, so I thiŶk Ǉou͛ƌe theƌe͛s a little ďit of the last thought soŵetiŵes...͟ 
(PI.28)  
 
Responsibility for Operational Position: 
͞Ǉou do Ŷeed the seŶioƌ offiĐeƌ ďuǇ-in and one of the difficulties is facing forces and it 
faces us as well is having enough influence at the top table in terms of comms. If you 
go back to the model of the ideal models of PR, should the PR be influencing the 
behaviour of the executive? Yeah because we're being influenced by the public if 
ǁe'ƌe listeŶiŶg pƌopeƌlǇ.͟ ;PI.ϭϮͿ  
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͞I kŶoǁ fƌoŵ speakiŶg to otheƌ Đolleagues iŶ otheƌ foƌĐes if Ǉou͛ǀe got a senior 
ĐoŵŵaŶd teaŵ that thiŶk it͛s just a ďit of fluffǇ P‘ ǁe ĐaŶ get the offiĐeƌs to do that 
tǁeetiŶg stuff aŶd faĐeďookiŶg so ǁe doŶ͛t Ŷeed theŵ, ĐoŵpletelǇ ŵisses the 
iŵpliĐatioŶs aŶd theǇ soŵetiŵes ŵake deĐisioŶs that theǇ doŶ͛t uŶdeƌstaŶd.͟ ;PI.23)   
 
3.2.3 Public Relations in the Police 
Role and Purpose of Police Communications: 
List: 
͞ϭͿ to ŵaŶage pƌess eŶƋuiƌies aŶd keep theŵ happǇ to poliĐe offiĐeƌs aƌe left aloŶe. 
2) creating the corporate identity of the force 
3) promoting visibility of police officers and key messages 
4) dealing with enquiries from the public 
5) providing tactical advice to police officers  
6) Answering FOI requests 
ϳͿ pƌiŵaƌǇ ƌole, hoǁeǀeƌ, is to "ǁaƌŶ aŶd iŶfoƌŵ" aŶd "sell the poliĐe foƌĐe͟. ;PI.ϮͿ 
 
Ideological: 
͞“o if Ǉou want to say, what is our purpose? Well our purpose is actually to help 
eitheƌ solǀe Đƌiŵe oƌ to ŵake people feel ďetteƌ aďout the poliĐe aŶd so oŶ.͟ ;PI.ϰͿ 
 
͞I'd saǇ ǁe'ƌe the guaƌdiaŶ of the ďƌuŶt. Whateǀeƌ that ŵight eŶtail, ǁhetheƌ it's the 
proactive things that we are putting out or whether it's reactive stuff coming in. I 
think it's our role to ensure that the organization is represented in a way that's 
consistent with the values that we have as a police force; being professional and 
friendly and interested is one of them and I think openness, transparency, that's 
what we need to be driving and pushing through and also set in that agenda from an 
iŶteƌŶal peƌspeĐtiǀe.͟ ;PI.ϵͿ 
 
͞But the uŶdeƌliŶiŶg theŵe is the ŵissioŶ, the poliĐiŶg ŵissioŶ… We should be 
achieving operational policing outcomes.  And I include in that solving crime, 
preventing crime by doing awareness campaigns and providing that reassurance and 
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ĐoŶfideŶĐe ďeĐause theǇ'ƌe keǇ poliĐiŶg outĐoŵes.  That's ǁhat ǁe should ďe doiŶg.͟ 
(PI.12) 
 
 ͞I see the puƌpose of the Đoŵs depaƌtŵeŶt to ǁoƌk ǁith fƌoŶtliŶe poliĐe offiĐeƌs aŶd 
iŶǀestigatoƌs to pƌeǀeŶt aŶd ƌeduĐe aŶd solǀe Đƌiŵe. That͛s ouƌ fuŶdaŵeŶtal as faƌ as 
I͛ŵ ĐoŶĐeƌŶed. That is ouƌ fuŶdaŵeŶtal puƌpose heƌe. As paƌt of that though theƌe͛ll 
be things like reputation managements, crisis management, etc. But that all kind of 
foƌŵs paƌt of that… We aƌe Ŷot Ŷoƌ should ǁe ďe a puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs depaƌtŵeŶt oƌ a 
marketing department. We want to promote the successes of the police, absolutely, 
but ouƌ fuŶdaŵeŶtal ƌeasoŶ foƌ ďeiŶg is that ǁe͛ƌe aŶ opeƌatioŶal depaƌtŵeŶt 
puttiŶg opeƌatioŶal poliĐe offiĐeƌs oŶ the gƌouŶd aŶd oŶ the fƌoŶtliŶe.͟ ;PI.ϲͿ 
 
Most Important Aspects of Modern Police Communications: 
͞I thiŶk iŶteƌŶal Đoŵŵs is as iŵpoƌtaŶt if Ŷot ŵoƌe iŵpoƌtaŶt thaŶ eǆteƌŶal Đoŵŵs… 
BeĐause if ǁe͛ƌe dealiŶg ǁith a ďig Đase theŶ I͛ŵ iŶteƌested iŶ telliŶg the foƌĐe ǁhat͛s 
going on first before they read it in the papers. Because sure as hell the papers will 
distoƌt it aŶǇǁaǇ so that͛s Ƌuite iŵpoƌtaŶt to me to get a message to the force, this is 
ǁhat͛s goiŶg oŶ, these aƌe the faĐts ďefoƌe it goes out to the ŵedia iŶ geŶeƌal.͟ 
(PI.13) 
 
͞I thiŶk it͛s tǁofold aŶd I thiŶk the ƌoles haǀe pƌoďaďlǇ ƌeǀeƌsed eǀeƌ so slightlǇ oƌ 
certainly the level of importance bestowed on certain aspects has changed ever so 
slightly.  Clearly the two main arms of what we do are to keep the force, to keep our 
poliĐe offiĐeƌs aŶd staff updated… EƋuallǇ Ǉou͛ǀe theŶ got the puďliĐ side of the 
business whereby we need to provide the public with a window into the world of 
policing, whether that be to help us solve crimes, to help us catch bad people, to help 
theŵ kŶoǁ ǁheƌe to aǀoid if theƌe͛s a ŵajoƌ ƌoad Đlosuƌe iŶ plaĐe, all that ƌealtiŵe 
information, but also that ethics, the integrity side of the business and the open and 
transparency stuff where they need to be able to see what their police forces do, 
ǁho ǁe aƌe, ǁhat ǁe do, ǁhat ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg foƌ theŵ aŶd theǇ Ŷeed to ďe aďle to Đall 
us to aĐĐouŶt if theǇ thiŶk that soŵethiŶg͛s ǁƌong. So, you know, whereas before up 
until maybe a few years ago it was very much media and marketing, it was very much 
external and internal, I think chief officers are realising now that, you know, the bulk 
of the people that do your bidding need to be absolutely pivotal right slap-bang at 
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the centre of everything that we do and we need to do everything that we can do to 
keep theŵ fullǇ aďƌeast of ǁhat͛s goiŶg oŶ aƌouŶd the foƌĐe, ďeĐause theǇ͛ƌe the 
oŶes that ǁe Ŷeed to ďuǇ iŶ, theǇ͛ƌe the keǇ stakeholdeƌs foƌ the poliĐe, theǇ͛ƌe the 
oŶes that ǁill deliǀeƌ this leǀel of seƌǀiĐe iŶ the futuƌe, it͛s ǀital to haǀe that iŶteƌŶal 
Đoŵŵs eleŵeŶt ƌight.͟ ;PI.ϮϮͿ 
 
͞Foƌ ŵe, the ďƌaŶd is pƌoďaďlǇ the ŵost iŵpoƌtaŶt thiŶg aŶd ǁhetheƌ that's ǁhat ouƌ 
external communication looks like in terms of print format or whether that's what 
people look like when they're out on the street talking to people, it's all about the 
brand. And I think that's one of the things we lacked. We lacked that consistency. We 
lacked that co-operatioŶ, alŵost… We haǀe ǁhat I like to thiŶk as ouƌ TesĐo ďƌaŶd, so 
we don't deviate from that. We've got quite strict brand guidelines, which has taken 
people a long time to get used to. But it means that there's a consistency in all of our 
communications, whether that's online, offline, things that we don't use, 
photogƌaphs.͟  (PI.8) 
 
͞pƌiŵaƌilǇ ǁe aƌe theƌe to suppoƌt the iŶǀestigatioŶ teaŵ, to suppoƌt fƌoŶt liŶe 
policing and to help get the intelligence and the witness appeals and information 
back to help pƌogƌess iŶǀestigatioŶs.͟ ;PI.ϲͿ 
 
Definitions of Public Relations: 
 ͞I doŶ't ƌeallǇ kŶoǁ, I ƌeallǇ doŶ͛t. It͛s Ƌuit ĐoŶfusiŶg. I suppose It's about managing 
the puďliĐ aŶd ouƌ ƌelatioŶship ǁith theŵ so that eǀeƌǇoŶe is happǇ͟. ;PI.ϳͿ 
 ͞You kŶoǁ if Ǉou said to people ǁhat is puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs ǁell theƌe isŶ͛t aĐtuallǇ 
anything they could point at and say that was public relations... It can be what you 
Đhoose to ŵake it aŶd it͛s aŶ iŶeǆaĐt sĐieŶĐe isŶ͛t it?͟ ;PI.ϭϯͿ 
 
͞PuďliĐ ƌelatioŶs, doŶe pƌopeƌlǇ, is aďout listeŶiŶg aŶd eŶgageŵeŶt… Well, ǁe'ƌe 
listeŶiŶg aŶd eŶgagiŶg all the tiŵe… You'ƌe ĐƌeatiŶg a ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ. You'ƌe taƌgetiŶg 
an audience. You're understanding what you're trying to deliver. Have they 
understood it? have they changed their behaviour? Have they changed their opinion? 
Those are the things you're doing. That's public relations work, isn't it, at the end of 
the daǇ… MaƌketiŶg, I thiŶk, is ŵoƌe output ďased… MaƌketiŶg is a tool ǁithiŶ the 
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public relations mix to reach an audience, but we don't like to see marketing purely 
as the end result. It's the engagement that that marketing can generate that turns it, 
in my view, into the public relations or engagements and content all  engagement is 
ŵaƌketiŶg iŶ soŵe ǁaǇs, isŶ't it?͟ ;PI.ϭϮͿ 
 
͞“o ǁe͛ǀe Ŷeǀer really had this public relations element to what goes on, because I 
think, you know, aside from anything we still have officers now who will walk around 
and go how much have you spun today and I pride myself on never having been in 
that position.  So I think the public relations element of it can have quite negative 
ĐoŶŶotatioŶs to a uŶit itself if Ǉou͛ƌe deeŵed to ďe ŵoƌe iŶteƌested iŶ ŵakiŶg suƌe 
we spin the right level of information at the right time or we keep back as much as 
we can do until we potentiallǇ put it out theƌe.͟ ;PI.ϮϮͿ 
 
Is PR Still Relevant to Police Communications? 
For: 
 ͞PoliĐe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs is still fuŶdaŵeŶtallǇ puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs - we just don't call it 
that aŶǇŵoƌe͟. ;PI.ϳͿ 
 
͞I fouŶd the P‘ ďit of ŵǇ ďaĐkgƌouŶd ǁas faƌ ŵoƌe useful in terms of the positive 
coverage, rather than fire-fighting, than knowing the law. There are still people in 
theƌe ǁho'd aƌgue ǁith ŵe.͟ ;PI.ϴͿ 
 
͞PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs does Đoŵe iŶ foƌ ďad P‘, iƌoŶiĐallǇ. I suppose the distƌiĐt offiĐeƌs, I 
would say, would get more involved in the traditional PR element if you like, where 
we might have local community tensions and things like that. But they play a really 
key role in supporting officers around some of that and the sensitivities that they 
maybe hire best to manage it. But from a central perspective, of course we all do PR 
ďut it's aŶ iŶteƌestiŶg oŶe ďeĐause Ǉeah, I doŶ͛t diffeƌeŶtiate it iŶ ŵǇ ŵiŶd if I'ŵ 
honest. I see it as all the same thing because whatever the reason you are doing it as 
for the ultimate end goal of actually whether it's protecting the force's reputation or 
promoting the force's reputation. So – aŶd the saŵe thiŶgs ƌuŶ thƌough ďoth.͟ ;PI.ϵͿ 
 
͞PuďliĐ ƌelatioŶs, doŶe pƌopeƌlǇ, is aďout listeŶiŶg aŶd eŶgageŵeŶt. Well, ǁe'ƌe 
listening and engaging all the tiŵe.͟ ;PI.ϭϮͿ 
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Against: 
͞DefiŶitelǇ Đoŵs. DefiŶitelǇ… I͛ǀe ǁoƌked iŶ P‘ so I kŶoǁ. I Đoŵe fƌoŵ a P‘ 
ĐoŶsultaŶĐǇ ďaĐkgƌouŶd, so aŶd that͛s Ŷot ǁhat ǁe do.͟ ;PI.ϲͿ 
 
͞It͛s ǀeƌǇ top doǁŶ isŶ͛t it like ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ theoƌǇ, it͛s ǀeƌǇ like top doǁŶ 
approach, sort of 1970s top down with top cat people I think, they associate that 
model of PR with kind of that period of the way that we used to sort of do 
communications and talking at people rather than it being bottom up sort of 
grassroots approaches and publiĐ led... “o ŵǇ kiŶd of joď title͛s eǀolǀed ǁith the kiŶd 
of puďliĐ iŵage of P‘, I͛ǀe kiŶd of Đut that off, ďeĐause I doŶ͛t thiŶk it͛s helpful.͟ 
(PI.16) 
 
͞I doŶ't use the phƌase to ďe peƌfeĐtlǇ hoŶest. We talk aďout ouƌselǀes as a 
communications team. We service the media, we service stake holders, we service 
the public directly and we service our internal customers.[long pause] I wouldn't 
really know how to define public relations which doesn't mean that I'm not 
interested in our relationship with the public, obviously that's what we're all about. It 
just feels a little ďut ƌeduŶdaŶt as a ĐoŶĐept.͟ ;PI.ϮϳͿ 
 
Change of Department Name 
Department Priorities: 
͞Coƌpoƌate ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs ďetteƌ ƌefleĐts ǁhat ǁe aƌe tƌǇiŶg to aĐhieǀe aŶd the 
professional nature of ouƌ ǁoƌk͟. ;PI.ϮͿ 
 
͞the ƌeasoŶ ǁhǇ ǁe͛ƌe Đalled the ŵedia depaƌtŵeŶt, Ŷot the kiŶd of ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs 
depaƌtŵeŶt, ďeĐause aĐtuallǇ theƌe͛s a diffeƌeŶĐe theƌe aŶd it ŵeaŶs Ǉou alǁaǇs 
pƌioƌitise ŵedia stuff.͟ ;PI.ϯͿ 
 
͞Wheƌe as ǁe used to Đall this pƌess aŶd P‘, it͛s Ŷoǁ Đalled Đoƌpoƌate Đoŵs, it͛s 
about us publishing information through our own sources and not and fundamentally 
giǀiŶg it to ŵedia Ŷets last oƌ seĐoŶd… But ǁhat I fiŶd is iŶteƌestiŶg, alŵost eǀeƌǇ 
police force has a team called corporate communicatioŶs Ŷoǁ, aŶd theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot Đalled 
head of pƌess oƌ P‘ oƌ ǁhateǀeƌ, it͛s all Đalled Đoƌpoƌate ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs, so theǇ͛ƌe 
oďǀiouslǇ, theƌe͛s a ďit of a tƌeŶd, soŵetiŵes theƌe͛s a ďit of a tƌeŶd toǁaƌds it. 
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CeƌtaiŶlǇ, Ǉou kŶoǁ it͛s iŶteƌestiŶg, I thiŶk that͛s probably a bit too sophisticated. I 
doŶ͛t thiŶk theƌe͛s aŶǇ ĐuŶŶiŶg plaŶ ďehiŶd ǁhǇ it͛s ďeeŶ ĐhaŶged. But I thiŶk all the 
Đoŵs ƌefleĐts the ƌole that ǁe do heƌe, ďeĐause it͛s aďout iŶteƌŶal Đoŵs as ŵuĐh as 
ŵaƌketiŶg, as ŵuĐh as aďout loĐal Đoŵs… “o it͛s Ƌuite ǁide spƌead ƌeallǇ… I thiŶk,  
who uses really public relations anymore? In fact who used press office anymore 
apaƌt fƌoŵ ŵe? You kŶoǁ, it͛s Ŷot so, it͛s all a ďit ŵisleadiŶg. “o Đoƌpoƌate Đoŵs 
aĐtuallǇ does saǇ it͛s aďout ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs aŶd ǁe͛ƌe Đalled Đoƌpoƌate Đoz ǁe͛ƌe a 
Đoƌpoƌate fuŶĐtioŶ aŶd Ŷot a loĐal fuŶĐtioŶ. It aĐtuallǇ ŵakes seŶse͟. ;PI.ϰͿ 
 
͞The Ŷaŵe͛s eǀolǀed ǁith ǁhat ǁe do; ďeĐause it did used to ďe just the pƌess offiĐe 
so it just used to deal with media and stuff and then we became media and 
marketing to cover the fact that we did events, corporate design work and all that 
kiŶd of thiŶg…͟ ;PI.ϭϴͿ 
 
͞No, I doŶ͛t thiŶk it͛s a ĐoŶsĐious thiŶg, I doŶ͛t thiŶk it͛s ďeeŶ doŶe deliďeƌatelǇ, 
ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ hasŶ͛t fƌoŵ ouƌ poiŶt of ǀieǁ.  We͛ǀe Ŷeǀeƌ been anything other than 
ŵaƌketiŶg aŶd ŵedia… aŶd Ŷoǁ ǁe͛ǀe goŶe iŶto Đoƌpoƌate ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs aŶd 
that͛s ŵaiŶlǇ ďeĐause ǁe͛ǀe got that ŵaŶǇ platfoƌŵs ǁe͛ƌe Ŷoǁ lookiŶg to seƌǀiĐe, 
ŵaƌketiŶg aŶd ŵedia ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ doesŶ͛t Đoǀeƌ it aŶǇŵoƌe, ǁe do so ŵuĐh ŵoƌe than 
ŵaƌketiŶg aŶd ǁe do so ŵuĐh ŵoƌe thaŶ ŵedia.  “o foƌ us it͛s aďout ĐhaŶgiŶg iŶto 
Đoƌpoƌate ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͟. ;PI.ϮϮͿ 
 
Distancing from Associations with Public Relations: 
 ͞People seeŵ to see P‘ as ďeiŶg soŵethiŶg ǁe do to aǀoid ďeiŶg aĐĐouŶtaďle aŶd 
hoŶest ǁith theŵ.͟ ;PI.ϭͿ 
 
͞We aƌe Ŷot Ŷoƌ should ǁe ďe a puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs depaƌtŵeŶt oƌ a ŵaƌketiŶg 
department. We want to promote the successes of the police, absolutely, but our 
fuŶdaŵeŶtal ƌeasoŶ foƌ ďeiŶg is that ǁe͛ƌe aŶ opeƌatioŶal depaƌtŵeŶt puttiŶg 
opeƌatioŶal poliĐe offiĐeƌs oŶ the gƌouŶd aŶd oŶ the fƌoŶtliŶe.͟ ;PI.ϲͿ 
 
͞I doŶ't like to use the teƌŵ P‘… people ƌightlǇ oƌ ǁƌoŶglǇ assoĐiate P‘ ǁith spiŶ aŶd 
politicians. PR itself is all about open communication but the negative connotations is 
why we use CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs foƌ a Ŷaŵe aŶd Ŷot PuďliĐ ‘elatioŶs͟. ;PI.ϮϲͿ 
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Part of Professionalization: 
͞I thiŶk this is the pƌofessioŶ is ĐhaŶgiŶg as ǁell iŶ teƌŵs of puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs… AŶd it's 
where we've been able to professionalise it because we don't want to be… just 
marketing because marketing is less palatable, I think, than public relations. Yes, we 
aƌe Đoƌpoƌate ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs͟. ;PI.ϭϮͿ 
 
͞“o I do ǁoŶdeƌ if the Ŷaŵe Đoƌpoƌate ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs Đaŵe out to alŵost 
suďliŵiŶal effoƌt to ĐoŶtƌol ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs… ǁhat actually quite interests me is 
that… has all the ƌiŶg of ǁe͛ll tell Ǉou like Đoƌpoƌate ǁhat the ĐoŵpaŶǇ liŶe is… I thiŶk 
it has that ĐoŶŶotatioŶ of Đoƌpoƌate… theƌe ǁas a tiŵe ǁheŶ people ǁeƌe ǀeƌǇ 
ƌeassuƌed ďǇ ͚this is the ĐoŵpaŶǇ liŶe͛ ǁheƌeas Ŷoǁ...͟ ;PI.15) 
 
Easier to Understand: 
͞Đoƌpoƌate ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs is aŶ easieƌ Ŷaŵe to eǆplaiŶ… puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs giǀes 
people ideas that aƌe theŶ haƌd to soƌt out.͟ ;PI.ϳͿ 
 
͞ďut ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ, the Ŷeǁ ǁoƌld that ǁe'ƌe iŶ, ǁe aƌe Đoƌpoƌate ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs. Theƌe 
is a very clear rational behind that, that actually we are not just press. There is a 
misconception even within the force that previously we were part of the press. Still, 
people would say 'can I tell you that?' 'Yes, you can tell us that'. So it was breaking 
down the barriers internally, but also recognising that communications is so much 
ďƌoadeƌ thaŶ just pƌess aŶd puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs Ŷoǁ, as Ǉou'ǀe oďǀiouslǇ ideŶtified.͟ 
(PI.17) 
 
Aspirational: 
͞ŵiŶe͛s ďeeŶ Đalled Đoƌpoƌate ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs siŶĐe I͛ǀe ďeeŶ heƌe ďeĐause I called 
it corporate comms right from the start, it used to be called media services.  I think 
it͛s paƌtlǇ, if I talk to people, eǀeŶ people ǁithiŶ the foƌĐe, theǇ͛ll still ƌefeƌ to ŵe as 
the media person, not really understanding that it is much, much wider than that , I 
thiŶk it͛s aĐtuallǇ paƌt of the, kiŶd of, poliĐe  Đultuƌe, it͛s aĐtuallǇ that that ǁas ǁhat 
the foĐus ǁas ďefoƌe.  ...  I thiŶk it͛s just that foƌ ŵe, puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs is a paƌt of it aŶd 
alǁaǇs has ďeeŶ, it͛s ďeeŶ a paƌt of the ǁideƌ ŵiǆ and in some forces... some people 
ǁould saǇ it͛s ŵaƌketiŶg, Ǉou see, so it ƌeallǇ does depeŶd oŶ alŵost oŶ ǁhat Ǉouƌ 
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background is, as to what you, sort of, think it should be and also what makes up 
Ǉouƌ depaƌtŵeŶt͟. ;PI.ϭϬͿ 
 
͞Yeah I thiŶk it ŵoƌe ƌefleĐts though… ǁe͛ǀe goŶe ďƌoadeƌ so it didŶ͛t ƌefleĐt a lot of 
it. I thiŶk it͛s Ŷot deliďeƌate atteŵpt ďeĐause ǁe used to ďe Đalled pƌess aŶd puďliĐ 
ƌelatioŶs, ǁell oŶe the pƌess doesŶ͛t eǆist as pƌess aŶǇŵoƌe aŶd the otheƌ thiŶg is 
that because of the expanding nature of what we were doing across the organisation 
it ǁas ŵoƌe to ƌefleĐt the ǁhole of the people that aƌe heƌe so that I haǀeŶ͛t got tǁo 
teaŵs that thiŶk theǇ͛ƌe pƌess aŶd P‘ aŶd that͛s all that ŵatteƌs aŶd all these otheƌ 
bits that we do are less impoƌtaŶt so it͛s ŵoƌe foĐused foƌ us oŶ aŶ iŶteƌŶal Ŷeed 
ƌatheƌ thaŶ eǆteƌŶal kiŶd of faĐiŶg…͟ ;PI.ϮϯͿ 
 
3.2.4 Communications Strategy  
 ͞aŶotheƌ aƌea ǁhiĐh I thiŶk ouƌ depaƌtŵeŶt paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ foĐusses oŶ is pƌeǀeŶtioŶ 
awareness raising and behaviour change communications in terms of helping people 
to not become victims of crime, so what can we do to help ensure that people have 
the iŶfoƌŵatioŶ, the kŶoǁledge that͛s goiŶg to pƌeǀeŶt theŵ fƌoŵ ďeĐoŵiŶg a ǀiĐtiŵ, 
ǁhetheƌ that͛s a ǀiĐtiŵ of a ďuƌglaƌǇ oƌ a ǀiĐtiŵ of doŵestiĐ aďuse it͛s Ƌuite ǀaƌied, 
ďut that kiŶd of ƌaŶge I ǁould saǇ.͟ ;PI.ϭϲͿ 
 
 ͞I ǁould saǇ ǁe do pƌaĐtisiŶg ďehaǀiouƌs. That͛s ǁhǇ ǁe do these ĐaŵpaigŶs to saǇ 
loĐk Ǉouƌ house, loĐk it oƌ lose it, all of these kiŶd of ŵessages, if Ǉou͛ƌe goiŶg out 
after dark, so I would say that bit is trying to change behaviours.  In terms of the Push 
aŶd Pull, it is ŵoƌe aloŶg the liŶes of Ǉeah, heƌe is the ŵessage, heƌe͛s ǁhat͛s goiŶg 
oŶ, aŶd  ǁe do, ǁe leaǀe it opeŶ foƌ diƌeĐtioŶ ďut ǁe͛ƌe a sŵall teaŵ, so the ŵore 
iŶteƌaĐtioŶ Ǉou get, the ŵoƌe Ǉou͛ǀe got to ŵaŶage that so ǁe do get iŶteƌaĐtioŶ…͟ 
(PI.19b) 
 
͞I ǁaŶt the ŵajoƌitǇ of the aĐtiǀitǇ to ďe foĐused oŶ – to be around at the least, 
engagement, ideally actual behaviour change, so I hope it makes them, – that will 
happily stop them being a victim, happily made them take preventative actions.  
Those are the kind of outcomes I want to see.  A lot of police officers still see effective 
Đoŵs as deliǀeƌiŶg that aǁaƌeŶess, just the uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg.͟ ;PI.ϭϭͿ 
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͞If you go up to the four models from public relations etc., we were very much press 
agency. We shout out what we did. That's how police comms was, and particularly 
when you had police officers running it. But now we're not symmetrical, but we're 
not far off at times. We ǁill ƌespoŶd to deŵaŶd… If ǁe'ƌe piĐkiŶg up ƌuŵouƌs of Đhild 
abductions, we will put posts out there to provide the facts and that people make the 
decision. We try and be the most credible, trusted voice. Whenever I train anybody 
on social media, that's the absolute value that they have, to protect to being the 
credible trusted voice. It's okay to say you don't know what's going on until you do 
know what's going on. I'd much rather that than us guess and put something out 
ǁƌoŶg.͟ ;PI.ϭϮͿ. 
 
͞It's aďout having those conversations. So yes, we push stuff out, but we should also 
be jumping into conversations that are happening in our local communities. So a big 
part of the local social media accounts is to keep an eye out about what's your local 
council saying and what are local people saying. Are they talking about something 
that actually, we should be talking about too. Is there a way for us to jump into the 
conversation and be part of that community?  I don't like the word engagement 
because you don't engage with somebody in a pub, do you? You don't engage with 
your friend in the pub. You talk to them. You talk with them and this is what this is 
about. It's talking with and that's what all our social media accounts should be about. 
It should be about talkiŶg.͟ ;PI.ϮϱaͿ  
 
͞it͛s a peƌsoŶal ǀieǁ, ďut I thiŶk ǁe aspiƌe to ďe pull [loŶg pause] ďut I doŶ͛t thiŶk 
ǁe͛ƌe aĐtuallǇ ǀeƌǇ good at it… I thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe ǀeƌǇ used to telliŶg people, I thiŶk it 
Đoŵes fƌoŵ a ĐoŵŵaŶd ethos that͛s iŶ the poliĐe, Ǉou kŶoǁ, ǁe͛ll tell you what 
ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg, ǁe doŶ͛t aĐtuallǇ eŶgage Ǉou iŶ the deďate aďout ǁhat ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg.͟ 
(PI.28)  
 
4.2.5 Social and Digital Media  
Social Media: 
͞I thiŶk ŵoƌe aŶd ŵoƌe ǁe'ƌe goiŶg to ďe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatiŶg ǁith the puďliĐ oŶliŶe. I 
think you're probably going to see fewer offices out there. You'll be expecting more 
conversations online, more online reporting and responding and so on. So I think 
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that's the way it's going to go. And the media will be provided with more and more 
video so that it's not just flat press releases and so on and the public will see officers 
talking. So it will be raising their profile and getting the odd messages of, I don't 
know, building our integrity of how the public see us, like building their confidence in 
us as they probably see us less.͟ ;PI.ϮϱBͿ  
 
͞CeƌtaiŶlǇ if it's iŶfoƌŵatioŶ aŶd adǀiĐe Ǉou ǁaŶt, hoǁ do I do X? You'll go to the 
website first, almost certainly. If it's a slightly more complex problem, and I will do 
this as well, you might just google, how do I fix a leaky battery in my Toyota and 
actually you'll probably find the answer in a forum somewhere. And only if you get 
really stuck will you then go to the phone, because you know that you'll probably end 
up in a phone queuing system, the person you speak to on the phone might not be 
able to offer you a very good service anyway, they might not even understand your 
problem and it will take you five to ten minutes. Whereas bang bang bang and you're 
in control if you're googling and you can filter our bad advice. That's what public 
customer behaviour is like and we're not in that space, we're not playing at this 
space. So what we, our next phase if you like of social media activity is about using it 
as a public contact channel, so that people can get in touch with us for advice and 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ aŶd theŶ also it ďeĐoŵes paƌt of a Đustoŵeƌ seƌǀiĐe ĐhaŶŶel as ǁell.͟ 
(PI.27) 
 
͞I ŵeaŶ I thiŶk, ĐleaƌlǇ the futuƌe has to ďe that soĐial ŵedia oƌ ǁhateǀeƌ it ďeĐoŵes, 
or whatever is the proper description. Online, lets say online. Online reporting, which 
soŵe poliĐe foƌĐes do, ĐleaƌlǇ that͛s goiŶg to ďe theƌe Đoz if I ǁaŶted to ƌepoƌt a 
Đƌiŵe, that͛s hoǁ I͛d ǁaŶt to do it. You kŶoǁ, uŶless theƌe ǁas a ϵϵϵ eŵeƌgeŶĐǇ, I͛d 
saǇ I͛d ǁaŶŶa do it ŵǇ eŵail oƌ ďǇ teǆt oƌ ǁhateǀeƌ it tuƌŶs out to ďe. It doesŶ͛t sit 
ǁith ouƌ depaƌtŵeŶt to do that, ďut I thiŶk it͛s iŶeǀitaďle that that͛s the ǁaǇ… 
actually I think people are emotionally attached to police stations. But reality is, 
ǀiƌtuallǇ ŶoďodǇ goes iŶto theŵ. It͛s the thought of haǀiŶg it, ƌatheƌ than the reality 
of usiŶg it.͟ ;PI.ϰͿ 
 
Interviewees Stance on Social Media: 
 ͞PeƌsoŶallǇ, I'ŵ Ŷot oŶ FaĐeďook. I'ŵ Ŷot oŶ Tǁitteƌ. AŶd I haǀe aďsolutelǇ Ŷo idea 
ǁhǇ aŶǇďodǇ ǁould ǁaŶt to ďe, hoŶestlǇ.͟ ;PI.ϴͿ 
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Pro Social Media: 
 ͞faŶtastiĐ ǁaǇ to eŶgage ǁith the puďliĐ͟. ;PI.ϭϳͿ 
 
͞PoliĐiŶg is Ŷot doŶe iŶ isolatioŶ - it needs all of the public because it is part of the 
public. Social media helps with this as it encourages public participation and opens up 
a new audience who don't look at the news - young people͟. ;PI.ϮϲͿ 
 
͞This is the ďiggest tool aŶd the ďiggest oppoƌtuŶitǇ the poliĐe haǀe had to diƌeĐtlǇ 
eŶgage ǁith the puďliĐ that theǇ seƌǀe. It͛s ďƌilliaŶt. Yes it has ƌisks, ďut it͛s aĐtuallǇ 
you know, brilliant and valuable beyond anything else really in terms of getting that 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ ďaĐk.͟ ;PI.ϲͿ 
 
͞“oĐial ŵedia Đould ďe oŶe of the ŵost ǀaluaďle aŶd iŵpoƌtaŶt deǀelopŵeŶts iŶ 
poliĐiŶg foƌ ŵaŶǇ Ǉeaƌs. No ĐoŵŵeŶt isŶ͛t aŶ optioŶ ǁith soĐial ŵedia, so ǁe haǀe to 
talk to the public, we have to keep them updated͟. ;PI.ϭͿ 
 
͞Theƌe aƌe soŵe aƌeas ǁheƌe theǇ ǁaŶt to folloǁ us oŶ tǁitteƌ aŶd folloǁ soĐial 
ŵedia, ďut theǇ doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to see a poliĐe Đaƌ… Đoz it ŵight iŵplǇ theƌe͛s a Đƌiŵe iŶ 
theiƌ ƌoad… “o soŵe aƌeas theǇ ǁaŶt to see poliĐe patƌolliŶg, Đoz that͛s ƌeassuring. In 
otheƌ aƌeas, people aƌe put off… “o it͛s Ŷot eǀeŶ as siŵple as get ŵoƌe Đops out, Đoz 
iŶ soŵe aƌeas it doesŶ͛t ǁoƌk.͟ ;PI.ϰͿ  
 
Against: 
 ͞ǁhat I'ǀe fouŶd oǀeƌ the last feǁ Ǉeaƌs is that ŵost of the iŶfoƌŵatioŶ poliĐe put 
out on social media is just ͞Ŷoise͟ that doesŶ͛t get ŶotiĐed, oƌ if it does, it gets 
ignored or forgotten about very quickly (traffic, good news stories, appeals for 
information, campaigns) the only things that seem to capture attention and are likely 
to be retweeted are missing peƌsoŶs ĐaŵpaigŶs aŶd if theƌe is a ŵuƌdeƌ͟. ;PI.ϳͿ 
 
Engagement and Dialogue: 
Yes: 
͞We do get a lot of iŶteƌaĐtioŶ, so oďǀiouslǇ ǁhat ǁe do is eŶgage ǁith theŵ, aŶd I 
thiŶk ǁith the ŵessages ǁe put out, ǁe do attƌaĐt ĐeƌtaiŶ audieŶĐes… AŶd ǁe tƌǇ to 
respoŶd, ǁe doŶ͛t just put the stuff out theƌe aŶd thiŶk oh it͛s out theƌe, ǁe tƌǇ to 
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ƌespoŶd to eǀeƌǇthiŶg that ǁe get iŶ ŵedia oƌ a liǀe Đall, if theƌe͛s a ƋuestioŶ asked 
we try to have that engagement side of social media rather than just pushing lots of 
infoƌŵatioŶ out͟. ;PI.ϭϵAͿ 
 
͞It͛s iŵpoƌtaŶt to ŵake people ǁho ƌeaĐh out to us feel ǀalued aŶd listeŶed to - and 
that ŵeaŶs ƌespoŶdiŶg ƋuiĐklǇ͟. ;PI.ϮϲͿ 
 
Getting There: 
͞It͛s ǀeƌǇ hit aŶd ŵiss aŶd it͛s aďout, ǁe͛ƌe still leaƌŶiŶg ǁhat ǁoƌks aŶd ǁhat 
doesŶ͛t. IŶ teƌŵs of ǁhat ǁe do ǁheŶ theƌe͛s aŶ iŶĐideŶt, it ǁoƌks ƌeallǇ ǁell aŶd ǁe 
get lots of hits oŶ it if ǁe͛ǀe got soŵethiŶg ǁheƌe ǁe, like the ŵuƌdeƌ, aŶd ǁe͛ƌe 
doiŶg ouƌ oǁŶ ǀideo of the offiĐeƌ speakiŶg, that gets a lot of hits. It͛s also theŶ 
imbedded in news by the press, which increased the hits. So something like that I 
thiŶk it͛s ƌeallǇ ƌeallǇ ǁoƌth ǁhile.͟ ;PI.ϲͿ 
 
To Some Extent: 
͞To soŵe eǆteŶt ǁe do. MostlǇ soĐial ŵedia is still used as a ŵeaŶs foƌ gettiŶg the 
poliĐe ŵessage out.͟ ;PI.ϭͿ 
 
͞I thiŶk police forces have got quite a long way to go in terms of the way that we use 
soĐial ŵedia, eǀeŶ us. I kŶoǁ ǁheƌe I ǁaŶt us to ďe, ďut it͛s Ŷot ǁheƌe ǁe aƌe, Ǉou 
kŶoǁ, if soĐial ŵedia͛s used ĐoƌƌeĐtlǇ it ǁill ďe ŵoƌe aďout a tǁo-way conversation, it 
will be about like communication as a two-ǁaǇ, ďut like ǁe͛ƌe still Ŷot theƌe ǁheƌe 
we want to be in terms of having that kind of proper engagement with the public, so I 
thiŶk theƌe͛s poteŶtial," ;PI.ϭϲͿ 
 
No: 
͞It's Ŷot up to that leǀel of eŶgageŵeŶt… Ŷot Ǉet aŶǇǁaǇ͟. ;PI.ϳͿ 
͞ǁe͛ǀe ƌealised ǁe͛ǀe got to get ďetteƌ at is ƌespoŶdiŶg oŶ Tǁitteƌ, so Ŷot just puttiŶg 
information out there but actually responding to people who are coming through and 
one of the things we want to do is to get our control room to use it a little bit more to 
help ǁith, kiŶd of, that ƌeduĐtioŶ iŶ deŵaŶd͟. ;PI.ϭϬͿ 
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͞ǁe doŶ͛t at the ŵoŵeŶt haǀe the ƌesouƌĐes to ƌespoŶd to those tǁeets.͟ ;PI.ϭϱͿ 
 
Preferred Platform: 
Twitter: 
͞ŵoƌe people teŶd to eŶgage oŶ Tǁitteƌ thaŶ oŶ FaĐeďook͟ ;PI.ϮͿ. 
 
͞We fiŶd Tǁitteƌ the ŵost effeĐtiǀe. PƌettǇ ŵuĐh. It͛s just, ǁe͛ǀe got ouƌ ďiggest 
folloǁiŶg is oŶ tǁitteƌ. It͛s the easiest ǁaǇ to eŶgage, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ ǁheŶ ǁe talk aďout 
doing the multimedia kind of package of the photos, etc. Instant responses from 
people͟. (PI.6) 
 
Facebook: 
͞We͛ƌe fiŶdiŶg FaĐeďook͛s takiŶg off ƌeallǇ ƌeallǇ ǁell foƌ us. I͛ŵ pƌettǇ suƌe that 
Facebook is a slightly different audience, an older audience to Twitter and so on. 
We͛ƌe usiŶg IŶstagƌaŵ, ǁe͛ƌe usiŶg eǀeƌǇthiŶg ǁe ĐaŶ. We͛ǀe doŶe ThuŶderclap, 
ǁe͛ǀe doŶe “toƌifǇ. We͛ƌe tƌǇiŶg lots of diffeƌeŶt ǁaǇs of eŶgagiŶg aŶd I thiŶk ǁhat it 
ŵeaŶs is, Ǉou͛ƌe ƌeaĐhiŶg lots of diffeƌeŶt gƌoups of people.͟ ;PI.ϰͿ 
 
Facebook and Twitter: 
͞I thiŶk theǇ aƌe ďoth ƌeallǇ iŵpoƌtaŶt ďut theǇ ƌeallǇ diffeƌ foƌ what you want to get 
out of theŵ, so I doŶ͛t thiŶk I ǁould put oŶe aďoǀe the otheƌ, to ďe hoŶest, I thiŶk it͛s 
that both are of equal importance but it depends who you are trying to reach and 
ǁhat Ǉouƌ ĐaŵpaigŶ͛s aďout oƌ ǁhat Ǉouƌ appeal oƌ ǁhateǀeƌ is aďout as to which 
oŶe is the ďest oŶe.͟ ;PI.ϭϬͿ 
 
͞But the diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ the FaĐeďook aŶd Tǁitteƌ audieŶĐe is ƌeallǇ Đleaƌ iŶ oŶe 
of those papers about only 15% of our Facebook audience use Twitter and similar 
proportion back. Everybody thinks you just use social media, you use both. They're 
diffeƌeŶt audieŶĐes… AŶd ǁhat ǁe fouŶd thƌough tƌial aŶd eƌƌoƌ… is that Tǁitteƌ 
works better on a geographic approach. Facebook works on a big mass and because 
the ǁaǇ people liǀe͟. ;PI.ϭϮͿ 
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͞I thiŶk diffeƌeŶt thiŶgs for different jobs and I would say historically, it's been 
Twitter. I personally and from a department perspective, I would say that Facebook 
has a gƌeateƌ poteŶtial… I ǁould saǇ, ǁe get ϵϬ% ŵoƌe iŶteƌaĐtioŶ oŶ FaĐeďook thaŶ 
ǁe do Tǁitteƌ so ǁe doŶ͛t – well, occasionally we chose not to put something on 
Tǁitteƌ if ǁe doŶ͛t feel it's goiŶg to add ǀalue ďut ŵost of the tiŵe, it goes out oŶ 
ďoth aŶd Ŷoǁ ǁe aƌe pƌoďaďlǇ appƌoaĐhiŶg siŵilaƌ audieŶĐes.͟ ;PI.ϵͿ 
 
͞“o MaƌtiŶ “oƌƌell suŵs it up iŶ a ƌeallǇ good ǁaǇ… he said Facebooks for your brand, 
Tǁitteƌ's foƌ puďliĐ ƌelatioŶs. I thiŶk that's Ƌuite a good ǁaǇ to put it͟. (PI.27) 
 
 ͞IŶ teƌŵs of eŶgageŵeŶt, FaĐeďook is ďetteƌ. We get ŵoƌe eŶgageŵeŶt thƌough 
Facebook than we do through Twitter. I have no idea why that is… Tǁitteƌ's good foƌ 
the quick time. Let's just get stuff out, so the road closures. Yeah, from a reactive 
point of view, certainly, Twitter is preferred, whereas Facebook is better for giving a 
ďit ŵoƌe iŶfoƌŵatioŶ, a ďit ŵoƌe detail.͟ ;PI.ϴͿ 
 
Other platforms: 
͞We͛ƌe usiŶg IŶstagƌaŵ, ǁe͛ƌe usiŶg eǀeƌǇthiŶg ǁe ĐaŶ. We͛ǀe doŶe ThuŶdeƌĐlap, 
ǁe͛ǀe doŶe “toƌifǇ. We͛ƌe tƌǇiŶg lots of diffeƌeŶt ǁaǇs of eŶgagiŶg aŶd I thiŶk ǁhat it 
ŵeaŶs is, Ǉou͛ƌe ƌeaĐhiŶg lots of diffeƌeŶt gƌoups of people.͟ 
 
͞I kŶoǁ that I͛ǀe had a Đouple of ƌeƋuests of ǁhǇ doŶ͛t ǁe use IŶstagƌaŵ oƌ ǁhǇ 
doŶ͛t ǁe get iŶǀolǀed ǁith “ŶapĐhat, ďut ƌeallǇ foƌ us foƌ IŶstagƌaŵ ǁe doŶ͛t ƌeallǇ 
haǀe a lot of piĐtuƌes to put oŶ it aŶd I thiŶk IŶstagƌaŵ foƌ ŵe is a Đƌeatiǀe, it͛s I 
dunno, mass images, I thiŶk West MidlaŶds aƌe usiŶg it aŶd it͛s ǁoƌked ǁell foƌ theŵ, 
theǇ͛ǀe got soŵe gƌeat piĐtuƌes aŶd theǇ͛ǀe got a ďig teaŵ so ŵaǇďe theǇ͛ǀe got 
soŵeoŶe ǁho͛s just dealiŶg ǁith that͟. ;PI.ϭϵAͿ 
 
͞I kŶoǁ that I͛ǀe had a Đouple of ƌeƋuests of ǁhǇ doŶ͛t ǁe use Instagram or why 
doŶ͛t ǁe get iŶǀolǀed ǁith “ŶapĐhat, ďut ƌeallǇ foƌ us foƌ IŶstagƌaŵ ǁe doŶ͛t ƌeallǇ 
haǀe a lot of piĐtuƌes to put oŶ it aŶd I thiŶk IŶstagƌaŵ foƌ ŵe is a Đƌeatiǀe, it͛s I 
duŶŶo, ŵass iŵages, I thiŶk West MidlaŶds aƌe usiŶg it aŶd it͛s ǁorked well for them, 
theǇ͛ǀe got soŵe gƌeat piĐtuƌes aŶd theǇ͛ǀe got a ďig teaŵ so ŵaǇďe theǇ͛ǀe got 
soŵeoŶe ǁho͛s just dealiŶg ǁith that͟. ;PI.ϭϵAͿ 
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͞OŶe of the gƌeat eǆaŵples of that is ǁe͛ǀe got FliĐkƌ, aŶd I kŶoǁ soŵe of the ďiggeƌ 
Forces use Flickr, like, foƌ all kiŶds of thiŶgs like ǁitŶess appeals aŶd ǁheŶ theƌe͛s 
ƌiots... Lost pƌopeƌtǇ, all this, ǁe kiŶd of dip iŶ aŶd out of it ďeĐause agaiŶ it͛s 
ƌesouƌĐes to ŵaŶage it, so ǁe use it a ďit foƌ lost pƌopeƌtǇ, ǁe teŶd to use it if theƌe͛s 
a big batch of photos of stuff ǁe͛ǀe fouŶd, ƌeĐeŶtlǇ ǁe͛ǀe fouŶd all this pƌopeƌtǇ 
that͛s ďeeŶ stoleŶ, so ǁe͛ǀe put the piĐtuƌes oŶ theƌe aŶd liŶked that to the Pƌess 
‘elease, ďut it͛s Ŷot oŶe that ǁe use a ƌegulaƌlǇ as ǁe͛d like to… if ǁe had ŵoƌe 
ƌesouƌĐes ǁe͛d pƌoďaďlǇ use it ŵoƌe ƌegulaƌlǇ… theƌe͛s this pƌessuƌe ǁheŶ a Ŷeǁ oŶe 
Đoŵes out that takes off, theƌe͛s this pƌessuƌe that oh Ǉou haǀe to do that ďeĐause 
it͛s so populaƌ ďut Ǉeah, ǁheŶ Ǉou aĐtuallǇ take a ďaĐk step aŶd go ǁell, is it goiŶg to 
benefit us that much, is theƌe aŶǇthiŶg ǁe ĐaŶ do oŶ that that ǁe ĐaŶ͛t do oŶ these?͟ 
(PI.19B) 
 
4.2.6 Traditional Media  
1) The Police-Media Relationship: 
 ͞I thiŶk ǁe'ƌe Ƌuite highlǇ ƌegaƌded ďǇ ŵedia, iŶĐludiŶg ŶatioŶals, ďeĐause theǇ kŶoǁ 
they will get a response from us. We Ŷeǀeƌ do a Ŷo ĐoŵŵeŶt aŶd ǁe'ƌe pƌettǇ sǁift.͟ 
 
͞“oŵe of the papeƌs ǁe haǀe ǀeƌǇ good ƌelatioŶships ǁith aŶd, if theǇ'ƌe shoƌt oŶ the 
front page or two, they'll come and ask if we've got anything and we're still trying to 
have that quite open dialogue. We can speak quite openly. There are a couple of 
papers where the turnaround in staff is so high that you never really get to know. 
They're just a name and an email address with the odd phone call, but you just 
doŶ't… But that's ŵoƌe a laĐk of iŶteƌaĐtioŶ on their part with us than our part with 
theŵ, if that ŵakes seŶse.͟ ;PI.ϴͿ 
 
͞I thiŶk ǁe geŶeƌallǇ do haǀe Ƌuite Đlose ƌelatioŶships ǁith theŵ ďut post LeǀesoŶ it's 
a lot more cautious. But no, I think there's good working relationships there and I 
think that's sort of quite important. Some are easier to work with than others which is 
Ŷatuƌal, just huŵaŶ Ŷatuƌe aŶd ǁe soƌt of ǁoƌk thƌough that͟. ;PI.ϵͿ 
 
 ͞“o it ǁoƌked out ƌeallǇ ǁell, ďut it's just ŵakiŶg suƌe that Ǉou kŶoǁ ǁhat theǇ'ƌe 
after, so you can get it͟. ;PI.ϮϬBͿ 
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͞a lot of it ǁas aďout tiŵiŶg, Ǉou kŶoǁ, theǇ didŶ͛t feel theǇ ǁeƌe ƌeĐeiǀiŶg the 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ tiŵelǇ eŶough aŶd that is aŶ issue foƌ a pƌess offiĐe, ďeĐause Ǉou͛ƌe 
working with officers who are investigating a crime, they want to be sure what 
theǇ͛ƌe iŶǀestigatiŶg ďefoƌe theǇ giǀe out loads of iŶfoƌŵatioŶ aŶd Ǉou ĐaŶ 
uŶdeƌstaŶd that, Ǉou kŶoǁ, Ǉou͛ll haǀe a Đall, Ǉouƌ offiĐeƌs ǁill ƌespoŶd, theǇ͛ll get to 
a sĐeŶe, it isŶ͛t alǁaǇs hoǁ it is poƌtƌaǇed oŶ the phoŶe to Ǉou as, Ǉou kŶoǁ, ǁhat 
has happened, so they want to make an assessment, they may arrest people, they 
may have them in custody, there may be limited information they want to give out 
ǁhile theǇ ƋuestioŶ that peƌsoŶ.͟ ;PI.ϮϴͿ 
 
͞soŵetiŵes I listeŶ to the ƌadio ϰ todaǇ pƌogƌaŵŵe foƌ example and in theory you 
would think that BBC, Radio 4 today programme that covered current affairs would 
ďe a faĐtual ƌouŶd up of the daǇ͛s Ŷeǁs.  But if Ǉou aĐtuallǇ listeŶ to it I fiŶd that theǇ 
ŵaŶage to put a Ŷegatiǀe slaŶt oŶ eǀeƌǇthiŶg.  I͛ǀe heaƌd people go on there with a 
positiǀe stoƌǇ aŶd theŶ suddeŶlǇ this is all ǀeƌǇ good let͛s foƌget that ǁhat aďout this 
possible negative implication.  And, you just think what are you trying to achieve 
heƌe.͟ ;PI.ϭϱͿ 
 
͞DiffiĐult aŶd tiŵe ĐoŶsuŵiŶg; it's haƌd to build rapport like we used to when it's a 
diffeƌeŶt faĐe eǀeƌǇ ǁeek… We doŶ't kŶoǁ theŵ aŶd theǇ doŶ't kŶoǁ us͟. ;PI.ϳͿ 
 
͞ǁe͛ǀe got Ƌuite a feǁ Đƌiŵe ƌepoƌteƌs... ǁho haǀe ďeeŶ statiĐ, theǇ haǀe ďeeŶ theƌe 
foƌ ϭϬ/ϭϱ Ǉeaƌs… so Ŷot oŶlǇ do theǇ haǀe ƌeallǇ good contacts with the press office, 
they have really good contacts within the force because they have been here for so 
long, they met somebody when they were a PC, who is now a Chief Super Intendant 
aŶd so theǇ haǀe those ĐoŶtaĐts, that͛s Ƌuite diffiĐult for us in terms of managing that 
because, you know, people have grown up with a Journalist, they trust them, they, 
Ǉou kŶoǁ, so aĐtuallǇ soŵe of those tƌaditioŶal ƌelatioŶships aƌe still theƌe.͟ ;PI.ϭϬͿ 
 
2) Changes to the Police-Media Relationship 
͞[the] power balance has shifted dramatically I would say. Even from when I started 
in the policing, it was everything that you did and everything that was around an 
incident or operation, it was all focussed on media management., press 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt… ďut the shift with the digital channels now, the kind of levels of 
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audieŶĐe that ǁe͛ǀe got ǁho aƌe aĐtiǀelǇ ǁaŶtiŶg to eŶgage ǁith us aŶd theǇ͛ǀe 
chosen to sign up and to follow us on twitter. They choose to be Facebook friends or 
likes of ours. They choose to sign up to ouƌ ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ ŵessagiŶg. TheǇ͛ƌe aŶ aĐtiǀe 
audience that has said we want to engage with you. That is far more powerful, 
potentially, than what we do necessarily through the newspapers and the more 
tƌaditioŶal pƌess… But the poǁeƌ ďalaŶĐe has shifted dƌamatically and you see it even 
with the chief officers now. Once upon a time a negative story in our local 
Ŷeǁspapeƌ… ǁould seŶd theŵ iŶto disaƌƌaǇ. TheǇ͛d ďe ǁaŶtiŶg to kŶoǁ hoǁ that 
happeŶed. But Ŷoǁ, it͛s kiŶd of like, Ǉeah theǇ͛ǀe ǁƌitteŶ a Ŷegatiǀe story, they kind 
of do that, but what we can now do is we can put our side out through our channels 
oƌ ǁe ĐaŶ put soŵe good Ŷeǁs out to ĐouŶteƌ ďalaŶĐe it.͟ ;PI.ϲͿ 
 
͞I had a ŵeetiŶg ǁith the loĐal papeƌ oŶlǇ a Đouple of ŵoŶths ago, to disĐuss hoǁ 
they were feeling left out and it's not that they're less important than they were. It's 
that our communities are more important than they were and they've got more, as a 
soƌt of pƌess fuŶĐtioŶ ďeĐause ǁe ĐaŶ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate diƌeĐt ǁith theŵ.͟ ;PI.ϭϮͿ 
 
͞[the pƌess used to] see us as a block to the police officers who will give them more 
aŶd ďetteƌ stoƌies… Noǁ ǁe aƌe a ŶeĐessaƌǇ eǀil as loĐal jouƌŶalists Ŷo loŶgeƌ haǀe 
time to go investigating on their own and post Leveson has placed restrictions of 
these ƌelatioŶships͟. (PI.27) 
 
͞It is although I thiŶk soŵetiŵes I thiŶk it͛s oǀeƌ egged ďeĐause the ĐhaŶge iŶ LoŶdoŶ 
is significant because you know I have had quite a few dealings with the MPS over 
the years and have seen a kind of Leveson kinda of happen and various other things, 
it was an old culture, it was that kinda old school thing, which is a world away from 
ǁheƌe ǁe ǁeƌe to ďe hoŶest ďeĐause ǁe hadŶ͛t doŶe those soƌts of ďƌiefiŶgs aŶd 
kiŶd of ŵeetiŶgs iŶ puďs foƌ ŵaŶǇ ŵaŶǇ Ǉeaƌs… I thiŶk the ƌelatioŶship͛s theƌe aŶd 
the iŵpaĐt oŶ LeǀesoŶ ǁeƌe huge foƌ us ǁe hadŶ͛t ďeeŶ ǁoƌkiŶg iŶ that soƌt of 
eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt so it ǁasŶ͛t a ŵassiǀe issue aŶd ǁe still saǇ to offiĐeƌs Ǉou ĐaŶ haǀe 
friendships with journalists provided you are always happy that whatever you share 
with them you would ďe happǇ that eǀeƌǇďodǇ kŶeǁ that Ǉou͛d shaƌed it ǁith theŵ 
Đos if Ǉou͛ƌe Ŷot that͛s ǁheƌe theƌe is a pƌoďleŵ aŶd ŵost offiĐeƌs aƌe fiŶe Ǉou kŶoǁ 
soŵe of theŵ ǁill still kŶoǁ a lot of the jouƌŶalists.͟ ;PI.ϮϯͿ 
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3) Local journalists 
Decrease: 
͞aŶd it͛s clear the newspapers are all dǇiŶg, ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ loĐallǇ … Big local newspapers 
used to have a circulation of up to 350,000 ten years ago. Latest figures shows that 
this has reduced to 81,000 in 2014. Far fewer journalists having to cover more areas 
so few journalists now specialise in just one area, like crime͟ ;PI.ϰͿ.  
 
͞in reality, there's hardly any journalists to speak to for one, but we don't have as 
much interaction and a lot of what we do with journalists is done socially… we used 
to have two dailies. We've gone to one daily. We had probably at least three crime 
reporters 10 years ago. We've got one and he has to do everything else as well. Yeah, 
they're just not there, with the decline of the proper journalist, if that's the right 
word, you get citizen journalists. And social media, obviously, encourages people to 
ask a lot more questions than we would have ever dealt with through a press office, a 
tƌaditioŶal pƌess offiĐe.͟ ;PI.ϴͿ 
 
Increase: 
͞We aƌe uŶusual… [iŶ that] ouƌ dailǇ papeƌ has just lauŶĐhed a “uŶdaǇ editioŶ… [iŶ a] 
climate where every other paper is shutting down or, you know, going to weekly, 
theǇ͛ǀe staƌted doiŶg aŶotheƌ papeƌ duƌiŶg the ǁeek aŶd that͛s paƌtlǇ ďeĐause 
aĐtuallǇ … the ƌeadeƌship is aĐtuallǇ faiƌlǇ stƌoŶg still foƌ us, so ǁe ĐaŶ͛t leaǀe it 
ďehiŶd͟. ;PI.ϭϬͿ 
 
͞I thiŶk possiďlǇ the ƌuƌal deŵogƌaphiĐ aŶd the age deŵogƌaphiĐ does ŵake a 
difference here because, people still do read their local papers.  The local papers still 
do have quite a high reach.  I think the local here, is one of the few that's bucked the 
circulation trends and its readership and that's the increased readership online as 
ǁell.͟ ;PI.ϭϭͿ 
 
͞I thiŶk theƌe aƌe ŵoƌe aƌouŶd at the ŵoŵeŶt͟. ;PI.ϭϵAͿ 
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Same: 
͞It͛s aďout the saŵe ƌeallǇ. We haǀe aĐtiǀe loĐal jouƌŶalists and local newspapers 
ƌouŶd heƌe. NatioŶal is pƌoďaďlǇ ǁheƌe ǁe͛ǀe seeŶ the ďiggest ƌeduĐtioŶs iŶ 
dediĐated Đƌiŵe jouƌŶalists͟. ;PI.ϭͿ 
 
 ͞Ouƌ loĐals [aƌe] still doiŶg ƌeallǇ ǁell, theǇ'ǀe just ĐhaŶged the ŵodel so papeƌs 
have now gone to a digital-first model, where it's basically everything is online, first 
and foremost. So the paper's only one edition during the day. It used to be four or 
five when I was there. But it's gradually deteriorated because the circulation has 
dropped. But the online has just gone through the roof. So they have now five or six, 
we call them spikes, through the day where their hits at the morning where people 
commuting to work. Lunchtime, people going on to work, when people get home at 
night, it's more of a social media thing. Basically, you hit those spikes with different 
ĐoŶteŶt. “o it's alŵost like haǀiŶg diffeƌeŶt editioŶs of a Ŷeǁspapeƌ.͟ ;PI.ϮϬBͿ 
 
Implications of reduction: 
͞ǁheƌeas Ǉou thiŶk Ŷeǁspapeƌs goiŶg out of ďusiŶess that͛s good foƌ us as faƌ as 
busyness is concerned it͛s Ŷot. It͛s aƌguaďlǇ eǀeŶ ŵoƌe ďusǇ Ŷoǁ ďeĐause theǇ͛ƌe all 
ǁaŶtiŶg to keep theiƌ ǁeďsites up to date. That͛s ǁhǇ ǁe͛ǀe ŵoǀed to this alŵost 
self-seƌǀe sǇsteŵ ǁheƌeďǇ aŶǇthiŶg that͛s ǀaguelǇ ďig that ǁe ǁaŶt to giǀe out ǁill 
be on our news centre and ǁe͛d still haǀe to deal ǁith the tƌiǀia ǁhiĐh I͛ŵ tƌǇiŶg to 
ŵoǀe aǁaǇ fƌoŵ. You still get Đalls fƌoŵ loĐal Ŷeǁspapeƌs saǇiŶg, ͞We͛ǀe seeŶ tǁo 
Đaƌs Đƌashed aŶd iŶ the hedge ǁhat͛s that all aďout?͟ It͛s gettiŶg to the stage ǁheƌe 
ǁe haǀeŶ͛t got tiŵe to deal ǁith all that aŶd if theƌe͛s soŵethiŶg sigŶifiĐaŶt aďout it, 
if theƌe͛s a fatalitǇ iŶ those tǁo Đaƌs oƌ if theƌe͛s seƌious iŶjuƌǇ theŶ that ǁill go oŶ the 
Ŷeǁs ĐeŶtƌe. I thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe gettiŶg to the stage ǁheƌe ǁe͛ƌe goiŶg to haǀe to tell theŵ 
to go away because ǁe͛ǀe Ŷot got tiŵe to deal ǁith that kiŶd of thiŶg.͟ ;PI.ϭϯͿ 
 
͞LoĐal Ŷeǁspapeƌs aƌe ĐlosiŶg. Theƌe's feǁeƌ aŶd feǁeƌ ƌepoƌteƌs so theǇ doŶ't get 
out. “o theǇ eǆpeĐt to ďe fed͟. ;PI.ϮϱBͿ 
 
͞That ǁould ďe like the ďest thiŶg aĐtuallǇ if ǁe had Ŷo Ŷeǁspapers anymore and, 
you know, I think the more we can get people to receive information directly from 
the poliĐe ƌatheƌ thaŶ thƌough the ŵedia the ďetteƌ, so foƌ ŵe it͛ll ďe like okaǇ if 
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people haǀe to ƌeĐeiǀe theiƌ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ fƌoŵ us theǇ͛ƌe heaƌiŶg it fƌoŵ the hoƌse͛s 
ŵouth, theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot heaƌiŶg ǁhat paƌt of a ƌepoƌt the ŵedia͛s ĐhoseŶ to foĐus oŶ, 
theǇ͛ƌe heaƌiŶg the ďit that ǁe ǁaŶt to kŶoǁ this tiŵe.  “o it ĐaŶ͛t ďe a Ŷegatiǀe.͟ 
(PI.16)  
 
͞We doŶ't kŶoǁ theŵ aŶd theǇ doŶ't kŶoǁ us. [ouƌ ƌelatioŶship] is difficult and time 
consuming because of that; it's hard to build rapport like we used to when it's a 
diffeƌeŶt faĐe eǀeƌǇ ǁeek͟.  
 
͞ǁe͛ǀe ŶotiĐed that the kiŶd of ƋualitǇ of the Đƌiŵe ƌepoƌteƌs iŶ teƌŵs of theiƌ 
tƌaiŶiŶg has ƌeallǇ ƌeduĐed, Ǉou kŶoǁ, ǁe͛ll have reporters asking us very obvious 
legal ƋuestioŶs that Ǉou thiŶk ǁell suƌelǇ Ǉou should͛ǀe leaƌŶt that ǁheŶ Ǉou tƌaiŶed 
to be a journalist.  So I think the quality of crime reporters and their training and their 
ďaĐkgƌouŶd ǁe͛ǀe ŶotiĐed the diffeƌeŶĐe aŶd theǇ aƌe less of theŵ, Ŷeǁspapeƌs ĐaŶ͛t 
seŶd people to Đouƌt all daǇ Ŷoǁ uŶless it͛s a ƌeallǇ ďig Đase.  “o Ǉeah, I thiŶk the ǁaǇ 
that loĐal jouƌŶalists kiŶd of ƌepoƌt has defiŶitelǇ ĐhaŶged.͟ ;PI.ϭϲͿ 
 
4) Self-service model 
͞We ĐouldŶ't ŵoǀe to the tiŵe kind of web firsts, breaking news ourselves, it just 
ǁouldŶ't ǁoƌk heƌe.͟ ;PI.ϭϭͿ 
 
͞Most jouƌŶalists Ŷo loŶgeƌ haǀe tiŵe to go out aŶd fiŶd stoƌies oŶ theiƌ oǁŶ Ŷoǁ, so 
theǇ ďasiĐallǇ ƌeguƌgitate aŶd ƌeǁƌite pƌess stateŵeŶts͟. 
  
͞But Ǉes, I thiŶk that aĐtually people can get information first hand from us, so if you 
go back five, six years, a lot of police forces would write a press release, they would 
issue it to an email distribution list of media. We don't issue anything to the media, 
everything that we put out on the public domain goes on our website, the media can 
set up an RSS feed just as any member of the public can, but we're putting out public 
information now, so we can tell the public what we're saying, as opposed to relying 
on the media to interpret that. So our website and social media have proved a 
ŵassiǀe oppoƌtuŶitǇ foƌ us to tell the puďliĐ thiŶgs iŶ ouƌ ǀoiĐe͟. ;PI.ϭϳͿ 
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͞Yeah, so it is ŵoǀiŶg ŵoƌe toǁaƌds ǁe'ǀe got the ĐoŶtƌol oǀeƌ ǁhat the ŵessage 
says, which is what we never had before, ǁhǇ Ŷot use it?͟ ;PI.ϴͿ 
 
͞We'ƌe tƌǇiŶg to keep up ǁith the deŵaŶd, ďut it is a stƌuggle aŶd likelǇ to ďe ŵoƌe so 
if there are further budget cuts. Self-service press releases would save us time and 
mean that the investigating officer can just add the relevant details to a template 
which they then put on the website rather than contacting the comms departments 
and giving us the information which we then have to write up and put in a press 
release that we've probably already confirmed verbally to five journalists by the time 
ǁe get ƌouŶd to puďlishiŶg it.͟ ;PI.ϮͿ 
 
͞Noǁ, jouƌŶalistiĐallǇ I ǁould alŵost ƋuestioŶ that aŶd saǇ ǁell aĐtuallǇ, theǇ 
shouldŶ͛t alǁaǇs take eǀeƌǇthiŶg ǁe saǇ foƌ gƌaŶted, ďeĐause theǇ should ƋuestioŶ it. 
I mean I know we do a professional job and I know we do it as well as we possibly 
can, but is that short changing their public? Their readers? By always accepting what 
ǁe do?͟ ;PI.ϰͿ 
 
5) Watchdog function 
Yes: 
͞ǀeƌǇ ĐƌitiĐal… aŶd ǁhat͛s ƌeallǇ loǀelǇ Ŷoǁ is that theǇ aƌe Ŷot oŶlǇ ĐƌitiĐal in the 
paper they are also critical on social media so, you know, you get a double hit frankly 
and online because they have all the papers online, so yeah, they definitely still do 
the watchdog function and, as I say, they are not shy at putting things up on Twitter 
and they are not shy at putting things on Twitter if they feel they are not getting a 
good service as well and that has changed things for us because you will have a, you 
know, the key crime reporter for one of the daily papers, who puts up something 
about the terrible service they have received from the police press office and actually 
that ĐhaŶges the ƌelatioŶship a little ďit as ǁell͟. ;PI.ϭϬͿ 
 
͞OŶe of the editoƌs of oŶe of the papeƌs had a ŵeetiŶg ǁith ŵe aŶd the Đhief 
constable, just a regular meeting and he said to both of us, I accept our job is never to 
ďƌeak the Ŷeǁs aďout poliĐe stuff aŶǇŵoƌe. He said I kŶoǁ Ǉou͛ƌe goiŶg to do that. 
He said I know our job, his job is to analyse and question and check the work of the 
police and I said yeah I thiŶk that͛s ƌight. BeĐause Ǉou͛ƌe Ŷot goŶŶa haǀe, uŶless 
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theǇ͛ǀe got soŵethiŶg aŵaziŶg, theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot goŶŶa get sĐoops aďout the poliĐe. 
TheǇ͛ƌe Ŷot goŶŶa fiŶd out fiƌst Đoz ǁe͛ƌe goiŶg to puďlish it fiƌst, ďut theǇ͛ƌe ƌight to 
then say, is this right? To question it, coz we should be questioned, we should be 
ĐheĐked.͟  ;PI.ϰͿ 
 
No: 
 ͞I thiŶk theƌe's ďad jouƌŶalisŵ aŶd I thiŶk theƌe's good jouƌŶalisŵ aŶd theƌe's a lot of 
lazǇ jouƌŶalisŵ these daǇs uŶfoƌtuŶatelǇ ďeĐause … AŶd ƌesouƌĐiŶg is ďeiŶg ƌeduĐed 
so much that good investigative journalism is much thinner on the ground than when 
I staƌted.͟  ;PI.ϭϭͿ 
 
͞No, I doŶ͛t thiŶk so.  Yeah, I thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe ǀeƌǇ aǁaƌe of theŵ aŶd I saǇ aǁaƌe aŶd 
ǁe͛ƌe Ŷot ǁaƌǇ I doŶ͛t thiŶk, Ǉou kŶoǁ, ǁe͛ǀe got aĐtiǀe… loĐal Ŷeǁspapers still, 
which from a journalist background is good to see and yes there is an element of, you 
kŶoǁ, theǇ ǁaŶt to kŶoǁ ǁhat͛s happeŶiŶg aŶd ǁheƌe ǁe aƌe, ďut I doŶ͛t thiŶk 
theǇ͛ƌe ƌeallǇ a ǁatĐhdog.͟ ;PI.ϮϴͿ  
 
͞I ǁould saǇ, foƌ the oŶes ǁe haǀe a ƌelationship with, not so much, but the ones that 
we don't have a relationship with, then yeah, very often they'll just print what we 
give. Very rarely do they come back with questions or a challenge. The two main 
newspapers that we have, they do. They come back and will stick a few FOI requests 
in and that kind of thing and then come back wanting a response. But yeah, we still 
get that, but just not anywhere near as much as we used to. And we don't have 
masses of interactions with nationals anymore. We used to have quite a bit. It's only 
oŶ the odd stoƌǇ ǁheƌeas Ŷoǁ a lot of it goes thƌough FOI.͟  ;PI.ϴͿ 
 
͞I just ƌeŵeŵďeƌ soŵe people ǁho used to ďe soƌt of old sĐhool I soƌt of suppose iŶ 
the past who would dig up some fairly interesting stories and sometimes not very 
positiǀe foƌ the foƌĐe ďut thiŶgs theǇ ǁould fiŶd out aďout that ǁe didŶ͛t kŶoǁ aďout 
at all aŶd theǇ had ĐleaƌlǇ got soŵe ĐoŶtaĐts out theƌe I͛ŵ Ŷot suƌe that ĐoŶtaĐts 
Ŷetǁoƌk eǆists aŶǇŵoƌe.  I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ if that͛s ďeĐause of LeǀesoŶ oƌ theǇ aƌe just a 
diffeƌeŶt ďƌeed Ŷoǁ ďut theǇ aƌe ǀeƌǇ ƌeliaŶt oŶ ǁhat Đoŵes out of the ĐeŶtƌe Ŷoǁ.͟ 
(PI.18) 
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͞I thiŶk that ĐeƌtaiŶ Ŷeǁspapeƌs haǀe ĐeƌtaiŶ ageŶdas… I doŶ͛t, I thiŶk the issue 
pƌoďaďlǇ is that at the eŶd of the daǇ I doŶ͛t ďelieǀe that the ŵedia ŶeĐessarily works 
foƌ the good of the ĐouŶtƌǇ, it ǁoƌks foƌ the good of its oǁŶ doesŶ͛t it iŶ that theǇ 
want to be seen to be the first and exclusive or they want to be seen to be being bold 
aŶd ďƌaǀe iŶ ďƌeakiŶg Ŷeǁs aŶd I͛ŵ Ŷot suƌe that that Đoŵes ǁith a lot of sense of 
ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ to ƌealise ǁhat the iŵpaĐt of that ŵight ďe.͟ ;PI.ϭϱͿ 
 
͞ĐƌitiĐisŵ isŶ͛t ŶeĐessaƌilǇ the saŵe thiŶg as ďeiŶg a ǁatĐhdog͟. ;PI.ϮϯͿ 
 
3.2.7 Audience 
1) Who is the Audience? 
͞ǁell I͛d like to saǇ the audieŶĐe is the people of [ouƌ Đounty] and the communities 
that paǇ foƌ theŵ thƌough the pƌeĐept foƌ the poliĐiŶg ďut I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ.  It goes ďaĐk 
to ǁhat I said ďefoƌe that ǁe͛ƌe ǀeƌǇ good at telliŶg theŵ, I doŶ͛t thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe 
eŶoƌŵouslǇ good at listeŶiŶg to ǁhat theǇ tell us.͟ ;PI.ϮϴͿ  
 
͞I thiŶk the easiest aŶsǁeƌ is at the ŵoŵeŶt ǁe doŶ͛t kŶoǁ eŶough to stipulate ǁho 
our audiences are.  Broadly speaking, everyone is potentially a stakeholder at some 
point, you know, while they live within the area. They might be ten now [but] if they 
stay ǁith us all the ǁaǇ thƌough theiƌ liǀes theŶ, Ǉou kŶoǁ, ǁe͛ǀe got to ďe iŶ a 
position where we start to talk to that person as early as possible and we maintain 
that relationship with them right the way through to the point of death - as morbid as 
it sounds͟. ;PI.ϮϮͿ 
 
͞‘aĐe, age etĐ. doŶ't aĐtuallǇ ŵake ŵuĐh of a diffeƌeŶĐe ǁheŶ it Đoŵes to 
communication - either people want to engage or they don't... and if they don't there 
isŶ't ƌeallǇ aŶǇthiŶg Ǉou ĐaŶ do aďout it.͟ 
 
͞Ouƌ audieŶĐes? Theƌe͛s a diffeƌeŶĐe ďetween audiences and clients. So I would say 
our audiences are the public. Just the general public of [our area] and I think we have 
client relationships with everyone internally and the media, if you like, as opposed to 
an audience. I would say audiences aƌe the puďliĐ ǁe seƌǀe. That͛s got to ďe ouƌ ŵaiŶ 
audieŶĐe.͟ ;PI.ϲͿ
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͞The people ǁho haǀe a ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ… so people ǁho liǀe… oƌ ǁoƌk iŶ this aƌea, oƌ 
ǁho haǀe ƌelatiǀes iŶ this aƌea.͟ ;PI.ϮϯͿ 
 
͞MǇ stƌategǇ is to ŵoǀe the diƌeĐtioŶ aǁaǇ fƌoŵ jouƌŶalists aŶd to citizens, our 
puďliĐ. But I ǁould kiŶd of eŵphasise that ǁithiŶ that I ǁouldŶ͛t ǁaŶt it to ďe ǁƌitteŶ 
that way without reflecting the fact that the media are actually one of the channels 
that ǁe Ŷeed the ŵost to do that… “o ǁheŶ Ǉou ask ǁho the ultiŵate ĐlieŶt is, it͛s 
the puďliĐ. But pƌoďaďlǇ oŶ the otheƌ eŶd of this is aĐtuallǇ the offiĐeƌs too. We͛ƌe a 
service organisation really within the force. We provide a service to our, to senior 
people in the organisation, that enables the organisation to do coŵs. “o it͛s kiŶd of 
like ďoth eŶds of the sĐale. Coz ƌeallǇ the ĐlieŶt is the puďliĐ… the faĐe theǇ see aƌe 
the offiĐeƌs aŶd ǁe͛ƌe theƌe ŵakiŶg suƌe the offiĐeƌs ĐaŶ do the joď theǇ Ŷeed to. 
TheǇ͛ƌe pƌoǀidiŶg aŶ oǀeƌlaǇ ǁheƌe ǁe͛ll pƌoďaďlǇ ŵaŶage the ǀeƌǇ high level kind of 
digital ŵessages that go out plus the ŵedia ďit, ďut ǁe͛ll tƌǇ aŶd use the offiĐeƌs to 
fƌoŶt it up, Đoz it ǁoƌks ďetteƌ.͟ ;PI.ϯͿ  
 
͞“o pƌioƌitǇ stakeholdeƌs aƌe those that ǁe ǁaŶt to take aĐtioŶ oƌ to do soŵethiŶg 
differently.  Secondary stakeholders are people who we want awareness or they've 
used the conduits to get to the priority stakeholders.  On a witness appeal for a 
murder our external stakeholders are members of the public who are likely to 
recognise and know this person, members of the public who have been directly 
impacted or were worried by this incident, they would be on my priorities.  My 
secondary externals would be the media because the media are conduits to the first.  
And a secondary might be local counsellors or opinion formers who can influence my 
primaries.  And I'd do the same for internal.  So internals would be I want to engage 
ǁith the offiĐeƌs aŶd staff ǁho aƌe oŶ that iŶǀestigatioŶ to ŵake suƌe that theǇ͛ƌe 
tƌaiŶed… to haǀe the iŶfoƌŵatioŶ theǇ Ŷeed.͟ ;PI.ϭϭͿ 
 
͞“o firstly we have the general public, then members of the press – those people 
ǁoƌkiŶg iŶ jouƌŶalisŵ. TheŶ theƌe͛s the thiƌd ǁaǇ - ǁhiĐh is foƌ people ǁho aƌeŶ͛t 
Ƌuite the puďliĐ aŶd aƌeŶ͛t Ƌuite Ƌualified jouƌŶalists, ďut haǀe ŵassiǀe folloǁiŶgs. 
Theƌe͛s a guǇ ǁho ƌuŶs... a ďlog... He͛s alŵost the ĐlassiĐ, soƌt of geekǇ tǇpe. But ǁe 
feed him information. He can get a hundred to two hundred thousand people 
iŶstaŶtlǇ. “o ǁhǇ ǁouldŶ͛t ǁe tap iŶto that ƌesouƌĐe? I ƌeĐkoŶ ǁe Đould ƌeaĐh people 
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more quickly than the papers can and the public can and if we get them on side. And 
of Đouƌse ŵostlǇ people aƌe uŶtƌaiŶed so theǇ͛ƌe aŵateuƌs at it, so theǇ'ƌe Ŷot as ǁell 
ǁƌitteŶ. TheǇ͛ǀe ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ Ŷot got aŶǇ jouƌŶalistiĐ ƋualifiĐatioŶs. TheǇ ǁouldŶ͛t kŶoǁ 
a lie if it came and bit them. But they know if it comes from us, it gives them the 
liteƌal legal pƌiǀilege to puďlish that iŶfoƌŵatioŶ, theǇ kŶoǁ theǇ͛ƌe pƌoteĐted ďǇ us.͟ 
(PI.4) 
 
͞[We haǀe thƌee ŵajoƌ stakeholdeƌ gƌoups] ouƌ politiĐal stake-holdeƌs… hoŵe offiĐe, 
IPCC, Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary and that's where you start from and 
then you can extend to that, you know, we have partnerships with business; business 
can be very important stake holders with some of the things you want to do. There 
might be third sector stake-holdeƌs ǁho ǁe'ƌe ǁoƌkiŶg ǁith oŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ pƌojeĐts… 
You kŶoǁ, jouƌŶalists aƌe ouƌ Đustoŵeƌs. Uŵŵŵŵ…We ǁaŶt theŵ to ďelieǀe ǁe 
give them a good service because we think that will increase their respect for the 
organisation. The reference to digital production capability recognises that there are 
increasing audiences for digital content on the web and that we have had a largely 
analogue print media focussed operation, used to dealing with tabloid and broad 
sheet journalists, not an operation geared towards producing content for websites, 
ďe it ouƌ ǁeďsite oƌ a Ŷeǁspapeƌ ǁeďsite.͟ ;PI.ϮϳͿ  
 
͞We haǀe ǀeƌǇ, ǀeƌǇ liŵited defiŶed audieŶĐes.  “o iŶ the Đase of ĐǇďeƌĐƌiŵe ǁho is 
your audience?  Everyone in county?  Well no, it's not.  The audience is going to be 
probably anyone that actually engages online, so if they're not using the internet, 
they're not going to be at risk of cybercrime.  And let's be more specific your risk 
group is very different for potential online victims of sexual exploitatioŶ aŶd that͛s 
going to be a very big difference to those at risk of financial exploitation versus those 
at ƌisk of ideŶtitǇ fƌaud.  “o let's… Ŷaƌƌoǁ it doǁŶ.  It ŵight ďe a deŵogƌaphiĐ, it 
might be personality-based, there are loads of factors.  It's as if, if I ask the question 
of who is my audience, they tend to be anyone.  Certainly potentially anyone in [my 
ĐouŶtǇ] also poteŶtiallǇ aŶǇoŶe elseǁheƌe if that's ŶeĐessaƌǇ ďut … It's a haƌd 
question to answer [long pause] I don't think there is an obvious answer.  It's going to 
ďe diffeƌeŶt depeŶdiŶg oŶ ǁhat is the ŵessage eǀeƌǇ siŶgle tiŵe.͟ 
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͞It depeŶds ĐoŵpletelǇ oŶ ǁhat ǁe'ƌe talkiŶg aďout. I suppose ouƌ thƌee ŵaiŶ 
audiences are victims of crime, the general public and vulnerable people; the elderly, 
the young, the disabled. They would be our three main audiences. The general public 
is a ŵassiǀe audieŶĐe, oďǀiouslǇ͟. ;PI.ϮϱAͿ 
 
͞It͛s ǀeƌǇ ŵuĐh people aƌe piĐkǇ aŶd theǇ deĐide this is the ŵethod of 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ I ǁaŶt aŶd that͛s kiŶd of ǁhat theǇ stiĐk ǁith, so we try our best to 
offeƌ diffeƌeŶt kiŶds of ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs so Ǉou͛ǀe still got Ǉouƌ tƌaditioŶal ĐhaŶŶels 
but then still got the more modern ones, but the more modern ones are now 
ďeĐoŵiŶg that ĐoŵŵoŶplaĐe to Đall theŵ ŵoƌe ŵodeƌŶ ĐhaŶŶels it͛s like how long 
haǀe theǇ, ďeiŶg goiŶg like seǀeŶ, eight Ǉeaƌs so Ǉou kŶoǁ it͛s just the digital 
channels I guess but we sort of, we  use them all and different people use them in 
diffeƌeŶt ǁaǇs, so tƌǇ to hit as ŵaŶǇ ďases as ǁe ĐaŶ.͟ ;PI.ϮϬBͿ 
 
͞The ǀast ŵajoƌitǇ of tiŵe people doŶ͛t aĐtuallǇ ǁaŶt ĐoŶtaĐt fƌoŵ the poliĐe.  “o 
that͛s a haƌd sell fƌoŵ a ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ peƌspeĐtiǀe, isŶ͛t it, if Ǉou͛ƌe tƌǇiŶg to get a 
message out... No matter how many communication campaigns we do to stop people 
leaving things in cars, theǇ eitheƌ doŶ͛t uŶdeƌstaŶd it, doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to ƌead it ďeĐause 
it͛ll Ŷeǀeƌ happeŶ to ŵe, ǁe still haǀe theft fƌoŵ ŵotoƌ ǀehiĐle aŶd theƌe aƌe still 
huŶdƌeds of people ǁho leaǀe thiŶgs oŶ the ďaĐkseat of theiƌ Đaƌ.  “o it doesŶ͛t 
matter what communications ĐaŵpaigŶ Ǉou ƌuŶ, people still leaǀe stuff iŶ theiƌ Đaƌs.͟ 
(PI.21)  
 
2) Targeted Communications: 
͞Theƌe͛ll ďe ĐeƌtaiŶ Đƌiŵes that affeĐt ĐeƌtaiŶ ĐoŵŵuŶities aŶd theŶ ouƌ Đoŵŵs is 
targeted. It might be different languages; it might be where we send information, 
which publications we use, where we might send out officers to deliver leaflets. So 
ǁe defiŶitelǇ taƌget the diffeƌeŶt audieŶĐes aŶd ĐoŵŵuŶities ǁheŶ ǁe Ŷeed to͟ 
(PI.6). 
 
͞DuƌiŶg a ĐaŵpaigŶ, Ǉes. IŶ geŶeƌal taƌgetiŶg is oŶlǇ doŶe ďǇ geogƌaphiĐ loĐation, so 
targeting a town for a witness appeal where someone was hurt/went missing. But if 
it͛s just like a geŶeƌal ŵessage eaĐh daǇ theŶ ǁe͛ƌe Ŷot thiŶkiŶg ƌight ǁell this 
ŵessage has to ďe ƌeleǀaŶt foƌ a speĐifiĐ audieŶĐe gƌoup… like as if Ǉou ǁeƌe editoƌ 
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of a Ŷeǁspapeƌ oƌ Ǉou͛ƌe the editoƌ of a ƌadio statioŶ oƌ ǁhateǀeƌ aŶd Ǉou͛ǀe got 
Ǉouƌ speĐifiĐ audieŶĐe. We doŶ͛t take that appƌoaĐh, it is kiŶd of eǀeƌǇďodǇ͟. ;PI.ϭϲͿ  
 
͞We take a pƌoďleŵ pƌofile Ŷoǁ that the iŶtelligeŶĐe teaŵ aƌe deǀelopiŶg foƌ 
operational poliĐiŶg aŶd it Đoŵes to ŵe… “oŵe thiŶgs ǁe'll saǇ FaĐeďook audieŶĐe 
will work on that. Some posts will only be targeted to a town, if it's a crime appeal 
about a burglary in a town centre, we will only deliver it to that town because the 
rest of the audieŶĐe aƌeŶ't iŶteƌested.͟ ;PI.ϭϮͿ  
 
͞ǁhǇ ǁould ǁe ďlaŶket eǀeƌǇďodǇ aďout soŵethiŶg that aĐtuallǇ is oŶlǇ goiŶg to hit a 
sŵall peƌĐeŶtage of the ĐitǇ?͟  
 
PI.12: 
͞The Đlue to ŵe ƌeallǇ, oƌ the keǇ to all of this is ďespoke ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ ďeĐause ǁe 
talk about ǁhat͛s the ďest ǁaǇ to ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate ǁith the puďliĐ oŶ this issue.  The 
little old ladǇ ǁho liǀes doǁŶ the stƌeet ǁith Ŷo iŶteƌŶet, Ŷo Đoŵputeƌ, doesŶ͛t haǀe 
an Android phone etc., probably wants you to knock on the door and have a 
conversation.  There is no one single way, I think, of engaging with the community.  
It͛s aďout uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg that theƌe aƌe diffeƌeŶt people ǁho ǁaŶt to ďe eŶgaged 
ǁith iŶ diffeƌeŶt ǁaǇs.  UŶless Ǉou eŶgage ǁith theŵ iŶ that ǁaǇ, theǇ ǁoŶ͛t ƌespoŶd 
to it ďeĐause theǇ ǁouldŶ͛t communicate with anybody else in that way, so why 
ǁould theǇ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate ǁith the poliĐe iŶ that ǁaǇ?͟ 
 
We take a problem profile now that the intelligence team are developing for 
opeƌatioŶal poliĐiŶg aŶd it Đoŵes to ŵe… “oŵe thiŶgs ǁe'll saǇ FaĐeďook audience 
will work on that. Some posts will only be targeted to a town, if it's a crime appeal 
about a burglary in a town centre, we will only deliver it to that town because the 
rest of the audience aren't interested. So we do filter it on that.  
 
A classic eǆaŵple of that ǁould ďe the ĐaŵpaigŶ ǁe did a Đouple of Ǉeaƌs ago Ŷoǁ… 
We'd done the press releases. We'd done the essential media messages. 
Neighbourhood officers had been talking to people. No effect had been made on 
reducing this crime. And, yes, we were doing the enforcement work and we were 
targeting the individuals who we believed to be involved. That work was going on, 
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but what we needed was the public to help us, just by securing the doors, taking the 
things off display. And the crime would stop because it's always three things to a 
crime, isn't there.  
 
 Yeah. Location, offender, victim, which we can influence the victim. We can influence 
them. So that's what we wanted to do. So we looked at that geographic area and we 
saw that we'd done press release with [a newspaper] and nothing had gone in. Radio 
station the local officer had been on, nothing, no effect.  
 
So we looked at the problem profile and we went to the Mosaic data, Acorn data. We 
get public sector access to that. Punched in the postcode, let's have a look at this 
area. Right, okay, they don't read the local paper. They don't engage with the local 
media. It's all on the profile. It's all on the profile. Buy the lottery on a Friday night.  
 
They work in factories and offices, work mainly eight 'til five. Okay, and there's all the 
things in there, wealthy achievers and all those sort of ones. These were industrial 
workers, effectively. And they've got kids and all that sort of thing. So no wonder 
nothing was happening because we weren't reaching them at all.  
 
The absolute solution to that one was face-to-face. So our team went out with six 
neighbourhood police officers, PCSOs. I got a lady, who's got a really nice voice for 
radio, out there. Recorded me something on an MP3 player, soldered together with 
the PA system to stick on top of a police car and got an e-board on the back of a 
truck. And we did house-to-house down the streets that were being affected, 
because it was 20 streets.  
 
So we knew the area. We knew the profile. We did it between five and seven at night 
because we knew that's what time they were getting in from work. Knocked on the 
door, you need to be aware of this. Here's a crime prevention leaflet, but, look your 
car's are locked. Demonstrated what they needed to do, but took a moment to 
gather their email addresses and postcodes and details as well.  
 
So you effectively had a circus down your street of six officers, a PA system on top of 
a police car, flashing lights and an e-board. You got the message delivered. It was 
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delivered. You got the message. Twenty-five percent reduction in crime within a 
ǁeek.͟ ;PI.ϭϮͿ  
 
3) How Effective or Success is the Team at Reaching These Audiences: 
͞I doŶ͛t thiŶk ǁe ƌeaĐh eǀeƌǇďodǇ as suĐĐessfullǇ as ǁe should do, Ŷo, I thiŶk… ǁe 
have a very, kiŶd of, dispaƌate populatioŶ doǁŶ iŶ… [this aƌea] ďeĐause ǁe haǀe a lot 
of eldeƌlǇ people, Ǉou kŶoǁ, a lot of people Đoŵe doǁŶ this ǁaǇ to ƌetiƌe…a lot of 
holiday people, yeah, so we have to do a lot of work through our traditional media to 
reach older people ďeĐause ŵost of theŵ still aƌeŶ͛t Ƌuite as digitallǇ saǀǀǇ as theǇ 
should be, some of them are but not all of them, so we have to do quite a lot of work 
aƌouŶd that ďut ǇouŶg people of Đouƌse just aƌeŶ͛t ƌeadiŶg, Ǉou kŶoǁ, theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot 
reading national papers, never mind reading their local papers, so we are doing quite 
a lot of ǁoƌk to tƌǇ aŶd  taƌget theŵ aŶd ǁe͛ǀe had doŵestiĐ aďuse ĐaŵpaigŶs… 
which was all around domestic abuse for teenagers and that was done a couple of 
years ago initially and has ďeeŶ ƌolled out siŶĐe aŶd ǁe͛ǀe doŶe a lot oŶ FaĐeďook, 
ǁoƌked ƌeallǇ, ƌeallǇ ǁell… aŶd theŶ as Ǉou saǇ, holidaǇ ŵakeƌs ďeĐause aĐtuallǇ, Ǉou 
know, they are still targets of [long pause], you know, people think that because they 
are on holiday, they can leaǀe all theiƌ stuff oŶ the ďeaĐh aŶd that ŶoďodǇ͛s goiŶg to 
[pause] Yeah and actually, the minority communities has traditionally been a very 
diffiĐult aƌea iŶ this paƌt of the ǁoƌld ďeĐause aĐtuallǇ, ǁe doŶ͛t haǀe the saŵe 
volume of minority communities, as some other parts of the country do and that has 
meant, I think, in the past, that they have been forgotten a little bit. So we know we 
have pockets where we have significant communities... and I think we are getting a 
lot better at targeting them but I still doŶ͛t thiŶk ǁe do eǀeƌǇthiŶg that peƌhaps ǁe 
should do͟. ;PI.ϭϬͿ 
 
͞“o Ǉou Ŷeed that soƌt of douďle laǇeƌ of ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ stƌategies. KeǇ oŶe is 
probably always going to be a geographical one, but you need another layer which is 
based on ethnicity or diffeƌeŶt tǇpes of ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ.͟ ;PI.ϮϳͿ 
 
͞I ŵeaŶ ǁe͛ƌe telliŶg people theǇ should feel ƌeassuƌed, ďut aĐtuallǇ aƌe theǇ 
reassured by the being given information or do they have to be told and the R word 
used, Ǉou ĐaŶ ďe ƌeassuƌed.͟ ;PI.ϮϴͿ.   
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͞“o ǁhǇ aƌeŶ͛t ǁe ĐhattiŶg? WhǇ aƌeŶ͛t ǁe doiŶg ŵoƌe of this? [pause] Theƌe͛s  
alǁaǇs ďeeŶ ĐoŵŵuŶities ǁe ĐaŶ͛t ƌeaĐh. We͛ǀe alǁaǇs stƌuggled to ƌeaĐh 
ĐoŵŵuŶities; ǁhetheƌ theǇ͛ƌe itiŶeƌaŶt aŶd tƌaǀelliŶg ĐoŵŵuŶities, ǁhetheƌ theǇ͛ƌe 
people that doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to ƌeaĐh us, some of the ethnic communities sometimes erm, 
I policed [one area] for a long time and very very little crime reported from the Hindu 
there, was it Hindu? No, the Sikh community. Very little reporting crime because they 
sorted it out between themselves. So the thing is, there comes a push back, what 
aďout the people that doŶ͛t get it? Theƌe ǁill alǁaǇs ďe people ǁho doŶ͛t get it.͟ 
(PI.24) 
 
͞ModeƌatelǇ suĐĐessful, I ǁould saǇ. I thiŶk ǁe do pƌettǇ ǁell ĐaptuƌiŶg soƌt of ŵid-
twenties probably and then older because even the people not captured through 
digital media are captured in traditional media but I would say it's our younger 
generation that are the hardest to capture. That's a mixture of them being apathetic-
safe or 'Why would I have any interest in the police force?' because they are not 
hoŵe oǁŶeƌs, theǇ doŶ͛t see theŵselǀes as haǀiŶg ŵaŶǇ assets, so theƌe is Ŷo ƌisk iŶ 
it foƌ theŵ. “o ǁhǇ ǁould theǇ ǁaŶt oƌ haǀe aŶ iŶteƌest iŶ the poliĐe?͟ ;PI.ϵͿ 
 
"We get the message out but whether anyone is a) interested, b) actually paying 
atteŶtioŶ oƌ ĐͿ goiŶg to do aŶǇthiŶg ǁith it, ǁe doŶ't kŶoǁ.͟ ;PI.ϵͿ 
 
 ͞I thiŶk uŶless that peƌsoŶ ǁaŶts ĐoŶtaĐt ǁith the poliĐe, ǁhǇ aƌe ǁe eŶfoƌĐiŶg 
ouƌselǀes oŶ theŵ?  “o that ǁe ĐaŶ saǇ ǁe͛ǀe eŶgaged ǁith that haƌd to ƌeaĐh 
coŵŵuŶitǇ, ǁhetheƌ theǇ ǁaŶted to ďe eŶgaged ǁith oƌ Ŷot.  It͛s like – ǁell to ŵe it͛s 
like anything in life, imagine if the pharmaceutical society said we want to be more 
iŶĐlusiǀe iŶ ouƌ ĐoŵŵuŶities as a phaƌŵaĐist.  UŶless I Ŷeed a phaƌŵaĐist, I doŶ͛t 
waŶt to go aŶd eŶgage ǁith the phaƌŵaĐist iŶ ŵǇ loĐal Đheŵist.͟ ;PI.ϮϭͿ 
 
3.2.8   Measuring Effectiveness and Success 
Assessing the Effectiveness of the Evaluation Metrics: 
͞ǁe Ŷoǁ doŶ't ŵeasuƌe faŶs as ouƌ ŵeasuƌe. It's ƌeaĐh. All ǁe'ƌe aďout is ƌeaĐh. “o 
that's how you measure success in social media, in my eyes. You can't measure it just 
ďǇ Ŷuŵďeƌ of faŶs. It ŵeaŶs ŶothiŶg… Yeah, it's outputs aŶd outĐoŵes, isŶ't it? Youƌ 
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output is how many impressions, your output is confidence or number of reports and 
we're trying to have, whenever I've got a strategy being developed, I try and have the 
differential on the document. These are the outputs which will be easy to measure. 
The outcomes are hard to measure effectively, but they're the ones I'm really 
interested in and if a campaign plan comes to me and it's got one outcome, that's 
fine. It might be absolutely fine as long as there's some way of saying, how do we say 
this worked and it's really tricky at times. There are campaigns we do which are 
output-based because of the speed we need to work at. We do have to say we've 
had a certain million impressions on this campaign. That will do for this evaluation. 
But we know that it's been of the right audience, at least, since we've got the profile 
in Mosaic. So again, we can do targeted posts to owners of 125 and smaller cc engine 
motorbikes who live in [a specific area] because we've got a thief targeting them at 
the moment. That's the problem profile. Fine, we can do something with that.  I can 
make a very deliverable message because we know what the messages are. We've 
got the crime prevention messages. We know how to engage with them, the young 
people, because of the channels we're using, but we can now target and tailor to 
make sure that our activity reaches the right people. But measuring impact is much 
ŵoƌe diffiĐult.͟ ;PI.ϭϮͿ 
 
͞The oŶe aƌea that all poliĐe foƌĐes stƌuggle ǁith is aƌouŶd eǀaluatioŶ aŶd ŵaƌketiŶg 
ĐaŵpaigŶs.͟ ;PI.ϯͿ 
 
"That͛s oŶe aƌea ǁheƌe I thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe ďad aŶd I thiŶk ŵost Đoŵs teaŵs aƌe ďad.͟ ;PI.ϲͿ  
 
͞the ǁhole thiŶg aďout digital is Ǉou ĐaŶ eǀaluate it too ŵuĐh. The tƌiĐk is to ǁoƌk 
out what you want to evaluate when you're starting to plan. What are you trying to 
geŶeƌate? WhǇ aƌe Ǉou doiŶg it? What's Ǉouƌ oďjeĐtiǀe?͟ ;PI.ϭϮͿ 
 
Measurement: 
͞Paƌt of the pƌoďleŵ is that ǁe just doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ǁhat effeĐtiǀe looks like iŶ soĐial 
ŵedia. With the pƌess it ǁas easieƌ, ďut ǁith soĐial ŵedia ǁe͛ƌe tƌǇiŶg to do so ŵaŶǇ 
diffeƌeŶt thiŶgs at the saŵe tiŵe…͟ ;PI.ϮͿ 
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͞suĐĐess is a tƌiĐkǇ ĐoŶĐept to ŵeasuƌe. Is it ƌeach? The number of followers? The 
Number of retweets/reposts? Likes? Comments? - I don't know! The traditional 
ŵethods of assessiŶg suĐĐess aƌeŶ't Ǉet suitaďle foƌ usiŶg oŶ soĐial ŵedia͟. ;PI.ϮϲͿ 
 
͞It͛s ƌeallǇ haƌd, Ǉou'll see ǁe put soŵe ŵeasuƌes iŶ theƌe. Some areas, the challenge 
is measuring the outcomes and not the activity and policing is very good at 
ŵeasuƌiŶg aĐtiǀitǇ aŶd Ŷot so good at ŵeasuƌiŶg outĐoŵes.͟ ;PI.ϮϳͿ 
 
͞We'ǀe staƌted to ŵoǀe aǁaǇ fƌoŵ ǁhat I Đall the ǀaŶitǇ stats. “o ǁe'ƌe Ŷot 
measuring how many followers we've got. We're measuring the engagement that 
we're having and actually making what we're doing on those channels more 
ŵeaŶiŶgful thaŶ ǁhat ǁe ŶeĐessaƌilǇ pƌeǀiouslǇ ǁeƌe… Just ďeĐause soŵethiŶg 
appears in a paper, it doesn't mean you read it. So because something appears in 
your Facebook feed, it doesn't mean you read it. If you like it, you comment on it. If 
you put it as a favourite it suggests that you've done some sort of interaction with it 
and we would class that as an engagement͟. ;PI.ϴͿ 
 
͞ǁhat͛s the poiŶt iŶ haǀiŶg a ƌeaĐh of ϱϱ,ϬϬϬ people iŶ oŶe paƌtiĐulaƌ aƌea if Ŷot oŶe 
peƌsoŶ has aĐted oŶ ǁhat ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg aŶd Ŷot oŶe peƌsoŶ has iŶteƌaĐted ǁith that 
ďit aŶd haǀe got aŶǇǁheƌe else oƌ, Ǉou kŶoǁ͟. ;PI.ϮϮͿ 
 
͞“o ǁheŶ Ǉou talk aďout measuring the success of or the different between 
traditional and social media, I think we need to go back to what are we trying to 
ŵeasuƌe?  UŶless Ǉou ĐaŶ pƌoǀe the thiŶg Ǉou͛ƌe ŵeasuƌiŶg has had aŶ iŵpaĐt, theŶ 
it doesŶ͛t hold aŶǇ suďstaŶĐe.  You ĐaŶ͛t evaluate the benefits of social media unless 
you create a sterile environment and you can attribute that behaviour to doing that 
soĐial ŵedia, aŶd I doŶ͛t thiŶk ǁe ĐaŶ iŶ ŵost ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes͟. ;PI.ϮϭͿ 
 
"Trying to separate out the impacts of that from other changes to legislation, alcohol 
liŵits aŶd all that is alǁaǇs ǀeƌǇ ǀeƌǇ haƌd͟. ;PI.ϮϳͿ 
 
͞I thiŶk it͛s ƌeallǇ haƌd to saǇ aĐtuallǇ ďeĐause a lot of Ǉouƌ ďiggeƌ suĐĐesses aƌe thiŶgs 
that doŶ͛t happeŶ…͟  
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Analysis: 
͞I suppose it͛s the iŵpossiďle thiŶg, ǁhiĐh is the how we evaluate the success of 
soĐial ŵedia iŶ poliĐiŶg. That͛s ŵǇ ďig issue. I ĐaŶ shoǁ Ǉou the Ŷuŵďeƌs… I ĐaŶ giǀe 
Ǉou eǆaŵples of suĐĐess. I ĐaŶ shoǁ Ǉou all of that, ďut hoǁ do ǁe… Noǁ ouƌ tƌouďle 
is, is how do you evaluate? How do you say, we are reaching these people? And of 
Đouƌse it͛s ƌeallǇ haƌd to saǇ oŶ Tǁitteƌ. Coz ǁell ǁe do kŶoǁ the Ŷuŵďeƌs; ďut, ǁe 
doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ǁho theǇ aƌe, ǁe doŶ͛t kŶoǁ hoǁ old theǇ aƌe͟. ;PI.ϰͿ 
 
Culture of Antipathy: 
͞ǁe doŶ͛t eǀaluate the outputs – the outcomes or the outputs from our comms 
offiĐe, so ǁe͛ǀe Ŷo idea if ǁhat ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg is ǁoƌkiŶg…͟ ;PI.ϮϭͿ 
 
͞If Ǉou'ƌe Ŷot opeƌatiŶg iŶ a stƌategiĐ adǀisoƌǇ ĐapaĐitǇ, Ǉou'ƌe Ŷot doiŶg the joď foƌ 
me.  And there's a lot of that in [here] where, even people in my team, they'll be part 
of a project team and success for them is doing what they're asked, creating a post 
that they were asked for, writing a leaflet they were asked for, not what are you 
tƌǇiŶg to aĐhieǀe, hoǁ aƌe ǁe goiŶg to get theƌe, ǁhat do Ǉou ǁaŶt to do?͟ ;PI.11) 
 
Time and Resources: 
͞The last ĐaŵpaigŶ ǁe did... ǁe paid to haǀe a pƌopeƌ eǀaluatioŶ doŶe ďǇ aŶ 
eǀaluatioŶ ĐoŵpaŶǇ. AŶd I thiŶk ǁe͛ll ďe doiŶg ŵoƌe of that ŵoǀiŶg foƌǁaƌds ǁith 
thiŶgs like that. BeĐause otheƌǁise, it͛s kiŶd of like, Ǉou doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ǁhetheƌ it͛s doŶe 
ǁhat it Ŷeeds to do. AŶd geŶeƌallǇ Đoŵs teaŵs doŶ͛t haǀe the ƌesouƌĐes oƌ the 
aďilities as suĐh to do ŵuĐh eǀaluatioŶ theŵselǀes͟. ;PI.ϲͿ 
 
͞We do soŵe ŵeasuƌeŵeŶt; ŵost of the ŵeasuƌeŵeŶt is aƌouŶd the paƌtiĐulaƌ 
number of followers and that kind of thing, so really basic stuff.  And again evaluation 
is soŵethiŶg ǁe ƌeallǇ Ŷeed to do that ŵoƌe aŶd I thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe kiŶd of stƌuggliŶg ǁith 
that at the ŵoŵeŶt just ďeĐause of sheeƌ Ŷuŵďeƌs of people that ǁe doŶ͛t haǀe ďut I 
think again evaluation is something that we are going to have to get into otherwise 
hoǁ to Ǉou kŶoǁ ǁhat͛s ǁoƌkiŶg aŶd ǁhat͛s Ŷot ǁoƌkiŶg.͟ ;PI.ϭϴͿ 
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Apathy: 
͞ultiŵatelǇ iŶ poliĐiŶg it [suĐĐess] is a ǀeƌǇ peƌsoŶal, suďjeĐtiǀe thiŶg, ǁhiĐh ŵeaŶs 
we can't properly, and shouldn't, put a measurement on it as this inevitably draws 
atteŶtioŶ aǁaǇ fƌoŵ the ǀiĐtiŵ ǁho should ďe the fiƌst aŶd oŶlǇ ĐoŶĐeƌŶ… The thiŶg 
is, communications can't be target driven - it ends up destroying, or at least 
iŵpediŶg, ǁhat Ǉou aƌe tƌǇiŶg to do͟. ;PI.ϭϰ) 
 
͞PoliĐiŶg is teƌƌiďle foƌ ĐhasiŶg figuƌes aŶǇǁaǇ I thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe ŵoǀiŶg aǁaǇ fƌoŵ that 
because of the target but it comes back and bites you on the bum you know like this 
stuff ǁith ǁhǇ “outh Yoƌkshiƌe ďotheƌed aďout ďuƌglaƌǇ ďut theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot ďotheƌed 
about CSE, because they were being hauled before the home office for their burglary 
ƌates theǇ ǁeƌeŶ͛t ďeiŶg hauled ďefoƌe the hoŵe offiĐe foƌ theiƌ C“E ƌates.͟ ;PI.ϮϯͿ 
 
3.2.9   Areas that need Improvement 
Social Media: 
 ͞I ǁould saǇ ǁe had a ǀeƌǇ diffeƌeŶt tone of voice and positioning through social 
ŵedia thaŶ ǁe did elseǁheƌe. I thiŶk theƌe's still a diffeƌeŶĐe ďut gap is ĐlosiŶg͟. 
(PI.9) 
 
͞“o I thiŶk ǁe did ǀeƌǇ good at the staƌt to get to this stage ďut ǁheŶ ǁe look at 
soŵe of the otheƌ foƌĐes theǇ͛ƌe ƌeallǇ flǇiŶg ǁith it [soĐial ŵedia] aŶd I thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe 
maybe a little bit behind now, but that will hopefully change when we get the tools in 
plaĐe.͟ ;PI.ϭϵAͿ 
 
͞I thiŶk theƌe͛s ŵoƌe that ǁe ĐaŶ do aďout soĐial ŵedia, I see it ǁoƌkiŶg Ƌuite ǁell iŶ 
other forces and I think we need to probably invest in a little more time in making 
offiĐeƌs do theiƌ fiǀe a daǇ, Ǉou kŶoǁ͟. ;PI.ϮϴͿ 
 
YouTube: 
͞We͛ƌe Ŷoǁheƌe Ŷeaƌ that. We aƌe ǀeƌǇ ŵuĐh kiŶd of like puttiŶg ouƌ little toe iŶ the 
sǁiŵŵiŶg pool kiŶd of teƌƌitoƌǇ, ǁe͛ƌe not there. We wanna get there, but we need 
to kiŶd of haǀe the ƌight ĐhaŶŶels to ďe aďle to push that stuff thƌough. Theƌe͛s Ŷo 
poiŶt iŶ just stiĐkiŶg it oŶ YouTuďe aŶd Ŷot ďeiŶg aďle to pƌoŵote it pƌopeƌlǇ.͟  ;PI.ϯͿ 
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͞We doŶ't use it [YouTuďe] eŶough to say at the moment. We're just sort of rolling 
out the fact that we've got technology to be able to go and take some short clips. It 
used to be that you would create these nice, formal, corporate videos and stuff. It's 
not now, you need to be able to take quiĐk, little, shoƌt sŶap shots͟. ;PI.ϭϳͿ 
 
Websites: 
͞I doŶ't thiŶk ǁe'ǀe got a ǀeƌǇ good ǁeďsite at the ŵoŵeŶt. It's pooƌlǇ desigŶed, 
doesn't get a massive amount of traffic and certainly since I've been here I've not 
invested a lot of time in improving it because it's very expensive to do so and social 
media channels are much more accessible to the public and actually most of the news 
and information we want to get out, we can get out much more effectively using 
soĐial ŵedia ĐhaŶŶels.͟ ;PI.ϮϳͿ 
͞The ǁeďsite should ďe a oŶe stop shop ďut ǁe͛ƌe ǁoƌkiŶg ǁith aŶ aŶtiƋue ĐoŶteŶt 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt sǇsteŵ, I ŵeaŶ it͛s aǁful aŶd it͛s ďeĐoŵe a ďig pƌioƌitǇ ďeĐause of 
course the force control room are getting over a million calls a year of which only 
about 100,000 of those are actually victim based crimes, a lot of those other calls are 
foƌ otheƌ iŶĐideŶts that iŶǀolǀe ouƌ paƌtŶeƌ oƌgaŶisatioŶs oƌ people doŶ͛t ƌeallǇ Ŷeed 
the police anyway, so we need to find a way of reducing that demand and there is a 
lot of work going on in that aƌea aŶd it͛s aďout ŵakiŶg the ǁeďsite, Ǉou kŶoǁ, ŵoƌe 
iŶfoƌŵatiǀe, ŵoƌe easǇ to use.͟ ;PI.ϮϴͿ 
 
Effective Campaigns: 
͞ǁe just doŶ͛t haǀe eŶough ƌesouƌĐe at the ŵoŵeŶt foĐussiŶg oŶ the Đƌeatiǀe 
content side of the business. So that is something that we are definitely focussing on 
ŵoǀiŶg foƌǁaƌd.͟ ;PI.ϲͿ 
 
͞ǁheŶ lots of ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs depaƌtŵeŶts aƌe desigŶiŶg ĐaŵpaigŶs theǇ aƌe 
foĐussiŶg oŶ a ŵiǆtuƌe of aǁaƌeŶess ƌaisiŶg aŶd ďehaǀiouƌ ĐhaŶge aŶd theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot 
focussing clearly enough on whether they want one or the other, so for example we 
just ran a really big domestic abuse campaign [here] and I was really clear that we 
needed to have a view as a force do we want this campaign just to raise awareness 
about domestic abuse and make people know kind of where they can go for 
information and help or are we trying to change a behaviour, are we trying to make 
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soŵeďodǇ soƌt of ŵoǀe fƌoŵ heƌe to heƌe… ďeĐause aǁaƌeŶess ƌaisiŶg is a 
completely different type of communication to actually making somebody change the 
waǇ that theǇ ďehaǀe aŶd thiŶgs that͛ll ŵotiǀate people to ĐhaŶge theiƌ ďehaǀiouƌ 
ǀaƌǇ depeŶdiŶg oŶ ǁhat that ďehaǀiouƌ is… lots of foƌĐes aƌeŶ͛t ƌeallǇ doiŶg this.͟ 
(PI.16) 
 
Internal Communications: 
͞What is ƌeallǇ iŶteƌestiŶg is that iŶteƌŶal ĐoŵŵuŶiĐations used to be, in the police 
service, almost non-eǆisteŶt aŶd I ĐaŶ ƌeŵeŵďeƌ ǁheŶ I staƌted at [heƌe] aŶd… I 
reviewed the structure and it was obvious to me that what they were missing was an 
internal communications officer.  So I produced this review saying they needed that 
aŶd ŵǇ liŶe ŵaŶageƌ at the tiŵe, the DeputǇ CoŶstaďle… said to ŵe poliĐe offiĐeƌs 
doŶ͛t Ŷeed iŶteƌŶal ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs theǇ do ǁhat theǇ͛ƌe told.͟ ;PI.ϭϲͿ 
 
͞We ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ haǀe Ŷo iŶteƌŶal Đoŵs fuŶĐtioŶ ďeĐause the ǀieǁ ǁas takeŶ that it 
made sense to create a big campaigns team, not big but like four people, campaigns 
teaŵ aŶd Ŷot haǀe aŶ iŶteƌŶal Đoŵs fuŶĐtioŶ. Foƌ aŶ oƌgaŶisatioŶ that͛s goiŶg 
through a massive change and has just taken fifty-five million out, about to go and 
restructure itself to take another twenty-five out... and exploring collaboration with 
other public sector organisations... to have no internal comms function just doesn't 
ŵake aŶǇ seŶse͟ ;PI.ϯͿ 
 
͞iŶteƌŶal Đoŵŵs I thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe ƌeallǇ ďad at, I doŶ͛t thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe ƌeallǇ good at internal 
Đoŵŵs, ďut I thiŶk that͛s a geŶeƌiĐ thiŶg aĐƌoss lots of ďig oƌgaŶizatioŶs, it͛s Ŷot just 
iŶ poliĐiŶg.͟ ;PI.ϮϭͿ 
 
Policy and Guidance:  
 ͞theƌe is soŵe guidaŶĐe oŶ it ƌatheƌ thaŶ aĐtual poliĐǇ ďut it͛s so loose ƌeallǇ that 
you can just do whatever you want really.  The impact area is if it comes under the 
area of you could make it fit pretty much anything.  I just think that everybody should 
ďe ǁoƌkiŶg to soŵe faiƌlǇ fiǆed ƌules.͟ ;PI.ϭϴͿ 
 
͞This is a ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ that happeŶs a lot at the ŵoŵent, in an age of massive cuts 
aŶd austeƌitǇ, ǁhetheƌ it͛d ďe the Hoŵe OffiĐe, ǁhetheƌ it͛d ďe the poliĐiŶg ŵiŶisteƌ, 
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whether it be the Association of Chief Police Officers, whoever, the College of 
Policing, you would think now would be the time to say here͛s Ǉouƌ liteƌatuƌe, 
ďeĐause ďuƌglaƌǇ͛s ďuƌglaƌǇ, doesŶ͛t ŵatteƌ ǁhat foƌĐe Ǉou͛ƌe iŶ, Đaƌ Đƌiŵe is Đaƌ 
Đƌiŵe, heƌe͛s Ǉouƌ liteƌatuƌe, stiĐk Ǉouƌ Đƌest oŶ theƌe, go aǁaǇ aŶd use it.  Heƌe aƌe 
your website templates, we need you to tackle these areas, these are the core issues, 
so siŵplǇ dƌoppiŶg Ǉouƌ pƌioƌities aŶd that ǁaǇ ǁe kŶoǁ that eǀeƌǇoŶe͛s ǁeďsite 
meets with whatever the Home Office require us to meet... and there are some 
forces across the country that are spending thousands on various different forms of 
public engagement and consultancy in order to try and establish what people want 
fƌoŵ oŶliŶe ĐhaŶŶels.͟ ;PI.ϮϮͿ 
 
Listening to Audiences: 
͞I doŶ͛t thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe ǀeƌǇ good at listeŶiŶg soŵetiŵes [pause] I thiŶk it Đoŵes oŶ the 
ďaĐk of telliŶg, ǁe͛ƌe good at telliŶg, ǁe͛ƌe Ŷot so good at listeŶiŶg.͟ ;PI.ϮϴͿ 
 
3.2.10   Threats  
 ͞I thiŶk ŵoŶeǇ is the pƌiŵaƌǇ thƌeat ďeĐause ŵoŶeǇ is dǁiŶdliŶg aŶd ǁill ĐoŶtiŶue to 
do so for a stable future. So I think that is the one threat and everything else comes 
after that because from that we could see our team reducing or almost disappearing 
altogether really.  It might be left to individual officers to be doing that media stuff so 
without doubt money more than legislation, technology or anything.  We can always 
adapt to those sorts of things but if the money is not there then the team goes so 
thiŶk oǀeƌ the Ŷeǆt teŶ Ǉeaƌs that ǁill ďe Ƌuite ĐƌitiĐal.͟ ;PI.ϭϴͿ 
 
͞The ďudget is ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ gettiŶg sŵalleƌ aŶd as people/poliĐe offiĐeƌs get ŵoƌe used 
to new technology they expect more from it for less. Over the last few years, I've 
noticed that there is a lot more pressure being put on the function of corporate 
communications in policing – police officers are learning and developing new 
expectations for what they want out of communications and we're struggling to keep 
up͟. ;PI.ϳͿ 
 
͞iŶ ƌealitǇ to ƌeaĐh a sigŶifiĐaŶt poƌtioŶ of ouƌ audieŶĐe, [thƌough] offliŶe ŵedia, it's 
the best way to reach them because they are not necessarily engaged digitally. But 
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with budget cuts, that becomes increasingly difficult to be able to do other than the 
traditional media routes which I say we do a good job of and we get good coverage in 
local broadcast and print media." (PI.9) 
 
͞Well ďudget͛s goiŶg to ďe the thiŶg. I ŵeaŶ ǁe͛ƌe goiŶg to ďe goiŶg through the 
hoop iŶ a Đouple of Ǉeaƌs͛ tiŵe agaiŶ ďeĐause ǁe͛ƌe goiŶg to haǀe to Đut… aĐĐoƌdiŶg 
to current government although it could all change next May. But according to the 
ĐuƌƌeŶt goǀeƌŶŵeŶt theǇ ƌeĐkoŶ theǇ͛ƌe goiŶg to loď us aŶotheƌ ϮϬ% off. We͛ƌe going 
to haǀe to fiŶd ouƌ Đuts. “o thƌeats, that͛s the keǇ thƌeat ďeĐause if theǇ Đoŵe to ŵe 
aŶd saǇ, ͞‘ight Ǉou͛ǀe got to Đut soŵe staff͟. OkaǇ that͛s fiŶe I͛ll Đut soŵe staff ďut ďǇ 
ĐuttiŶg those staff this is ǁhat Ǉou ǁoŶ͛t get. If I Đut the pƌess offiĐe any well the 
service certainly to the media is going to go down and potentially to officers. Because 
theƌe͛s oŶe guǇ off at the ŵiŶute dealiŶg ǁith a ďig fƌaud iŶƋuiƌǇ that͛s goŶe oŶ that 
theǇ͛ƌe goiŶg to Đhaƌge toŵoƌƌoǁ oŶ so ǁe ǁouldŶ͛t haǀe that ƌesouƌĐe to do that. 
Theƌe͛s all soƌts of iŵpliĐatioŶs foƌ opeƌatioŶal suppoƌt, ouƌ suppoƌt to opeƌatioŶs 
and also if they want nice graphics then if you jeopardise having graphics people. The 
saŵe ǁith the ǁhole depaƌtŵeŶt I͛ǀe desĐƌiďed to Ǉou. That is the ďiggest threat and 
depending on how harsh the cuts are is depending on how much of a service I can 
ĐoŶtiŶue to pƌoǀide. Otheƌ thƌeats ƌeallǇ I doŶ͛t… I suppose iŶ that saŵe ĐoŶteǆt a 
thƌeat of the eǀeƌ iŶĐƌeasiŶg ŵedia ǁhetheƌ Ǉou͛ƌe iŶĐludiŶg soĐial ŵedia. Then we 
ǁould ďe iŶĐapaďle of dealiŶg ǁith aŶǇ gƌeat eǆpaŶsioŶ if ǁe ǁeƌe ĐuttiŶg ďaĐk.͟ 
(PI.13) 
 
͞I͛ǀe had to ƌeduĐe iŶ otheƌ aƌeas aŶd I just doŶ͛t haǀe the people to ďe aďle to 
provide the service that people want, so I think that is one of the biggest thƌeats͟. 
(PI.10) 
 
͞ǁe'ǀe goŶe fƌoŵ haǀiŶg had Ϯϳ people doiŶg Đoƌp Đoŵs iŶ ϮϬϬϵ to haǀiŶg ϭϬ Ŷoǁ so 
… Ǉeah I'ǀe doŶe the ĐoƌƌelatioŶs, the dƌop iŶ ĐoŶfideŶĐe leǀels totallǇ Đoƌƌelates the 
lack of investment in the gaps in corp coms and engagement activity.... reductions 
here have been over 60%.  I've done a kind of benchmarking, it's the highest degree 
of Đuts aŶǇǁheƌe iŶ the ĐouŶtƌǇ that's affeĐted a Đoƌp Đoŵs depaƌtŵeŶts.͟ (PI.11) 
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͞It's a huge aŵouŶt of ǁoƌk aŶd this is the ĐhalleŶge Ŷoǁ faĐiŶg poliĐiŶg and certainly 
a challenge for us, how do we cope with the demand, 24/7. People are beginning to 
report incidents and calls for assistance though social media and how does the force 
ƌespoŶd to that. Hoǁ ĐaŶ ǁe ŵake suƌe ǁe piĐk theŵ up iŶ a tiŵelǇ fashioŶ?͟ (PI.12) 
 
͞the ŵoƌe Ǉou eŶgage ǁith people the ŵoƌe theǇ eǆpeĐt aŶd ǁaŶt out of the seƌǀiĐe 
- requiring more resources in order to deal with expectation management. Social 
ŵedia is Ŷot ͚the easǇ optioŶ͛ Ŷot ǁheŶ it Đoŵes to loŶg teƌŵ ŵaŶageŵeŶt͟. ;PI.ϭϰͿ 
 
͞the ďottoŵ liŶe is people aƌe oǀeƌ ǁoƌked, people feel the ƌeal pƌessuƌe͟ ;PI.ϮϯͿ 
 
͞AŶd ǁe'ƌe all eǆtƌeŵelǇ ďusǇ aŶd it's Ŷot just the Đoŵŵs that aƌe ďusǇ. EǀeƌǇ poliĐe 
offiĐeƌ, eǀeƌǇ staff ŵeŵďeƌ haǀe got eǆtƌa ǁoƌk oŶ. We'ƌe all too ďusǇ.͟ ;PI.ϮϱAͿ 
 
͞ǁe doŶ͛t haǀe the ŵoŶeǇ, so people leaǀe ǁheŶ theǇ get a ďetteƌ offeƌ͟ ;PI.ϮϴͿ  
 
͞I thiŶk a lot of the tiŵe theǇ aƌe ĐoŶĐeƌŶed aďout loss of skills ďeĐause of the 
ƌeduĐed ďudgets aŶd oďǀiouslǇ soŵe plaĐes doŶ͛t haǀe a head of Đoŵŵs theǇ haǀe a 
police officer iŶ theƌe oƌ theǇ haǀe soŵeďodǇ iŶ theƌe that is a head of uŶit ďut isŶ͛t 
reflected in the pay and the reporting lines or anything so the loss of skills and 
experience and knowledge which has come through, or am told. I spoke to [a senior 
official] about the report he was doing on South Yorkshire with Cliff Richard and one 
of the thiŶgs that Đaŵe thƌough that ǁas that the Ŷeǁ teaŵ ǁeƌeŶ͛t Ƌuite suƌe ǁho 
to tuƌŶ to aŶd I ǁas thiŶkiŶg ǁhǇ Ŷot? if Ǉou͛d just phoŶed ŵe ǁe͛d haǀe told Ǉou, 
ǁe͛ǀe had loads of thiŶgs like that " (PI.23) 
 
͞ďut I do fiŶd it a lot haƌdeƌ thaŶ ǁhat it used to ďe ďeĐause people doŶ͛t haǀe the 
time to share information as much, I used to know all the actual names of the Web 
MaŶageƌs iŶ diffeƌeŶt FoƌĐes ǁheƌeas Ŷoǁ I͛ǀe just lost it.͟ ;PI.25A) 
 
͞We ŵeŶtioŶed eaƌlieƌ aďout, Ǉou kŶoǁ, Ǉou fiŶd it stƌaŶge that theƌe isŶ͛t oŶe 
ǁeďsite teŵplate foƌ the foƌĐes, oŶe set of ŵaƌketiŶg ŵateƌial, ďut theƌe͛s also Ŷot 
oŶe set of ďest pƌaĐtiĐe foƌ soĐial ŵedia.͟ ;PI.ϮϮͿ 
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͞EǆteƌŶallǇ, it's a huge ĐhalleŶge for us to service the different requirements of our 
deŵogƌaphiĐs͟ ;PI.ϵͿ 
 
͞MǇ oŶlǇ ǁoƌƌǇ is  ǁe tell theŵ this soƌt of stuff ǁe told Ǉou, like Ŷo this is, aŶd 
theǇ͛ƌe like, Ŷo ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg this, shut it doǁŶ aŶd theǇ eŶd up iŶ a pƌoďleŵ ďeĐause 
they haveŶ͛t ƌeallǇ listeŶed to the people ǁho aƌe aĐtuallǇ doiŶg it.͟ ;PI.ϭϵBͿ 
 
͞“eŶioƌ poliĐe ŵaŶageƌs aŶd loǁeƌ poliĐe offiĐeƌs haǀe a ǀeƌǇ high eǆpeĐtatioŶ of 
what social media can deliver in terms of cost-reduced and effective communication. 
The thing is these expectations are increasingly unrealistic and problematic for them 
doing their job. Social media is one tool but it should never be allowed to dominate 
as Ǉou ǁould ďe Đut off fƌoŵ too ŵaŶǇ audieŶĐes͟. ;PI.ϳͿ 
 
͞PoliĐiŶg ĐaŶŶot affoƌd to ďe a diŶosauƌ͟ ;PI.1) 
 
͞just keepiŶg paĐe ǁith the ĐhaŶgiŶg laŶdsĐape of ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs oƌ so, it is ƌapidlǇ 
evolving, it presents challenges operationally for policing but also for us from a 
communications perspective actually which channels we should be investing time and 
effoƌt iŶ ǀeƌsus those that ǁe doŶ͛t. Do ǁe keep it siŵple aŶd deǀelop ĐeƌtaiŶ 
channels massively and not worry about some of the other emerging ones but 
actually then we could get left behind the curve and also accessing our younger 
audieŶĐe͟. ;PI.ϵͿ 
 
͞ǁe are constantly fighting a rear-guard action against information leaks and 
iŶĐoƌƌeĐt iŶfoƌŵatioŶ͟ ;PI.ϮͿ 
 
͞CitizeŶ jouƌŶalisŵ is ŵoƌe aŶ iŶĐoŶǀeŶieŶĐe thaŶ a pƌoďleŵ – the usual policy is to 
igŶoƌe it uŶless ǁe ĐaŶ͛t. BǇ ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ, hoǁeǀeƌ, the Ŷeǁ geŶeƌation of crime 
journalists are a big problem for [us]. With the death of the dedicated crime reporter 
ǁe͛ǀe seeŶ a ƌise of spotlightiŶg ƌepoƌteƌs – journalists who do a bit of this, a bit of 
that and a bit of crime on the side. The problem is with this approach is that these 
ƌepoƌteƌs ƌeallǇ doŶ͛t uŶdeƌstaŶd the ƌepoƌtiŶg ƌules iŶ plaĐe – especially since 
Leveson – and so report things wrongly, libellously, slanderously or on occasion 
illegallǇ͟. ;PI.ϳͿ 
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"So there may be fewer traditional journalists, but also there's now citizen journalists 
or bloggers or community activists who've sprung up. The barrier between what's a 
journalist and what's somebody who's just interested in what you're up to is very 
gƌeǇ. We'ǀe got foƌŵeƌ MP…, she ǁƌites a ďlog Ŷoǁ. “he Đomes in and expects a 
service that a traditional journalist would get and it's quite hard to say we're not 
gonna answer your questions, but we will answer somebody from the Daily Mails, 
doesn't really make a great lot of sense." (PI.27) 
 
͞I guess a Đouple of threats are obviously, some have got issues with the police and 
crime commissioners who have stolen some of the corporate communications 
teaŵs.͟ ;PI.ϲͿ 
 
3.2.11 Police Crime Commissioners 
For: 
͞We haǀe staǇed ǁithiŶ the poliĐe foƌĐe stƌuĐtuƌe ďut… A lot of our work is structured 
around – our proactive campaign work is structured around the PCC priorities but if I 
am honest, I'm quite comfortable with that because there are the things that public 
have set their priorities what's key to them and we obviously have internal working 
groups here operationally to be driving improvement in those areas. So, it makes 
seŶse that ǁe adopt theŵ fƌoŵ a ĐaŵpaigŶ peƌspeĐtiǀe.͟ 
 
͞[A]s it tuƌŶed out ǁith the daǇ to daǇ it didŶ͛t seeŵ to ŵake a lot of diffeƌeŶĐe at the 
time because we were still primarily doing things for the force. So I think the focus of 
all the work we were doing was all around delivery of the police and crime plan. Of 
Đouƌse it the PCC͛s plaŶ is aĐtuallǇ the ǁoƌk the foƌĐe should ďe doiŶg aŶǇǁaǇ, so ǁe 
didŶ͛t ƌeallǇ get ŵaƌƌed iŶ aŶǇ of the politiĐs of thiŶgs; that ŵight ďe diffeƌeŶt ǁheŶ it 
comes to the next PCC election because politics will come into play a bit then; but 
theŶ theǇ haǀe theiƌ oǁŶ Đoŵŵs lead Ŷoǁ.͟ 
 
͞It͛s ǁoƌkiŶg as faƌ as I͛ŵ ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ďecause I get on with the people and make a 
poiŶt of it. But I ǁas ďit ǁaƌǇ aďout it at fiƌst as to ǁhetheƌ it ǁould ǁoƌk; ďut it͛s all 
doǁŶ… like I said at the staƌt it͛s all doǁŶ to iŶdiǀiduals iŶ the eŶd. AŶd if Ǉou ĐaŶ get 
oŶ ǁith the people that Ǉou͛ƌe dealiŶg ǁith theŶ Ǉou͛ƌe fiŶe ďut if theƌe͛s aŶǇ 
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aǁkǁaƌdŶess oƌ theǇ͛ƌe doiŶg thiŶgs off the Đuff ǁithout ĐoŶsultiŶg Ǉou theŶ oƌ 
telliŶg Ǉou ǁhat͛s goiŶg oŶ theŶ it Đould ďe iŶĐƌediďlǇ aǁkǁaƌd. I kŶoǁ that happeŶs 
iŶ otheƌ plaĐes ďut as faƌ as I͛ŵ ĐoŶĐeƌŶed heƌe it͛s ǁoƌkiŶg aŶd ǁoƌkiŶg ǀeƌǇ ǁell… 
Well oŶe thiŶg that poliĐe aŶd Đƌiŵe ĐoŵŵissioŶeƌs ĐaŶ͛t do ǁhateǀeƌ theǇ take oǀeƌ 
is deal with operational policing. So generally our news branch for want of a better 
phrase deals with operational policing so however big and bold they are if the crime 
ĐoŵŵissioŶeƌ Đoŵe iŶ aŶd said ͞I doŶ͛t ǁaŶt Ǉou to aŶsǁeƌ that͟ I ĐaŶ tell hiŵ to 
push off ďeĐause it͛s ŶothiŶg to do ǁith hiŵ.͟ ;PI.ϭϯͿ 
 
͞Yeah, it ǁoƌks, I ŵeaŶ, Ǉou kŶoǁ, ǁe͛ƌe pƌofessioŶals, Ǉou kŶoǁ, I ǁoƌk foƌ the 
Commissioner, the Commissioner has an agenda of what she needs to achieve 
during the year of what her responsibilities are, what she has to deliver on, so I will 
ǁoƌk to that ageŶda. But it ǁoƌks ďeĐause she͛s aŶ IŶdepeŶdeŶt. I͛ŵ Ŷot suƌe hoǁ it 
would ǁoƌk if she ǁasŶ͛t.͟ (PI.28). 
 
Neutral: 
͞It seeŵs to ǁoƌk iŶ soŵe foƌĐes. It's uŶlikelǇ to happeŶ heƌe as [the PCC] is keeŶ to 
keep his office separate from the police force. I think it needs to stay separate 
otherwise how can the PCC hold policing to accouŶt aŶd eŶsuƌe tƌaŶspaƌeŶĐǇ?͟ ;PI.ϮͿ 
 
͞I thiŶk it͛s a good idea to shaƌe ƌesouƌĐes. I'ŵ Ƌuite happǇ foƌ it to ďe a kiŶd of 
pƌofessioŶal adǀisoƌǇ ƌole that I ĐaŶ giǀe to the PCC's offiĐe…  As loŶg as it's Ŷot a 
ĐoŵŵaŶded ĐoŶtƌol sĐeŶaƌio.͟ ;PI.ϭϭͿ 
 
͞A lot of them will see it as more of a – theǇ doŶ͛t uŶdeƌstaŶd, theǇ'ƌe ĐoŵiŶg fƌoŵ 
outside the sector and think this is like a political press office, it could be around spin, 
perception...  [the PCC here] presumed that the chief constable must have like a 
private office managing their profile and managing their perception.  And when they 
came into being he said okay, we accept we can't have all corporate communications 
functions but can we have the part of it that delivers and drives the chief officer's 
personal profiles, well, we don't have a function that does that.  But they presume 
that the police have that kind of function from the backgrounds that they've worked 
iŶ ďefoƌe.͟ 
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Against: 
1) Operational Communications: 
͞Otheƌ plaĐes, soŵe poliĐe aŶd Đƌiŵe Đoŵŵissioners were very keen to take their 
corporate communication department because it was about publicity...But not here, 
ďeĐause I thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe ĐoŶsideƌed to ďe ǀeƌǇ ŵuĐh paƌt of opeƌatioŶal poliĐiŶg.͟ ;PI.ϯͿ 
 
͞Theƌe's a ǀeƌǇ stƌoŶg liŶe ďetǁeeŶ PCC's offiĐe aŶd us. We aƌe opeƌatioŶal… "AŶd 
our chief was very adamant that, actually, there needs to be an operational function 
aŶd PCC's politiĐal fuŶĐtioŶ aŶd it ǁould ďe uŶfaiƌ to ask soŵeďodǇ to do that.͟ ;PI.ϴͿ 
 
͞The PCC should haǀe Ŷo ĐoŶtƌol oǀeƌ opeƌatioŶal policing but when they take over 
the Đoŵŵs teaŵ it ǀeeƌs daŶgeƌouslǇ iŶto this teƌƌitoƌǇ͟.  ;PI.ϮϲͿ 
 
͞[It] took ŵaǇďe aďout siǆ ŵoŶths to a Ǉeaƌ to ƌeallǇ ƌealise, ƌeallǇ kŶoǁ ǁhat 
messages were coming out from the PCC and it is completely different to what ǁe͛ƌe 
putting out.  So basically their messages are kind of promoting what the PCC is doing 
aďout the ŵeetiŶgs, ǁhat the PCC is doiŶg aďout the fuŶdiŶg that he͛s giǀiŶg out… 
ǁheƌeas ǁe͛ƌe ǀeƌǇ ŵuĐh opeƌatioŶal. But at the saŵe tiŵe he͛s got soŵe keǇ taƌgets 
iŶ his plaŶ suĐh as doŵestiĐ ǀioleŶĐe oƌ Đhild seǆual eǆploitatioŶ, so if ǁe͛ƌe eǀeƌ 
doiŶg a ĐaŵpaigŶ aďout that he͛ll ǁaŶt to ĐoŵŵeŶt iŶ it͟. ;PI.ϭϵaͿ 
 
2) Openness, Transparency and Politicisation: 
͞MǇ ǀieǁ is it Ŷeeds to [ďe sepaƌate] ďeĐause the PCCs were always to hold the chief 
constable on the force to account. So at times there may be issues where the PCC 
needs to be saying something negative about the police. So how can the police 
comms team be in that position and defend itself, or whatever, and the PCC is about 
stƌategiĐ diƌeĐtioŶ of the oƌgaŶisatioŶ. We'ƌe aďout the opeƌatioŶal deliǀeƌǇ.͟ ;PI.ϭϮͿ 
 
͞poliĐe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs ďeloŶgs ǁith the poliĐe seƌǀiĐe. We haǀe to ƌeŵaiŶ a-
political and that could be a challenge if communications is controlled ďǇ the PCC… 
ǁhiĐh is a politiĐal positioŶ͟. ;Pi.ϭϰͿ 
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͞ǁe ideŶtified ǀeƌǇ eaƌlǇ oŶ that ǁe felt that ǁe Ŷeeded that opeŶŶess aŶd 
transparency and separation to have that accountability, so the communications for 
both PCC's are delivered by separate comms pƌofessioŶals.͟ ;PI.ϭϳͿ 
͞Yeah, it just ǁouldŶ͛t ǁoƌk… theǇ Ŷeed to ďe sepaƌate ƌeallǇ ďeĐause theǇ hold us to 
aĐĐouŶt͟. ;PI.ϭϵAͿ 
 
͞Huge, huge ĐoŶfliĐt of iŶteƌest.  EǀeƌǇ foƌĐe ǁeŶt thƌough the saŵe pƌoĐess ǁith 
their PCCs and it was something that the Home Secretary wanted us to do when the 
PCCs were up to speed.  So there was a stage one and a stage two transfer process, 
stage one was no different to the way that it worked under the police authority, i.e. 
the police authority were the budget holders, at some stage all of those resources 
that belonged to the police authority were just transferred over to the control of the 
chief constables and it was an automatic thing, it was one of these great, you know, 
we put the clocks back and forward things that doesn͛t ƌeallǇ seƌǀe a puƌpose, ďut it 
happeŶed… The adǀeŶt of the PCC saǁ the stage tǁo tƌaŶsfeƌ side of it, ǁhiĐh ǁas foƌ 
all of the enabling services, for all of the civilian roles started off under the control of 
the PCC and he then reviewed them all to look at what he wanted to keep and what 
went back to the control of the chief constables.  Communications was a huge 
ďugďeaƌ, ďeĐause it didŶ͛t take a geŶius to figuƌe out that theǇ ǁaŶted a ĐeƌtaiŶ 
amount of control of what went out, so they could be seen to be delivering on their 
manifestos and they could be seen to be meeting the needs of the public. We argued 
right from the word go that there would be a huge, huge impact on the level of trust 
between the police and the press, the PCC and the press.  There would be this 
ŵassiǀe ĐoŶfliĐt of iŶteƌest, ďeĐause it ǁasŶ͛t ďǇ aŶǇ ŵeaŶs uŶthiŶkaďle to ďe iŶ a 
situatioŶ ǁheƌe the PCC is ĐalliŶg the Chief to aĐĐouŶt, ďut ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg ďoth sets of 
Đoŵŵs foƌ it. “o ǁe͛ƌe defeŶdiŶg the Chief, ďut ǁe͛ƌe also doiŶg the PCC stuff and as 
if by magic Lincs Police then went through that process where, you know, the PCC 
fired the Acting Chief Constable at the time and it just acted as the demonstration 
that we needed.  So how would you deal with that if you were one comms office? 
BeĐause ethiĐallǇ it͛s all ǁƌoŶg aŶd theŶ ǁe aƌgued aďout the politiĐal side of thiŶgs, 
ǁe kŶoǁ Ǉou͛ƌe Ŷot a politiĐal aŶiŵal, ďut haǀe Ǉou Ŷot got Đlose liŶks ǁith the 
Conservative Party?  So there are all of these different things that were taken into 
account, but fortunately it was all built on quite a good initial working relationship 
aŶd a faiƌlǇ fiƌŵ platfoƌŵ ǁith the PCC, so ǁe staǇed.͟ ;PI.ϮϮͿ.  
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͞I said I ĐouldŶ͛t do it. If theǇ did that heƌe I ǁouldŶ͛t ďe heƌe to do that dual ƌole.  I 
know lots of people that do, do a head of comms for both pcc and the force and I 
haǀe said heƌe Ƌuite opeŶlǇ I ǁould Ŷot ďe heƌe to do it, I ĐouldŶ͛t do it ďeĐause foƌ 
me I always see it as like doing PR for an energy company and for the energy 
ƌegulatoƌ, Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t provide that level of advice to both at the same time so no, 
people do the joď, soŵe do the joď pƌettǇ ǁell I͛ŵ Ŷot ĐoŶǀiŶĐed that ǁheŶ thiŶgs 
got haƌd that theǇ Đould still do that aŶd I thiŶk as ǁe head to the eleĐtioŶ it͛s goiŶg 
to get increasingly diffiĐult… it͛s sad ƌeallǇ aŶd dooŵed foƌ ŵe to Đollapse at soŵe 
poiŶt ďeĐause Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t opeƌate like that…͟ ;PI.ϮϯͿ 
 
3.2.12  Public Confidence 
1) Is Confidence Still Important? 
͞I doŶ͛t thiŶk it is that siŵple as that ďut I do thiŶk it͛s a ŵassiǀe faĐtoƌ ďeĐause 
ǁe͛ǀe liǀed it.  IŶ aƌeas ǁheƌe ǁe͛ǀe had pƌoďleŵs ďeĐause people doŶ͛t feel as 
though theǇ͛ƌe goiŶg to get listeŶed to ŶoďodǇ tells us aŶǇthiŶg ďeĐause theǇ haǀe Ŷo 
confidence that they will be protected, that we will be able to deal with it, that we 
are taking the issue seriously so you can see how that impacts. There are other 
faĐtoƌs affeĐtiŶg puďliĐ ĐoŶfideŶĐe, aďsolutelǇ the stuff that ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg heƌe iŶ 
terms of communication is important but there will be other factors that impact on 
peoples͛ Đonfidence.  However, if you know the local officer or you know the area 
ǁheƌe Ǉou ǁoƌk oƌ Ǉou liǀe aŶd Ǉou kŶoǁ hoǁ to get hold of theŵ aŶd Ǉou͛ƌe 
confident that you needed them, you would get a response or they would help you, 
or whatever that might be then you are going to have more confidence because if 
Ǉouƌ fƌieŶds Ŷeeded the poliĐe aŶd the ƌespoŶse has ďeeŶ good theŶ Ǉou͛ll pƌoďaďlǇ 
ďe ŵoƌe ĐoŶfideŶt ďeĐause theǇ͛ǀe giǀeŶ Ǉou the good eǆpeƌieŶĐe. IŶ a siŵilaƌ ǁaǇ if 
we give a bad service then everybody knows it was a bad service and with social 
ŵedia Ŷoǁ eǀeƌǇďodǇ kŶoǁs it͛s a ďad seƌǀiĐe.͟  
 
ϮͿ Is CoŶfideŶĐe Still Measured iŶ the IŶterǀieǁee͛s ForĐe? 
 ͞It͛s a ƌeallǇ diffiĐult oŶe to ŵeasuƌe aŶd ǁe pƌoďaďlǇ doŶ͛t do it as ǁell as ǁe 
Đould.͟ ;PI.ϲͿ 
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͞I thiŶk it͛s ƌeallǇ haƌd ďeĐause it tells Ǉou ǁhat it tells Ǉou. I kŶoǁ that souŶds stupid, 
ďut it tells Ǉou if this gƌoup of people, ǁho Ǉou͛ǀe appƌoaĐhed thiŶk this. I thiŶk ǁe 
pƌoďaďlǇ Ŷeed to get a ďit ŵoƌe sophistiĐated iŶ teƌŵs of hoǁ ǁe do it. But I͛ŵ not 
Ƌuite suƌe ǁhat that sophistiĐated ǁaǇ of doiŶg it is Ǉet.͟ ;PI.ϰͿ 
 
͞I thiŶk histoƌiĐallǇ, theƌe'd ďeeŶ Ƌuite a sigŶifiĐaŶt liŶk ďeiŶg ŵade iŶteƌŶallǇ, heƌe 
anyway, with how informed people felt affected in their confidence score. So, those 
of you [who say] that we should be doing more newsletters etcetera because when 
people feel more informed, they feel more confident - I challenge some of the 
methodology as to how they are asking that. So that's also changed slightly for this 
year. So we are waiting on Q1 outputs at the moment so it'd be quite interesting to 
see whether we are learning anything different from the way were are now asking it 
ďeĐause I thiŶk the ƋuestioŶs ǁeƌeŶ͛t leadiŶg ďut the stƌuĐtuƌe of theŵ ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ 
would make certain things jump into ahead of others. So, I wanted to try and 
neutralize some of that with things - because the force has been very wedded to 
Ŷeǁsletteƌs, [ďut] I kŶoǁ that Ŷeǁsletteƌs doŶ͛t get distƌiďuted ǁheŶ ǁe seŶd theŵ 
out to statioŶs.͟ ;PI.ϵͿ 
 
͞That is a diffiĐult oŶe isŶ͛t it ďeĐause Ǉou kŶoǁ ǁheŶ Ǉou look at suƌǀeǇs aŶd thiŶgs 
how you phrase the question is so important to the answers you get and actually 
phƌasiŶg the ƋuestioŶ iŶ a ǁaǇ that doesŶ͛t pƌoŵpt people to a positiǀe oƌ Ŷegatiǀe 
response is actually a scieŶĐe.͟ ;PI.ϭϱͿ 
 
͞But ǁe'ǀe Ŷeǀeƌ ƌeallǇ laŶded oƌ uŶdeƌstood ǁhat tƌulǇ ǁoƌks iŶ ĐoŶfideŶĐe… ǁhat 
is going to have the biggest bang for buck on confidence. Not surprisingly, it's hugely 
complicated because confidence is a very remote tool.  Yeah, a very, very remote 
tool, so what does it mean?... With confidence, what we found was that the four 
ƋuestioŶs just huŶg iŶ isolatioŶ aŶd theǇ ǁeƌeŶ't paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ useful͟. ;PI.ϮϬAͿ 
 
͞You kŶoǁ, ǁhat is ĐoŶfideŶĐe? CoŶfideŶĐe that aŶ offiĐeƌ͛s goiŶg to tuƌŶ up?  
ConfideŶĐe that ǁheŶ Ǉou ƌiŶg Ǉou͛ƌe goiŶg to get Ǉouƌ ƋueƌǇ aŶsǁeƌed? If ǁe doŶ͛t 
kŶoǁ, theŶ ǁhat aƌe ǁe ŵeasuƌiŶg?͟ ;PI.ϮϴͿ.  
 
͞We ŵeasuƌe it ďeĐause it's oŶe of the ŵeasuƌes that ǁe'ƌe ŵeasuƌed agaiŶst ďǇ the 
home office. But at the moment, I chair the engagement board, which is sort of force-
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wide overarching look at how we engage and why we engage and who we engage 
with and where issues are that we need to address.  
 
And one of the measures initially for that was confidence and satisfaction. And I've, in 
the last thƌee ŵoŶths, ďeeŶ lookiŶg at that, saǇiŶg aĐtuallǇ, is that… Theƌe ǁas a ďig 
piece of work done by Cambridge University that was released this month around 
aĐtuallǇ does eŶgageŵeŶt affeĐt ĐoŶfideŶĐe oƌ is it just… I liteƌallǇ staƌted ƌeadiŶg it 
yesterday and I was like, well, this contradicts everything that we've put in place... 
But basically, they conclude that there is no correlation between engagement and 
ĐoŶfideŶĐe, ǁhiĐh kiŶd of ďloǁs ouƌ ŵeasuƌes of eŶgageŵeŶt ƌight out the ǁateƌ.͟ 
(PI.8)  
 
͞Satisfaction is much easier to measure and of more use in a practical sense - we can 
do soŵethiŶg to iŵpƌoǀe satisfaĐtioŶ; ĐoŶfideŶĐe oŶ the otheƌ haŶd…͟ ;PI.ϳͿ  
 
͞it͛s like Đustoŵeƌ seƌǀiĐe if Ǉou ǁaŶt people to feel satisfied ǁith Ǉouƌ seƌǀiĐe aŶd 
the poliĐe doŶ͛t see the puďliĐ as Đustoŵeƌs the ǁaǇ theǇ aƌe iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ ďegiŶŶiŶg 
to do so you know if you speak to people nicely if you keep them informed I mean 
there is obvious things that wind us all up but one would be lack of information if 
theƌe͛s a pƌoďleŵ like ǁheŶ the tƌaiŶ͛s if theƌe is a delaǇ aŶd Ŷo oŶe eǆplaiŶs to Ǉou, 
Ǉou get ŵoƌe aŶd ŵoƌe ǁouŶd up doŶ͛t Ǉou.  Just like if theƌe is a tƌaffiĐ jaŵ aŶd Ŷo 
one tells you why you get more and more cross whereas if someone was keeping you 
informed and saying this is happening of course this is why it takes so long you would 
pƌoďaďlǇ haǀe a ĐoŵpletelǇ diffeƌeŶt ƌeaĐtioŶ to that.͟ ;PI.ϭϱͿ  
 
͞ViĐtiŵ satisfaĐtioŶ is ƌeallǇ iŵpoƌtaŶt - it's at the heart of the circle of trust; if victims 
have a good experience of the police their friends and families know about it and the 
ĐiƌĐle of tƌust eǆpaŶds oƌgaŶiĐallǇ.͟ ;PI.ϮϬAͿ 
 
ϯͿ Is There a ͚Crisis͛ iŶ CoŶfideŶĐe?  
Yes  
͞theƌe aƌe issues ŶatioŶallǇ at the ŵoŵeŶt as ǁe all kŶoǁ, puďliĐ ĐoŶfideŶĐe is Ŷot 
where it should ďe aŶd ǁheƌe it Ŷeeds to ďe, ďut it is pƌettǇ okaǇ heƌe.͟ ;PI.ϱͿ 
 
͞We'ƌe iŶ Đƌisis, Ǉeah.͟ ;PI.ϮϬAͿ 
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No 
 
 ͞Not iŶ ouƌ ĐouŶtǇ; ďut it doesŶ't ƌeallǇ ŵatter if there is or there isn't, when it 
comes down to it you're never going to be able to win everyone over, not really. 
Theƌe ǁill alǁaǇs ďe soŵeoŶe ǁho doesŶ͛t like the poliĐe-  it just can't be done - not 
when we have to juggle being a deterrent and approachable. Too many conflicting 
ŵessages͟. ;PI.ϳͿ 
 
͞Yeah, it has, I thiŶk ĐoŶfideŶĐe is ƌeallǇ iŶteƌesting because I think the, sort of, 
ŶatioŶal stoƌies that ǁe͛ǀe had ƌuŶŶiŶg ƌeĐeŶtlǇ so Ǉou kŶoǁ, Pleďgate aŶd all of the 
[pause] Hillsborough and all of the integrity issues, a lot of Chief Constables have 
goŶe, theƌe͛s ďeeŶ a lot of issues ƌeĐeŶtlǇ ďut if Ǉou look at the confidence stats and 
satisfaction stats, actually people are still pretty happy with their local police force, so 
I thiŶk people doŶ͛t thiŶk that this is theiƌ poliĐe͟. ;PI.ϭϬͿ  
 
͞I thiŶk Ǉeah, that͛s a ŵisĐoŶĐeptioŶ.  It͛s iŶteƌestiŶg though.  Overall the vast 
majority of people have got confidence in the police, but you get minor blips where 
something happens to shake that confidence and it becomes the overarching view of 
the poliĐe as opposed to that oŶe eǀeŶt.  “o it͛s ƌeallǇ iŶteƌestiŶg when you look at 
British Crime Survey, because that was really important from comms perspective.  
That the thing that impacts on the British Crime Survey, and I think Ipsos MORI have 
done some work on this, where it shows that, for example, when the Ipswich 
pƌostitute ŵuƌdeƌs happeŶed…“o ǁheŶ that happeŶs, oƌ a joď like that happeŶs aŶd 
it͛s all oǀeƌ the fƌoŶt of eǀeƌǇ ŶatioŶal Ŷeǁspapeƌ, ǁheŶ the Bƌitish Cƌiŵe “uƌǀeǇ 
happeŶs aŶd theǇ ƌiŶg people up ǁho liǀe ϮϬϬ ŵiles aǁaǇ fƌoŵ theƌe, ǁho doŶ͛t 
have any lifestyle link to prostitution or anything else and there is no connection 
ǁhatsoeǀeƌ, ǁith ǁhat͛s happeŶed iŶ IpsǁiĐh aŶd theiƌ life, theǇ ǁill Ƌuote a gƌeateƌ 
feaƌ of Đƌiŵe foƌ theŵselǀes ďeĐause that͛s oŶ the fƌoŶt of a ŶatioŶal Ŷeǁspapeƌ.  
Theƌe͛s a pieĐe of research about it that shows the thing that impacts most on 
people͛s feaƌ of Đƌiŵe is Ŷot ǁhat͛s happeŶiŶg iŶ theiƌ stƌeet todaǇ, it͛s ǁhat theǇ 
ƌead oŶ the fƌoŶt of the ŶatioŶal Ŷeǁspapeƌs.͟ ;PI.ϮϭͿ 
 
͞Yes and No. Politicians certainly want us to think there is a crisis and maybe there is 
on a national level - but on a local one, in this county confidence has remained 
steadǇ͟. ;PI.ϭͿ 
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͞No! No, it's Ŷot tƌue if Ǉou assuŵe that the puďliĐ attitude suƌǀeǇ that ǁe do eǀeƌǇ 
Ƌuaƌteƌ, is aĐĐuƌate… OŶe of ouƌ [seŶioƌ offiĐeƌs] last ǁeek…  ŵade this poiŶt that 
journalese and political circles as well have referred to crisis of confidence in policing, 
it's not born out by what the public say and the things that give the public confidence 
of policing are, are they tackling with the anti-social behaviour in my street? Are they 
there when I need them? Not, what are journalists saying about what happened 
thirty years ago or whatever or even what's happening now. We have a very 
important role in that. A lot of our marketing activities is devoted towards that, but 
some of our social media activity as well will be producing supportive messages as 
ǁell. “o that's aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt oďjeĐtiǀe foƌ us.͟ ;PI.ϮϳͿ 
 
͞“o I thiŶk theƌe is aŶ eleŵeŶt ǁho ǁe ǁill Ŷeǀeƌ satisfǇ, ďeĐause ǁe͛ll never be able 
to do it the way that they think it should be done, but I think for the most part what 
the austeƌitǇ ŵeasuƌes haǀe shoǁŶ is that aĐtuallǇ theƌe͛s a lot of suppoƌt foƌ UK 
policing out there and actually more people are worried about the service in a crisis, 
ďeĐause theǇ feel that theǇ͛ǀe got Ŷo ĐoŶfideŶĐe iŶ ouƌ aďilitǇ to do the joď.  I thiŶk 
the actual crisis in confidence comes when you look at the political side of things and 
people are saying well the police could do what they wanted if the government 
stopped taking money away from them or stopped lumbering these stupid things that 
theǇ͛ǀe got to keep doiŶg oƌ ƌeŵoǀe the ƌed tape. I thiŶk it͛s ƌeallǇ, ƌeallǇ aǁkǁaƌd, 
because, you know, when the government talk about crisis in policing or crisis in 
confidence in policing you agree certainly with forces that are constantly under the 
microscope for making mistakes like South Yorkshire.. , but then the other side of it is 
ǁe͛ƌe Ŷot talkiŶg aďout thiŶgs that happeŶed ǇesteƌdaǇ aŶd I thiŶk this is where 
police forces sometimes need to grow a pair a bit more and yes be hugely 
sympathetic to families of victims of Hillsborough or, you know, be extremely 
sympathetic to any victims of this, the Rotherham sex abuse scandal and, you know, 
your Yewtrees of this world and all of those sorts of investigations, whilst also 
reminding people of the fact that because of horrible things like this these things 
ƌeshaped poliĐiŶg as ǁe kŶoǁ it todaǇ, so ǁithout that ǁe ǁouldŶ͛t ďe heƌe aŶd this 
is ǁhat͛s ĐhaŶged.͟ (PI.22) 
 
͞I thiŶk ĐoŶfideŶĐe geŶeƌallǇ iŶ the poliĐe is still faiƌlǇ high. If Ǉou look at all the polls, 
etĐ. TheǇ͛ƌe still pƌettǇ good. I doŶ͛t thiŶk that theƌe͛s a geŶeƌal seŶse that theiƌ 
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confidence in the police is lacking and you tend to see, you know, there tends not to 
be a massive correlation between a big national story about how bad the police are, 
ǁith theŶ hoǁ Ǉouƌ loĐal people feel aďout Ǉou as a foƌĐe. I thiŶk it͛s a ǀeƌǇ loĐalised 
thiŶg... But I geŶuiŶelǇ doŶ͛t ďelieǀe theƌe is a ŵassiǀe issue with confidence in the 
police in this country. I think there are pockets that need improving and we still need 
to do ŵoƌe ǁoƌk ǁith ouƌ BME ĐoŵŵuŶities aĐƌoss the ďoaƌd aŶd that͛s aƌouŶd 
making sure that the BME communities are much better represented within the 
police service as officers and as police staff. And I know a lot of forces are doing work 
oŶ that, ďut it͛s diffiĐult.͟ ;PI.ϲͿ 
 
͞I doŶ't thiŶk tƌust has ďeeŶ lost iŶ the poliĐe as ŵuĐh as people thiŶk.͟ ;PI.ϭϮͿ 
 
͞hoǁ do Ǉou defiŶe... Đƌisis, ďeĐause people still will tell you and will tell the 
Commissioner on the doorstep that they want officers in their neighbourhood.  Well 
if they had a crisis in the confidence in those officers would they want them in their 
Ŷeighďouƌhood?͟ ;PI.ϮϴͿ 
 
͞I thiŶk that there are two levels of police identity - the local and the national, which 
is usually confused with the MPS͟ ;PI.ϭͿ 
 
͞Yeah, it has, I thiŶk ĐoŶfideŶĐe is ƌeallǇ iŶteƌestiŶg ďeĐause I thiŶk the, soƌt of, 
ŶatioŶal stoƌies that ǁe͛ǀe had ƌuŶŶiŶg ƌeĐeŶtlǇ so you know, Plebgate and all of the 
[pause] Hillsborough and all of the integrity issues, a lot of Chief Constables have 
goŶe, theƌe͛s ďeeŶ a lot of issues ƌeĐeŶtlǇ ďut if Ǉou look at the ĐoŶfideŶĐe stats aŶd 
satisfaction stats, actually people are still pretty happy with their local police force, so 
I thiŶk people doŶ͛t thiŶk that this is theiƌ poliĐe. I thiŶk it͛s ƌeallǇ iŶteƌestiŶg ďeĐause 
I thiŶk people do aŶd doŶ͛t thiŶk of it as a, kiŶd of, hoŵogeŶeous ďodǇ, I doŶ͛t thiŶk 
people understand how policing works, so, and understandably actually because, you 
know, if you look at it from the outside, it is slightly confusing as to why this Bernard 
Hogan-Howe person is always commenting on policing and yet appears to be nothing 
to do with Devon and Cornwall, for example, so I think they get a bit confused, I think 
people thiŶk theƌe aƌe theiƌ loĐal poliĐe… aŶd theŶ I thiŶk, theǇ thiŶk, theƌe is soŵe 
otheƌ soƌt of poliĐe that sits aďoǀe that aŶd I doŶ͛t thiŶk theǇ ƌeallǇ uŶdeƌstaŶd Ƌuite 
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how that works but they think there is something, there is, you know, some sort of 
ďodǇ aŶd that leads to ĐoŶfusioŶ ǁheŶ ǁe ask ƋuestioŶs aďout ĐoŶfideŶĐe͟ ;PI.ϭϬͿ 
 
͞WheŶ Ǉou look at suƌǀeǇs I thiŶk people teŶd to thiŶk faiƌlǇ ǁell of the poliĐe 
actually generally.  I think sometimes there is a difference between it is almost an 
abstract vision of the police sometimes in that people have they are not good at this 
because this this and this happened but then my local cops are really good.   So I think 
at ground level people really like them and we are getting back to that 
Neighbourhood policing thing up here they might not be detecting or preventing a lot 
of crime probably but they are keeping people on their side and that is probably 
worth a lot actually going forward I think. I think inwardly the police worry a bit too 
ŵuĐh aďout ǁhat the puďliĐ thiŶk ďut I doŶ͛t thiŶk it is as ďad as theǇ thiŶk it is. We 
doŶ͛t ǁaŶt eǀeƌǇďodǇ to like ďeĐause theƌe aƌe soŵe people that ǁe ǁaŶt to ďe 
scared of us really.  I think some of that has been lost over the years because 
eǀeƌǇďodǇ kŶoǁs theiƌ ƌights Ŷoǁ doŶ͛t theǇ - we will never win everyone over these 
daǇs ďeĐause Ŷot eǀeƌǇoŶe is ŶiĐe aƌe theǇ that͛s the thiŶg.͟ ;PI.ϭϴͿ 
 
ϰͿ Causes of the ͚Crisis iŶ CoŶfideŶĐe͛ 
Engagement: 
 ͞We'ǀe ŵoǀed fƌoŵ being – 2000 to 2010, the second highest confidence levels in 
the country out of 43 forces that were in that assessment to now 20.  All of that, yeah 
I've done the correlations, the drop in confidence levels totally correlates to the lack 
of investment in the gaps iŶ Đoƌp Đoŵs aŶd eŶgageŵeŶt aĐtiǀitǇ.͟ ;PI.ϭϭͿ 
 
͞theƌe's ƌeseaƌĐh that saǇs that people feel ŵoƌe eŶgaged ǁheŶ theǇ haǀe ŵoƌe 
information but on the other side of it, there's also an awful lot of research which 
shows that more information people have information about something, the less 
confident they feel. It's almost like are only more confident in ignorance. The 
'apathetiĐ safe' ǁe Đall theŵ.͟ ;PI.ϵͿ 
 
Public Expectation:  
 ͞OŶe of the pƌoďleŵs that the poliĐe faĐe is the gap ďetǁeeŶ ǁhat the ǀictim wants 
aŶd ǁhat the poliĐe ĐaŶ aĐtuallǇ do aďout the situatioŶ͟. ;PI.ϭϰͿ 
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͞Yeah, if Ǉou get a seƌǀiĐe that͛s ďetteƌ thaŶ the oŶe Ǉou eǆpeĐted to get theŶ Ǉouƌ 
ĐoŶfideŶĐe is goiŶg to go up ƌight?͟ ;PI.ϭϲͿ  
 
͞Ǉou kŶoǁ Ǉou ǁatĐh the IŶspeĐtoƌ Moƌse of this world or whatever the current one 
is. It is oďǀiouslǇ ŵiles aǁaǇ fƌoŵ the ƌealitǇ of eǀeƌǇdaǇ poliĐiŶg ďeĐause Ǉou͛ǀe got 
a copper who spends all of his time leisurely investigating one incident where as in 
reality they would probably be investigating two dozen incidents at once and going 
from here to there and doing all sorts of things. Traditionally have an antagonistic 
relationship with public in this area -they still exist those feelings and relationships I 
think in the former mining communities which are still pretty downtrodden in terms 
of there is not much economic growth.  If you look at some of the smaller towns and 
ǀillages that ǁeƌe soƌt of ĐeŶtƌed oŶ ŵiŶiŶg theǇ͛ǀe Ŷot ƌeallǇ Đoŵe aloŶg that ŵuĐh 
and I still think there is some old feelings theƌe so ǁe͛ǀe got that, ǁe͛ǀe got 
addressing the demographic makeup of large centres of BME populations. There is a 
Đouple of thiŶgs ƌeallǇ, ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ the Ŷostalgia thiŶg it is a ďit like let͛s go ďaĐk to the 
time when there was a copper on every street corneƌ ǁell I doŶ͛t thiŶk that eǀeƌ 
happened really that there was a policeman stood on every corner but that was what 
eǀeƌǇďodǇ alǁaǇs said.  I thiŶk it͛s ǁe͛ǀe Ŷot ŵaŶaged eǆpeĐtatioŶs that ǁell iŶ the 
past because everybody knows then they ring the doctors foƌ aŶ appoiŶtŵeŶt theǇ͛ƌe 
probably not going to get in that morning are they? - You know you are in for a long 
ǁait aŶd ǁheŶ Ǉou go soŵeǁheƌe likes the doĐtoƌ͛s Ǉou aƌe goiŶg to ďe sittiŶg 
around a long time.  People by and large tend to live with that really but that a police 
offiĐeƌ ǁoŶ͛t ďe theƌe iŵŵediatelǇ foƌ eǀeƌǇthiŶg still seeŵs to ǁiŶd people up a lot 
really - poliĐe aƌe ͚ǀiĐtiŵs of ouƌ oǁŶ suĐĐess͛͟ ;PI.ϭϴͿ 
  
Politicians: 
 ͞PolitiĐiaŶs like haǀiŶg soŵethiŶg theǇ ĐaŶ fight foƌ oƌ agaiŶst. CoŶfidence is just one 
of theiƌ loŶg staŶdiŶg faǀouƌites͟. ;PI.ϭϬͿ 
 
Dual Identity: 
͞We aƌe the oŶes that Đoŵe ƌuŶŶiŶg toǁaƌds Ǉou ǁheŶ Ǉou Ŷeed us, ďut ǁe'ƌe also 
the ones who will come and, if you're breaking the law, deal with you and issue you a 
fine for speeding. And that's the classic divisive issue, one of the biggest issues for 
concern in our communities is speeding and parking. And we ask the public, always 
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have done, well we have done for a long time, what are the issues affecting your 
neighbourhood right now. And most people say no issues. The second most common 
thing is parking and traffic issues. Crime hardly ever appears as being their issue that 
they want us to address. But nobody wants anybody to speed down their street, but 
you're happy to speed dowŶ soŵeďodǇ else's.͟ ;PI.ϭϮͿ 
 
Inherited:  
͞a lot of it [ǁheŶ it Đoŵes to ĐoŶfideŶĐe] iŶheƌited… , it is a ĐhalleŶge aŶd soŵe of it 
does go ďaĐk to thiŶgs like the ŵiŶeƌs͛ stƌikes aŶd ƌeal issues ǁheƌe people haǀe goŶe 
head to head with the police, you know, foƌ theiƌ ƌights at that stage.  “o Ǉou͛ǀe 
almost ended up with maybe two or three generations whose whole I suppose 
peƌĐeptioŶ of poliĐiŶg is this ǁell theǇ͛ƌe just a goǀeƌŶŵeŶt heaǀǇ-handed bunch of 
idiots that͛ll Đoŵe iŶ aŶd sǁeep up afteƌǁaƌds aŶd although it translates differently, 
you know, it does translate down, it is passed down into this generation. that child 
theŶ gƌoǁs up at least ǁith Ŷo tƌust oƌ ĐoŶfideŶĐe iŶ the poliĐiŶg, theǇ͛ƌe ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ 
not going to want to report anything to us or speak to us about any problems that 
theǇ ŵight haǀe, ďeĐause theǇ͛ǀe ďeeŶ fed this staple diet of if Ǉou doŶ͛t paĐk it iŶ 
I͛ŵ goiŶg to haǀe Ǉou aƌƌested ďǇ that Đoppeƌ oǀeƌ theƌe... The iŵpoƌted ǀieǁs, I 
suppose a lot of the negativity and a lot of bigoted feelings around certainly BME 
communities or Eastern European communities, the minority groups in general, a lot 
of those iŶheƌited thiŶgs aƌe hugelǇ uŶhelpful aŶd theƌe͛s Ŷo easǇ ǁaǇ aƌouŶd it, 
because again, you know, my parents have bred me on this for the past 20 odd years 
that͛s Ŷoǁ ǁhat I thiŶk, ŵǇ dad saǇs that this is ǁhat he thiŶks of that IŶdiaŶ 
shopkeepeƌ oǀeƌ theƌe aŶd that͛s ƌight.  “o, Ǉou kŶoǁ, hoǁ do Ǉou opeŶ people͛s 
minds up to be more tolerant of the fact that we are multinational companies, now 
ǁe aƌe ŵultiŶatioŶal ĐoŵŵuŶities, ǁe͛ƌe Ŷot iŶ a positioŶ like ǁe ǁeƌe ϱϬ oƌ ϲϬ Ǉeaƌs 
ago when minority groups were real minority groups because, you know, you look at 
soŵe of the BME ĐoŵŵuŶities theǇ͛ƌe thiƌd aŶd fouƌth geŶeƌatioŶ, theǇ͛ǀe got as 
much ƌight to ďe iŶ heƌe as aŶǇoŶe iŶ the ĐitǇ of Hull oƌ GƌiŵsďǇ oƌ “ĐuŶthoƌpe.͟ 
(PI.22) 
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4.2.13   Collaboration and Awareness 
2) Attitude towards Collaboration: 
 ͞“o ǁe'ƌe Ŷot agaiŶst ĐollaďoƌatioŶ ďǇ aŶǇ stƌetĐh of the iŵagiŶatioŶ, ďut it's got to 
be beneficial for us. We won't do it just because it says collaboration is a good thing 
to do.͟ 
 
͞We aƌe all lookiŶg at ǁhat ĐollaďoƌatioŶ ǁe ĐaŶ do ǁith ĐouŶtǇ paƌtŶeƌs. What ĐaŶ 
we do better with our county council colleagues in terms of campaigning. We work 
closely with [neighbouring forces] in particular, in terms of sharing ideas on 
campaigns. Because of the geography, it means that we can use similar materials and 
messaging without the audience seeing it being similar because that's important. 
Otherwise, you can have difficulties with a regional campaign that its seen as a, for 
example, West Midlands campaign and not a [your] campaign. It is because it then 
might not be relevant to them. They might not see it as relevant. If they live in [here] 
and they're seeing a West Midlands badge on it, they might not think it's relevant. If 
it's on Midlands Today, the regional television and it's not got [our badge] on it, do 
theǇ sǁitĐh off a little ďit? Is it ƌeleǀaŶt to theŵ?͟ 
 
͞Theƌe's a ƌegioŶal ďuƌglaƌǇ ĐaŵpaigŶ at the moment that we're collaborating with... 
there's four forces there, so somebody's doing the internal and we're doing the press 
ƌeleases aŶd theƌe's the posteƌs aŶd so oŶ, so that ǁe'ƌe ďeiŶg effiĐieŶt, I thiŶk.͟ 
(PI.25A) 
 
3) Problems with Collaboration: 
͞ĐoŶsideƌiŶg that ǁe͛ƌe Đoŵŵs pƌofessioŶals ǁe ĐaŶ ďe ŶotoƌiouslǇ pooƌ 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatoƌs ǁheŶ it Đoŵes to talkiŶg to aŶd shaƌiŶg ǁith otheƌ depaƌtŵeŶts͟. 
(PI.10) 
 
͞ďut Ǉeah soŵetiŵes eǀeŶ ŵoƌe hassle thaŶ it͛s ǁoƌth.  Otheƌ tiŵes it͛s fiŶe, otheƌ 
times, you kŶoǁ, theǇ͛ll seŶd the desigŶ thƌough aŶd ǁe ĐaŶ put [ouƌ] ďadge oŶ it 
aŶd stuff, ďut agaiŶ that stuff all seeŵed easieƌ iŶ the past as ǁell Đos Ŷoǁ eǀeƌǇoŶe͛s 
so ďusǇ it͛s like ǁe haǀeŶ͛t got the tiŵe, do Ǉou kŶoǁ ǁhat ǁe͛ƌe dealiŶg ǁith heƌe? 
“o Ǉea, it͛s just gettiŶg ŵoƌe aŶd ŵoƌe͟. ;PI.ϭϵBͿ 
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͞The AssoĐiatioŶ of Chief PoliĐe OffiĐeƌs atteŵpted last Ǉeaƌ iŶto this Ǉeaƌ to do 
ŶatioŶal ǁeeks of aĐtioŶ to foĐus foƌĐes͛ atteŶtioŶ oŶ ĐeƌtaiŶ suďjeĐts all at the saŵe 
time, it caused a few issues, you know, that it ǁasŶ͛t ǀeƌǇ ǁell thought out, so a lot of 
forces opted out after the first few, but it shows that, you know, policing in general is 
tƌǇiŶg to get its aĐt togetheƌ foƌ ǁaŶt of eǀeŶ ǁoƌse ǁaǇ of phƌasiŶg it͟. ;PI.ϮϮͿ  
 
 ͞I'ŵ pƌoud to saǇ ǁe aĐtuallǇ do tƌy to look at what other forces have done and learn 
fƌoŵ theiƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐes.͟ ;PI.ϭϳͿ 
 
͞I used to be really on board with web online activities back in the day when we used 
to meet up once a month at the Constabulary and have a chat and a lunch and all of 
that.  I fiŶd it a lot haƌdeƌ to keep iŶ touĐh ǁith ǁhat eǀeƌǇthiŶg͛s goiŶg oŶ aŶd foƌ 
Web Managers they have a Facebook group and Nick Keen from the College of 
Policing tries to send messages out to keep on board but sometimes I really struggle 
nowadays to kŶoǁ ǁhat͛ƌe the key messages that we should be doing.  For example 
theƌe͛s this PoliĐiŶg eCoŵŵeƌĐe iŶitiatiǀe so theǇ͛ƌe saǇiŶg aďout puttiŶg fiƌeaƌŵs 
licencing online and I know that there were going to be some Forces rolling this out 
ďut I still doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ǁho theŵ FoƌĐes aƌe, ǁhetheƌ it͛s happeŶed aŶd I do fiŶd it 
haƌd, aŶd I ŵake a Ŷote, Ŷoǁ that I͛ŵ saǇiŶg this I͛ŵ like, I ƌeallǇ Ŷeed to kŶoǁ that.  I 
know [our boss] goes to a Communications meeting that still takes place maybe once 
every three months oƌ soŵethiŶg like that aŶd she fiŶds that Ƌuite useful so theǇ͛ll 
talk aďout ǁhat theǇ͛ƌe usiŶg… so I thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe Ƌuite good that ǁaǇ, ďut I do fiŶd it a 
lot haƌdeƌ thaŶ ǁhat it used to ďe ďeĐause people doŶ͛t haǀe the tiŵe to shaƌe 
information as much, I used to know all the actual names of the Web Managers in 
different Forces ǁheƌeas Ŷoǁ I͛ǀe just lost it.͟ ;PI.ϭϵAͿ.  
 
͞I ŵeaŶ theƌe aƌe foƌuŵs ǁheƌe, Ǉou kŶoǁ, poliĐe ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatoƌs get togetheƌ aŶd 
that soƌt of thiŶg aŶd theƌe is aŶ aŶŶual ĐoŶfeƌeŶĐe isŶ͛t there that Lincolnshire are 
very keen they run, but I suppose, you know, I think the funding has focussed minds 
and, you know, we are perhaps 43 different forces setting off in different directions 
sometimes, where it would be better if there was some sharing of best practice 
peƌhaps a little ŵoƌe ǁidelǇ.͟ ;PI.ϮϴͿ 
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͞I thiŶk it's ŵoƌe as aŶd ǁheŶ ǁe haǀe tiŵe to look aĐƌoss foƌĐes, the Đollege of 
policing is useful, they have done a couple of social media events that we have 
attended and that's been really useful to get a review. Social media is easier because I 
follow a load of them and see what they are doing on my feeds and then there's the 
APCOM Conference once a year that we go to which brings – well, not everyone 
attends but a lot of forces come together at that point so sort of share learnings, best 
pƌaĐtiĐes etĐeteƌa.͟ ;PI.ϵͿ 
 
͞But the otheƌ foƌĐes I'ǀe spokeŶ to, theǇ ǁeƌe like 'Ŷo, ǁe doŶ't touĐh otheƌ people's 
campaigns, we do them all in-house, because if we had shared across the borders 
campaigns, people ŵight get ĐoŶfused aďout the ďƌaŶdiŶg'.͟ ;PI.ϭϳͿ 
 
͞“uƌelǇ it͛s aďout ǁhat Ǉou͛ƌe saǇiŶg to theŵ aŶd the ŵessage.  I doŶ͛t thiŶk 
anybody, you know, goes back to what I was saying before about whether you put a 
uniform or a plain clothes officer [pause] I doŶ͛t thiŶk theǇ ƌeŵeŵďeƌ theiƌ Ŷaŵe oƌ 
ǁheƌe theǇ͛ƌe fƌoŵ, theǇ just ƌeŵeŵďeƌ seeiŶg a poliĐe offiĐeƌ… BeĐause I doŶ͛t 
think actually the public care that much. What they care about is when they call the 
police they get an answer and if they need somebody there they get somebody there. 
And maybe our efforts should be, you know, better just on how we communicate 
ǁith the puďliĐ͟. ;PI.ϮϴͿ 
 
͞is the iŶfoƌŵatioŶ that the puďliĐ ǁaŶt is that so ǀeƌǇ diffeƌeŶt fƌoŵ eaĐh aƌea?  I͛ŵ 
not sure it is and I would feel personally, again this is a personal view, that I could go 
and work in Suffolk, I could go and work in Hampshire and I could go and work in 
North Yorkshire and the way I did my job, the basics of the way I did my job would be 
the saŵe, theƌe͛ll ďe nuances for each area, that would largely reflect how you were 
poliĐiŶg eaĐh aƌea, ďut that͛s Ŷot aŶ esseŶtial paƌt of the joď, the esseŶtials I thiŶk aƌe 
the saŵe ŶatioŶǁide.͟ ;PI.ϮϴͿ 
 
͞I peƌsoŶallǇ alǁaǇs ǁoŶdeƌed ǁhǇ the poliĐe seƌǀiĐe doesŶ͛t just doesŶ͛t haǀe a 
ĐeŶtƌal uŶit doiŶg ŶatioŶal ĐaŵpaigŶs ďeĐause Ǉou͛ll fiŶd doŵestiĐ aďuse is Ƌuite high 
on the police agenda and everyone is doing individual campaigns and replicating it 
why does everybody not just make a contribution to the central unit which produces 
a national poster with the messages that the police services want to get out and that 
ǁhǇ Ǉou͛ǀe got ĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ haǀeŶ͛t Ǉou.  “o Ǉou͛ƌe ŵoƌe likelǇ to get the ŵessage 
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aĐƌoss.  That has alǁaǇs puzzled ŵe… “oŵe foƌĐes aƌe ǁoƌƌied aďout BƌaŶd ďeĐause 
the poliĐe seƌǀiĐe ƌeŵaiŶs Ƌuite paƌoĐhial isŶ͛t it, iŶ that iŶ geŶeƌal it has Ŷeǀeƌ had a 
paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ stƌategiĐ oǀeƌǀieǁ it hasŶ͛t looked iŶ the ǁhole ǁhat ŵessages Ǉou Ŷeed 
to get out to the public to reduce crime and they tend to be quite insular in saying 
this is The City of London Police or this is The Metropolitan Police and actually people 
doŶ͛t ƌeallǇ Đaƌe do theǇ.  TheǇ aƌe ŵoƌe iŶteƌested iŶ the ŵessagiŶg geŶeƌallǇ... I 
would be very surprised if people could pick out the individual logos for their county 
fƌoŵ the ϰϯ ǁoŶdeƌiŶg aƌouŶd the UK at the ŵoŵeŶt͟. ;PI.ϭϱͿ  
 
͞ǁe ǁeŶt out to the ƌegioŶ aŶd said, 'Look, Ǉou aƌe pƌoďaďlǇ doiŶg Ǉouƌ oǁŶ thiŶg, 
this is what we are doing, here's our materials, if you want any of it, you know, grab 
away. Let us know what you want and we'll send it over.' There was [only one force] 
who did. So, yeah, I think culturally we have got a way to go but I think some – I know 
theƌe's otheƌ foƌĐes that aƌe doiŶg ŵoƌe ĐollaďoƌatioŶ.͟ ;PI.ϵͿ  
 
͞AŶd aĐtuallǇ ǁith the Ŷeǆt stage that we're getting into would be, campaign sharing.  
So if we're both dealing with how we use the classics, we're both doing a Halloween 
poster, I'll bet there's 43 versions of the same Halloween poster being used across 
multiple forces, why the heck can't we be doing one version and sharing it?  That's 
not a contentious issue for, there's not a localisation issue there for me that's going 
to be the same problem with every single force area.  And it, and I was on about the 
same thing in [my last force] when I was trying to get them to collaborate more.  A lot 
of things where the causation practice, the risk factors and the outcomes are 
ideŶtiĐal… pƌoďaďlǇ the ŵajoƌitǇ of Đƌiŵe issues aƌe geŶeƌiĐ... Pƌoďleŵ ǁith this ǁas 
highlighted at a recent meeting betǁeeŶ ϱ foƌĐes oǀeƌ ĐaleŶdaƌ shaƌiŶg… PoteŶtiallǇ 
over time it would have led to staff reductions as well as you don't need five people 
all designing a Halloween poster or five people all doing a slightly different version of 
a drink-drive campaign.  That's is efficient coms for me, cutting those roles which is 
unpalatable when it's people losing jobs but, we have to be thinking in that way and a 
lot of foƌĐes doŶ't.͟ ;PI.ϭϭͿ  
 
͞I thiŶk it ǁould ďe ƌeallǇ aŵaziŶg if that [ĐollaďoƌatioŶ ďǇ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ teaŵs] 
could happen, but my experience of the police has been that a lot of police forces, 
paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ Đoŵŵs teaŵ aƌe ƌeallǇ, ƌeallǇ like… iŶsulaƌ - This is my area.  I mean we 
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were doing a domestic abuse campaign, you know, we offer our materials out to 
other people aŶd it͛s like ǁell ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg ouƌ oǁŶ, thaŶks foƌ that, ďut ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg 
ouƌ oǁŶ, it͛s like ǁell haŶg oŶ a ŵiŶute I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ǁhat it͛s goiŶg to take foƌ theƌe 
to be more of a joined up approach even within a region where I meet with other 
heads of comms and even with forces like [this one] who collaborate with [another 
force] on more than half of their back office and some of their front office shared 
services like we collaborate on serious crime directorate, IT, HR, training, all those 
sorts of thiŶgs, eǀeŶ oŶ Đollaďoƌatiǀe foƌĐes it͛s ƌeallǇ diffiĐult to do joiŶt ĐaŵpaigŶs, 
Ǉeah... ďut geŶeƌallǇ ǁheŶ I joiŶed the poliĐe I fouŶd that theƌe ǁas Ƌuite a ͚this is 
ŵiŶe, ǁe do it this ǁaǇ͛; ǁe ƌeallǇ ǁaŶt to ǁoƌk ǁith otheƌ foƌĐes aŶd it͛s Ŷot ƌeallǇ 
helped at a national level either by the things like ACPO or the College of Policing and 
even like the Home Office for example, so the Home Office have their own kind of 
policing comms team who will kind of like just put a campaign on you and tell you 
that this is a ĐaŵpaigŶ that theǇ͛ƌe doiŶg aŶd theǇ haǀeŶ͛t eŶgaged foƌĐes aĐƌoss the 
country in that journey or look to work with you, they just sort of do things to you, so 
foƌĐes haǀe ďeĐoŵe ǀeƌǇ like this is ŵiŶe aŶd this is ǁhat I͛ŵ goiŶg to deliǀeƌ aŶd I 
think it would be so good if it could be much more joined up and it makes ever so 
much sense like  we lead on [one things here], but somebody else leads on burglary 
behaviour change and someone else leads on some other form of crime reduction or 
robbery or some sort of a sexual assault or rape or whatever it is and we learn from 
oŶe aŶotheƌ aŶd ǁe kiŶd of shaƌe that ďest pƌaĐtiĐe, ďut I thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe ƌeallǇ faƌ off 
that…͟. ;PI.ϭϲͿ  
 
͞Well the ǁaǇ that ǁe͛ǀe appƌoaĐhed it, ďeĐause ǁe haǀe at the ŵoŵeŶt a zeƌo 
marketing budget, but we ran our recent domestic abuse campaign with [our] County 
Council, I can tell you the cost, it cost about £27,000 and they paid the money and we 
put in the kind of equivalent staff time, so we made the films, we did all the work, did 
all the graphic work, all the images, all the digital images, all the digital adverts etc 
etc, so we sort of contributed in sort of staffing time the equivalent, but they put up 
the actual cash for the advertising on the buses and online and social media and that 
soƌt of thiŶg, so ǁe͛ǀe kiŶd of goŶe to like the ĐouŶĐil ƌeallǇ as ouƌ kiŶd of keǇ paƌtŶeƌ 
in terms of collaborative working instead of them having a domestic abuse campaign 
aŶd us haǀiŶg oŶe, ǁe͛ll do joiŶt aŶd ǁe͛ǀe got the plaŶs to do like a ƌogue kind of 
tƌadeƌ/fƌaud ĐaŵpaigŶ lateƌ this Ǉeaƌ ǁith theŵ͟. ;PI.ϭϲͿ  
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͞I thiŶk theƌe͛s soŵe Đoƌe eleŵeŶts ďetǁeeŶ all foƌĐes that aƌe ƌelatiǀelǇ siŵilaƌ 
ǁhetheƌ it͛s a sŵall foƌĐe oƌ a ďig foƌĐe, theƌe aƌe soŵe keǇ ďits that aƌe kiŶd of 
universal, so some of the media law stuff is universal, some of the areas and the 
boundaries and the way you work has to be similar, I think where the differences are 
are probably due to environmental factors, internally and externally. I think the 
difficulty is different forces have different priorities, I think there are things we should 
absolutely share and you could do it, you absolutely could do it, but you would then 
haǀe to saǇ that͛s Ǉouƌ teŵplate so effeĐtiǀelǇ soŵe PCCs ǁill get haĐked off ďeĐause 
theǇ͛ll go ͚ďut I haǀe this ǁhole aƌea that ǁe do this ǁith…..ǁell, Ŷo, Ǉou͛ƌe Ŷot 
haǀiŶg it͛….do Ǉou kŶoǁ ǁhat I ŵeaŶ….ǁe͛ƌe Ŷot iŶ the ǁoƌld ǁheƌe Ǉou aƌe aďle to 
do that…..ďut foƌ a lot of the ďasiĐ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ Ǉou Đould do it Ǉou Đould saǇ ǁell ǁe 
kŶoǁ Ǉou͛ƌe goŶŶa Ŷeed to know this, this, this, etc and we can do you a basic 
ǁeďsite ǁhiĐh has all that iŶ it… ďut I thiŶk ǁe aƌe fuƌtheƌ aǁaǇ fƌoŵ theƌe Ŷoǁ thaŶ 
ǁe haǀe eǀeƌ ďeeŶ ďeĐause I just doŶ͛t see hoǁ Ǉou͛ll get PCCs to agƌee, Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t 
even get them to agree to the national policing requirement in the way that you 
would want to and all that says is you know with some areas of policing quite rightly 
it͛s a ŶatioŶal ƌespoŶse aŶd possiďlǇ aŶ iŶteƌŶatioŶal ƌespoŶse ďut Ǉeah Ǉou haǀe to 
have that as a consideration.  I kŶoǁ iŶ soŵe aƌeas PCCs haǀe said I͛ŵ Ŷot ďotheƌed 
aďout that I͛ŵ ďotheƌed aďout this happeŶiŶg I doŶ͛t Đaƌe if theƌe͛s oƌgaŶised 
ĐƌiŵiŶals ĐoŵiŶg oǀeƌ fƌoŵ that as loŶg as theǇ͛ƌe Ŷot doiŶg aŶǇthiŶg heƌe aŶd theǇ 
ĐaŶ go oǀeƌ theƌe aŶd do it.͟ (PI.23).  
 
͞but in the long term, I think we can imagine a smaller comms department, a joined 
up oŶe pƌoďaďlǇ. AŶd I thiŶk that's happeŶed elseǁheƌe, hasŶ't it?͟ ;PI.ϮϱBͿ  
 
͞I thiŶk ŵeƌgiŶg is soŵethiŶg that is goiŶg to happeŶ ŵoƌe iŶ the futuƌe, ǁith foƌĐes 
and more in the regional work in terms of the amount of money that is going to be in 
the public sector in future.  I think there has got to be more of that merging of forces 
and I think we will see a lot more close working between forces and other blue light 
agencies aŶd loĐal authoƌities so a lot of seƌǀiĐes ďeiŶg pƌoǀided oŶ a shaƌed ďasis.͟ 
(PI.18) 
 
͞I ƌeallǇ doŶ͛t kŶoǁ.  I thiŶk afteƌ eǀeƌǇthiŶg ǁe͛ǀe ďeeŶ thƌough aŶd all the diffeƌeŶt 
Đuts aŶd ƌeshuffles aŶd ƌestƌuĐtuƌes, the faĐt that ǁe͛ƌe still heƌe I doŶ͛t thiŶk theƌe͛s 
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a Đase of ǁell, ǁe͛ll ǁipe Ǉou all out aŶd ǁe͛ƌe Ŷot goiŶg to haǀe a Coŵŵs Teaŵ aŶd 
ǁe͛ll haǀe PoliĐe OffiĐeƌs doiŶg it. Theƌe ŵight ďe if theƌe͛s talk of CoŶstaďulaƌies 
merging together which could be the case that they do it a bit differentlǇ.͟ ;PI.ϭϵAͿ 
 
͞Whoeǀeƌ Ǉou ŵeƌge us ǁith Ǉou get this thiŶg of ǁell ǁe haǀe ƌuƌal Đƌiŵe aŶd ǁe 
haǀe these issues oǀeƌ heƌe, ďut Ǉou Đoŵpaƌe that ǁith, I duŶŶo… ǁheƌe it͛s like ĐitǇ 
Đƌiŵe aŶd theƌe͛s oŶlǇ so ŵaŶǇ OffiĐeƌs, ǁell theǇ͛ƌe goiŶg to seŶd the Officers over 
there and well, out low level stuff that we used to be on top of is going to go up, so 
it͛s Ŷot goiŶg to help [this ĐouŶtǇ].  ThiŶgs like that ŵake Ǉou a ďit ĐoŶĐeƌŶed that if 
they do put it all together it like, well we need all the Officers over here. You know 
this is loǁeƌ leǀel stuff, ďut the loǁ leǀel stuff ďeĐoŵes high leǀel stuff aŶd theŶ Ǉou͛ll 
haǀe, oh this ǁas a ďad idea, ǁhat ǁeƌe ǁe thiŶkiŶg. Let͛s go ďaĐk to hoǁ it ǁas, ďut 
it͛s too late ďeĐause Ŷoǁ ǁe͛ƌe liǀiŶg iŶ Gothaŵ CitǇ. Gothaŵ CitǇ… At soŵe poiŶt 
the wheels will probably fall off if they keep trying to do this and then someone will 
deĐide ͚haŶg oŶ a seĐoŶd this isŶ͛t ǁoƌkiŶg ǀeƌǇ ǁell, let͛s stiĐk ďits ďaĐk oŶ agaiŶ aŶd 
it͛ll go a ďig full ĐiƌĐle.͟ ;PI.ϭϵBͿ 
 
͞Yeah, ǁell look at PoliĐe FoƌĐe “ĐotlaŶd, Ǉou kŶoǁ, ultiŵatelǇ as aŶ eǆaŵple it͛s just 
oŶe giaŶt poliĐe foƌĐe Ŷoǁ isŶ͛t it aŶd, Ǉou kŶoǁ, eǀeƌǇoŶe looked at that ǁith a hell 
of a lot of ĐǇŶiĐisŵ aŶd tƌepidatioŶ ǁheŶ it all Đaŵe togetheƌ, hoǁ ǁell͛s that aĐtuallǇ 
going to work?  The reality of it is we all work to one set of laws, we all work to one 
set of pƌaĐtiĐe diƌeĐtioŶs foƌ oďǀious ƌeasoŶs.  Yeah, ǁe͛ƌe goiŶg to haǀe to Đoŵe to a 
poiŶt if soŵethiŶg doesŶ͛t giǀe fiŶaŶĐiallǇ ǁheƌe the Ŷeǆt stage is lookiŶg at - all right 
so what can was just do together, now where can we either merge police forces, 
become one big giant police force, provide one set of governance or one set of 
ŵateƌial that͛ll ďe used, Ǉou kŶoǁ, Ǉou ĐaŶ guaƌaŶtee Ŷot oŶlǇ the ŵaƌketiŶg 
material or probably even down to the stock check forms or the penalty notices or 
the speeding fine tickets, you know, all of these sorts of things probably look different 
force to force, but the information on them will have to be exactly the same.  So, you 
know, it probablǇ isŶ͛t too faƌ aǁaǇ at all if thiŶgs staǇ the ǁaǇ that theǇ aƌe aŶd 
foƌĐes aƌe still haǀiŶg to ŵake soŵe dƌastiĐ Đuts.͟ ;PI.ϮϮͿ  
 
"It used to be a lot more coordinated. It's a lot more difficult now with PCCs involved 
because some PCCs wanted to lead on soŵe of the ĐaŵpaigŶ aƌeas.͟ ;PI.ϭϮͿ 
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͞WheŶ Ǉou'ƌe lookiŶg at ĐollaďoƌatioŶ, Ǉou haǀe to Đollaďoƌate alŵost fƌoŵ a siŵilaƌ 
baseline, particularly in policing and, when you look at funding arrangements in 
policing, the variability is massive... And then it's a case of, okay, so what baseline are 
you coming from, when have you gone with your savings because the savings are, 
say, over three years. What's the appetite for collaboration from your PCC? Who do 
you want to collaborate with? Have you got the same kind of operating standards, 
poliĐies aŶd pƌoĐeduƌes ďeĐause foƌĐes ǁoƌk diffeƌeŶtlǇ?͟ ;PI.ϮϬAͿ  
 
͞We͛ǀe alƌeadǇ disĐussed it͛d pƌoďaďlǇ ďe ǀeƌǇ ďad foƌ [this aƌea] ďeĐause of the ƌuƌal 
kiŶd of, the ǀeƌǇ diffeƌeŶt ǁaǇ ouƌ ĐouŶtǇ is.͟ ;PI.ϭϵBͿ 
 
͞okaǇ that ŵight ǁoƌk foƌ “usseǆ ďut it doesŶ͛t ǁoƌk heƌe. AŶd that͛s the gƌeat 
diffiĐultǇ.͟ ;PI.ϭϯͿ 
 
͞The pƌoďleŵ is, oďǀiouslǇ, Ǉou'ǀe got diffeƌeŶt tǇpes of ďuƌglaƌǇ [heƌe] to LoŶdoŶ. 
You'ǀe got diffeƌeŶt ƌesideŶts, Ǉou'ǀe got diffeƌeŶt audieŶĐes.͟ ;PI.ϮϰͿ 
 
͞AŶd theŶ the HMIC and the government are pushing it as a money saving 
opportunity, but often these things need funding to make them work and then who 
recognises the savings and who realises them. So we're not against collaboration by 
any stretch of the imagination, but it's got to be beneficial for us. We won't do it just 
ďeĐause it saǇs ĐollaďoƌatioŶ is a good thiŶg to do.͟ ;PI.ϮϬAͿ 
 
͞We͛ǀe doŶe the odd thiŶg ďut it hasŶ͛t ƌeallǇ ǁoƌked foƌ use, it eŶds up ďeiŶg ŵoƌe 
eǆpeŶsiǀe ďut ǁe͛ǀe doŶe thiŶgs, let͛s saǇ, ǁe did an advent calendar a couple of 
years ago and [another force] helped us with that but by the time it all added up it 
ǁasŶ͛t ƌeallǇ that ŵuĐh Đheapeƌ thaŶ goiŶg to a desigŶeƌ.͟ ;PI.ϭϵAͿ  
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APPENDIX 3.9:    Website Functionality  
Website Functionality 
The ability for the public to engage online with the police is becoming increasingly essential, 
aĐĐoƌdiŶg to the HMIC ;ϮϬϭϱͿ. IŶ theiƌ ƌepoƌt ͚PoliĐiŶg iŶ AusteƌitǇ͛, HMIC ;ϮϬϭϱ, pϭϬϵͿ judged 
that ͞the optioŶs aǀailaďle foƌ the puďliĐ to iŶteƌaĐt ǁith foƌĐes online and the level of 
iŵpoƌtaŶĐe the foƌĐes plaĐe oŶ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ diffeƌ, to a laƌge degƌee, ďetǁeeŶ foƌĐes͟.  
 
In 2009 the majority of police websites were repositories for news and appeals for information 
with contact information and advice on crime prevention. These sites tended to be quite 
cumbersome to use with a sometimes complicated navigation system. Most of the current 
police websites have increased user functions and applications and are fully compatible with 
phones and tablets. Five forces had specifically designed websites to be touchscreen friendly
34
 
opting for tabs in favour of the drop down menus police websites have previously favoured. 
Most police websites are between two and five years old (see appendix 3.2) with a small 
number who have updated this year or are in the process of updating. The oldest website still 
iŶ use is KeŶt CoŶstaďulaƌǇ͛s ǁhiĐh ǁas lauŶĐhed iŶ ϮϬϬϲ.  
 
As can be seen from Fig 3.22 current police websites range between a one-stop-shop for 
policing matters and those that offeƌ ͞little else foƌ the puďliĐ ďeǇoŶd a ďasiĐ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ 
ǁeďsite͟ ;HMIC, ϮϬϭϱ pϭϭϬͿ. AĐĐessiďilitǇ optioŶs ǁeƌe also iŶĐoŶsisteŶt aĐƌoss ǁeďsites ǁith 
some, like Avon and Somerset Police, offering comprehensive language and accessibility 
options for users with visual and other disabilities while other websites provided neither (see 
Appendix 3.10 for a comparison of police websites).  
 
Accessibility 
27 websites have a number of in built language options available for users of different 
nationalities. This ranges from one site with seven options to another that has over 50 
language options. A further 19 also have one or more options for those with visual, audio or 
learning disabilities.  
 
 
                                           
34
 Humberside, Wiltshire and Northamptonshire are examples of this new touch screen style 
website.  
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Appeals 
All force websites have a news/appeals for information section – although with a differing level 
of cover and frequency of updating. 20 forces have also included a picture gallery of people 
they are looking for in connection with various crimes.   
 
Do It Online 
Police forces are being encouraged to move services online as a cost saving measure (Ford, 
2015). 29 websites now have the ability for people to report crimes online (an increase of 13 
from the HMIC study in 2014) but only five allow victims to follow the progression of their 
cases. The majority of forces now offer the ability to make a complaint or pay a compliment 
through an online form, and an increasing number (27) are hosting community web chats to 
discuss local policing issues with residents.  
 
Miscellaneous  
A number of police forces are branching out and including non-standard features like 
depaƌtŵeŶt pages so that the puďliĐ ĐaŶ see theiƌ poliĐe foƌĐe͛s ŵaŶageŵeŶt teaŵ aŶd leaƌŶ 
about how the different backroom departments contribute to modern policing in their area.  
 
A growing number
35
 have also incorporated youth zone areas into their main website. In some 
cases, this zone included informative games designed to help children and teenagers learn 
about crime prevention and danger awareness both online and in the real world.  
 
13 websites are also proactiǀelǇ puďlishiŶg ͚suĐĐess͛ stoƌies to update the puďliĐ oŶ hoǁ 
crimes they might have been aware of have progressed to court and sentencing.  
 
six websites still offer a dedicated press area for journalists to go and find, or request, 
information. This has almost halved since 2012.  
 
Social Media  
All 39 websites have links to the corporate social media pages; although considerably fewer 
(22) also have links to the local neighbourhood social media accounts and only 19 forces have 
twitter updates actually on their webpages.  
 
                                           
35
 17 in 2015 up from 13 in 2012 
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Police Website Functions 
  Yes No 
Miscellaneous Corporate Communications 
/ Media Page 
13 26 
Weather 3 36 
Children and Teenagers 
Area 
17 22 
In Court / Success Stories 13 26 
Dedicated Press Area 6 33 
 
Do It Online 
 
Option to Report Crimes 29 
4 with the option 
to report hate 
crimes only 
6 
Option to Track Crimes 5 34 
Report Lost Property 10 29 
Web Chats 27 12 
Make an FOI Request 
through their website 
12 27 (Email or by 
letter only) 
Make a Complaint 34 5 
Make a Compliment 33  6 
 
Appeals Most Wanted / Photo 
Appeals 
20 19 
News / Appeals for 
Information Section 
39 0 
 
Accessibility Language Option 27 12 
Alternative Communication 
Methods (e.g. Browse 
Aloud, BSI).  
19 20 
 
Social Media Scrolling Social Media 
Updates 
19 20 
Links to Force Social Media 
Sites 
37 2 
 
 
